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ABSTRACT  
 
In early 2000, Australia experienced a medical insurance ‘crisis’ due to a surge in medical 
negligence litigation and many publicised instances of hefty compensation payouts. Sustained 
critique of the compensation system prompted state and federal governments to commission 
an enquiry, known as the ‘Ipp Report’. Australian states reacted to the crisis by enacting 
legislative amendments in their respective civil liability legislation which are referred to as 
the ‘Ipp Reforms’. In Victoria reforms were made to the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) (‘Wrongs 
Act’), limiting entitlement to compensation in negligence disputes, introducing permanent 
injury thresholds, imposing caps on damages and implementing a statutory test of causation. 
The impact of the Ipp Reforms was drastic. Prominent Australian academics questioned 
whether the rights of plaintiffs with meritorious negligence claims were unfairly curtailed or 
denied altogether. For the purposes of this research, these are considered as the first tranche 
of medical negligence reforms under review.  
 
A decade later, public debate about the compensation system led to the commissioning of a 
2014 report by the Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission. The Victorian 
government adopted many of the recommendations in the report through the 2015 
amendments to the Wrongs Act. This second tranche of legislative amendments attempted to 
achieve a better balance between the need for affordable insurance premiums and the need to 
compensate the meritorious claims of individuals who have suffered loss or damage. This 
research demonstrates that medical negligence legal practitioners and judges perceive that 
current medical negligence injury thresholds are too high, and that compensation caps 
continue to be set too low, so that the current systems fails to meet the financial needs of 
victims.  
 
The aim of this doctoral research was to gather reflections from senior tort lawyers, barristers 
and sitting judges about continuing challenges in both litigation and mediation of medical 
negligence and mental harm claims. Part One of this thesis explores the background of the 
initial insurance crisis, resultant legislative changes, the 2015 remedial amendments and the 
perceived effect of law reform on disputants’ rights. Part Two of this thesis explores how 
mediation operates in the shadow of the law, and particularly examines lawyers and parties’ 
emotional and non-legal needs in the mediation of medical negligence claims. The research 
seeks to establish the effects that the 2002-2003 law reforms have exerted on the litigation 
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and mediation of meritorious medical negligence claims from the perspective of practising 
medical negligence lawyers, and sitting judges with medical negligence experience. The 
research is grounded in interpretivist epistemology, and uses a doctrinal and qualitative 
methodological design. Research data was gathered through semi-structured interviews with 
24 legal practitioners comprising senior tort lawyers, barristers and Victorian judges with 
medical negligence experience. The researcher used grounded theory as the theoretical 
framework to analyse the data.  
 
Analysis of the data through the lens of corrective justice theory shows the research 
participants perceived that injury thresholds, caps on damages and the statutory principle of 
causation continue to present high hurdles in both progressing medical negligence and mental 
harm claims, and obtaining fair compensation. This finding supports the contention that the 
2015 amendments to the Wrongs Act are inadequate to remedy the adverse effects of the 
2002-2003 Ipp Reforms, and thus indicates that further reform is required to ensure the law 
achieves a more reasonable balance between the competing needs of claimants and insurers.  
 
The findings indicate that consideration of emotion is an important but often neglected stage 
of medical negligence mediation. There was general acknowledgement from research 
participants that they neglected to exploit the unique opportunity that mediation offers 
individuals to express emotion in a way that assists emotional closure. The research 
participants endorsed the value of mediation, perceiving their role as advising on the law and 
settlement options. Some participants identified their role as a ‘translator’ of the legal system 
during negotiation in mediation, attempting to promote understanding of realistic parameters 
of settlement. As repeat players, the research participants demonstrated a strong tendency to 
shield their clients from the legal system, with the resultant effect of controlling and 
dominating the mediation process. Practitioner participants discouraged their clients from 
speaking in mediation and largely acted as spokesperson, although some clients expressed 
their wish to speak. These insights and perceptions about the culture in this area of legal 
practice prompt the question whether, in the area of medical negligence, it is advisable for 
lawyers to allow their clients the prospect of greater engagement in the legal process to 
facilitate emotional closure from the experience.  
 
This research thesis breaks new ground as the first study in Victoria exploring the efficacy of 
the Victorian medical negligence compensation process, from the perspective of the legal 
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practitioner. This research significantly contributes to legal theory and also contributes to 
practice by making recommendations for law reform based on the perceptions gathered on 
contemporary challenges in the litigation and mediation of medical negligence and mental 
harm claims.   
4 
 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Australian patients who become victims of medical negligence, such as misdiagnosis or 
surgery error, often sustain devastating injuries and rely on the legal system to obtain 
financial compensation to assist in managing life after injury. The medical practitioners 
occasioning the medical error are indemnified through insurance companies who manage the 
claims and provide compensation if damages are awarded. By 2002, myriad factors were 
impacting the high cost and availability of medical indemnity insurance. Australia found 
itself in an insurance ‘crisis’ due to a legal compensation system perceived as ‘out of 
control’.1 Australia’s second largest insurance company, HIH Group, collapsed; Australia’s 
largest medical defence organisation, United Medical Protection, fell into liquidation;2 
substantial compensation payouts received highly publicised awards; and litigation surged 
due to the rise of ‘no-win, no-fee’ firms.3  
 
In response, all Australian state and federal governments commissioned a report into the law 
of negligence, headed by the Hon. David Ipp and titled Review of the Law of Negligence 
Report4 (‘Ipp Report’) which was released in September 2002. The Ipp Panel was charged 
with reformulating the common law to limit liability and limit the quantum of damages in 
personal injury cases.5 The Ipp Report led to the ‘Ipp Reforms’, a suite of amendments to 
each state’s civil liability legislation. The focus of this empirical research is the state of 
Victoria, where amendments were made to the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) (‘Wrongs Act’) 
severely restricting amounts of compensation paid to victims of medical negligence, resulting 
in a legal compensation system which was not meeting the financial needs of medical 
negligence victims. This raises a fundamental question: what is the fairest regulatory 
                                                 
1
 S. Stuart Clark and Christina Harris, ‘Tort Law Reform in Australia: Fundamental and Potentially Far-
Reaching Change’ (2005) 72(1) Defense Counsel Journal 16, 16-17. 
2
 Jonathan Burdon, ‘Medical Indemnity Insurance in Australia’ in Roy G. Beran (ed), Legal and Forensic 
Medicine (Springer-Verlag, 2013) 629.  
3
 Clark and Harris, above n 1, 16-17. See also S. Stuart Clark and Ross McInnes, ‘Unprecedented Reform: 
The New Tort Law’ (2004) 15(2) Insurance Law Journal 1; Loane Skene and Harold Luntz, ‘Effects of Tort 
Law Reform on Medical Liability’ (2005) 79(6) Australian Law Journal 345, 346; Peter Underwood, ‘Is Ms 
Donoghue’s Snail in Mortal Peril’ (2004) 12(1) Torts Law Journal 39, 39-42. 
4
 Panel of Eminent Persons to Review the Law of Negligence, Review of the Law of Negligence Report, 
Second Report, Canberra, October 2002 (‘Ipp Report’), xiii. In this thesis reference is made to the panel as 
the ‘Ipp Panel’ and to the report as the Ipp Report, as the chair of the panel was the Honourable David Ipp.  
5
 Ipp Report, above n 4, 26.  
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framework that can be implemented to allow victims to pursue their rights?  The balance 
between the needs of medical negligence victims and the cost of the compensation claims is a 
dilemma for the justice system, which requires exploration and ultimately, rectification.  
 
Australian law aims to provide avenues of relief in circumstances where members of society 
have had their legal rights infringed, allowing individuals to seek redress through the courts,6 
or alternative/appropriate dispute resolution (‘ADR’) options.7 In particular, the law of torts 
plays a key role in determining whether responsibility for an individual’s loss should be 
shifted to the tortsfeasor who has committed the civil wrong.8 The tort of negligence allows a 
person who has suffered a loss, as a consequence of the tortfeasor’s failure to take reasonable 
care, to sue for compensation. To prove negligence, a plaintiff must prove three factors: the 
defendant owed them a duty of care; the defendant breached their duty; and the breach caused 
the harm.9 Causation, the third criterion, can be a high hurdle to successful attainment of 
compensation, as a plaintiff may be unable to satisfy a clear causal link between breach of the 
duty of due care and the injury sustained.10 Of the three elements, this thesis will focus on the 
element of causation as it can be a real barrier that prevents plaintiffs from recovering 
compensation in meritorious claims.  
 
Medical negligence is a niche subset of the broader category of negligence,11 referring to 
negligence arising in the course of treatment by a doctor, nurse or other health care worker.12 
There are two types of harm in medical negligence: physical and psychological/psychiatric 
(termed ‘mental harm’). Both types of harm may arise in the course of medical treatment. A 
                                                 
6
 Andrew Clarke et al, Torts: A Practical Learning Approach (LexisNexis, 3
rd
 ed, 2014) 55.  
7
 Dispute resolution processes other than trial were initially collectively referred to as ‘alternative dispute 
resolution’. However, in recent times a preference has emerged for ‘appropriate dispute resolution’ or simply 
‘Dispute Resolution’ amongst commentators: see Michael King et al, Non-Adversarial Justice (Federation 
Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2014) 96 and Laurence Boulle and Rachael Field, Australian Dispute Resolution: Law and 
Practice (LexisNexis, 2017) 38-39.  
8
 Harold Luntz et al, Torts: Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis, 8
th
 ed, 2017) 10.  
9
 Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook Co, 10
th
 ed, 2011) 122.  
10
 For a comprehensive discussion on the principle of causation see Ian Freckelton and Danuta Mendelson 
(eds), Causation in Law and Medicine (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 2002).  
11
 For an overview of medical negligence see John Devereux, ‘Medical Negligence’ in Anne-Maree Farrell 
et al, Health Law: Frameworks and Context (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 138-148.  
12
 Thomas B Hugh and Sidney W A Dekker, ‘Hindsight Bias and Outcome Bias in the Social Construction 
of Medical Negligence: A Review’ (2009) 16(5) Journal of Law and Medicine 846, 846. For an overview of 
medical negligence litigation see Janine McIlwraith and Bill Madden, Health Care and the Law (Lawbook 
Co, 6
th
 ed, 2014) 189-270.  
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medical practitioner will be held liable, but only if the plaintiff can satisfy (in court) that a 
breach of a duty of care occurred and that the breach has caused damage.13  
 
Plaintiffs in medical negligence, or mental harm cases, often suffer serious loss and 
subsequent disabilities which can impact their lives permanently. In the seminal case of 
Rogers v Whitaker,14 a patient who was already blind in one eye lost sight in her other eye as 
a result of the doctor’s failure to warn of risks associated with the medical procedure. A 
medical practitioner can be held liable for failure to warn of material risks,15 for negligent 
treatment (such as surgical errors)16 or for a delayed diagnosis or misdiagnosis.17 Medical 
practitioners can also be held liable in specific situations such as unwanted pregnancy 
(considered a separate category of medical negligence termed ‘wrongful bir th’).18 Extant case 
law shows that no liability exists for ‘wrongful life’19 or for loss of a chance of a better 
outcome.20  
 
Claims for mental harm may also arise in the context of medical negligence, whether as a 
result of physical injury to the patient, or injury to a third party such as a child.21 The Wrongs 
Act draws a distinction between ‘pure mental harm’ where the plaintiff has sustained 
psychological or psychiatric harm without physical injury and ‘consequential mental  harm’ 
where the mental injury develops as a consequence of the physical injury.22 The Australian 
legal provisions depart from the British position where victims who have sustained mental 
harm are categorised as either a ‘primary victim’ or a ‘secondary victim’.23 In the United 
Kingdom (‘UK’) primary victims are individuals who have developed psychiatric conditions 
                                                 
13
 For a comprehensive explanation of negligence in healthcare see Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy 
Willmott, Health Law in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2
nd
 ed, 2014) 259-334.  
14
 (1992) 175 CLR 479.  
15
 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; Hookey v Paterno (2009) 22 VR 362. Special leave to the HCA 
was denied: see Hookey v Paterno [2009] HCA Trans 226 (4 September 2009).  
16
 Dixon v Foote & Calvary Health Care ACT Limited [2012] ACTSC 101 (27 June 2012).  
17
 McKay v McPherson [2010] VCC 585 (11 June 2010).  
18
 Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1. 
19
 Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52. ‘Wrongful life’ refers to legal action taken by a severely disabled 
child (or their parents) who sues a defendant (usually a medical practitioner) for failing to prevent the child’s 
birth.  
20
 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537. An action for loss of chance in medical negligence arises where a 
plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant’s negligence caused their injury, so instead they contend the 
defendant’s negligence deprived them of the chance of a better outcome.  
21
 McKenzie v Lichter [2005] VSC 61 (18 March 2005) where the father suffered nervous shock as a result 
of his wife giving birth to a stillborn child as a consequence of medical negligence. For a discussion see 
Peter Handford, ‘Psychiatric Injury Resulting From Medical Negligence’ (2002) 10(1) Tort Law Review 38.  
22
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 67.  
23
 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310, 407.  
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associated with physical bodily harm, whereas secondary victims have sustained pure mental 
harm as a result of witnessing the death or injury of another individual.24  
 
In Australia, the legislation does not distinguish between primary and secondary victims. In 
Victoria, a duty of care is not owed for pure mental harm ‘unless the defendant foresaw or 
ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the 
case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken.’25 Additional 
limits are imposed so that individuals are prevented from recovering damages for pure mental 
harm, unless the harm arose from a single shock, and the plaintiff either ‘witnessed, at the 
scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in danger’ or ‘the plaintiff is or was in a close 
relationship with the victim.’26 In the medical context, a claim for ‘pure mental harm’ can 
arise where a doctor’s negligent treatment to the patient causes a third party (such as a family 
member) to suffer psychiatric harm. For example, in Sorbello v South Western Sydney Local 
Health Network; Sultan v South Western Sydney Local Health Network the parents of a child, 
who was injured due to oxygen deprivation at birth, sued the hospital for compensation for 
psychiatric injury sustained by them as a result of the physical injuries caused to the child.27  
 
The Wrongs Act provisions also outline circumstances where damages may be sought for 
‘consequential mental harm’. Damages cannot be recovered unless, ‘the defendant foresaw or 
ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the 
case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken’.28  This section 
is worded with the same test outlined above, but applies to a different category of mental 
harm.  In assessing the circumstances of the case, a court can take into consideration the 
physical injury to the plaintiff out of which the mental harm arose.’29 In this thesis, the use of 
the term mental harm is intended to encapsulate both pure mental harm and consequential 
mental harm which occurred as a result of medical injury.30  
 
                                                 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 72. 
26
 Ibid s 73(2).  
27
 [2016] NSWSC 863 (24 June 2016).  
28
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 74(1).  
29
 Ibid s 74(2).  
30
 On some occasions participants’ responses also referred to mental harm claims which were not limited to 
the medical context, particularly to emphasise the challenges of pursuing those claims in negligence more 
broadly. 
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Once a plaintiff has established the three elements of negligence in legal proceedings, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that they have suffered an injury which satisfies specific statutory 
requirements to qualify for damages for economic and/or non-economic loss. The Wrongs 
and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) introduced provisions 
limiting damages for economic loss to three times average weekly earnings and a cap on non-
economic loss damages. Statutory thresholds were introduced in 2003 through the Wrongs 
and Limitations of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003 (Vic) and were designed to 
limit damages paid in personal injury claims. Prior to their introduction, no such thresholds 
existed under the common law.  
 
Economic loss relates to the plaintiff’s lost income and ability to work. The maximum 
amount for loss of earnings is capped at three times the average weekly earnings.31 Plaintiffs 
can also make a claim for non-economic loss which encompasses pain and suffering, loss of 
amenities of life and loss of enjoyment of life,32 but only where the individual has sustained a 
permanent and ‘significant injury’.33 To qualify as a ‘significant injury’, the injury must be 
assessed by an independent medical practitioner using the American Medical Association’s 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (5th edition) (‘AMA Guides’)34 at ‘more 
than 5 per cent’ impairment for physical injury, ‘equal to 5 per cent’ for spinal injuries, or 
‘equal to 10 per cent’ for psychological injuries.35 Psychiatric injuries are assessed pursuant 
to the Guide to the Evaluation of Psychiatric Impairment for Clinicians (GEPIC).36  
 
If a plaintiff can demonstrate that a breach of duty has caused a ‘permanent injury’ which 
meets the prescribed threshold, that plaintiff is entitled to compensation. Unlike other 
jurisdictions such as New Zealand, Australia operates a fault-based tort compensation 
system, meaning plaintiffs are required to pursue legal action in the courts and satisfy the 
elements of negligence to attain damages.37 Successful plaintiffs are compensated by 
                                                 
31
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28F. As at November 2017, the Average Weekly Earnings are set at $1,628.10. 
Multiplied by three, this equates to $4,884.30. 
32
 Ibid s 28B.  
33
 Ibid s 28LF.  
34
 Gunar B J Andersson and Lina Cocchiarella, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment  
(American Medical Association, Chicago, 5
th
 ed, 2004).  
35
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28LB defines the threshold level for significant injury assessment.  
36
 Michael WN Epstein, George Mendelson and Nigel HM Strauss, The Guide to the Evaluation of 
Psychiatric Impairment for Clinicians (2005).  
37
 In contrast, a no-fault compensation would require an injured person to show they have sustained a 
‘treatment injury’ and to apply to the Accident Compensation Corporation of New Zealand for financial 
compensation.  
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insurance companies, whose role is to indemnify medical practitioners. Medical indemnity is 
a framework to redress adverse healthcare outcomes arising from a breach of expected 
standards of care in medical treatment.38 Indemnification through insurance companies plays 
a critical role in medical negligence because once a claim is commenced, the insurer (or their 
legal representatives) manages the claim and finances compensation if damages are awarded. 
Australia’s fault-based tort system has been criticised by scholars as ‘slow, costly, inefficient, 
stressful and often inequitable and unpredictable’.39 Resolving disputes can be protracted and 
complex as litigation is known to be a key stressor for disputants,40 and inequities can arise 
where a claimant has sustained an injury, but is unable to satisfy the legal requirements for 
compensation.41  
 
1.1.1 THE FIRST TRANCHE OF REFORMS: THE 2002-2003 IPP REFORMS  
Based on the recommendations contained in the Ipp Report, each Australian state government 
implemented law reforms in their respective civil liability legislation affecting medical 
negligence and mental harm claims. The recommendations adopted by the Australian state 
governments varied, with some states introducing statutory amendments to existing 
legislation and others retaining common law principles.42 Each state selected areas for reform 
arising out of the Ipp Report recommendations, hence the reforms across Australia vary 
significantly and the resultant changes are not uniform for each state.43 The Ipp Reforms 
affect all personal injury claims arising out of negligence by imposing statutory provisions 
for principles which were previously governed by the common law.44 These reforms created 
additional barriers for claims with a lower level of impairment, and they adversely impacted 
                                                 
38
 Win-Li Toh, Linda Satchwell and Jonathan Cohen, ‘Medical Indemnity – Who’s Got the Perfect Cure?’ 
(Paper presented at Institute of Actuaries of Australia, 12
th
 Accident Compensation Seminar, 22-24 
November 2009, Melbourne) 4.  
39
 David Weisbrot and Kerry J Breen, ‘A No-Fault Compensation System for Medical Injury is Long 
Overdue’ (2012) 197(5) Medical Journal of Australia 296. 
40
 Michael King and Robert Guthrie, ‘Using Alternative Therapeutic Intervention Strategies to Reduce the 
Costs and Anti-Therapeutic Effects of Work Stress and Litigation’ (2007) 17(1) Journal of Judicial 
Administration 30.  
41
 Weisbrot and Breen, above n 39, 296.  
42
 For an overview of the civil liability regime in each Australian jurisdiction refer to Annexure 1 of this 
thesis.  
43
 A comprehensive explanation of the reforms implemented in the Australian states is outside of the scope 
of this thesis as the reforms varied significantly. For an overview see James J Spigelman, ‘Tort Law Reform: 
An Overview’ (2006) 14(1) Tort Law Review 5.  
44
 For example, the case of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 47-48 stood for the proposition 
that a foreseeable risk is not ‘far-fetched’ or ‘fanciful’. The equivalent test is now contained in s 48 of the 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic).  
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plaintiffs with severe injuries through the limited calculation of damages.45 A significant 
consequence of the reforms was to limit the liability of health professionals, by reducing the 
quantum of damages awarded by the courts.46  
 
Limitation of damages was achieved through the introduction of ‘permanent impairment 
thresholds’ that plaintiffs must satisfy via formal assessment by an independent medical 
practitioner. To recover damages for non-economic loss,47 a plaintiff must show they have a 
‘significant injury’ that meets the prescribed threshold. At the time of introduction in 2003, 
the Victorian thresholds were set at ‘more than 5 per cent’ for a physical injury (including 
spinal injuries) and ‘more than 10 per cent’ for a psychiatric injury.48 Even when a plaintiff 
could satisfy the threshold hurdle, their award of damages was limited through the 
introduction of a cap on damages for non-economic loss. The Victorian cap was initially set 
at $371,380 with that figure to be indexed annually.49  
 
A significant change from the Ipp Reforms in Victoria was the alteration of the negligence 
criteria for the standard of care and breach of duty. These reforms relate to the second 
element of negligence and involve an assessment of whether a medical practitioner has 
breached their duty of care. Unlike the element of duty of care which involves a question of 
law, assessment of breach of duty is a question of fact, so each case will be determined based 
on individual circumstances. In the medical context, a doctor can breach their duty of care 
through failure to examine or adequately treat the patient, failure to diagnose or failure to 
warn a patient of material risks associated with treatment.50  
 
At common law, Mason CJ developed the legal test for the standard of care which must be 
owed to a person, which centred on a reasonable person’s response to a foreseeable risk:   
 
A risk of injury which is quite unlikely to occur… may nevertheless be plainly 
foreseeable… when we speak of a risk of injury as being “foreseeable”… we are implicitly 
                                                 
45
 Belinda Bennett and Ian Freckelton, ‘Life after the Ipp Reforms: Medical Negligence Law’ in Ian 
Freckelton and Kerry Petersen (eds), Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law (Federation Press, 2006) 405.  
46
 Jennifer Yule, ‘Defences in Medical Negligence: To What Extent Has Tort Law Reform in Australia 
Limited the Liability of Health Professionals?’ (2011) 4(1&2) Journal of the Australasian Law Teachers 
Association 53, 63.  
47
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28B.  
48
 Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003  (Vic) s 28LB. 
49
 Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002  (Vic) s 28G.  
50
 Sonia Allan and Meredith Blake, The Patient and the Practitioner: Health Law and Ethics in Australia  
(LexisNexis, 2014) 200. 
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asserting that the risk is not one that is far-fetched or fanciful … A risk which is not far-
fetched or fanciful is real and therefore foreseeable.51 
 
Mason CJ’s judgment heavily influenced the legislative reforms relating to standard of care 
and breach of duty in negligence. Following the Ipp Reforms, the Wrongs Act was amended 
so that the plaintiff must establish three matters in determining breach:  
(1) the risk was foreseeable;  
(2) the risk was not insignificant; and  
(3) that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have taken 
precautions against the risk of harm.52  
 
Notably, the Wrongs Act departed from Mason CJ’s ‘far-fetched or fanciful’ requirement, and 
instead imposed a stricter test requiring risks be ‘not insignificant’, in response to the Ipp 
Panel’s concerns that the common law test was too easily satisfied.53 Once the reasonable 
foreseeability test is satisfied, the court is required to address the ‘calculus of negligence’. 
Four factors are used to assess whether a reasonable person ought to have taken precautions. 
These factors include: (1) probability of the risk materialising; (2) the likely seriousness of 
the harm; (3) the practicality or burden of taking precautions to avoid the harm; and (4) the 
social utility of the defendant’s conduct.54  
 
In relation to the liability of professionals (including medical professionals) the Victorian 
law-makers also introduced a requirement that the court must have regard to the standard of 
care that one should expect of professionals. In assessing whether the relevant standard of 
care has been met, the court may have regard to any special skills or qualifications the 
defendant possessed and the standard that can reasonably be expected of a person possessing 
such a skill.55 The legislation provides that:  
 
a professional is not negligent in providing a professional service if it is established that the 
professional acted in a manner that (at the time the service was provided) was widely 
                                                 
51
 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 47-48. 
52
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 48(1).  
53
 Ipp Report, above n 4, 104-105.  
54
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 48(2).  
55
 Ibid s 58.  
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accepted in Australia by a significant number of respected practitioners in the field (peer 
professional opinion) as competent professional practice in the circumstances.56  
 
The ‘peer professional opinion’ provisions do not apply to liability arising in connection with 
the giving of (or the failure to give) a warning or information with respect to a risk of harm.57 
In this regard, the statutory requirements introduce a modified ‘Bolam rule’, which is a test 
used in the UK that states a defendant is not negligent if their practice complied with a 
reasonable body of opinion in the profession.58 The statutory Bolam rule applies to 
examination, diagnosis and treatment, but not the giving of a warning or information.59  
 
While the standard of care and breach of duty provisions were a key area of interest in 
Australia at the time of implementation, this thesis focuses on the reforms to causation, the 
third element of negligence.60 The Ipp Reforms created a two-part statutory test for causation, 
requiring a plaintiff to establish: negligence as a necessary condition of the occurrence of the 
harm (factual causation), and that the scope of the negligent person's liability extends to the 
harm which was caused (scope of liability).61 The causation element has been the subject of 
considerable academic commentary and thus is a critical focus of this thesis, reflective of this 
being a contested area of the law requiring law reform.  
 
Concurrent with capping compensation damages for non-economic loss, the Ipp Reforms also 
limited defendants’ liability when plaintiffs pursued damages for mental harm. This was 
implemented by imposing a ‘normal fortitude’ requirement which plaintiffs must meet, 
meaning the psychiatric injury must be suffered by a person of normal fortitude in the 
circumstances.62 This increased the threshold to be satisfied,63 which further reduced the 
ability of plaintiffs to recover compensation. In addition, the plaintiff must possess a 
recognised psychiatric illness, as opposed to a recognisable illness, requiring the illness to be 
                                                 
56
 Ibid s 59(1).  
57
 Ibid s 60.  
58
 The Bolam test derives from Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee  [1957] 1 WLR 582. See 
also Carolyn Sapideen, ‘Bolam in Australia – More Bark than Bite?’ (2010) 33(2) UNSW Law Journal 386.  
59
 The statutory provisions preserve the principles in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479.  
60
 As seen in Chapter Five of this thesis, participants’ responses indicated that in their experience breach of 
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compensation.  
61
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 51(1). See also Genna Angelowitsch, ‘Cause for Concern: The Link Between 
Breach and Injury’ (2014) 88(11) Law Institute Journal 44.  
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 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 72.  
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formally recognised by an expert psychiatric body.64 Academic commentators propound that 
this definition is ‘backward-looking’ by implying a condition that the illness must have 
already been identified and classified by an authoritative body, rather than a forward-looking 
approach where an illness could be diagnosable by a body in the future.65  
 
1.1.2 THE EFFECTS OF THE IPP REFORMS 
The effects of the Ipp Reforms have prompted prominent academics and legal practitioners to 
question the coherency of the current tort regulatory framework.66 Advocates of the reforms 
argued the changes alleviated the ‘insurance crisis’,67 whereas opponents of the reforms 
questioned whether legislative intervention was genuinely required or if the response was an 
‘instantaneous, unreasoned political reaction to popular outcry’.68 Both the driver of the 
reforms (the alleged crisis) and the manner in which the review was undertaken, were 
comprehensively criticised by distinguished commentators who declared that the two-month 
evaluation timeframe was too short, and that allegations of an ‘insurance crisis’ were public 
policy hype, utterly unsubstantiated by empirical evidence.69  
 
Academic and legal experts highlight the unreasonableness to the plaintiff in the post-Ipp 
framework.70 John Chu analysed the implications of the 2002-2003 tort reforms, asserting 
that the overall effect of the existing regime is ‘unfair’ for individuals because of the 
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‘significant injury’ thresholds and the caps on damages.71 John North, former president of the 
Law Council of Australia, has stated that: 
[T]he common law system provides proper compensation to people injured as a result of 
negligence by someone else... However, because of “tort reform” this elegantly simple 
principle has been hedged about with a forest of restrictions, many of which are simply 
arbitrary... A particularly ugly weed in this forest is thresholds on compensation for non-
economic loss.72 
 
Thresholds for non-economic loss have attracted thorny criticism. King presents three 
arguments to support the view that ‘significant injury’ thresholds restrict claimants with 
genuine injuries from accessing justice: first, the need for a permanent injury; second, the 
inability to consider subjective consequences of an injury on a person’s life; and third, the 
rigid structure of the AMA Guides in assessing a ‘significant injury’.73 The assessment of an 
injury, and subsequent conversion into a whole person impairment percentage by an 
independent medical practitioner, in accordance with the AMA Guides, produces a 
‘substantial gulf’ between the AMA impairment rating and the claimant’s disability.74 For 
example, a child who has sustained some permanent impairment in the use of their hand, 
coupled with permanent scarring would not meet the threshold, despite that injury being 
considered ‘significant’.75 An individual who has had surgical equipment, such as scissors, 
left inside their body due to a medical practitioner’s negligence would not satisfy the 
permanence requirement, thus would be ineligible for compensation as their injury is 
‘transient’. An individual with permanent scarring, calculated at a 4, not 5, per cent whole 
person impairment would not qualify for compensation despite having a permanent 
disfigurement. These examples show that compensation thresholds for non-economic loss are 
less like North’s ‘ugly weeds’ and more like an impenetrable thicket, preventing meritorious 
claims from accessing a ‘just’ financial remedy.  
 
The primary concern with the AMA Guides lies in the significant difference between one 
category of impairment and the next, as categories increase in 5 per cent increments. 
Following the 2003 amendments to the Wrongs Act introducing thresholds, plaintiffs were 
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required to demonstrate a permanent impairment of ‘more than 5 per cent’ for spinal injuries. 
Therefore, a person with a spinal injury could be initially assessed as having an impairment 
of 5 per cent or less. If that person’s injury marginally worsens due to a nerve root 
compromise, the individual may still be prevented from obtaining compensation because the 
next category of impairment for spinal injuries is not 6, 7 or 8 per cent, but 10 per cent 
according to the AMA Guides.76 Such anomalies persisted between the introduction of the 
thresholds until the minor amendments in 2015 following the Victorian government review, 
set out below.  
 
1.1.3 THE SECOND TRANCHE OF REFORMS: THE VCEC REPORT AND THE 2015 
VICTORIAN TORT REFORMS 
On 30 May 2013, the Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission (VCEC) undertook 
an inquiry into aspects of the Wrongs Act responding to concerns that the law had imposed 
‘unreasonable barriers’ and ‘limitations’ to legitimate personal injury claims.77 The scope of 
the inquiry was to make recommendations to address any anomalies, inequities or 
inconsistencies in the Wrongs Act relating to personal injury damages, without undermining 
the objectives of the major tort reforms from 2002 to 2003.78 VCEC released the final report, 
Adjusting the Balance: Inquiry into Aspects of the Wrongs Act 1958 (‘the VCEC Report’) on 
26 February 2015. This report contained three overarching recommendations, many relevant 
to this thesis, including lowering the injury threshold for psychiatric and spinal injuries, and 
increasing the compensation cap for damages for non-economic loss.  
 
On 18 November 2015, the Wrongs Act was again amended to enact many of the VCEC’s 
recommendations.79 The cap on non-economic loss was raised to $577,050 (to be indexed 
annually). The former cap, initially set at $371,380 in 2002,80 had increased annually so that 
at 1 July 2015 it had reached $518,300. In real terms, the 2015 cap increase to $577,050 
resulted in only a minor elevation of $58,750. The injury threshold for psychiatric injury was 
lowered to 10 per cent, opposed to the previous requirement of ‘more than 10 per cent’. The 
injury threshold for spinal injury was also lowered to 5 per cent, opposed to the former ‘more 
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than 5 per cent’. No recommendations regarding the principle of causation were made in the 
VCEC Report, so the law in this area remains unchanged. The 2015 reforms raise important 
questions about whether the amendments are sufficient to address the ‘harshness’ of the 
existing legislation and whether the removal of certain restrictions will increase litigation, 
which may reignite fear of another insurance ‘crisis’.  
 
The ability to seek redress against wrongs, through litigation and ADR avenues, is a 
fundamental aspect of tort law. This tension begs the question: what is the fairest regulatory 
framework that can be implemented to allow victims to pursue their rights?  The 2015 
reforms to the Wrongs Act were an attempt to achieve a better balance, however the 
amendments have not addressed the perceived unfairness to claimants. The next section of 
this chapter will discuss the theoretical framework underpinning this research, focusing on 
corrective justice theory, economic efficiency and regulatory coherence.  
1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
An analysis of legal theory may support the legislative regulation of tort law in Australian 
society. This section will discuss the theoretical position that provides the best basis for 
coherent legislative regulation of the tort of negligence. For instance, apportioning liability in 
negligence may be seen as the core of the purpose of the law and the concept of justice.81 
From a corrective justice perspective, the law’s purpose in the context of tort law is to correct 
wrongdoing by holding a defendant liable for his harmful conduct. However, achieving 
justice often needs to be balanced with practical considerations such as the economic welfare 
of society. This section focuses on three theories particularly relevant to negligence: 
corrective justice theory; economic efficiency theory; and ensuring coherent regulation.  
 
In King v Philcox,82 the High Court of Australia restricted the plaintiff’s ability to claim 
damages for sustaining psychiatric injury in the form of pure mental harm in the aftermath of 
an accident. Justice Keane articulated the policy reasons behind the restrictions, stating:  
 
Legislative measures which deny the remedy of damages in certain cases of negligently inflicted 
personal injury are now familiar measures, taken in the public interest to preserve the general 
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availability of the remedy by ensuring the viability and affordability of arrangements to meet the 
costs involved.83 
 
Justice Keane’s comments point to the ongoing tension in medical negligence law. The 
ability to access compensation for negligence claims is well established at common law, but 
the need to balance this principle with compensation affordability is said to be in the public 
interest, to ensure the ongoing availability of indemnity insurance. This friction is reflected in 
the principles of corrective justice theory and economic efficiency theory, which aid in 
comprehending the development of current tort principles. In negligence, awards of damages 
arguably have a corrective purpose as they are designed to ‘put something right that has gone 
wrong’.84 This infers that any wrong should be remedied in the form of ‘just compensation’. 
However, plaintiffs who do not satisfy permanent impairment thresholds or whose loss 
exceeds the maximum caps on damages are unable to access corrective justice. The purpose 
then becomes to ‘partially put something right that has absolutely gone wrong’, which 
opposes the concept of general negligence.  
 
Throughout this thesis, corrective justice theory is adopted as the theoretical construct for 
understanding tort principles and analysing qualitative interview data. Contemporary theorist 
Ernest Weinrib defines corrective justice as a bilateral relationship, where each of the two 
parties adopts an active or passive pole of the same injustice.85 Corrective justice theorist 
Allan Beever describes this relationship as ‘interpersonal justice’:86 if one person wrongs the 
other by infringing on their legal rights, there is an obligation to restore the equality of the 
parties. In this way, Beever posits that the law of negligence is best understood in terms of 
principles of morality.87 
 
In contrast, economic efficiency theorists are concerned with the distribution of wealth in 
society.88 The focus for economic theorists is not restoring justice between a wrongdoer and a 
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victim, but in how resources can be optimally allocated to serve society’s economic 
wellbeing. Economic efficiency theory may best explain the rationale between the Ipp 
Reforms, which unraveled because the ‘efficiency’ of resource allocation usurped the notion 
of a just outcome.  
 
1.2.1 CORRECTIVE JUSTICE THEORY 
The theoretical framework that supports the legislative regulation of tort law in a fault-based 
system is corrective justice. Corrective justice is centred on the premise that if an individual 
causes harm to another, there is an obligation to repair the loss.89 The theory has its origin in 
Aristotle, who distinguished between ‘corrective justice’ and ‘distributive justice’.90 Aristotle 
envisaged two parties starting in a position of equality. If one party was to disrupt that 
equality, corrective justice demands restoration by deducting something from the party who 
disturbed the equality and returning it to the other disrupted party.91 In other words, if one 
person causes another to be injured through negligence, this person has made a gain through 
the other person’s loss. Corrective justice requires the negligent person to repair the injured 
person’s loss, which is achieved through compensation. Corrective justice can be contrasted 
with distributive justice, which is concerned with the equal distribution of goods and wealth 
in society.92 Distributive justice addresses justice across a community based on a criterion of 
merit, requiring a broad institution to implement appropriate distribution across the 
community.93 A compensation scheme that distributes resources from a pool provided by 
contributors which distributes these resources according to some set criteria, is an example of 
distributive justice.94   
 
To Aristotle as well as to contemporary theorist Ernest Weinrib, corrective justice is 
considered an alternative to distributive justice, which is dependent on a transaction between 
the affected parties.95 Distributive justice has been likened to ‘legislative justice’ involving 
the creation of statute law that distributes benefits and burdens through the regulation of 
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society.96 Corrective justice is more akin to ‘judicial justice’ where judges have the power to 
correct wrongs through the imposition of remedies.97 In contrast, Wright contends that 
corrective and distributive justice are compatible, allowing a plaintiff to be fully compensated 
by shifting the loss from the plaintiff to the members of society who should properly bear the 
burden.98  
 
The imposition of tort liability arguably has its roots in the notion of justice.99 This is because 
a fundamental premise of tort law remedies is to effect justice between the parties. Corrective 
justice theory provides that a tortfeasor has an obligation to compensate his victim for harm 
suffered.100 Accordingly, corrective justice theory takes into account the moral aspects of tort 
law.101 It can be contrasted with distributive justice that arguably fails to create an appropriate 
lens through which tort law can be viewed. This is because the role of courts in torts disputes 
is not to distribute resources in society, but rather, to adjudicate disputes and award remedies 
individually.102  
 
According to the corrective justice theory, the purpose of negligence law should be to ensure 
tortfeasors redress wrongs they have committed. The law should be able to facilitate this by 
enabling aggrieved individuals to commence negligence actions and by providing a variety of 
dispute resolution avenues to enable the recovery of remedies. Under this view, the aim of 
negligence law should not be to concern itself with distributive justice for the entire society. 
Rather, its sole objective should be to effect justice between the tortfeasor and the aggrieved 
party.  
 
A modern pioneer of corrective justice is American philosophy professor Jules Coleman who 
has written extensively on the interrelation of tort law and corrective justice. Coleman 
explores whether tort practices can be understood as expressing an ideal of justice.103 In 
Coleman’s view corrective justice specifies grounds for recovery and liability, but it does not 
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provide a mode of rectification.104 For instance, Coleman ponders who ought to bear the cost 
if a defendant is held liable for damages: should it be the particular defendant, a class of 
defendants or those best able to reduce the risk of injury at the lowest marginal cost? 
Coleman asserts that the fairest and most effective compensation scheme is one where 
victims draw payment from a fund stocked by potential injurers, in other words a no-fault 
scheme.105 Coleman outlines three categories of interrelation between justification and 
compensation: (1) where the defendant only owes compensation to the victim if the loss is 
caused by the defendant’s unjustifiable or unreasonable conduct (2) where the victim suffers 
loss as a result of justifiable conduct, but recovery of compensation is not barred and (3) the 
defendant’s conduct is justifiable only if they pay compensation for the losses they 
occasion.106 Coleman contends that the first two categories involve the principle of corrective 
justice.107 Coleman concludes that corrective justice does not provide a full explanation of 
tort law, especially in circumstances where tort law is unable to provide a remedy for every 
wrongdoing, but that corrective justice is important in understanding tort law.108 
 
Contemporary tort scholars support the application of corrective justice in negligence. For 
instance, Gemma Turton contends that corrective justice is the preferred foundation for 
negligence law.109 In her view, the dualistic form of corrective justice correlates with 
negligence liability because an injustice can only be corrected when the wrongdoer repairs 
the injured person’s loss.110 Turton further elaborates that causation is an integral aspect of 
corrective justice because the very essence of corrective justice theory is concerned with 
justice in interactions between people.111 This is supported by Weinrib who states, ‘[t]he 
requirement of factual causation establishes the indispensable nexus between the parties by 
relating their rights to a transaction in which one has directly impinged upon the other.’ 112 
Causation is therefore a central part of negligence.  
 
                                                 
104
 Ibid 358. 
105
 Ibid 352.  
106
 Ibid 355.  
107
 Ibid 379.  
108
 Ibid 379.  
109
 Gemma Turton, Evidential Uncertainty in Causation (Hart Publishing, 2016) 6.  
110
 Ibid 9. 
111
 Ibid 20.  
112
 Ernest J Weinrib, ‘Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law’ (1983) 2(1) Law and Philosophy 37, 38. 
21 
 
Torts academic Sharon Erbacher adopts a corrective justice framework for analysing 
principles of negligence and illegality.113 Erbacher argues that the doctrine of illegality in 
negligence, despite being traditionally justified through public policy frameworks, can be 
understood in a corrective justice framework.114 Building on the work of scholars such as 
Ernest Weinrib, Allan Beever and Robert Stevens, Erbacher argues that corrective justice is 
an appropriate theoretical framework for understanding illegal negligent acts because 
previous reliance on public policy has led to the development of an uncertain and 
unsatisfactory illegality doctrine.115 According to Erbacher, corrective justice provides a 
principled framework for deciding future cases in a consistent and systematic manner.116  
 
Applying corrective justice theory to a medical negligence context, the law should enable 
those who have suffered harm to seek compensation from the medical practitioners 
responsible. This view does not require consideration of the needs of the entire community, 
but rather, it is about effecting justice between a medical practitioner and patient. However, 
one cannot disregard limits on the financial resources required to effect justice, which means 
there will ultimately be some legitimate constraints on the ability to compensate all injured 
persons. Corrective justice theory thus presents deficiencies that economic efficiency theory 
seeks to remedy. However in practice a balance must be sought between the roles and needs 
of plaintiffs and of defendants in society. 
 
1.2.2 ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY THEORY 
Whilst corrective justice philosophers are concerned with notions of justice and morality, 
economists on the other hand contend that tort law can most adequately be explained through 
an economic analysis. A contemporary advocate of an economic efficiency approach, US 
judge Richard Posner, contends that, ‘the common law is best explained as if the judges were 
trying to maximize economic welfare’.117 Economic theory is concerned with the distribution 
of wealth in society and according to its tenets, judges should decide cases with the aim of 
maximising society’s total wealth.118 In other words, justice is equated to wealth 
maximisation.  
                                                 
113
 Sharon Erbacher, Negligence and Illegality (Hart Publishing, 2017).  
114
 Ibid 8-9.  
115
 Ibid 21-22.  
116
 Ibid 9.  
117
 Posner, above n 88, 4.  
118
 Freeman, above n 90, 520.  
22 
 
Economic theory is normative, because it focuses on how the law ought to be. In a negligence 
context, economists are concerned with the imposition of liability rules that promote and 
encourage economic efficiency. Posner contends that, ‘[t]he common law method is to 
allocate responsibilities between people engaged in interacting activities in such a way as to 
maximize the joint value, or, what amounts to the same thing, minimize the joint cost of the 
activities’.119 Therefore, according to economists, the role of tort law is simply costs 
allocation. Tort law should be aimed at minimising the cost of accidents and reducing the cost 
of avoiding them.120 Hence, if the cost of taking care to avoid injury is less than the cost of 
compensating for an injury sustained, people should be encouraged to take action to avoid the 
risk of injury. Tort law consists of a set of liability rules that determine the circumstances in 
which a person is required to compensate another. These rules govern the distribution of 
losses generated by human conduct. Assuming that human beings are rational utility 
maximisers, legal economists assert that human beings will make choices that maximise their 
welfare, which in turn leads to an allocation of resources that maximises society’s wealth.121  
 
Economic efficiency theory assists with an analysis of the Ipp Reforms. If the cost of 
personal injury compensation payouts grow too high (and this is implied in the claim that 
high costs resulted in an insurance ‘crisis’), it follows there is a need to reduce compensation 
payouts and consequently increase society’s wealth. One of the criticisms of this pursuit of 
economic efficiency is that it leads to inequality. Coleman contends that it causes the wealthy 
to gain more rights and increase their wealth while the poor become worse off.122 In a 
medical negligence context, the wealth of insurance companies, hospitals and medical 
practitioners increases, while the rights of injured individuals to access compensation 
decreases. A problem with such an approach is that it focuses on a theoretical ideal regarding 
the regulatory framework, which does not necessarily translate well to tort law regulation 
which is set in motion after a wrong has been committed.123 On the other hand, effective tort 
regulation can steer behaviour and deter wrongs. While economic efficiency theory creates an 
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ideological framework within which tort law may operate, corrective justice theory appears to 
be the better fit in substance form because it operates after the wrong has occurred, to compel 
the wrongdoer to correct the wrongdoing. As Keating states, ‘[t]he success of corrective 
justice as a theory of tort is the flip side of the failure of economic analysis. The basic 
structural features and main concepts of tort law embody the principle of corrective 
justice’.124  
 
Mendelson contends that the Australian judiciary has tended to apply principles of economic 
efficiency theory in case law, with judges imposing liability based on social, moral, political 
and economic considerations.125 Yet, Mendelson acknowledges that the tort reform 
legislation has strongly been influenced by principles of corrective justice, which she asserts 
forces judges to concentrate on a ‘very intricate analysis of facts’ of a case, particularly with 
regard to breach of duty and causation principles, when determining how to apportion 
liability.126 Arguably, such an analysis requires judges to have regard to the social facts of the 
case. Kylie Burns argues it has long been accepted that in negligence cases judges refer to 
policy consequences of tort liability within their reasoning, including effects on insurance.127 
Burns argues that corrective justice theory and rights-based theories of tort law do not 
adequately account for judicial use of social facts in tort cases.128 Burns contends that such 
considerations must be taken into consideration when formulating an accurate theoretical 
account of judicial reasoning in negligence cases,129 given that empirical evidence shows 
judges do use social facts in judicial decision-making.130  
 
1.2.3 COHERENCE AND REGULATION 
Commissioning an inquiry into personal injury compensation suggests the Victorian 
government was concerned that the effects of the 2002-2003 reforms were too harsh. The 
2015 amendments attempted to address the injustice caused by the original reforms, but their 
enactment raises questions about whether the current regulatory approach is adequate. 
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Regulatory coherence is a theory of law that provides a framework for analysis and 
evaluation of existing regulatory frameworks.131 It examines how political and social 
considerations influence the design and implementation of regulation.132  It is premised on the 
concept that incoherent regulatory frameworks are ineffective and fail to achieve their 
intended objectives.133 Accordingly, the concept of regulatory coherence provides an 
evaluative tool to assess the operation and consequences of a regulatory framework.134 
Applied to the area of tort law and the dilemma of recompense for those who suffer damage 
due to medical negligence, this framework allows critique of the Ipp law reforms and the 
2015 reforms, to determine whether the legislature has struck the right balance between 
corrective justice and economic efficiency in order to achieve regulatory coherence.  
1.3 MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND MEDIATION 
Forms of ADR, such as mediation, are prevalent in the resolution of civil disputes, and are an 
increasing part of court mandated, case management processes. Mediation involves the 
intervention of a trained and impartial third party whose role is to assist the parties in dispute 
to achieve a voluntary agreement.135 Mediation offers myriad advantages over litigation as 
the traditional vehicle for adversarial dispute resolution: it can be quicker, more cost effective 
and produce confidential settlements which may assist to preserve the parties’ existing 
relationship.136 Mediation is increasingly being used as part of the litigation process, either as 
a mandatory pre-action protocol or through court referral during proceedings.137 In this thesis 
the acronym ADR refers to ‘alternative or appropriate dispute resolution’ , which encapsulates 
a range of dispute resolution processes including negotiation, mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration.138 The term ‘dispute resolution’ refers to parties’ engagement in a consensual 
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resolution process. Finally, the National Mediator Accreditation Standards definition of 
‘mediation’ is used.139   
 
In Victorian civil proceedings, legislation imposes an overarching purpose to ‘facilitate the 
just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute’,140 which can 
be realised by an ADR process either agreed to by the parties, or ordered by the court. This 
obliges all litigants, including legal practitioners, in medical negligence disputes to attempt 
some form of ADR prior to trial.141 Given that the shadow of the law informs dispute 
resolution avenues, it is imperative to explore whether the Ipp Reforms have had any impact 
on the mediation of medical negligence disputes.  
 
The second part of this thesis focuses on how reforms to the Wrongs Act have impacted upon 
mediation practice, which contributes to research concerning the lawyer’s role in court-
connected mediation and how lawyers frame their practice.142 The manner in which lawyers 
construct their role can influence settlement and client satisfaction,143 particularly as dispute 
resolution of medical negligence and mental harm claims can occur in an emotionally 
charged environment, where claimants have sustained devastating injuries, and there is a loss 
of trust in the medical practitioner. Emotion is a key aspect of conflict and an integral part of 
dispute resolution,144 so addressing emotion may be integral in medical negligence disputes 
involving heightened levels of emotion. Extant literature highlights the benefits of using 
mediation as a dispute resolution process in emotionally-charged disputes.145 It is therefore 
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apposite to explore the role emotion plays in medical negligence cases where mediation is 
used. This research will explore whether emotion is an integral factor to resolution from the 
perspective of lawyers, and whether parties are able to express their emotions in the 
mediation process.  
1.4 RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND SCOPE 
The Ipp Reforms have been criticised by prominent members of the legal profession as being 
driven by external economic pressures, and for being hastily implemented.146 Given the 
objective of the Ipp Reforms was to reduce the compensation payable to plaintiffs in personal 
injury claims,147 nearly two decades later it is timely to explore whether these reforms have 
been effective. Further, all Victorian plaintiffs who instigate medical negligence proceedings 
will at some stage face a court-connected ADR process, typically mediation.148 Therefore this 
research needs to address how the current laws have affected mediation in medical 
negligence disputes. The VCEC Report and subsequent reforms underscore the ongoing 
problems plaintiffs endure in securing compensation in meritorious medical negligence and 
mental harm claims. This persistent problem provided a unique opportunity to explore the 
legal challenges faced in the litigation and mediation of such claims, through the perspective 
of practising medical negligence lawyers.  
 
As the literature review chapter of this thesis makes clear, there is no existing empirical study 
on the effects of the Ipp Reforms on medical negligence litigation and mediation in Victoria. 
Internationally, a Canadian interpretive study undertaken by Tamara Relis canvassed the 
different perceptions of professional, legal and lay actors in the litigation and mediation 
process of medical injury claims.149 Whilst Relis’ research was conducted on a larger scale 
than this project, her findings provide meaningful data with which to compare the different 
perceptions of legal and lay actors involved in tort disputes, particularly as Victoria and 
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Canada are both common law jurisdictions. Relis’ research aids in identifying problems with 
the regulatory framework governing the litigation and mediation of these disputes.  
 
1.4.1 SCOPE OF RESEARCH  
The scope of this research was limited to analysing the medical negligence compensation 
system in the Victorian jurisdiction. Further, this study was confined to court-connected 
mediation of medical negligence disputes. Wider issues regarding resolution of healthcare 
disputes in hospitals were not explored for the purposes of this doctoral research project.  
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
The aim of this research thesis is to critically evaluate whether the 2002-2003 and 2015 
amendments to the Wrongs Act, continue to present unreasonably high hurdles for plaintiffs 
to obtain financial compensation in medical negligence and mental harm disputes. 
 
The four research objectives for this thesis are:  
1. to gather qualitative data about the perceptions from lawyers practising in the field of 
medical negligence, and sitting judges with medical negligence experience; 
2. to explore what effects the Ipp Reforms have had on the litigation and mediation of 
meritorious medical negligence claims from the perspective of lawyers and judges;  
3. to explore what effects the 2015 reforms have had on the litigation and mediation of 
medical negligence, and to ascertain whether further reform is required; and 
4. to analyse the perceptions derived from the qualitative data and generate theory to 
understand the phenomenon under investigation.  
 
This research into medical negligence disputes in Victoria is warranted, because it will 
address the following two research questions:   
1. Have the 2002-2003 amendments to the Wrongs Act, resulting from the Ipp Reforms, 
had any effect on the litigation and mediation of meritorious medical negligence 
claims?  
2. What impact has the 2015 amendments to the Wrongs Act had, and likely to have, on 
the litigation and mediation of medical negligence disputes?  
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These research questions are explored through qualitative interviews with practising lawyers 
representing plaintiffs and defendants in medical negligence, as well as barristers and sitting 
judges with medical negligence experience. All participants are experts in this field, able to 
provide insight and offer reflections on the challenges experienced post the 2002-2003 and 
2015 reforms, as they are deeply involved in the legal processes of compensation. As experts, 
the participants are well-positioned to identify any need for further reform. The lawyers 
engaged in mediation in medical negligence possess a rich source of experience to understand 
what typically occurs in negotiations and settlements related to medical negligence, and thus 
are expertly placed to inform the researcher about practices during the mediation of medical 
negligence disputes.  
1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN  
This research is embedded into an interpretivist epistemology, utilising a qualitative 
methodological design. Interpretivist research is concerned with assessing qualitative data 
relating to the gathering of thoughts, feelings and ideas.150 As such, interpretivism is an ideal 
construct to underpin this study, given the research involves gathering subjective sources of 
data including thoughts, feelings, beliefs and perceptions concerning medical negligence 
compensation processes. The research data was gathered through semi-structured interviews 
with 24 research participants: 11 medical negligence lawyers from plaintiff and defendant 
law firms in Victoria, 10 barristers and three judges with medical negligence litigation 
experience. The participants were purposively selected based on the length of their medical 
negligence experience, and invited by email to participate in the research.151 The participants 
provided commentary on their perceptions of legal issues impacting the attainment of 
compensation in medical negligence cases, following the Ipp Reforms and subsequent 2015 
amendments. Further, the participants’ breadth of legal experience assisted in articulating the 
need for further legislative overhaul.  
 
Consistent with the epistemological approach, grounded theory was adopted as the research 
methodology. Grounded theory is an inductive framework, used when the researcher seeks to 
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create a theory from data or when researching a matter where little is already known.152 
Grounded theory is useful in explaining the phenomenon being studied, which in this instance 
are the high hurdles to compensation presented by the 2002-2003 and 2015 amendments to 
the Wrongs Act. Grounded theory was selected as the preferred research methodology to 
justify the research method and undertake data analysis. The use of grounded theory as a 
research methodology can be contrasted with corrective justice theory and economic 
efficiency theory, which was used as the conceptual framework through which the analysis of 
the data occurred. Grounded theory was used to extract themes (incorporating access to 
justice, unfairness, emotion and the role of lawyers) and to formulate a theoretical framework 
underpinning the concepts (corrective justice), in order to comprehend the responses that 
emerged from the data. The use of grounded theory assisted in formulating the conclusion 
that the present legal framework governing personal injury is incompatible with principles of 
corrective justice, necessitating further reform. While qualitative research is not usually 
affiliated with numerical representation of the data, some scholars accept that use of numbers 
in qualitative research is a legitimate and valuable method of presenting data.153 Therefore, in 
some sections of this thesis, numerical indicators are used to offer greater clarity and 
illustrate the analysis of the data.  
1.7 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
The aim of this thesis was to make an original contribution to the field of medical negligence 
research and practice in Victoria, which has already been achieved. This study contributes to 
the existing body of knowledge, by exploring the impact of the 2002-2003 and 2015 reforms 
on the ability of medical negligence plaintiffs to recover compensation. This doctoral 
research is noteworthy because it is path-breaking: it represents the first study investigating 
the impact of the Victorian Ipp Reforms on medical negligence parties, from the perspective 
of legal actors. The informed perceptions and reflections of the research participants enable 
critical evaluation of the reforms, and facilitate consideration of their efficacy in addressing 
the issue of personal injury compensation since the alleged ‘crisis’. 
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Although a plethora of academic literature has focused on the negative impacts of the Ipp 
Reforms, no systematic empirical study in this subject area has been undertaken within the 
Victorian jurisdiction. The Ipp Reforms can be viewed as reactive and it is argued the reforms 
were introduced so that the government could be seen to be responding to the much-hyped, 
but largely unsubstantiated insurance crisis.154 For instance, esteemed legal academic 
Professor Harold Luntz has made reference to a ‘supposed insurance crisis’155 and an ‘alleged 
public liability and medical indemnity crisis’156 in his work in this area.  
 
This research recommends enhancements to the current regulatory framework, including 
amending the existing fault-based system to reduce barriers to recovery of compensation. 
Alternatively, the study explores the feasibility of introducing a no-fault system of 
compensation, modelled on the current New Zealand system.  
 
Also, this doctoral research significantly contributes to knowledge of mediation practice (in 
medical negligence) by exploring the role of lawyers in conducting mediation of such 
disputes, including the extent that expression of emotion plays in addressing personal injury 
disputes. Mediation operates in the shadow of the law, and encompasses corrective justice 
through a quicker and less expensive method of dispute resolution. This doctoral research has 
found that the legal actors in the mediation of personal injury disputes do not use mediation 
to its fullest potential to facilitate the expression of emotion by their clients. These research 
findings provide a platform to explore themes regarding the culture of lawyers and 
adversarialism.  
 
Finally, recommendations are made to reform mediation practice in medical negligence 
disputes through: (1) the introduction of pre-action protocols; (2) imposition of a mandatory 
requirement for doctors to attend mediation; (3) introduction of ‘medical negligence 
restorative conferences’, a process similar to restorative justice conferencing but within 
medical negligence disputes, where plaintiffs can confront doctors; and (4) use of legal 
education as a catalyst for shifting the practice of lawyers towards non-adversarialism in 
mediation within the Victorian jurisdiction. These findings and recommendations may be 
generalised to the practice of medical negligence compensation in other Australian states.  
                                                 
154
 Luntz, above n 69, 836.  
155
 Harold Luntz, ‘Turning Points in the Law of Torts in the Last 30 Years’ (2003) 15(1) Insurance Law 
Journal 1, 4. 
156
 Luntz, above n 69, 836. 
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1.8 STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 has outlined the background to the 
research, including objectives, research questions and research design. Principles of 
corrective justice, economic efficiency and regulatory coherence are used as the conceptual 
basis for this research, as they assist to explicate the underlying reasoning for the 
development of key aspects of negligence principles. The chapter also indicates the research 
contributions and provides an outline of the thesis structure.  
   
Chapter 2 contains a comprehensive literature review relating to the Ipp Reforms, including 
its background, an overview of the key amendments, and the legal community’s response to 
the two tranches of reforms. The impact of the Ipp Reforms and the 2015 remedial reforms 
on medical negligence and mental harm claims is explored with a focus on the continuing 
challenges presented by these reforms including thresholds, caps on damages and the 
statutory principle of causation.  
 
Chapter 3 contains a literature review of the history of mediation, and the significance of 
court-connected mediation to the resolution of medical negligence disputes. It explores the 
role of lawyers in mediation, including their ability to influence settlement and achieve client 
satisfaction. The role of emotion is identified in the mediation literature as the opportunity to 
explore underlying interests and concerns of parties through a discourse that allows for 
expression of emotions, such as anger. Litigating in medical negligence can be stressful. 
Expression of emotion may contribute to the successful settlement of a dispute, and to 
generating greater levels of procedural satisfaction for the disputants. Empirical studies 
focusing on mediation in medical negligence are explored to demonstrate that no systematic 
empirical study of lawyers’ perceptions of mediation in medical negligence disputes in 
Victoria has ever been undertaken. Finally, legal culture and the adversarialism of the legal 
profession are explored, alongside the potential of legal education as a catalyst for 
meaningful reform.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the epistemological and methodological framework. It outlines the 
organisation of the study, method of data collection and addresses ethical issues. This study 
has adopted grounded theory as the method of analysing the interview data to extract themes. 
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The method of analysis through open, axial and selective coding is explained, and the 
limitations of the research are presented.  
 
Chapter 5 contains the first part of the findings of this study, focused on the continuing 
challenges which arise in medical negligence and mental harm claims. Analysis of the 
responses shows that the majority of participants thought that significant injury thresholds, 
caps on damages and causation pose high hurdles in progressing medical negligence and 
mental harm claims. Some research participants raised concerns that the law discriminates 
between physical and psychiatric injuries, reinforcing the historic distinction between the 
two, by imposing more onerous requirements to demonstrate existence of mental harm. When 
questioned about causation, most participants expressed the view that causation was the 
greatest issue for litigants in medical negligence proceedings. Participants articulated 
numerous benefits of no-fault schemes, including those mirrored under the Victorian 
transport and workplace accident schemes, such as the quicker resolution of claims and 
certainty of compensation without the need to establish negligence in court. Consequently, 
this chapter briefly discusses potential law reform and contemplates the feasibility of 
adopting New Zealand’s no-fault statutory scheme in Australia.  
 
Chapter 6 contains the second part of the findings of this study, relating to the mediation of 
medical negligence disputes. Research participants endorsed the value of mediation as a 
relatively quick, informal opportunity for dispute resolution. With regard to the examination 
of emotion which is a focus of this project, analysis of the data shows that participants 
broadly considered that emotion can be an important aspect of medical negligence mediation. 
Participant attitudes to emotion were confined to ‘avoidance’ of addressing it during 
mediation, rather than engaging with the parties’ experience. Participants mostly viewed 
mediation as beneficial to their client, by providing the opportunity to avoid the emotional 
cost of pursuing a negligence claim. Research participants did not exploit the prospects that 
mediation presents for parties to express emotion in a way that assists both victim and 
medical practitioner to obtain emotional closure or procedural satisfaction. 
 
In addition, the dominant role of lawyers in the mediation of medical negligence disputes 
emerged as a major theme. Analysis of the data shows that participants unquestionably 
valued mediation in the context of medical negligence disputes. Research subjects reflected 
on the benefits of mediation as an informal option in case management. Some lawyers 
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specifically referred to the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) as promoting mediation. 
Participants valued mediation as a way for clients to avoid the stress of court, and viewed 
their role as advising on the law and settlement options. Some participants commented on 
their role as a ‘translator’ of the legal system during negotiation in mediation, describing their 
efforts to promote understanding of realistic parameters for settlement. As experienced legal 
practitioners, the lawyers acted to shield their clients from the legal system, thus appearing to 
dominate the process. Further, the lawyer participants discouraged their clients from 
speaking, or even being present at mediation, largely choosing to act as spokespeople even 
though many identified that some clients expressed their wish to be more involved in the 
dispute resolution process.  
 
Chapter 7 summarises the findings in this study, concluding that the 2015 legislative changes 
are inadequate to remedy the adverse effects of the Ipp Reforms. Further law reform is 
required. This conclusion is based on the legal challenges raised by the participants, including 
the causation hurdle, injury thresholds and caps on compensation. The existing National 
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) and the proposed National Injury Insurance Scheme 
(NIIS) are discussed, together with the strengths and weaknesses of no-fault schemes for 
medical treatment injury. The mediation findings are also discussed, particularly focusing on 
the role of emotion and adversarialism of lawyers in medical negligence. Recommendations 
for reform are made, including the need for more restorative forms of dispute resolution. This 
chapter contains the theoretical and practical implications of the research, recommendations, 
limitations of the study, and the need for future research. The findings of this doctoral study 
should be used to assist policy makers when considering future law reform to principles of 
negligence, and could be applied to jurisdictions other than Victoria: both within and outside 
Australia.  
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CHAPTER 2 – THRESHOLDS, CAPS AND CAUSATION IN MEDICAL 
NEGLIGENCE AND MENTAL HARM PROCEEDINGS  
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the last two decades, Australian jurisdictions have experienced significant legislative 
reform in tort law. Contemporary principles regarding liability in negligence were 
substantially altered at the beginning of the twentieth century and the effects of these reforms 
continue to play a role in the operation of the current compensation system. The central 
themes of this thesis circle around three restrictions emanating from the civil liability 
reforms: permanent injury thresholds, caps on damages and the statutory principle of 
causation. Following the implementation of the reforms, legal commentators argued that the 
restrictions emanating from the civil liability reforms prevent plaintiffs with meritorious 
negligence claims from recovering compensation. It is imperative to explore the background 
to the civil liability reforms, the legal community’s response to the reforms, and the effects 
on the compensation system because the perceived restrictiveness and unfairness of the 
reforms was a crucial emergent theme in the data gathered for this study.  
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the increasing cost and decreasing availability of 
medical indemnity insurance was attributed to substantial insurance payouts in the preceding 
decade and a perception that damages awarded by courts were too high,1 as well as to the 
collapse of several large medical insurance providers. These factors contributed to a 
perceived ‘insurance crisis’ in Australia.2 Legislative intervention was called for, especially 
in light of the common perception that the law of negligence was ‘unclear and unpredictable’, 
that ‘it has become too easy for plaintiffs in personal injury cases to establish liability for 
negligence’ and ‘damages awards in personal injuries cases have been too high’.3 As a 
consequence, the Commonwealth, state and territory governments agreed to a joint review of 
                                                 
1
 Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, Adjusting the Balance: Inquiry into Aspects of the 
Wrongs Act 1958, Final Report, Melbourne, 26 February 2014 (‘VCEC Report’) 14.  
2
 Loane Skene and Harold Luntz, ‘Effects of Tort Law Reform on Medical Liability’ (2005) 79(6) 
Australian Law Journal 345, 346; Peter Underwood, ‘Is Ms Donoghue’s Snail in Mortal Peril’ (2004) 12(1) 
Torts Law Journal 39, 39-42.  
3
 Danuta Mendelson, ‘Australian Tort Law Reform: Statutory Principles of Causation and the Common 
Law’ (2004) 11(4) Journal of Law and Medicine 492, citing the Ipp Report [3.5].  
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the tort liability system with the objective of reducing the quantum of damages payable in 
personal injury claims.4 The review was chaired by the Honourable David Ipp and resulted in 
a report titled Review of the Law of Negligence Report (‘Ipp Report’). Based on the 
recommendations contained in the Ipp Report, the Victorian government implemented law 
reforms, predominantly affecting public liability and professional responsibility negligence 
claims.5  
 
It is outside the scope of this thesis to canvass the entire breadth of the 2002-2003 reforms, 
therefore only the amendments that have had a significant impact on medical negligence and 
mental harm claims are addressed. Three vital changes were implemented. These were the 
need to satisfy permanent injury impairment thresholds, the introduction of caps on damages 
for non-economic loss, and the introduction of a statutory test of causation. Recovery of 
compensation for non-economic loss is precluded unless a plaintiff can demonstrate that they 
have sustained a ‘significant injury’ assessed at ‘more than 5 per cent’ whole person 
impairment for physical injuries, ‘equal to 5 per cent’ for spinal injuries and ‘equal to 10 per 
cent’ for psychiatric injuries.6 While the threshold does not affect recovery of economic loss, 
it does adversely affect members of the community (such as children, non-working parents 
and the elderly) who are not earning a high income and rely on non-economic loss 
compensation. If a plaintiff does satisfy the significant injury thresholds, the sum of damages 
they receive is capped at a figure indexed annually. In 2015, the base cap figure was 
increased to $577,050.7 
 
The element of causation is an integral, but particularly problematic, aspect of a negligence 
action. This is because in order to recover damages a plaintiff must prove the defendant owes 
them a duty of care, the defendant has breached that duty of care, and the defendant’s 
negligent act has caused the plaintiff’s harm or loss. Proving this causative link is often 
                                                 
4
 Panel of Eminent Persons to Review the Law of Negligence, Review of the Law of Negligence Report, 
Second Report, Canberra, October 2002 (‘Ipp Report’) 26. The Ipp Report provides that the prime task of the 
Panel, as stated in the Terms of Reference, is ‘to examine a method for the reform of the common law with 
the objective of limiting liability and quantum of damages arising from personal injury and death’.  
5
 Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003  (Vic).  
6
 Section 28LE of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) provides that a person is not entitled to recover damages for 
non-economic loss unless the person injured has suffered significant injury. A ‘significant injury’ is defined 
in s 28LF of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) as the degree of impairment of the whole person resulting from the 
injury has been assessed by an approved medical practitioner as satisfying the threshold level. Section 28LB 
gives a definition of ‘threshold level’.  
7
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28G. 
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complicated in cases involving indirect harm or unintentional conduct.8 The Ipp Reforms 
introduced a two-part causation test into s 51 of the Wrongs Act, altering but not eliminating 
the common law principles that had developed over previous decades. The causation tests 
remain problematical and difficult to apply in the medical negligence (including mental 
harm) context and arguably constitute an unfair restriction of patients’ rights to 
compensation. This is because the statutory test is poorly defined, leading to uncertainty and 
unpredictability in application.9 
 
This chapter begins with the background to the Ipp Reforms and a brief outline of the Ipp 
Reforms relating to this thesis, followed by a critical analysis of the literature relating to those 
legislative amendments. Next, the chapter contains a doctrinal analysis of the principle of 
causation, through an analysis of legislation and case law in the medical negligence and 
mental harm context. This is followed by an examination of how the principle of causation 
has been applied by superior courts in Australia subsequent to the amendments. Then the 
chapter outlines a summary of the VCEC’s report and the 2015 reforms affecting injury 
thresholds and caps to damages, while identifying the failure of Victorian government to 
address the contentious issue of causation in these reforms.  
2.2 BACKGROUND TO THE IPP REFORMS 
By early 2002, the availability of medical insurance was affected by the collapse of some of 
Australia’s largest insurance companies, United Medical Protection and HIH Group.10 High 
compensation payouts in the preceding decade were blamed for an alleged ‘insurance crisis’ 
motivating the review of the law of negligence and reforms to tort law.11 The motivation 
behind the reforms and the manner in which the review was undertaken were criticised by 
distinguished commentators, who contended that the timeframe for the review (two months) 
was too short and the allegations of an ‘insurance crisis’ were unsubstantiated by empirical 
                                                 
8
 Danuta Mendelson, The New Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2014) 454.  
9
 Mirko Bagaric and Sharon Erbacher, ‘Causation in Negligence: From Anti-Jurisprudence to Principle – 
Individual Responsibility as the Cornerstone for the Attribution of Liability’ (2011) 18(4) Journal of Law 
and Medicine 759, 772.  
10
 Jonathan Burdon, ‘Medical Indemnity Insurance in Australia’ in Roy G. Beran (ed), Legal and Forensic 
Medicine (Springer-Verlag, 2013) 629.  
11
 See for instance Simpson v Diamond [2001] NSWSC 925 (5 November 2001) where the plaintiff was 
awarded $14,202,042 in damages for cerebral palsy caused by the defendant medical practitioner. The 
amount was reduced on appeal to $10,998,692 however the doctor’s insurance company, United Medical 
Protection Ltd went into liquidation.  
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evidence.12 In response to the alleged ‘insurance crisis’, the states and the federal government 
commissioned a review of the law of negligence, chaired by Justice David Ipp (‘Ipp Panel’).13 
The Ipp Report was released in September 2002 and contained 61 recommendations.14  
 
One challenge faced by the Ipp Panel was to create recommendations aimed to reduce 
uncertainty in the law. This was in response to submissions from community groups who 
stated their perception that ‘the net of responsibility for the consequences of negligence is 
being cast too widely’.15 In other words, courts were deemed to be too easily imposing 
liability for consequences that were only remotely connected to a defendant’s conduct. The 
Ipp Panel’s recommendations for the adoption of a statutory causation test to limit the scope 
of responsibility were subsequently implemented through legislative reform and form a 
critical part of this thesis.  
 
Another challenge faced by the Ipp Panel was to develop and evaluate proposals to limit the 
quantum of damages, in response to the perception that damages awards in personal injury 
claims were too high. This was reflected in the views of Senator Helen Coonan, a proponent 
of the reforms, who alleged the increase in insurance premiums and collapse of insurance 
companies such as HIH Insurance were ‘due in large part to the operation of the legal 
system’16 and that personal injury law was providing, ‘very generous compensation to a very 
small proportion of the population at considerable expense to the rest of the community’.17 
The Ipp Panel’s objective to limit damages awards is reflected in the recommendations 
regarding injury thresholds (limiting who has access to compensation payments) and caps on 
non-economic loss damages (limiting how much compensation is paid).  
 
The Ipp Report recommendations spanned a wide range of tort issues. Firstly, the Ipp Panel 
recommended that a national response to tort reform be enacted in a single statute in each 
                                                 
12
 Harold Luntz, ‘Reform of the Law of Negligence: Wrong Questions – Wrong Answers’ (2002) 25(3) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal  836; Peter Cashman, ‘Tort Reform and the Medical Indemnity 
“Crisis”’ (2002) 25(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 888; James J Spigelman, ‘Negligence 
and Insurance Premiums: Recent Changes in Australian Law’ (2003) 11(3) Torts Law Journal 291; Peter 
Cane, ‘Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A Personal Perspective’ (2003) 27(3) Melbourne University Law 
Review 649; Underwood, above n 2, 39.  
13
 The other three members of the Ipp Panel comprised of Professor P Cane, Associate Professor D Sheldon 
and Mr I MacIntosh. 
14
 Ipp Report, above n 4.  
15
 Ibid 116.  
16
 Helen Coonan, ‘Insurance Premiums and Law Reform – Affordable Cover and the Role of Government’ 
(2002) 25(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 819, 819.  
17
 Ibid 823. 
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jurisdiction.18 Amongst the recommendations was the adoption of a ‘Bolam’ standard of care 
for medical practitioners,19 a recommendation that duties of medical practitioners to inform 
patients should be legislatively stated,20 and insertion of statutory provisions about 
recreational services21 warning of obvious risks,22 emergency services23 and time limitations 
for bringing claims.24 With regard to negligence, the Ipp Panel recommended that principles 
regarding foreseeability, standard of care, causation and remoteness, be legislatively stated.25 
Defences of contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk were extended,26 
common law principles relating to recovery for mental harm were altered,27 and liability of 
public authorities was limited.28 Various recommendations were made regarding entitlement 
to claim for damages, including the introduction of permanent impairment thresholds and 
caps on damages.29 
 
Based on the recommendations contained in this report, each state government implemented 
law reforms affecting medical negligence and mental harm claims (Ipp Reforms). The Ipp 
Reforms were executed in two waves: one wave in 2002 predominantly affected public 
liability claims,30 whilst the second wave in 2003 affected time limitations and the law of 
negligence more broadly.31 The Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) 
Act 2002 (Vic) introduced provisions regarding intoxication and illegality, apologies, good 
Samaritans and volunteer liability. Most notably, this amending Act inserted a number of 
provisions regarding personal injury damages, including limiting damages for economic loss 
to three times average weekly earnings and a cap on damages for non-economic loss. The 
Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) implemented amendments to 
duty and standard of care, causation and mental harm, and liability of public authorities. 
                                                 
18
 Ipp Report, above n 4, 35 (Recommendation 1).  
19
 Ibid 41-42 (Recommendation 3). The Bolam test stems from the English case Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 and provides a medical practitioner is not negligent if they acted 
pursuant to opinion widely held by the medical profession.  
20
 Ipp Report, above n 4, 45-53 (Recommendations 5-7). 
21
 Ibid 62-64 (Recommendation 11). 
22
 Ibid 67-68 (Recommendation 14). 
23
 Ibid 69-70 (Recommendation 16). 
24
 Ibid 85-99 (Recommendations 23-26). 
25
 Ibid 101-119 (Recommendations 28-29). 
26
 Ibid 121-130 (Recommendations 30-32). 
27
 Ibid 135-149 (Recommendations 33-38). 
28
 Ibid 151-163 (Recommendations 39-42). 
29
 Ibid 181-227 (Recommendations 45-61). 
30
 Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Reforms) Act 2002  (Vic). 
31
 Wrongs and Limitations of Actions Act (Insurance Reform) Act 2003  (Vic) and Wrongs and Other Acts 
(Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic).  
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Finally, the Wrongs and Limitations of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003 (Vic) 
implemented significant injury thresholds, rules regarding proportionate liabi lity, and time 
limitation periods.  
 
2.2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE KEY AMENDMENTS  
It is outside the scope of this thesis to address all of the recommendations made in the Ipp 
Report in detail. The recommendations most relevant in the current context relate to 
causation, injury thresholds and caps on damages, as well as the legislative provisions 
relating to mental harm. Amongst the Ipp Panel’s recommendations was the endorsement of 
caps on damages, to limit the maximum amount of compensation payments a court could 
award. The Ipp Panel recommended a cap of $250,000 for general damages (non-economic 
loss), encompassing payments relating to loss of expectation of life, loss of amenity and pain 
and suffering.32 Subsequently, the Victorian government introduced a slightly more generous 
cap of $371,380 (to be indexed annually) for non-economic loss into the Wrongs Act.33 
Another recommendation made by the Ipp Panel was the introduction of a permanent 
impairment threshold, outlining the minimum injury percentage a plaintiff was required to 
satisfy in order to recover compensation, a threshold set at 15 per cent impairment of a most 
extreme case.34 The Victorian government implemented ‘significant injury’ thresholds, 
requiring plaintiffs to satisfy their injury exceeded a ‘more than 5 per cent’ permanent 
impairment requirement for physical and spinal injuries, and a ‘more than 10 per cent’ 
impairment for psychiatric injuries.35  
 
The ability to claim compensation for mental harm claims was also affected by the Ipp 
Reforms. The reforms limited insurer liability for mental harm claims by tightening the 
ability of plaintiffs to recover compensation through the imposition of a ‘normal fortitude’ 
requirement, increasing the threshold to be satisfied.36 In addition, a requirement that the 
plaintiff have a recognised psychiatric illness (as opposed to recognisable) was introduced. 
                                                 
32
 Ipp Report, above n 4, 186.  
33
 This was introduced into the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28G (as it then was). For a discussion on the effect 
of the damages limitation see John Chu, ‘Analysis and Evaluation of Victorian Reform in General Damages 
for Personal Injury under the Tort of Negligence’ (2007) 10(2) Deakin Law Review 12.  
34
 Ipp Report, above n 4, 193.  
35
 Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003  (Vic) s 28LB.  
36
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 72. See also Danuta Mendelson, ‘Defendants’ Liability for Pure Mental Harm to 
Third Parties in Australia: Still a Work in Progress’ (2009) 17(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 165. 
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This requirement imposes a condition that the illness must be formally recognised by an 
expert psychiatric body.37   
 
A further recommendation particularly relevant to this thesis was the adoption of a two-part 
statutory test of causation.38 The legislative test for causation was inserted into s 51 of the 
Wrongs Act and requires that the negligence must be a necessary condition of the occurrence 
of the harm (factual causation) and that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent 
person's liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability).39 A comprehensive 
analysis of the thresholds, caps on damages, mental harm provisions and the principle of 
causation are contained in this chapter.  
 
2.2.2 RESPONSE TO THE IPP REFORMS 
The composition of the Ipp Panel, preparation of the Ipp Report and the subsequent law 
reform process were questioned by many lawyers, judges and legal academics.40 The central 
criticisms related to the main driver of the reforms being lobby groups, the existence of an 
insurance crisis that could not be empirically substantiated, the lack of transparency of the 
reform process, and finally, the effects the reforms have had on plaintiffs’ rights.  
 
The first issue of concern was the driver of the legislative reforms, with many commentators 
contending the reforms were driven by insurance lobby groups to decrease insurance payouts 
rather than to alleviate an actual crisis. Justice Peter Underwood was critical of the reforms 
for this very reason, stating that the demand for legislative reform was driven not by principle 
but rather by the need to reduce insurance premiums.41 Likewise Judge Tom Wodak of the 
County Court of Victoria labelled the perceived insurance ‘crisis’ motivating the reforms a 
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 Des Butler, ‘Gifford v Strang and the New Landscape for Recovery for Psychiatric Injury in Australia’ 
(2004) 12(1) Torts Law Journal 108, 123; Christine Forster and Jeni Engel, ‘Reinforcing Historic 
Distinctions Between Mental and Physical Injury: The Impact of the Civil Liability Reforms’ (2012) 19(3) 
Journal of Law and Medicine 593, 600-601.  
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 Ipp Report, above n 4, 11-12.  
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 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 51(1). See also Genna Angelowitsch, ‘Cause for Concern: The Link Between 
Breach and Injury’ (2014) 88(11) Law Institute Journal 44.  
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Dietrich, ‘Liability for Personal Injuries Arising from Recreational Services: The Interaction of Contract, 
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‘myth’, explaining that a surge in cases prior to the implementation of the reforms was simply 
plaintiffs’ haste to bring their case to court so as to avoid the new laws.42 Chu identified five 
drivers behind the alleged crisis, contending the reform was driven by community attitude, 
common law developments of negligence, the downturn in the insurance industry cycle, the 
emergence of specialist plaintiff law firms offering ‘no win no fee’ services, and class 
actions.43 Chu asserts that the criticisms against the reforms can be grouped into the areas of 
premise, objective, rationale, process and outcome.44  
 
The Ipp Panel was not permitted to challenge the premise that negligence law was 
‘unpredictable’ or that recovering damages was ‘too easy’ and the simple objective was to 
limit the quantum of awards for damages. Davis contends the reforms arose out of insurers’ 
public campaign for tort reform which was ‘big on rhetoric but scant on facts’ and that the 
terms of reference denied the Ipp Panel the ability to ascertain the true cause of insurance 
premium increases.45 From a national report on litigation trends during the period 1995 to 
2005, Professor Wright concluded there was no empirical basis to substantiate a crisis stating, 
‘[t]here is little or no evidence of a sustained, significant increasing trend in claims prior to 
the Ipp Review’.46 
 
It was also suggested that if there were a genuine need to prevent a surge in insurance 
premiums, a solution could have been achieved through a more transparent reform process. 
Danuta Mendelson critiqued the reform process, stating that ‘[t]he process of reform has been 
hasty, and some of the profound legal and social implications of the legislation appear not to 
have been fully thought through’.47 Joachim Dietrich noted, ‘In my view, the process was 
always going to be flawed. This is because the process by which the Ipp Report’s conclusions 
and recommendations were reached was fundamentally compromised from the outset.’48 The 
composition of the Ipp Panel was also questioned, given that law reform bodies are typically 
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 Fergus Shiel, ‘Medical Negligence Crisis a Myth: Judge’, The Age (Melbourne) (2 January 2004) 
<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/01/01/1072908850982.html>. 
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 Chu, above n 33, 130-131. See also S. Stuart Clark and Christina Harris, ‘Tort Law Reform in Australia: 
Fundamental and Potentially Far-reaching Change’ (2005) 72(1) Defense Counsel Journal 16, 17. 
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 Chu, above n 33, 135.  
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 Edmund Wright, ‘National Trends in Personal Injury Litigation: Before and After ‘Ipp’’ (2006) 14 (3) 
Torts Law Journal 233, 246. 
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42 
 
staffed by lawyers. The Ipp Panel consisted of two lawyers, with the other two members from 
a local authority and the medical profession which were key stakeholder groups.49 
 
Loane Skene and Harold Luntz argued that the outcome of the report was practically given to 
the Ipp Panel. Skene and Luntz state, ‘[t]he terms of reference themselves made it clear that 
the assumptions contained in [its] preamble were unchallengeable and that the panel had in 
effect to devise ways of limiting liability and damages, but within the law of negligence’.50 It 
was contended that the Ipp Report was prepared and its recommendations implemented 
within a relatively short period, considering that the common law principles governing this 
area of law were developed over hundreds of years and had been functioning quite well.  The 
Honourable Ian Callinan, former Justice of the High Court of Australia, echoed this 
sentiment:  
 
Both the common law, and insurance business and practice, are the products of hundreds of 
years of evolutionary development. It seems rather unlikely that everything that has so 
evolved is wrong and should be discarded. When loud voices clamour for radical change it is 
usually a time for patience and caution.
51 
 
Des Butler argued, ‘The panel’s task was made difficult by the imposition of a ridiculously 
short timeframe for reporting, […] less than two months, […] and an entire absence of 
empirical evidence from the insurance industry substantiating any assertion that the industry 
was in crisis.’52 In summary, the views of esteemed legal scholars indicate that some of the 
basic assumptions underpinning the reforms were questionable.  
 
One effect of the reforms is arguably an excessive curtailment of the rights of injured 
plaintiffs. In attempting to reduce insurance premiums, the legislature limited plaintiffs’ 
rights to meritorious claims leading to potentially unfair results. The then Chief Justice of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal, James Spigelman has publicly criticised the effect of the 
legislative reforms on plaintiffs’ rights to seek compensation.53 Peter Cashman highlighted 
that the reforms have led to unfair consequences:  
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The abolishment or curtailment of the rights of innocent victims of injury negligently inflicted 
by others is neither fair nor a solution to the problem. Particularly unfair is the attempt by 
some sections of the media, aided and abetted by an army of lobbyists and public relations 
consultants engaged by the insurance industry, to blame plaintiffs and their lawyers. The real 
causes of the medical indemnity crisis are apparent to those with an interest in the reality 
rather than the rhetoric. The truth is that the current crisis has primarily arisen out of a variety 
of complex commercial and economic factors.54  
  
Following the reforms, Chu evaluated Victorian provisions for compensating non-economic 
loss due to negligence and found the overall effect of the existing regime unfair for 
individuals.55  
 
One aspect of negligence the Ipp Reforms intended to adjust was a plaintiff-centred shift in 
personal responsibility. Keeler asserts that an influential body of legal opinion had become 
critical of the common law, arguing that the standard of care imposed on defendants was too 
stringent and that levels of care imposed on plaintiffs for their own safety was too low.56 Yet, 
Stewart and Stuhmcke contend that since the 1990s tort scholars have observed a shift in 
focus of the common law towards personal responsibility.57 Through a doctrinal analysis of 
High Court negligence cases over an eleven-year period between 2000 and 2010, the authors 
found that parties who had suffered loss or damage were successful in 25 cases, compared 
with defendants who were successful in 53 cases.58 Given the commencement of actions 
before the implementation of the Ipp Reforms, only three of the cases were substantially 
affected by the civil liability reforms.59 The low levels of plaintiff success rates can be 
attributed to a change of judicial composition of the High Court bench.60 A comparable study 
by Professor Harold Luntz of decisions between 1987 and 1999 showed a 71% success rate 
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for plaintiffs in 56 appeals.61 Stewart and Stuhmcke assert their research confirms the views 
of tort law scholars that the common law had imposed greater personal responsibility on 
plaintiffs,62 and that the tort reform legislation was unnecessary.63 McDonald argues that by 
trying to impose greater personal responsibility, the legislature has permitted ‘complete 
exculpation of negligent defendants in some cases, thus undoing the advances in 
apportionment of responsibility that had been achieved by earlier legislation’.64 
 
Despite being enacted more than a decade ago, a recent Victorian government report has 
recognised that the Ipp Reforms continue to cause ongoing problems to ‘legitimate claims’ by 
imposing stringent limitations leading to denial of claims, as well as dealing with plaintiffs 
inconsistently due to anomalies in the implementation of the reforms.65 For instance, one 
anomaly is the manner in which impairment assessment is conducted under the relevant 
medical guides for spinal injury and psychiatric claims. An injury must be assessed at 10 per 
cent or more (psychiatric injury), 5 per cent or more (spinal injuries), or more than 5 per cent 
(injuries other than psychiatric or spinal injuries) to qualify for non-economic loss damages. 
The injury is assessed and converted into a whole person impairment pursuant to the 
American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (5th ed) 
(‘AMA Guides’) for physical injuries and the Guide to the Evaluation of Psychiatric 
Impairment for Clinicians (‘GEPIC’) for psychological or psychiatric injuries. These tools 
separate impairment percentages into categories or ‘classes’. For example, an impairment of 
‘more than 5 per cent’ for spinal injuries, prior to the 2015 remedial reforms, would have to 
satisfy an impairment threshold of 10 per cent, rather than 6 per cent, because the threshold 
categories increase in multiples of five. In relation to psychiatric impairment, ‘Class Two’ of 
GEPIC refers to impairment assessed at between 10 to 20 per cent, so that claimants with a 
10 per cent impairment were excluded from that category because they needed to satisfy a 
more than 10 per cent impairment.66  
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The 2015 reforms have remedied the anomalies in relation to spinal and psychiatric injuries 
by reducing the spinal injury threshold to ‘5 per cent or more’ and the psychiatric injury 
threshold to ‘10 per cent or more’. Claimants who have a physical injury, other than a spinal 
injury, are still required to satisfy a threshold of ‘more than 5 per cent’.67 Criticisms of the 
Ipp Reforms centred on the thresholds and caps being too restrictive and adversely impacting 
legitimate claims, with some commentators questioning whether the provisions conflict with 
notions of justice.68  
 
A second anomaly is the fact that similar injuries can produce different damages awards 
across the three personal injury regimes in Victoria, namely the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), the 
Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) and the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic). For 
instance, assessment of injury under the AMA Guides pursuant to the Wrongs Act regime has 
been criticised for focusing heavily on objective assessment criteria and thus failing to take 
into consideration the subjective impact of an injury on a claimant’s l ife.69 This issue is 
addressed by the transport accident and workplace accident statutory scheme through the use 
of a ‘narrative test’, which allows a subjective assessment of the impact of an injury on an 
injured person’s life.  
 
There are a number of concerns around the Ipp Report legislative changes that are surfacing 
not only in medical negligence but also in public liability claims which have a similar 
trajectory to the reform outcomes. For example, Bell-James and Barker have recently argued 
regarding public liability claims, that the legal community and policy makers must consider 
whether the Ipp Reforms were flawed and question whether a reversion to the common law 
approaches would be an appropriate solution.70 Apart from the threshold restrictions and 
limits placed on damages for non-economic loss in Victoria, problems also persist with the 
statutory principle of causation. As this is a common law principle with a lengthy judicial 
history, it warrants the more comprehensive discussion in section 2.3 of this chapter.   
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2.3 CAUSATION AND MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE  
Causation is a complex legal principle that is an essential component in establishing 
negligence. As His Honour Justice Spigelman opined, ‘Nothing is more calculated to excite a 
common lawyer, or exasperate the uninitiated, than a discussion on the subject of 
causation’.71 The term causation concerns a consequential relationship between two 
occurrences.72 The main causal question that courts are concerned with is whether an action 
has caused a specific harm, that question being relevant both to liability and to its extent.73 
The principle of causation has been described as ‘esoteric’ and ‘poorly defined’.74 It is 
therefore unsurprising that there is no universal definition that the courts have accepted. 
However, Mason CJ in March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd75 held that ‘[g]enerally speaking, 
…causal connection is established if it appears that the plaintiff would not have sustained his 
or her injuries had the defendant not been negligent’.76 
 
At common law, judges adopted the ‘but for’ test to aid in satisfying the causation 
requirement.77 The ‘but for’ test requires the court to enquire: would the plaintiff have 
sustained harm or damage but for the defendant’s negligence? For instance, in Barnett v 
Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee78 a hospital doctor was not found 
to be negligent despite refusing to examine and admit to hospital a person who had been 
vomiting after drinking tea. The patient subsequently died five hours later of arsenic 
poisoning. Causation was not satisfied because the patient would likely have died of 
poisoning even if he had been admitted to the hospital, as it was unlikely an antidote would 
have been administered in time.79 The ‘but for’ test has been criticised for its ‘seductive 
simplicity’,80 with potential to lead to a limited application. This is because the test requires a 
court to essentially question whether the plaintiff’s injuries would have been sustained but for 
the defendant’s negligence, the response requiring only a yes or no answer. This simplicity 
led the High Court of Australia (HCA) to reject the ‘but for’ test as the sole determining 
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factor proving causation in March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd.81 Mason CJ noted that the 
‘but for’ test may cause difficulties in circumstances where there are two or more acts 
sufficient to cause injury to the plaintiff.82 The High Court expanded the test to include a 
‘common sense’ approach to determine if, as a matter of common sense, the negligent act 
should be regarded as the cause of the injury. 
 
One of the effects of the Ipp Reforms was the introduction of a statutory test of causation in 
2003.83 The legislative test for causation is contained in s 51(1) of the Wrongs Act and 
requires that the plaintiff satisfy that negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence 
of the harm (factual causation) and that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent 
person’s liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability).84 The first stage of 
analysis requires the plaintiff to establish that ‘but for’ the defendant’s negligence, the 
plaintiff would not have sustained harm. In cases where there is an evidentiary gap and it is 
impossible to prove causation (for instance where multiple potential causes of the harm exist) 
the legislation includes a ‘material contribution’ test. This allows the court to make a 
normative judgment about whether liability should be imposed in the circumstances.85 In 
other words, a court can make a finding of negligence without a clear causal link between 
fault and harm.86 The second stage of analysis requires the court to determine the extent of 
the defendant’s liability in the circumstances.87 Essentially this obliges the court to decide 
whether it is fair or ‘right’ that the defendant bear the loss.88 Problems with the statutory test 
of causation are discussed in detail below. 
 
2.3.1 PROBLEMS WITH CAUSATION 
When the Ipp Reforms were implemented, the law regarding causation in negligence was not 
codified. Accordingly, the legislative provisions are subject to judicial interpretation and 
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expansion, increasing the uncertainty surrounding the principle.89 McDonald highlights the 
confusion in interpreting the statutory provisions by reference to the factual causation and 
scope of liability provisions.90 In order to explain ‘scope of liability’, the Ipp Report stated 
the term covered concepts such as ‘real cause’, ‘effective cause’, ‘remoteness of damage’ and 
‘foreseeability’.91 That definition in the Ipp Report conflicts with established common law 
principles that use terms such as the ‘reasonable foreseeability’ test to assess duty of care, 
breach of duty and remoteness of damage.92 Similarly, the Ipp Report affiliated the ‘scope of 
liability’ element with notions of common sense, yet at common law, common sense was 
affiliated with factual causation. McDonald argues that this allows for the construction that 
the statutory changes intended to alter common sense considerations of the broader ‘scope of 
liability’ element.93  
 
Susan Bartie contends that the common law approach allowed courts to mask or avoid the 
delivery of clear reasons with respect to causation and that the reforms would eliminate some 
of the uncertainty.94 Bartie discusses the influence of Jane Stapleton’s scholarly work on the 
development of causation principles, given Stapleton’s work was the only academic 
publication considered by the Ipp Panel.95 Stapleton contends that the common law principles 
did not adequately address the considerations of causation and remoteness, and that a two-
stage enquiry is not only preferable in addressing the surrounding normative issues but would 
encourage clearer judgments.96 Bartie asserts that the Ipp Reforms were intended to extend 
the causation and remoteness inquiries, and that judicial interpretation consistent with 
Stapelton’s work would expand the ‘scope of liability’ enquiry.97 
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The operation of both the factual causation and scope of liability principles have been subject 
to criticisms by legal commentators. Bagaric and Erbacher argue that, ‘causation is a poorly 
defined legal concept, leading to a large degree of uncertainty and unpredictability regarding 
the operation of the principle’.98 Due to the difficulty of using the ‘but for’ test as a sole test 
of causation, the courts must rely on the scope of liability test which lacks precision and 
clarity. Bagaric and Erbacher are critical of the scope of liability test:  
 
It is not defined with any degree of precision but rather focuses on “appropriateness” which is 
a normative concept that incorporates undefined policy considerations. It confers a broad 
judicial discretion to determine causation in individual cases by reference to idiosyncratic 
notions of “policy” and “justice”. It is no more transparent or principled than the common 
sense approach.99 
 
Manning identifies three difficulties with causation.100 The first is that the plaintiff’s adverse 
outcome may be as a result of a naturally worsening health condition rather than the breach of 
the practitioner’s duty of care. The second problem is that it may be impossible to prove the 
cause of an injury (as in mesothelioma cases) due to limits in the current state of medical 
science. The third issue relates to the ‘but for’ test being problematic in circumstances where 
there are several possible causes of an injury.101 In relation to the material contribution test 
and cases with evidential gaps, Mendelson suggests that the legislative amendments have 
made it easier for plaintiffs to bridge the causal ‘evidential gap’.102 But in doing so, the 
legislature has not succeeded in achieving clarity with the test because of the substantial 
discretion vested in the judiciary to decide causation principles on policy grounds rather than 
legal principle.103 Arguably, to vest judges with this task blurs the functions of the executive 
and the judiciary.  
 
The causation element can be particularly problematic in ‘failure to warn’ cases, which are a 
specific niche of medical negligence, involving a failure of a medical practitioner to warn the 
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patient of a material risk associated with a procedure or medication.104 In order to succeed, a 
plaintiff is required to satisfy an objective test (that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position would want to know the information) and a subjective test (that the plaintiff himself 
or herself would want to know of the risk).105 Skene and Luntz highlight that the Wrongs Act 
is at odds with the equivalent legislation of many other Australian states in failure to warn 
cases. It neglects to codify the subjective test at common law about what the plaintiff would 
have done if warned of the risk.106 Four other jurisdictions make statements by the plaintiffs 
about what they would have done inadmissible, except to the extent that the statement is 
against the plaintiff’s interest.107  
 
This lack of codification and uniformity means that the element of causation is governed by a 
broad two-part statutory test combined with common law principles, which contributes to 
uncertainty. This is supported by Davies and Malkin who note that the wide-ranging reforms 
in 2003 not only altered entitlement to damages (by placing a cap on non-economic loss) but 
also ‘affect[ed] basic common law doctrine, modifying or even eliminating judicial discretion 
that had hitherto determined when liability should be imposed’.108 Davies and Malkin further 
comment that ‘…these changes do not tame the common law’s harshness. Instead, in some 
respects, they add to its severity, at least from the vantage point of injured persons who are 
dependent on tort for compensation.’109 This issue will be explored through a discussion of 
medical negligence and mental harm case law both prior and subsequent to the Ipp Reforms. 
The cases have been included to illustrate the development and operation of common law 
principles in medical negligence and mental harm claims prior to the reforms, as well as the 
interpretation and application of legislative provisions after the Ipp Reforms.  
 
2.3.2 ROGERS V WHITAKER  
Rogers v Whitaker110 (Rogers) is a landmark decision which concerns negligence proceedings 
against an ophthalmologist for failure to disclose an inherent risk associated with a medical 
                                                 
104
 See for instance Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
105
 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434. 
106
 Skene and Luntz, above n 2, 356. 
107
 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5D(3); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(3); Civil Liability Act 
2003 (Tas) s 13(3) and Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5C(3). See also Tina Cockburn and Bill Madden, 
‘Proof of Causation in Informed Consent Cases: Establishing What the Plaintiff Would Have Done’ (2010) 
18(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 320.  
108
 Davies and Malkin, above n 80, 45. 
109
 Ibid.  
110
 (1992) 175 CLR 479.  
51 
 
procedure. The patient, Maree Whitaker, was effectively blind in her right eye and consulted 
Dr Christopher Rogers, an ophthalmic surgeon, to undergo an operation to improve the sight 
in that eye. Following the operation, Mrs Whitaker’s eyesight in her right eye did not 
improve. Instead she developed sympathetic ophthalmia, an inflammation in her left eye, 
leading to loss of sight in that eye.111 The issue on appeal in the High Court was whether Dr 
Rogers was negligent for failing to warn of a risk associated with the medical treatment, in 
this particular instance a one in 14,000 risk of the patient developing sympathetic ophthalmia. 
The High Court decided that Dr Rogers was negligent for failing to warn Mrs Whitaker of the 
risk.  
 
The significance of the Rogers decision is that it permitted actions in negligence against 
medical practitioners in ‘failure to warn’ situations and simultaneously highlighted the legal 
consequences for medical practitioners for such a failure. The policy behind the imposition of 
the duty of care in Rogers centred on the autonomy of adult patients who have the right to be 
properly informed of all risks associated with undergoing a medical procedure in order to 
decide whether to undertake that procedure.112 This policy was balanced with practical 
considerations requiring medical practitioners to adhere to onerous disclosure thresholds.113 
Ultimately, the Rogers decision privileged patient autonomy and placed the onus on medical 
practitioners to provide comprehensive disclosure.114 Whilst the judgment was not contingent 
on causation, the case is vital in establishing the rights of patients in failure to warn medical 
negligence cases. 
 
2.3.3 CHAPPEL V HART  
The High Court in Rogers focused largely on issues of medical practitioners’ duty of care and 
the materiality of the risk in question. Even when both of these factors have been satisfied a 
patient must then establish causation. Whilst the Rogers judgment did not contain much 
guidance on rules with respect to causation, a short time later the High Court was faced with 
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another medical negligence case which provided an opportunity for further articulation of the 
principles relating to causation.  
 
In Chappel v Hart115 Mrs Hart underwent an operation to remove a pharyngeal pouch in her 
oesophagus. The procedure was performed by ear, nose and throat specialist Dr Chappel. Mrs 
Hart enquired about the risks associated with the operation, particularly on her vocal cords, 
indicating her specific concern that she did not wish to end up with a voice resembling that of 
Neville Wran, former Premier of New South Wales, whose distinctively croaky voice was 
due to vocal cord damage caused by a throat infection.116 Dr Chappel warned Mrs Hart of the 
risk of perforation, but not of an infection occurring which could affect her voice.117 Mrs Hart 
contended that if she had been informed of the risk, she would not have proceeded with the 
operation, but rather, would have engaged the most experienced surgeon to conduct the 
procedure. The question on appeal concerned principles of causation.118 Counsel for Dr 
Chappel submitted that there was no causal connection between Dr Chappel’s failure to warn 
of the risks and the injury suffered by Mrs Hart. Dr Chappel’s argument was further premised 
on the basis that Mrs Hart’s claim was based on a loss of a chance to have the surgery 
performed by a more experienced surgeon as opposed to the physical injury she sustained.119 
 
Mrs Hart was successful in a split High Court decision, the court finding Dr Chappel 
negligent for failing to disclose the risk a punctured oesophagus would have on Mrs Hart’s 
vocal cords. The decision was controversial, particularly because of the consequences to the 
medical community at large in that Mrs Hart asserted an entitlement to an extremely high 
level of information and disclosure from her medical practitioner. Causation was established 
because of Mrs Hart’s evidence that had she known of the risks she would not have 
undertaken the procedure and instead would have consulted a more experienced surgeon. 
Justice Kirby delved into a detailed discussion about the principles of causation in this case. 
His Honour stressed the complexity of causation stating, ‘[e]stablishing a causal connection 
between medical negligence and the damage alleged is often the most difficult task for a 
plaintiff in medical malpractice litigation’.120  
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His Honour accepted that the ‘but for’ test remains a relevant but not exclusive criterion for 
establishing causation.121 Further, the High Court in Chappel confirmed that the test for 
causation is subjective.122 To satisfy the test, one must enquire what the particular patient 
would have done if informed of the material risk associated with the procedure. If the patient 
would have proceeded with the procedure then the medical practitioner cannot be said to have 
caused the injury to the patient.123 This creates evidential problems insofar as the subjective 
test is concerned, because plaintiffs are likely to give self-serving testimony in order to 
satisfy the test. There were several notable aspects of this case, including the endorsement of 
a subjective test of causation by the High Court of Australia and the endorsement of a 
reversed onus of proof of causation onto the defendant if the plaintiff satisfied a prima facie 
causation.124 The judgment is also significant for its emphasis on patient autonomy as a 
policy consideration.125 
 
2.3.4 ROSENBERG V PERCIVAL  
With the Rogers decision having opened doors for plaintiffs in medical negligence cases, 
numerous cases were subsequently heard involving negligent failure to warn of risks.126 In 
2001 the High Court in Rosenberg v Percival127 was once again faced with a medical 
negligence action which raised issues regarding whether a medical practitioner’s failure to 
warn caused the patient’s injury. In this instance, however, principles of causation presented 
an obstacle to the plaintiff’s likelihood of succeeding. The patient underwent elective surgery 
to her jaw to correct a dental condition. Prior to the surgery the dental surgeon, Dr 
Rosenberg, warned the patient of general risks associated with the procedure but did not warn 
her of the particular risk of temporomandibular joint disorder. The patient developed the 
disorder and sued Dr Rosenberg claiming that if she had been informed of the risk she would 
not have elected to undergo the procedure. Ultimately all five judges unanimously decided 
against the patient because she was not able to establish causation in the particular 
circumstances.  
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The High Court was required to address two issues in the appeal. The first issue was whether 
the doctor was in breach of his duty of care towards the patient. The second issue was if there 
was a breach, whether the breach caused the patient’s injuries.128 The Court established that 
the test for causation in circumstances where there is a failure to warn a patient of risks is 
subjective, requiring the Court to ask whether if warned of the risks this particular patient 
would have undertaken the surgery.129 Justice Gummow addressed the question of causation 
stating that the process involved two levels of inquiry: the first requires the risk to be related 
physically to the injury and the second requires a causal connection between the material risk 
and the injury.130 His Honour highlighted that in failure to warn cases there can never be a 
negligent physical act which truly causes an injury but rather that the legal concept of 
causation is more concerned with attributing responsibility in such instances.131  
 
Ultimately the plaintiff failed because she was unable to satisfy causation on the evidence 
provided to the court. Whilst the plaintiff testified that she would not have undergone the 
surgery had she been informed of all of the risks, such a statement is subjective and can often 
be self-serving. Chief Justice Gleeson warned of the ‘prism of hindsight’ stating that ‘[r]ecent 
judgements in this Court have drawn attention to the danger of a failure, after the event, to 
take account of the context, before or at the time of the event, in which a contingency was to 
be evaluated’.132 To overcome this, the Court suggested a number of objective factors be 
considered such as the need for the procedure, knowledge of treatment options and the 
plaintiff’s questioning of the risk.133 The decision is significant because it highlights that 
courts must carefully examine the needs of a reasonable patient, as well as the needs of the 
particular patient in the circumstances. Further, the case emphasises a patient must 
demonstrate that the failure to warn has genuinely altered the course of treatment such that 
the patient would not have undergone the treatment if warned of the risks, rather than the 
patient simply ‘reciting the formula’.134 
 
                                                 
128
 Ibid. 
129
 Ibid 443. 
130
 Ibid 460.  
131
 Ibid 460.  
132
 Ibid 441.  
133
 Ibid 442 (Gleeson CJ); 446 (McHugh J); 455 and 459 (Kirby J); See also Mendelson, above n 8, 518.  
134
 Ian Freckelton, ‘Editorial: Rogers v Whitaker Reconsidered’ (2001) 9(1) Journal of Law and Medicine 5, 
11. The article discusses the Rogers v Whitaker and Rosenberg v Percival decisions and concludes these 
judgments consolidate Australia’s distinctive emphasis upon patients’ entitlements to information to enable 
them to make informed decisions regarding their health.  
55 
 
2.3.5 ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW BETWEEN 1992 AND 2002  
The Rogers decision extended the rights of patients to sue their medical practitioners not only 
for medical negligence resulting in physical injuries but also for failure to warn of risks 
associated with medical procedures. Thomas Addison has conducted an analysis of case law 
between 1992 and 2002 to determine whether it has become easier or more difficult for 
patients to succeed in negligence claims for failure to warn.135 Addison examined 57 cases 
decided after Rogers and observed that in only seven cases the risk of harm was held not to 
be material.136 Addison concludes however that in light of decisions such as Rosenberg the 
pendulum has swung in favour of medical practitioners in that it is becoming more 
challenging for patients to establish negligence in failure to warn cases. This is largely due to 
causation being difficult to establish, and now courts tend to place more emphasis on an 
objective test evaluating how a reasonable person would have acted regarding the procedure 
if a warning had been given.137  
 
Arguably, the Rosenberg decision appeared to be the beginning of a change in medical 
litigation trends at common law. It provided the High Court with an opportunity to review the 
state of the law and address whether the burden placed on medical practitioners was too high. 
Justice Kirby in Rosenberg took the opportunity to highlight the practical considerations 
raised in response to the Rogers decision which centre mainly on whether it is unreasonable 
to expect medical practitioners to communicate to patients every single risk associated with a 
procedure.138 Ultimately his Honour noted that the practical considerations do not affect the 
legal principle established in Rogers. Case law relating to medical negligence and mental 
harm claims following the Ipp Reforms is outlined in section 2.5 below.  
2.4 LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MENTAL HARM  
Pure mental harm (sometimes referred to as psychiatric harm or nervous shock) is a niche of 
negligence where the plaintiff suffers no physical injury, but is left with purely psychological 
injuries as a result of the defendant’s negligence.139 Historically, legal principles regarding 
psychological injury were slower to develop than those regarding physical injuries, with 
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courts reluctant to recognise such an action.140 The law of mental harm has been described as 
‘marching with medicine but in the rear and limping a little’141 and the remedies developing 
‘slowly, cautious step by cautious step’142 and these metaphors reflect the reality of the slow-
moving development of the law of mental harm.  
 
In Australia, the ability to claim compensation for mental harm was initially limited by 
English authority.143 In Victorian Railway Commissioners v Coultas144 a couple travelling in 
a horse-drawn carriage passed a set of railway tracks, and the woman feared their cart would 
be struck by the train. The Privy Council held the woman’s mental harm was too remote from 
the incident. Subsequently, the High Court adopted a similar restrictive approach in Chester v 
Council of Municipality of Waverley145 where a mother suffered nervous shock upon seeing 
her child’s body lifted out of a trench. The defendant council had failed to erect a fence 
around the trench. The High Court held that the plaintiff could not recover damages as the 
harm was unforeseeable, given the plaintiff did not directly perceive the incident causing 
death.  
 
It was not until 1970 that the High Court allowed damages to be recovered for nervous 
shock.146 In Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey147 the respondent witnessed two co-workers who 
were burned in an electric accident and later developed a form of schizophrenia. The 
respondent did not directly witness the traumatic incident nor did he know the victims 
involved. In finding in favour of the respondent, the High Court determined the case on 
principles of foreseeability, holding it was not necessary to foresee the precise injury, but 
rather merely the class of injury.148 
 
A significant turning point in the field of mental harm occurred in 1984 in Jaensch v 
Coffey149 when a wife suffered nervous shock as a result of witnessing her husband in 
hospital following a car accident where the husband had sustained serious injuries. Despite 
                                                 
140
 Bernadette Richards and Melissa De Zwart, Tort Law Principles (Lawbook Co, 2
nd
 ed, 2017) 238. 
141
 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 at 395, per Windeyer J.  
142
 Ibid 403. 
143
 Victorian Railway Commissioners v Coultas (1888) 13 AC 222. 
144
 Ibid.  
145
 (1939) 62 CLR 1. 
146
 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383. 
147
 Ibid. 
148
 Ibid 390.  
149
 (1984) 155 CLR 549. 
57 
 
the wife not being present at the scene of the accident the High Court permitted recovery on 
the basis that she had witnessed the aftermath of the incident. In order to establish causation, 
the plaintiff was required to prove they had suffered a single shock (a subjective test) but this 
was qualified by an objective requirement that a reasonable person of normal fortitude would 
also have suffered a shock. Following this decision, mental harm principles remained 
relatively stable, with courts requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a sudden sensory perception 
of the accident or its aftermath.  
 
The legal principles established in Jaensch were reviewed almost two decades later when the 
High Court simultaneously heard two nervous shock cases. In Tame v New South Wales150 
Mrs Tame claimed she suffered a nervous shock upon being told that a police officer had 
negligently recorded her blood alcohol result so that it was the same as that of another driver, 
when in fact Mrs Tame’s blood alcohol reading was zero. Annetts v Australian Stations Pty 
Ltd151 involved a boy who was employed as a jackaroo in a remote part of Australia. The 
boy’s parents were reassured by the boy’s employer that he would be safe , but instead he was 
sent to work in an even more remote area where he died. The boy’s parents suffered nervous 
shock upon being told of the boy’s death. Given neither of the factual circumstances fell into 
the nervous shock categories of direct sensory perception or witnessing the aftermath of an 
accident, the cases provided the High Court with an opportunity to review mental harm 
principles.  
 
The control mechanisms prior to Tame and Annetts consisted of the need for a recognisable 
psychiatric illness, the need for reasonable foreseeability, a requirement that the plaintiff be 
of normal fortitude and the controls of direct perception and sudden shock.152 The first 
control of the plaintiff needing to establish that he or she is suffering from a recognisable 
psychiatric illness remained unaltered so as to distinguish and prevent plaintiffs seeking 
damages for pure ‘emotional distress’.153 The requirement that the plaintiff be a person of 
normal fortitude was rejected by the High Court as being a ‘separate and definitive test of 
liability disqualifying a plaintiff with a particular susceptibility to nervous shock from 
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recovery’.154  In addition, the control of direct perception was strictly rejected with the Court 
being persuaded by the ‘anomalous, illogical and unjust results ensuing from their 
application’.155 The need for sudden shock was also discarded, with the focus being on the 
illness rather than the manner in which the illness was sustained.156   
 
The High Court held the test of ‘reasonable foreseeability’ as central to determination of 
whether a duty of care is owed157 and lowered the requirements of ‘normal fortitude’ and 
‘sudden shock’ from prerequisites to mere considerations. Ultimately the High Court decided 
Mrs Tame’s psychological injury from a clerical error was not reasonably foreseeable. The 
Annetts’ appeal was allowed. The High Court’s decision was significant because it widened 
the scope of liability and made it easier for plaintiffs to seek compensation for mental harm 
sustained as a result of the defendant’s negligence. This decision was ‘greeted with some 
alarm’158 by policy makers given the decision was handed down at the time of an alleged 
insurance crisis. Subsequently in Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring159 three children 
claimed to have suffered a psychiatric injury after learning of their father’s death. The father 
had been crushed by a forklift at work. In finding the employer did owe a duty of care to the 
children, the High Court clarified that reasonable foreseeability was not the only criterion for 
determination of mental harm following Tame and Annetts and that the other restrictions 
continued to apply.  
 
2.4.1 PROBLEMS WITH LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS IN MENTAL HARM CLAIMS 
As part of the Terms of Reference, the Ipp Panel was required to inquire into the application, 
effectiveness and operation of common law principles applied in negligence to limit liability 
including the formulation of duties and standards of care such as in claims for mental 
harm.160 In relation to mental harm claims, the Ipp Report contained the following 
recommendations:  
(a) The plaintiff’s mental harm must consist of a recognised psychiatric illness; 
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(b) No duty of care is owed unless the defendant foresaw that a person of normal 
fortitude might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness.  
(c) Various matters be taken into account such as whether the mental harm was sustained 
through a sudden shock or whether the plaintiff was at the scene where the shocking 
events occurred.161  
 
This recommendation is reflected in s 72 of the Wrongs Act which addresses circumstances 
where a duty of care is owed in mental harm cases. In order to succeed, a plaintiff must 
satisfy the court that due to the defendant’s failure to take care, it was reasonably foreseeable 
that a personal of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised 
psychiatric illness.162 Section 72(2) of the Wrongs Act provides that the “circumstances of the 
case” include the following:  
(a) whether or not the mental harm was suffered as the result of a sudden shock;  
(b) the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put in danger;  
(c) the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any person killed, injured 
or put in danger; and  
(d) whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant.163  
Similarly to Victoria, legislation in New South Wales, South Australia, the ACT, Western 
Australia and Tasmania imposes ‘normal fortitude’ and ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ 
requirements.164 In contrast to Victoria, the common law continues to govern mental harm 
principles in Queensland and the Northern Territory.  
 
Section 73 of the Wrongs Act imposes a limitation by providing that a plaintiff is not entitled 
to recover for pure mental harm (as opposed to consequential mental harm) unless the 
plaintiff witnessed the scene where the victim was being killed, injured or put in danger, or 
the plaintiff is or was in a close relationship with the victim.165 Section 74 imposes a further 
limitation, in relation to recovery for consequential mental harm. The plaintiff cannot claim 
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compensation unless the defendant foresaw that a person of normal fortitude might suffer the 
harm, or the defendant knew that the plaintiff was a person of less than normal fortitude.166 
 
The statutory provisions relating to mental harm are problematic for several reasons. The first 
is the imposition of the ‘normal fortitude’ requirement (an objective test) that increases the 
threshold that has to be satisfied. This is a departure from the common law position in Tame 
and Annetts where the High Court had reduced the ‘normal fortitude’ rule as a consideration 
not a prerequisite. A further problem is the use of the term ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ 
which seems to impose a higher threshold than the common law term ‘recognisable 
psychiatric illness’. The term ‘recognised’ seems to impose a requirement that the illness be 
formally recognised by psychiatric experts compared with a situation where a plaintiff suffers 
a psychiatric condition (which may indeed exist) but may not have a recognised name.167 
Further, the legislation addresses the principle of breach of duty but does not give any 
guidance as to interpretation and application of principles of causation in the context of 
mental harm. Mendelson comments on this issue:  
 
It is unfortunate that statutory provisions relating to recovery of damages for negligently 
occasioned mental harm, while focusing on the duty of care and thresholds to recovery of 
damages, fail to explicitly instruct the courts that establishing breach of duty and causation 
are also essential elements of liability.
168  
The consequence in having this gap is that neither the common law nor the statutory 
provisions govern this area of law in its entirety. It has the potential to lead to inconsistent 
application of the law and to an increase in complexity in negligence cases for pure mental 
harm.  
 
The restrictions imposed on mental harm claims, that is ‘normal fortitude’, ‘recognised 
psychiatric illness’ and the need to satisfy a significant injury threshold of ‘10 per cent or 
more’ which is double that of physical injury, illustrate the law’s discriminatory treatment of 
psychological injuries. The stringent requirements recommended by the Ipp Panel have been 
widely adopted in legislative provisions and reflect the longstanding suspicion with which the 
law treats psychological injury. Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Western 
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Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory have provisions outlining 
circumstances where a duty of care is owed, requiring the plaintiff be of ‘normal fortitude’ 
and that the plaintiff must sustain a ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ .169 In Queensland and the 
Northern Territory, common law principles apply. A comparison of mental harm provisions 
in the Australian jurisdictions is contained in Appendix 6. 
 
The Ipp Panel acknowledged the law has made it more difficult for plaintiffs in mental harm 
claims: firstly, that psychiatric injury is difficult to diagnose objectively; secondly, that it may 
be difficult to foresee the number of people who suffer mental harm (as opposed to physical 
harm) from one single act of negligence and thirdly, due to resource limitations it is deemed 
more important to compensate people for physical rather than psychological injury.170 Forster 
and Engel are critical that the effects of the Ipp Reforms seem to have magnified the 
distinction between physical and mental harm.171 They highlight that the impact and costs of 
mental injuries on society are significant, particularly given that treatment of mental injuries 
can be long-term and often requires ongoing use of medication and professional assistance.172 
The impact of mental harm can be debilitating for an aggrieved individual and also more 
widely for society.173 Forster and Engel contend that mental injuries are costly to society, 
both directly through ongoing need for professional consultation and medication, and 
indirectly through reduced employment prospects for sufferers.174 These problems highlight 
the need to revist this issue by the legislature to achieve an ‘effective compensatory 
framework [that] could reduce the direct and indirect impacts and costs of mental injury’.175 
2.5 CASE LAW SUBSEQUENT TO LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION  
Assessing case law trends in the post-Ipp era demonstrates how the amendments stemming 
from these reforms have impacted upon litigation of medical negligence and mental harm 
claims. In 2006, the Law Council of Australia commissioned a report on the litigation trends 
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before and after the Ipp Reforms.176 In a report on national litigation trends during the period 
1995 to 2005, Professor Wright concluded that ‘data indicates in most jurisdictions that there 
has been an appreciable (in some States, dramatic) decline in litigation since the 
implementation of the Ipp Review-inspired reforms’.177 The Victorian trends show a 
‘dramatic’ decline with Victoria being the lowest claiming state.178 Several appellate court 
decisions are drawn upon to illustrate the ongoing issues affecting medical negligence and 
mental harm claims following the Ipp Reforms.  
 
2.5.1 WALLACE V KAM 
In 2013, the High Court was faced with a medical negligence case for failure to warn. In 
Wallace v Kam179 the patient consulted Dr Kam (a neurosurgeon) with respect to a lumbar 
spine condition. The patient underwent surgery which held two risks: the first risk involved 
nerve damage as a result of lying down on the operating table for an extended period of time 
and the second risk was permanent paralysis due to damage to the spinal nerve. The first risk, 
the less catastrophic of the two, eventuated. Mr Wallace initiated negligence proceedings 
against Dr Kam for failure to warn him of both risks. Mr Wallace was unsuccessful at trial 
and in his appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal. His appeal to the High Court was 
also dismissed. The High Court considered principles of causation under s 5D of the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW) which is essentially a replica of s 51 of the Wrongs Act. The High 
Court focused on the scope of liability element, deciding it would not be appropriate to find 
Kam negligent in circumstances where if Mr Wallace had been warned of the risk he would 
have been prepared to accept that risk.180 The decision in Wallace has been described by 
Thomas Faunce as continuing a judicial trend to ‘go cool’ on patients’ rights in medical 
negligence cases.181 
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2.5.2 ODISHO V BONNAZI  
Following the 2013 Wallace decision, the Victorian Court of Appeal was faced with a failure 
to warn case in 2014. The appellant in Odisho v Bonazzi182 suffered from abnormally heavy 
bleeding and was prescribed tranexamic acid for this condition by specialist gynaecologist 
Marcia Bonazzi. As a result of a side effect of the tranexamic acid the appellant developed 
multiple pulmonary emboli which involve a blockage of blood vessels. The appellant’s 
counsel argued Dr Bonazzi failed to warn her of the risk of developing the pulmonary embol i. 
The Victorian Court of Appeal dismissed Ms Odisho’s appeal. The court specifically 
addressed principles of causation under the Wrongs Act. In this regard the court was not 
satisfied that even if warned of the risk, Ms Odisho would have declined the treatment. An 
application for special leave to the High Court on the point of causation was dismissed on 15 
October 2014.183 The case demonstrates that causation can be an unjust obstacle in 
circumstances where the plaintiff can satisfy a breach of duty of care but is unable to satisfy 
the subjective test that she would have been deterred from taking the medication based on the 
warning.  
 
2.5.3 OVERVIEW OF RECENT CASES  
In King v Western Sydney Local Health Network184 the plaintiff, a pregnant woman, attended 
hospital where doctors were informed that the woman’s daughter had been diagnosed with 
chickenpox. Doctors decided not to administer a vaccine to the plaintiff, who subsequently 
contracted chickenpox, a virus that can inhibit foetal development. The plaintiff’s baby was 
born with Congenital Varicella Syndrome. The plaintiff claimed that had she been given the 
vaccine at her initial hospital attendance, she would not have contracted chickenpox and thus 
the injuries sustained by the baby would have been prevented. The plaintiff was unsuccessful 
at both the trial and on appeal, due to being unable to satisfy factual causation. The Court of 
Appeal found that the plaintiff was only able to satisfy a possible material increase in risk, 
which was insufficient to satisfy the threshold on the balance of probabilities.  
 
The Court of Appeal considered the application of the ‘but for’ test in Carangelo v State of 
New South Wales.185 The case concerned an action for mental harm by a police officer, 
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alleging he had suffered psychiatric injury in the course of his employment. Specifically, the 
appellant claimed the failure to offer pastoral care and support, and/or to recommend him to a 
private psychiatrist caused the injury. The Court of Appeal considered the Ipp Report 
recommendations regarding causation, including factual causation, increased risks, material 
contribution and the scope for application of the exceptional case provision.186 The court 
highlighted the limitations of the ‘but for’ test where there is more than one sufficient 
condition to the occurrence of the plaintiff’s injuries.187 Ultimately, the court found that the 
evidence did not support a finding of a connection between the failure to offer psychiatric 
support and the psychiatric injury.188 The court further held that the circumstances of this 
case did not constitute an ‘exceptional case’ to which the material contribution test could 
apply.189  
 
The scope of liability element has also been judicially considered by the NSW Court of 
Appeal, in Paul v Cooke,190 a case involving a failure to diagnose an aneurysm on the 
appellant’s computerised tomography (CT) scan in 2003. The appellant underwent surgery in 
2006 where the aneurysm burst during the operation. The appellant was unsuccessful because 
the court found it was not appropriate to extend liability to Dr Cooke for risks inherent in the 
condition rather than in the delay of diagnosis. In other words, Dr Cooke’s negligence 
changed the timing of the surgery but did not affect the inherent risk associated with it. This 
case is an example where a plaintiff can satisfy that a medical practitioner has breached a 
duty of care, but that breach has not caused the injury. An appeal for special leave to the 
HCA on the issue of causation was denied.191  
 
Apart from causation, the legislative provisions relating to mental harm have also been 
subjected to judicial interpretation. For instance, in King v Philcox192 the plaintiff was the 
brother of a victim killed in a motor vehicle collision. The plaintiff drove past the scene 
several times without realising the victim was his brother. He subsequently realised he had 
driven past the location of the accident whilst his brother was trapped inside a vehicle. The 
plaintiff developed a major depressive disorder. On appeal, the HCA set aside an award of 
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damages awarded by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia and held that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages because he was not at the scene of the accident 
when the death occurred within the meaning of s 53(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA). The wording of the South Australian provision is similar to s 72 of the Wrongs Act, so 
that the High Court’s decision would apply to cases decided under Victorian legislation. 
However, the High Court acknowledged the difference in the wording between the South 
Australian provision and the NSW provision which requires the plaintiff to be ‘present at the 
scene of the accident when the accident occurred’.193 Given the similarities between the NSW 
and Victorian provisions, there is also scope for Victorian cases to distinguish this decision 
when interpreting mental harm provisions.194  
 
A NSW decision demonstrates how the thresholds on non-economic loss have impacted upon 
recovery of compensation in medical negligence and mental harm claims. In Sorbello v South 
Western Sydney Local Health Network; Sultan v South Western Sydney Local Health 
Network195 the plaintiffs were parents of a child born with a severe intellectual disability due 
to oxygen deprivation at birth. The hospital conceded elements of duty, breach and causation 
so those elements were not in issue; however, an issue relevant to this thesis was the quantum 
of damage. Schmidt J assessed non-economic loss for the mother at 35 per cent of the 
maximum cap196 whereas the father was assessed at 20 per cent.197 This case serves to 
highlight the problems with the cap on non-economic loss damages, and shows the maximum 
cap is only likely to be received in cases where plaintiffs have sustained a significant injury 
of the most serious kind. 
 
These cases illustrate that appellate courts’ interpretation of the statutory test of causation 
was presenting as a barrier to plaintiffs, particularly in circumstances where plaintiffs are able 
to satisfy a breach of duty of care but fail at the causal hurdle. The cases also highlight 
problems with mental harm provisions and caps on damages. It is therefore important to 
identify a coherent legal response to the regulation of personal injury and this is explored 
through the lens of corrective justice theory in this chapter.  
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2.6 2015 LEGISLATIVE REFORMS  
On 30 May 2013, VCEC undertook an enquiry into aspects of the Wrongs Act in response to 
the concern that the law had imposed ‘unreasonable barriers’ and ‘limitations’ to legitimate 
personal injury claims.198 The scope of the enquiry was to identify and make 
recommendations to address any anomalies, inequities or inconsistencies in the Act relating 
to personal injury damages, without undermining the objectives of major tort reforms in 2002 
and 2003.199 This included addressing limits placed on damages for economic and non-
economic loss, impairment thresholds imposed in relation to damages for non-economic loss, 
discount rates for lump sum damages for future economic loss and limitations on damages for 
gratuitous attendant care.200  
 
VCEC consulted numerous stakeholders who identified factors that led to people missing out 
on ‘fair’ compensation for economic and non-economic losses or produced inconsistencies in 
outcomes for similarly injured parties under the Victorian compensation regimes.201 The Law 
Institute of Victoria highlighted the unfairness to VCEC with an example of a boy who was 
denied compensation for non-economic loss because the Medical Panel assessed the boy’s 
injury at less than 5 per cent, despite the injury requiring surgery and a lengthy recovery 
time.202 The terms of reference specifically excluded VCEC from revisiting the underlying 
objectives of the previous tort law reforms or from assessing their overall impact on the 
effectiveness of the reforms, their impact on economic efficiency, or their impact on equity or 
fairness.203 While implicitly acknowledging the problems presented by the Ipp Reforms, the 
legislature nevertheless directed VCEC to steer clear of re-opening the debate relating to the 
previous decade’s reforms.  
 
VCEC’s report contained three overarching recommendations: (1) a decrease in significant 
injury thresholds and an increase in the maximum amount of damages to address anomalies, 
inequities and inconsistencies in the limitations on damages for personal injury or death; (2) 
the introduction of prescribed forms to reduce transaction costs and improve equity; and (3) 
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that section 31 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) be amended to allow for recovery of damages 
for mental harm caused by an aircraft accident only in circumstances where personal or 
property damage is also caused by the aircraft.204 The first of these overarching 
recommendations (Recommendation 7.1) is most relevant to this thesis. In this regard, VCEC 
recommended that the Victorian government amend the Wrongs Act to allow for a more 
generous impairment threshold for damages for non-economic loss to 10 per cent or greater 
for psychiatric injuries, and 5 per cent or greater for spinal injuries, and to increase the 
maximum amount of damages that may be awarded to a claimant.205  
 
VCEC recommended a ‘modest’ reform package, balancing the need to address anomalies, 
inconsistencies and inequities but without adversely increasing the cost of insurance. In 
relation to non-economic loss, VCEC made the following recommendations:206  
 a reduction of the impairment threshold for spinal and psychiatric injuries; 
 an increase to the maximum cap on non-economic loss damages; 
 the cap on economic loss to apply to pre- and post-injury earnings;  
 in claims for loss of expectation of financial support, deductions for the deceased 
person’s expenses are to be made before applying the cap on economic loss; 
 a limited entitlement for loss of capacity to care for others; 
 the impairment assessment for spinal injuries take into account the claimant’s post-
surgery condition (rather than pre-surgery); 
 common law claims arising from the use of a motor vehicle are subject to the Wrongs 
Act limitations.  
On 18 November 2015, amendments were made to the Wrongs Act.207 The amendments were 
in response to VCEC’s 2014 Final Report titled Adjusting the Balance: Inquiry into Aspects 
of the Wrongs Act 1958 (‘VCEC Report’).208 The purpose of the changes was to make 
damages more accessible by lowering the impairment threshold for psychiatric and spinal 
injuries, and by increasing the damages cap for non-economic loss. The Wrongs Amendment 
Act 2015 (Vic) implemented the majority of the changes recommended by VCEC.209 The 
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Victorian Government did not adopt the recommendation to make common law motor 
vehicle claims subject to the limitations in the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) nor the 
recommendation to assess degree of impairment for spinal injuries based on the claimant’s 
post-surgery condition. The amended provisions commenced operation on 19 November 
2015. 
 
One of the key amendments was an alteration to s 28LB of the Wrongs Act decreasing the 
impairment threshold level.210 The section reads as follows:  
threshold level means –   
(a) in the case of injury (other than psychiatric injury or spinal injury), impairment of 
more than 5 per cent;  
(b) in the case of psychiatric injury, impairment of 10 per cent or more;  
(c) in the case of spinal injury, impairment of 5 per cent or more. 
 
The threshold for spinal injuries was reduced from ‘more than 5 per cent’ to ‘5 per cent or 
more’. The change with respect to spinal injuries has potential to have significant impact 
because of the way an injury is assessed pursuant to the AMA Guides. All other physical 
injuries continue to be assessed at more than 5 per cent whole person impairment.211 A 
similar amendment was made to the threshold for psychiatric injury, reducing it from ‘more 
than 10 per cent’ to ‘10 per cent or more’.212 However, the change to psychiatric injury may 
not have such a significant impact given it applies only to primary psychiatric injury, such as 
nervous shock. VCEC acknowledged this amendment would apply in limited cases.213  
 
A separate amendment increased the non-economic damages cap from $371,380 to $577,050, 
with that figure indexed annually.214 This is an increase of approximately $60,000, given the 
indexed figure was $518,300 as at 1 July 2015. This amendment is likely to only impact 
serious physical injuries at the higher end of the limit such as paraplegia, quadriplegia and 
severe cognitive impairment. The Act also amended the calculation of the cap on economic 
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loss, altering it to three times the average weekly earnings and removing the requirement to 
‘disregard’ earnings above the cap of three times average weekly earnings.215  
 
VCEC considered the introduction of a ‘narrative test’ to assist claimants whose claims might 
otherwise fall below the threshold.216 The narrative test is used under the Accident 
Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) and Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), and allows a 
subjective assessment of the impact an injury has had on a plaintiff.217 For instance, it enables 
assessment of the long-term effects on a person’s quality of life, including occupational, 
financial, social, domestic and psychological effects.218 VCEC rejected the narrative test due 
to a risk that over time it may result in plaintiffs receiving compensation for unmeritorious 
claims.219 VCEC did not provide evidence of extensive consideration of this reform proposal, 
save for consideration of submissions from three stakeholders, nor did VCEC provide 
comprehensive reasons for rejecting the proposal. The essence of the rejection was premised 
on three factors: first, existing chapters of the AMA Guides already include an allowance for 
pain; second, if the narrative test was implemented, it could lead to adverse effects on 
insurance premiums with the increase of compensation and third, it could lead to increased 
court and administrative costs.220 Ultimately, the reforms recommended by VCEC to increase 
impairment thresholds by one per cent were conservative in order to avoid adversely 
impacting on costs.221  
 
The 2015 reforms raise important questions about whether the amendments are sufficient to 
address the ‘harshness’ of the existing legislation or whether the removal of certain 
restrictions will increase litigation to the point that insurance companies will  again complain 
of an unfair financial burden. Despite the remedial nature of the 2015 amendments, the 
imposition of permanent injury thresholds and caps on non-economic loss damages are 
excessively restrictive to the detriment of injured persons dependent on the legal system for 
compensation. It is important to recognise that keeping insurance premiums low is necessary 
to allow various stakeholders to obtain affordable insurance, however restricting 
compensation harshly can also have undesirable financial consequences by placing a 
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financial burden on the welfare system to assist the injured who are unable to recover 
compensation. Some commentators have argued that locking out a portion of claimants 
because they do not satisfy thresholds may also be contrary to human rights provisions.222 
The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) provides for the equal 
protection of the law without discrimination223 giving rise to an argument that the current 
Wrongs Act provisions are discriminatory against claimants who rely on non-economic 
damages. Further, the thresholds are restrictive in excluding claimants who fail to meet the 
permanent injury thresholds, even by a small margin. In circumstances where the imposition 
of thresholds and caps is potentially discriminatory, it is relevant to consider compensation 
alternatives such as a no-fault scheme that allows claimants to be compensated equally.  
2.7 COMPENSATION ALTERNATIVES – NO-FAULT SCHEME  
Given the challenges that continue to exist in medical negligence and mental harm litigation, 
an alternative means of compensating victims including the no-fault statutory scheme in New 
Zealand (NZ) is worthy of consideration. Introduced in 1972, the no-fault scheme provides 
compensation to those harmed by accidents without the need to pursue fault-based 
litigation.224 In this regard it is similar to the no-fault transport accident and workplace 
schemes already operating in Victoria.225 The scheme is administered by the Accident 
Compensation Corporation under the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Act 2001 (NZ). Funding is drawn from various sources including employees, the New 
Zealand Government, and taxes on petrol and vehicle registrations.226 In order to receive 
compensation for medical negligence, an injured person must show they have suffered a 
‘treatment injury’.227 A treatment injury is defined as a personal injury suffered by a person 
seeking or receiving treatment from a health professional, caused by treatment and is not a 
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necessary part or ordinary consequence of the treatment.228 The NZ legislation also requires 
proof of causation between treatment and injury, stating that treatment injury does not include 
‘personal injury that is wholly or substantially caused by a person’s underlying health 
condition’.229 However, the courts have allowed drawing an inference of a causal nexus 
between treatment and injury, even if not medically proven.230  
 
The benefits of NZ’s no-fault scheme have prompted commentators to question whether 
Australia should adopt a similar system. Weisbrot and Breen are critical of the present 
Australian fault-based tort system which is ‘slow, costly, inefficient, stressful and often 
inequitable and unpredictable means of assisting people harmed through medical care.’ 231 
They argue that the Productivity Commission should conduct an enquiry into the merits of 
moving to a no-fault scheme for all medical injuries.232 Some of the benefits of a no-fault 
system include more predictable care and support, more consistent coverage of all injured 
people regardless of the particular circumstances of the injury and a more efficient system.233 
Criticisms of the no-fault system centre on the fact that compensation can be lower than 
under a fault-based scheme and thus claimants may be financially worse off under a no-fault 
system. In addition, there are compelling arguments around the potential costs of a no-fault 
scheme given the likely rise in the number of claimants who would receive compensation and 
the issue of who will pay for this increase.234 Yet the recent introduction of the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in Australia provides a useful guide on adoption of a no-
fault scheme, without excessive cost to the community. The NDIS is funded through 
government revenue (including a diversion of all usual disability services funding to the 
NDIS) and an increase to the Medicare levy.235  
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Insofar as mental harm is concerned, the NZ scheme permits recovery of compensation only 
if the mental injury is suffered as a consequence of physical injury.236 The plaintiff also has to 
show the mental injury (arising from the physical injury) was a clinically significant 
behavioural, cognitive or psychological dysfunction.237 The restrictions under the scheme are 
analogous to recovery for ‘consequential mental harm’ and the need for the injury to be a 
‘recognised psychiatric illness’ under Australian law. The NZ scheme excludes recovery for 
pure mental harm without accompanying physical injury. Plaintiffs are also unable to claim 
compensation in ‘secondary victim’ circumstances, such as witnessing harm to others. 
Thwaites posits that seeking compensation at common law is particularly difficult for 
secondary victim claimants.238 Therefore, despite the advantages of the NZ scheme, it does 
not entirely eliminate the disparity between physical and psychological injuries. 
 
The obvious benefit under the NZ scheme is that plaintiffs have the entitlement to basic 
compensation not only for their physical injuries but also for psychological injuries in limited 
circumstances. Additionally, the no fault scheme means an applicant need not litigate, thus 
saving them the stress of a trial. This may be particularly important for those suffering a 
mental health illness as the experience of litigation can be distressing and may mean a litigant 
is revictimised by the experience of court.239 For instance, a longitudinal study of 332 
Australian hospital patients examined whether claiming for compensation after injury is 
associated with poor health outcomes.240 The study found that stress associated with the 
claims process following injury is linked to long-term disability.241 A separate aspect of the 
same study examined claimant experiences in compensation processes, and found that claims 
processes are the primary facilitators of access to justice for injured persons.242 Further, tools 
for assessing compensation sums such as the AMA Guides were intended to foster accuracy, 
predictability and consistency of decision-making, yet claimants perceive such tools to be 
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‘dehumanising and insensitive’.243 The findings of this study support the premise that 
administrative systems in personal injury should strive to grant claimants access to 
compensation in a straightforward manner, without being overly complex, time-consuming 
and confusing. Given the advantages of no fault schemes, there is potential to explore 
whether litigation avoidance and a simpler claims process assist claimants to experience a 
more ‘just’ resolution of their claim, and further, it may assist with the development and 
evaluation of a more adequate claims system in Victoria.  
2.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has amalgamated tort law literature and a doctrinal analysis of legislation and 
case law on the topic of medical negligence and mental harm claims, to explain the 
development of the law in this area and to highlight the level of concern that these tort policy 
reforms have merited. The analysis has shown that many legal academics are of the view that 
the Ipp Reforms were hastily implemented without proper empirical underpinning or 
community consultation. The Ipp Reforms have impacted upon the ability of plaintiffs to 
succeed in meritorious negligence proceedings by placing restrictions such as permanent 
injury thresholds, caps on damages and the statutory causation test. The 2015 reforms by the 
Victorian legislature were indicative of a need to reform the area of personal injury 
compensation, yet the reforms were relatively conservative. Case law demonstrates ongoing 
restrictions in compensating claimants in medical negligence and mental harm claims, 
supporting the researcher’s decision to undertake qualitative research on this topic and to 
interview lawyers and judges with medical negligence experience to gather their views on the 
challenges presented by the current legislative framework. Further, given that all claims 
brought by injured individuals in Victorian courts will be subjected to ADR processes prior to 
trial, the next chapter will comprehensively explore the use of mediation in medical 
negligence disputes.  
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CHAPTER 3 – MEDIATION OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND MENTAL HARM 
DISPUTES  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Over the past few decades in Australia and internationally, the legal practice landscape has 
changed considerably with the increase of dispute resolution avenues other than litigation. In 
Australia this increase is evident in many legal fields and dispute types, including family, 
government and civil disputes.1 In medical negligence, ADR is deeply entrenched within the 
dispute resolution culture, with court practice directions encouraging parties to resolve their 
disputes without the need for trial.2 The privileging of ADR as the primary method of dispute 
resolution is apparent in legislation which imposes an overarching purpose for a ‘just, 
efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute’.3 Likewise, judicial 
officers are now expressly empowered to use ADR as a case management tool to encourage 
efficient resolution of disputes.4 Proponents advocate for increased use of ADR because it 
offers a speedier, cost effective and less adversarial method of dispute resolution than 
traditional adversarial avenues. Despite the benefits, some scholars question whether ADR 
poses a threat to the adversarial system, particularly to the doctrine of precedent, and whether 
mandatory imposition threatens the voluntary nature of parties’ participation in ADR.5 
Notwithstanding such criticisms, recent government reports have further endorsed the 
trajectory of increased use of ADR in Australia.6 
 
Alternative avenues of dispute resolution, such as mediation, are an integral part of medical 
negligence disputes. Medical negligence disputes often involve a medical error that entails a 
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breach of trust between a doctor and a patient, frequently giving rise to an emotionally heated 
dispute. Less adversarial arenas are therefore more appropriate forums for the resolution of 
medical negligence disputes, allowing for an explanation, an expression of regret, sympathy 
or emotional closure.7 Given that the shadow of the law influences the choice and use of 
dispute resolution avenues,8 it is important to explore whether the Ipp Reforms have had any 
impact on the mediation of medical negligence disputes and whether any challenges occur in 
practice.  
 
This chapter explores the role of lawyers in influencing the mediation process, as well as 
highlighting the potential benefits of addressing emotion in medical negligence disputes. This 
chapter will first define mediation, describe its historical development in Australia and 
explore its importance as a dispute resolution mechanism. This is followed by a discussion of 
the current use of court-connected mediation as a tool for resolving disputes prior to trial, as 
well as a focus on the role of lawyers, and an exploration of the potential to address emotion 
in the mediation process. Next the discussion centres on the use of mediation in medical 
negligence and mental harm disputes, and outlines previous empirical studies in this context. 
Finally, the chapter addresses the role of legal education in shifting the adversarial culture of 
the legal profession to ensure lawyers’ improved engagement with mediation. This literature 
review chapter contributes to the overall research aim by providing a theoretical frame of 
reference against which to conduct qualitative interviews about mediation practice in medical 
negligence.  
3.2 WHAT IS MEDIATION?  
Mediation can be described as a system of negotiation or decision-making where parties are 
assisted to reach agreement with the assistance of a neutral third party.9 The Mediator 
Standards Boards offers the following definition of mediation in the National Mediator 
Accreditation Standards:  
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Mediation is a process that promotes the self-determination of participants and in which 
participants, with the support of a mediator: (a) communicate with each other, exchange 
information and seek understanding (b) identify, clarify and explore interests, issues and 
underlying needs (c) consider their alternatives (d) generate and evaluate options (e) negotiate 
with each other; and (f) reach and make their own decisions. A mediator does not evaluate or 
advise on the merits of, or determine the outcome of, disputes.10  
 
The process of the traditional model of mediation involves the identification of issues in 
dispute (including parties’ underlying needs, goals, wants and desires), developing options 
and aiming to reach an agreement.11 Mediation can be used to define problems, settle or 
manage disputes, negotiate contracts, create policy or prevent future conflicts.12 Advantages 
of mediation are said to include that the process is flexible, informal, emphasises a ‘win-win’ 
solution for all parties and provides parties with a higher degree of control over the process.13 
The premise of a ‘win-win’ negotiation rejects adversarialism and positional bargaining, and 
instead encourages both parties to negotiate to achieve an outcome that satisfies their 
individual interests as well those of the other party.14 
 
Four models of mediation have been identified over time in the mediation field reflecting the 
evolution of mediation practice. These models can be referred to as the  settlement, 
transformative, evaluative and facilitative models.15 Settlement mediation focuses on 
incremental bargaining, often reaching a mid-point compromise between parties.16 
Transformative mediation moves away from a purely settlement focus to conflict privileging 
party clarity and strength in decision-making through recognition and empathy.17 Evaluative 
mediation will often include an advisory role for the mediator with the aim of reaching a 
settlement according to parties’ legal rights and entitlements.18 Facilitative mediation focuses 
on addressing parties’ underlying needs and interests and achieving collaborative problem 
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solving.19 Spencer and Hardy argue that the facilitative model of mediation is the most 
commonly used model in Australia, although they acknowledge that in court-connected 
contexts settlement or evaluative models are common.20 Despite the existence of several 
models of mediation, a common factor is the fact that solutions to a dispute must be by 
agreement21 as there is no judge to be the decision-maker.22 
 
Within the mediation process, lawyers will frequently undertake negotiation over the subject 
matter of the dispute, and the approaches they can adopt vary. There are two widely accepted 
negotiation models: the first is ‘zero-sum negotiation’ which can also be referred to as 
positional or distributive negotiation and the second is the integrative problem-solving 
model.23 Zero-sum negotiation focuses on a distributive approach where what is achieved by 
one party is gained at the expense of the other. It is accepted in disputes where other matters, 
such as parties’ desire for an ongoing relationship, are not critical.24 Zero-sum negotiation 
involves lawyers using tactics and arguments over the law and evidence to persuade the 
opposition of the merits of their case.25 In contrast, the problem-solving approach recognises 
that individuals have a variety of needs and interests (including economic, social, 
psychological, moral and communal), thus takes into account needs and objectives in 
reaching a creative solution.26 Engaging in problem-solving approaches is challenging for 
repeat players (such as insurers, governments and lawyers) who tend to adopt positional 
bargaining, as a lack of time and resources force leave little time to explore needs, interests 
and collaborative solutions.27 Yet, Boulle and Field recognise that problem-solving 
negotiation is an aspiration for many negotiators, as it is the model on which mediation 
theory and standards are premised.28 
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3.3 THE HISTORY OF MEDIATION IN AUSTRALIA  
Indigenous communities in Australia have used a range of dispute resolution processes for 
thousands of years.29 Following settlement in Australia, the English legal system was 
influential in the development and use of non-litigious forms of dispute management.30 In 
Australia, the modern ADR movement can be traced back to the 1980s in New South Wales 
and Victoria.31 It began with a Community Justice Centre Pilot Project providing community-
based mediation services in New South Wales in 1980,32 and was followed by the 
establishment of four Neighbourhood Mediation Centres by the Legal Aid Commission in 
1987 in Victoria.33 The 1980s saw expansion of ADR in other Australian states,34 with further 
growth in the 1990s with the legislative introduction of mediation into a range of dispute 
categories such as farm debt, native title and workplace relations.35 In 1995 the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General created the National Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Advisory Council (NADRAC) for the promotion of ADR.36 In 2006, reforms were introduced 
to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) requiring parties to a parenting dispute to attend 
compulsory mediation prior to issuing a formal application to the Family Court,37 evidencing 
a gradual but important move towards mandatory mediation. In September 2017, it was 
announced by the Attorney General that a comprehensive review of Family Law would be 
undertaken38 and this review is likely to include more initiatives relating to ADR. 
 
The rise in ADR may be attributed to a number of problems experienced with the adversarial 
legal system, including excessive cost and delay.39 In the adversarial system of justice, parties 
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are antagonists and the judge is an impartial umpire who remains largely passive, albeit 
responsible for making the ultimate binding decision.40 One problem with the adversarial 
system that was recognised in the 1990s was that it encouraged an arena of conflict and 
resulted in a system that was too expensive and too slow in delivering justice to the parties.41 
Influential writer Carrie Menkel-Meadow is critical of the adversarial system and the binary 
solutions it produces. In a postmodernist critique, Menkel-Meadow argues that court-derived 
outcomes or solutions produced in the shadow of the law produce ‘win-loss’ outcomes that 
oversimplify human problems.42 She contends that avenues of problem-solving which are 
capable of meeting the needs and interests of the parties, such as ADR, can produce fairer 
outcomes.43  
 
Mediation offers many benefits when compared to litigation: it reduces costs, alleviates 
pressure on court resources, maintains amicable relations between parties, and increases the 
possibility of early dispute resolution.44 Prompted by major legislative reform in the UK, 
Australian government inquiries were conducted with a view to improving the justice system 
at a federal and state level.45 In 2010 significant legislative reforms were made to the 
Victorian Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) with the introduction of an overarching purpose to 
facilitate a ‘just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute’.46 
In practice this is implemented through court-connected mediation, where judges are 
expressly empowered to give directions or orders to conduct and manage court proceedings 
in accordance with the overarching purpose.47 Judges can encourage parties to use 
appropriate dispute resolution avenues to attempt to resolve a dispute.48 This is just one 
example of policy promoting ADR and more detailed examples in recent government reports 
are discussed below.  
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3.3.1 POLICY PROMOTING ADR  
The release of the Australian Government Productivity Commission’s Access to Justice 
Arrangements report in December 2014 has endorsed the trajectory of embedding ADR in the 
civil litigation process.49 Most noteworthy is the recommendation that ADR should be used 
as the default dispute resolution mechanism.50 The Productivity Commission acknowledged 
that ADR is increasingly used by courts and tribunals as an alternative to formal hearings. 
The report outlined many benefits of ADR, including the possibility for parties to achieve an 
overall result that is more satisfactory than litigation, retention of control by parties in the 
dispute resolution process, and significant cost and time savings.51 Further, ADR encourages 
early settlement, minimises the overall time the dispute is before the courts, is more informal 
than litigation and can be more culturally appropriate.52  
 
The Productivity Commission identified certain types of disputes where there is potential to 
target and increase the use of ADR, including prior to approaching a court, prior to the court 
hearing if the parties are already engaged in the litigation process, as well as in government 
disputes and in private disputes (particularly for small businesses).53 In dispute types where 
ADR processes have been demonstrated to be efficient and effective, the report 
recommended that ADR should be employed as the default mechanism in the first instance.54 
The Productivity Commission further recommended that courts should undertake and 
evaluate pilots for dispute types that are not currently referred to ADR. In addition, 
recommendations sought to encourage greater use of ADR by governments,55 as well as 
identifying the importance of education and the promotion of information about ADR.56 
 
In August 2016, the Victorian Government’s Access to Justice Review report further endorsed 
the use of ADR in the Victorian jurisdiction.57 The review was commissioned in 2015 to 
expand on the Productivity Commission’s Access to Justice Arrangements report by 
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addressing the cost of legal services, access to information and litigants’ ability to secure 
legal representation. One requirement stipulated an examination of whether and how ADR 
mechanisms could be expanded in Victoria.58 The review acknowledged that ADR was used 
widely throughout Victoria, in private settings as well as by government departments, courts,  
the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT), independent statutory bodies and 
industry bodies.59 The review highlighted ADR had the capacity to increase access to justice 
for the public by providing a quicker and cheaper process and more satisfactory outcomes for 
the parties.60  
 
A particular focus was the role of apologies which can provide a meaningful means of redress 
and reduce the desire to litigate.61 Submissions to the review highlighted the reluctance of 
government agencies to offer apologies because of lack of protection from consequences that 
might flow if the apology was used in future litigation.62 In a negligence context for example, 
s 14J of the Wrongs Act applies in limited circumstances involving death or injury and does 
not prevent an apology from being adduced into evidence.63 The Victorian provisions only 
cover expression of sorrow, regret or sympathy and not an acknowledgement of fault, unlike 
the NSW civil liability legislation which protects an apology that includes or implies an 
admission of fault.64 
 
Despite many benefits, the review identified circumstances where ADR may be 
inappropriate, such as where engaging in the process would cause delay, disempower the 
parties, create additional legal costs or prematurely end disputes where public adjudication is 
warranted.65 The report further identified the need to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged 
people, as in family law disputes where one party has been subjected to domestic violence by 
the opposing party. Nevertheless the review endorsed increased use of ADR and indicated 
there were opportunities for further expansion as a primary dispute resolution mechanism. 
For instance, the review recommended that VCAT partner with the Dispute Settlement 
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Centre of Victoria to expand ADR services.66 The review also recommended increased use of 
ADR by government, including a public ministerial commitment to ADR, the creation of a 
culture of good dispute resolution, a stronger expectation of ADR in government Model 
Litigant Guidelines and the establishment of a community of practice to encourage sharing of 
knowledge and ideas about good dispute resolution.67 Particularly relevant to the subject 
matter of this thesis, the review recommended amendments to the Wrongs Act to broaden 
protection given to apologies in circumstances beyond those involving death or serious 
injury, so that an apology does not constitute an admission of liability and is not subsequently 
admissible in court as evidence of fault or liability.68 Further, the review recommended that 
public bodies develop policies around the making of apologies. The recommendations 
regarding apologies are consistent with views of scholars who have advocated for the 
legislative recognition of apologies as a genuine reflection of their significance in society.69 
Commentators have also acknowledged the important role that mediation has as a forum to 
facilitate the expression of apologies.70   
3.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF MEDIATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
The principles and procedures of mediation have often been compared with the traditional 
model of litigation to highlight their advantages as an alternative avenue of dispute 
resolution.71 Mediation is capable of addressing many of the shortcomings of litigation: the 
adversarial nature of the trial process, prohibitive expense, delay and lack of party 
participation and control.72 Litigation can be a long and costly process, and other ADR 
avenues such as arbitration involve similar drawbacks. In contrast, mediation is less 
expensive, can be organised quickly and sessions can last as little as a few hours.73 Mediation 
avoids the risks associated with adjudication, not only experienced in court proceedings, but 
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in other forms of dispute resolution such as arbitration.74 Section 2 of the National Mediator 
Accreditation System (NMAS) defines mediation as follows:  
a process that promotes the self-determination of participants and in which 
participants, with the support of a mediator: (a) communicate with each other, 
exchange information and seek understanding; (b) identify, clarify and explore 
interests, issues and underlying needs; (c) consider their alternatives; (d) generate and 
evaluate options; (e) negotiate with each other; and (f) reach and make their own 
decisions.75 
As indicated in the NMAS definition, a vital aspect of mediation is self-determination, 
described as the value that grounds every model of mediation and is fundamental to any 
mediation process.76 In mediation the parties have control over the decision-making process 
and can contribute to the overall outcome. The prospect of self-determination can also 
encourage parties to communicate in a meaningful way.77  
 
Mediation offers the benefit of privacy which is not afforded in public court proceedings.78 In 
medical negligence proceedings the reputations of doctors and hospitals are often at stake 
which creates a desire to avoid publicity. Similarly, plaintiffs may wish to keep details of 
their claims confidential. The benefit of privacy is also present in unassisted negotiations 
between parties and their lawyers.79 However, the disadvantage of private negotiations is that 
there is no independent third party to assist the parties to reach an agreement. Lawyer 
negotiators tend to adopt a positional bargaining approach which can focus too heavily on 
legal rights and duties rather than non-legal objectives. The use of a mediator can assist in the 
facilitation of negotiation guidelines, create an environment of trust and provide problem-
solving techniques.80 When collated, all of these strengths indicate that mediation can be a 
helpful process as a pre-action dispute resolution tool to prevent proceedings being initiated. 
Accordingly, the next section will address the advantages and disadvantages of using 
mediation in a court-connected context.  
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3.5 THE USE OF COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION 
Court-connected mediation refers to the situation where parties are encouraged or ordered by 
a judge to undertake mediation before a trained mediator prior to a matter proceeding to 
trial.81 Court-connected mediation can be voluntary or ordered by a judge pursuant to 
legislation, regulation or court practice notes.82 Spencer and Hardy contend that mediation 
can be ‘connected’ to a court in various ways: it can be recommended or required  prior to the 
filing of proceedings or prior to the matter being listed for trial; it can be conducted internally 
within the court system by a judicial officer or externally through referral to a mediator; and 
it can also be conducted by judges in the hearing room.83 Sourdin describes Victoria as 
having the oldest and most well developed court-connected ADR programs of the Australian 
states.84 For instance, the Supreme Court of Victoria places great importance on the use of 
mediation prior to trial so that, save for exceptional circumstances, no case will proceed to 
trial without at least one attempt at mediation.85 Similarly, the Medical List in the County 
Court of Victoria, which hears the majority of medical negligence proceedings, requires that 
all proceedings be subject to mediation prior to trial.86 John Arthur acknowledges that both 
federal and state legislation increasingly provide for ADR to be used by courts, tribunals and 
other agencies.87 
 
The evolution of mandatory or court-connected mediation, particularly through pre-action 
procedures, is evident in Australia and internationally. At the federal level, compulsory pre-
action ADR operates in family law where parties are required to make a genuine effort to 
resolve their dispute at family dispute resolution (most often mediation) and obtain a 
certificate prior to instigating court proceedings.88 In civil disputes, parties must file a 
‘genuine steps’ statement to indicate that genuine steps have been made to attempt to resolve 
a dispute.89 Federal Court judges are also empowered to refer proceedings to ADR.90 The 
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Victorian state government has been more reluctant to adopt legislation analogous to the 
federal compulsory pre-action ADR rules. For example, mandatory pre-action protocols 
introduced in 2010 by the Victorian Labor government were promptly overturned by a 
subsequent Liberal government.91 Yet, the Victorian transport accident scheme has 
implemented pre-action dispute resolution protocols which encourage the use of ADR as the 
primary dispute resolution mechanism.92 South Australia has also recently shown an 
inclination towards adopting pre-action ADR with the introduction of the Supreme Court Fast 
Track Rules 2014 (SA). Particularly prevalent in construction and medical negligence 
disputes, the rules require parties to attempt to resolve their dispute before commencing 
proceedings, including exchanging information and attending ADR.  
 
Research emanating from the construction industry in Scotland has found the mediation 
process does not assist parties to resolve a dispute if they are too deeply entrenched in their 
positions, indicating that attempts at mediation early in the dispute may be more beneficial.93 
Despite many benefits, commentators caution that pre-action protocols can have 
disadvantages, including front-loading of costs for parties and an increase in ‘satellite’ 
litigation where parties litigate over compliance with pre-action protocols.94 However, 
provided safeguards are implemented to allow exceptions to the pre-action protocols in 
certain circumstances, commentators accept pre-action protocols hold many advantages for 
parties and court systems.95 
 
International jurisdictions have also initiated pre-action requirements. For example, in the UK 
the Woolf reforms to civil procedure introduced pre-action protocols requiring early 
exchange of information with a view to a speedier resolution. In personal injury cases,  the 
plaintiff is required to provide a letter outlining a factual summary, the nature of injuries and 
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the loss incurred.96 Taking a different approach to Australia and the UK, pre-action mediation 
has been implemented contractually in the US through the Florida Patient Safety and Pre-Suit 
Mediation Program.97 Introduced in 2008, the program requires patients to contractually 
agree to pre-suit mediation before receiving medical care, obliging them to mediate before 
commencing court proceedings.98 While the methods across jurisdictions vary, all initiatives 
demonstrate an increasing trend towards the imposition of pre-action protocols or mandatory 
court-connected ADR avenues.  
 
The merits of mandatory mediation have been extensively discussed.99 Notwithstanding the 
benefits of mediation, and ADR more generally, some scholars have questioned whether the 
lines between adversarial and non-adversarial processes are becoming blurred, contending it 
is risky for ADR to assume all the functions of a court.100 This caution is in response to 
mandatory mediation which risks creating conflict in six ways.101 Firstly, mediation 
privileges party autonomy and the right to voluntarily participate in the process. By imposing 
mediation as a mandatory dispute resolution process, parties’ empowerment and self-
determination are necessarily diminished.102 Secondly, use of mediation in inappropriate 
circumstances may be detrimental where there is domestic violence or a power imbalance 
between the parties.103 For instance, Field has highlighted the need to adopt specific strategies 
to protect the interests and safety of victims of domestic violence in mediation.104 Thirdly, 
problems of confidentiality and court resources can arise where a judge has been involved in 
mediation but must then be recused from subsequent proceedings if the mediation is 
unsuccessful.105 Fourthly, private ADR processes are said to threaten the doctrine of 
precedent by undermining the value of the common law justice system.106 Fifthly, user 
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satisfaction may be affected in mediation which uses an informal and flexible procedure and 
where participants are focused on obtaining procedural fairness.107 For example, researchers 
have found that collaborative approaches and informality can jeopardise procedural fairness 
in child protection cases where there is a need to prioritise children’s safety and rights.108 
Finally, mediation arguably does not provide procedural justice because it denies participants 
the right to have their case decided pursuant to established legal precedent and does not 
provide avenues of appeal.109 Baron, Corbin and Gutman contend that a tension is evident 
between ADR and adversarial processes, but achieving a balance between the two is 
important and depends upon the roles, responsibilities and expertise of the legal actors 
involved.110 
 
In the UK, Professor Dame Hazel Genn is a vocal opponent against the imposition of 
mandatory mediation at the expense of the civil litigation system. While Genn accepts the 
general benefits of mediation, she bases her criticisms on three grounds.111 Firstly, Genn 
accepts that mediation can be beneficial but only when the parties have voluntarily agreed to 
participate in the process.112 Secondly, Genn views the civil litigation system as a necessary 
backdrop against which mediation occurs because in her view it is the threat of litigation 
which motivates parties to negotiate.113 Thirdly, Genn questions whether mediation has 
strengths in its own right or whether the promotion of mediation is simply due to its 
advantages when compared to the disadvantages of the litigation process.114  
 
Frequently, mediation is presented as a quicker, cheaper and less stressful dispute resolution 
process than trial so it is touted as the preferred method of resolving disputes.115 However, 
Genn cautions that the growing preference for private avenues of dispute resolution over 
public processes is not without challenges.116 For example, a rise in mandatory mediation 
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risks losing the value of court adjudication which diminishes the public role of the civil 
justice system and public dissemination of judicial decisions.117 Adjudication facilitates 
vindication of rights rather than comprise, allowing for claims of injustice to be heard.118 For 
instance, in the medical negligence context plaintiffs who are the victim of medical error may 
wish to have the matter heard and decided in a public forum so that such errors can be 
discovered and prevented in the future. Genn suggests that participating in court proceedings 
can also be empowering for the parties.119 Further, mandatory mediation presents as a threat 
to common law precedent which facilitates articulation and clarification of the law, effects 
justice between parties and has potential to deter future misbehaviour.120 
 
In the US, Carrie Menkel-Meadow opposes mandatory court-instituted ADR, and expresses 
scepticism regarding its use in a court-connected context where she argues the process can be 
distorted by lawyers’ adversarial culture.121 Menkel-Meadow contends that ADR has become 
increasingly institutionalised through use by courts and private organisations, but also that the 
process has become legalised by being subjected to legal rules.122 She stresses that the key to 
effective dispute resolution processes is found in voluntary participation yet many programs 
make ADR mandatory.123 In her view, courts are ‘at best ambivalent’ as to whether to 
mandate settlement, but time and case efficiency factors might override this reluctance to 
mandate settlement.124  
 
While Menkel-Meadow is an advocate of ADR, she cautions that mandatory mediation must 
be coupled with certain safeguards to protect the legitimacy of the process. She suggests 
seven: (1) that settlement outcomes procured through mandatory mediation should not be 
binding; (2) that legal protections are offered, such as a record of proceedings, to overcome 
coercive settlement conduct; (3) court-related ADR should be facilitated by a judicial officer 
other than the one appointed at trial; (4) provision of appropriate settlement training to 
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facilitators; (5) evidence of systematic evaluation of ADR; (6) different forms of ADR should 
be unbundled and separately evaluated; (7) the nature of process varies so allow judges to 
experiment with different process but allow legal challenges.125  
 
Woodward has highlighted the tension that exists between traditional adversarial litigation 
and ADR which is reflected in two schools of thought: some argue that their objectives are 
incompatible whilst others contend that ADR should continue to be integrated into the court 
process.126 Woodward sees this division as being centred around philosophical differences 
where ADR is seen as voluntary, flexible, confidential and informal whilst the court process 
is seen as rigid, public, regulated and litigious.127 Olivia Rundle’s research into lawyers’ 
perspectives on court-connected mediation highlights the tensions that arise when mediation 
is conducted as part of the court process.128 Her solution is centred on the crucial role of 
lawyers to advise their clients of their legal rights and responsibilities, empowering them to 
make individual decisions, which in turn satisfies the court’s obligation to apply the law.129 
 
Some of the criticisms aimed at the use of mediation in the legal system are that it may 
minimise the significance of legal principles and precedents, and perpetuate power 
imbalances.130 Commentators have also questioned whether court mediation can deliver 
justice to the parties.131 In this regard, social psychologists have revealed that people’s 
notions of fairness and justice are dependent on subjective perceptions of procedure and 
outcome, not on objective measures such as time or cost effectiveness.132 The need for 
participants in a legal system to experience fairness both in the legal process and in the 
outcome of a decision is reflected in procedural justice theory. Research in this area 
emphasises that participants’ subjective perceptions of procedural justice will affect how they 
think about and react to a legal outcome.133 Procedural justice research indicates that one 
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aspect of procedural satisfaction is the ability of participants to be heard in the dispute 
resolution process, to be allowed to tell their story and to be treated with respect.134 
Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler contend that procedural justice is not only limited to the 
adversarial context but is also present in ADR, and that participants may choose to engage in 
non-adversarial processes because they appear fairer.135 In a medical negligence context, 
procedural justice theory would support the use of court-connected mediation as a mechanism 
allowing the plaintiff’s non-legal objectives (such as expressions of emotion, regret and 
remorse) to be met.  
 
Mandatory mediation is not without critics, and some commentators question whether 
mandatory court-connected mediation is appropriate.136 Richard Ingleby questioned whether 
settlement should always be seen to be the desirable outcome, and contends that mandatory 
mediation is not constructive due to the loss of the defining characteristic of voluntariness. As 
such it risks increasing costs and formality, and challenges the rule of law.137 Proponents of 
mandatory mediation view it as a positive tool that can assist in managing court lists and save 
costs, time and emotional energy for the parties.138 Further, the mediation process is more 
consensual than the litigation process and parties cannot be forced into a settlement.139  
 
Another argument is that certain cases (such as family law cases with a history of violence or 
cases that require a definitive ruling for precedential value) are not suited to mediation.140 
Yet, in the majority of cases mediation is suitable and the parties are able to select mediators 
with the skills, experience and expertise relevant to their area of dispute.141 In fact, mediation 
may be of particular benefit in medical negligence disputes given the cost and complexity of 
litigating these disputes and the heightened emotions involved. Finally, the argument that 
mediation threatens the rule of law should not be given too much credence as mediation does 
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not seek to abolish the court system, only to complement it.142 While critics caution about the 
dangers of mandatory mediation, the increased use of court-connected mediation in many 
contexts would reflect the recognition and acceptance of mediation as a legitimate process of 
dispute resolution, one that offers many benefits not readily apparent in traditional adversarial 
avenues of dispute resolution.  
3.6 THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN MEDIATION  
The rise in court-connected ADR (particularly mediation) in the Australian legal system 
means that lawyers increasingly participate in these dispute resolution processes.143 Given 
that the majority of participants are legally represented at mediation, the approach and 
attitude of lawyers are an integral aspect of the mediation process.144 Most disputes will settle 
before reaching an adjudicated decision, therefore it is imperative that lawyers participating 
in ADR processes refrain from adopting an aggressive adversarial stance and instead remain 
settlement focused.145 Lawyers can thwart the dispute resolution process if they adopt an 
adversarial style in mediation.146 Cooper suggests that the key to successful dispute resolution 
advocacy is the ability of lawyers to ‘switch hats’ between adversarial advocacy in a 
courtroom and dispute resolution advocacy in mediation.147 
 
Lawyers are required to actively encourage their clients to participate in ADR because of 
overarching purpose and pre-action legislative requirements, professional conduct rules and 
non-binding guidelines.148 For instance, lawyers have a duty to advise and assist clients with 
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the filing of a genuine steps statement in federal jurisdictions.149 Lawyers also owe a general 
duty to a client to act with honesty and courtesy, competence and diligence, loyalty and 
confidentiality.150 However, a question arises around whether lawyers owe the same duties in 
mediation as they normally would in court.151 In addition, the existence of voluntary 
guidelines may assist lawyers in setting the standard expected in mediation.152  
 
Lawyers have the capacity to influence the mediation process.153 Rundle asserts that lawyers 
are influential in shaping the dispute resolution process, including influencing their clients’ 
needs and expectation.154 For instance, lawyers can ensure their clients experience 
empowerment and self-determination by allowing them to be active participants able to tell 
their stories or express their emotions. In contrast, lawyers might adopt an adversarial 
approach and take a rights-based evaluative style in ADR which risks transforming the 
mediation into a court-room. In the early 1990s Menkel-Meadow expressed her concern that 
lawyers involvement in ADR risks colonising the settlement process. Menkel-Meadow 
contends that lawyers colonise ADR by approaching settlement adversarially, and by 
bringing legal, technical and procedural matters associated with court proceedings into the 
settlement arena.155 She contends that while courts use ADR to increase case settlement 
efficiency, lawyers may use the ADR process to their client’s advantage to control time, and 
impact on discovery or rules of procedure.156  
 
Menkel-Meadow’s concerns are represented in contemporary mediation research. A 
Canadian study of the perceptions of legal and lay actors in litigation and mediation of 
personal injury disputes found that lawyers were seen to dominate the mediation process and 
frequently ignored their client’s needs.157 Similarly, an evaluative study of mediation in the 
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Supreme and County Courts of Victoria showed that in some cases lawyers adopted their 
preferred mediation process rather than one which served the needs of their clients.158 A 
Tasmanian study found that lawyers and mediators tended to control the mediation process, 
and were the dominant participants in mediation.159 Further, while direct disputant 
participation is frequently cited as a benefit of mediation, the findings indicated party 
participation may be minimal because lawyers tend to act as a spokesperson. Rundle 
concluded that lawyers perceive advocacy to be a fundamental aspect of their role, and thus 
they discourage clients from participating in court-connected mediation.160 These studies 
support the assertion that lawyers are uncomfortable parting from their adversarial style in a 
mediation context, and transfer this adversarialism to mediation.  
 
The level of involvement of lawyers in mediation and their approach to the dispute resolution 
process can vary significantly depending on the dispute context. In an article usefully 
summarising lawyer approaches Rundle has categorised the various contributions lawyers can 
make in the mediation process across a spectrum of involvement using five models.161 The 
least involved is the ‘absent advisor’ who supports the client to participate in the process but 
does not attend the mediation session.162 Slightly more involved than the absent advisor is the 
‘advisor observer’ who attends mediation but does not engage with the opposing lawyer or 
the mediator.163 In the middle of the spectrum is the ‘expert contributor’ who participates by 
advising their client on legal issues but restrict other contributions.164  
 
Rundle identifies medical negligence cases as cases where lawyers may appropriately adopt 
the expert contributor role.165 Situated on the more involved side of the spectrum is the 
‘supportive professional participant’ who offers legal advice, support and coaching, reality 
testing of the workability of the settlement and also supports the client through the mediation 
process.166 The most involved lawyer is the ‘spokesperson’ who speaks on behalf of their 
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client at mediation and exhibits a high level of control over the process.167 Douglas and 
Batagol used Rundle’s model in exploring approaches taken by lawyers in the VCAT 
jurisdiction.168 Interviews with 16 VCAT mediators about lawyers’ roles in mediation 
indicated most supported the expert contributor role, followed by the supportive professional 
participant role.169 The mediators in that study valued lawyers who worked collaboratively 
and encouraged client participation.170 All participants indicated they preferred to mediate 
with lawyers who adopted less adversarial approaches.171  
 
Macfarlane contends that a lawyer’s role is continuously shaped by social and economic 
interests, and further that lawyers play a key role in endorsing novel practices.172 In a 
comparative study of two Canadian cities, Toronto and Ottawa, Macfarlane explored how the 
introduction of civil procedure rules mandating early mediation impacted upon lawyer’s 
attitudes and practices.173 In the study, interviews were held with 40 commercial lawyers, 20 
from Toronto, a large urban centre of 2.2 million population, and 20 from Ottawa, a medium 
urban centre with a population of 500,000.174 Pursuant to Canadian civil procedure 
requirements lawyers must formally ‘opt-out’ through the court system (rather than 
voluntarily ‘opt-in’), mediation must take place before discovery and lawyers are required to 
bring their client to mediation.175 The study results showed that practitioners in Ottawa had a 
more settled and accepting culture of mediation than Toronto.176 While lawyers do not 
generally appear comfortable with their clients’ direct involvement in mediation,177 when 
mediation was imposed on parties prior to discovery, lawyers found themselves reliant on 
their clients for information and thus facilitated more client involvement.178  
 
In an Australian study of taxation disputes, Tania Sourdin found that settlement rates through 
ADR between Victoria and NSW varied substantially. Out of 118 taxation disputes, 58.8 per 
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cent of Victorian disputes resolved following ADR, compared with 38.5 per cent in NSW.179 
Sourdin suggests that the discrepancy can be attributed to various factors, including a culture 
of practitioner behavior, and notes that practitioners engage with ADR to varying degrees in 
different states.180 Macfarlane attributes the willingness of the Ottawa practitioners to engage 
in mediation to a combination of legal culture and also increased exposure to mediation. 
However, cultural change requires more than simple reform to civil procedure rules and 
instead requires fostering a climate of acceptance and legitimisation of mediation.181 
 
The role of lawyers in medical negligence claims more generally was explored through a 
study using in-depth interviews with 30 medical malpractice claimants from England and 30 
claimants from Scotland.182 In those jurisdictions, the researchers found that medical 
negligence lawyers take a client-aligned approach, meaning they take into consideration their 
clients’ practical and emotional needs but do not necessarily follow their clients’ wishes.183 
The study found lawyers were able to manage their clients’ expectations, provide emotional 
support and keep their clients well-informed.184 Claimants expressed dissatisfaction when 
they were unable to obtain non-financial outcomes (such as an apology) or when they were 
unhappy with the overall outcome of their case, but did not blame their lawyer for such 
dissatisfaction.185 
 
Tom Tyler contends that in tort litigation lawyers assume their client’s primary interest is to 
receive a large and fair settlement and to have their matter resolved quickly.186 In an analysis 
of empirical studies of tort litigation, Tyler found litigants are more procedure- than outcome- 
oriented, wanting to participate in the settlement of disputes and have their views heard rather 
than simply focusing on the settlement sum.187 Tyler concluded that lawyers’ views of client 
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expectations are fundamentally flawed and do not address clients’ non-outcome related 
concerns.188  
 
A British study evaluated the role of lawyers in medical negligence mediation and explored 
whether the introduction of a mediation pilot scheme was conceived as a threat to medical 
negligence lawyers.189 Data was drawn from a NHS-funded evaluation of the pilot scheme, 
but also included interviews with 50 solicitors who chose not to participate in mediation.190 
The study results showed that many of the solicitors found the mediation process unsettling, 
and they were not prepared for the informality and flexibility of the process.191 They 
frequently adopted an adversarial stance, and their adversarialism was heightened because 
they were conducting negotiations in the presence of their client.192 The study found lawyers 
were not prepared for the shift in emphasis from them to their client. In other words, the 
lawyers were accustomed to holding the focus in a court room, to be ‘seen to be doing 
something’ for their client, while the focus of the mediation was on the client’s narrative.193 
Out of 50 solicitors who did not participate in mediation, 27 indicated they thought their 
clients would expect them to have knowledge of mediation because of legislative reforms, but 
that mediation was not a process which appealed to these lawyers.194 Further, the solicitors 
spoke about mediation as if it were part of the litigation process, rather than seeing it as an 
alternative.195 The authors concluded that lawyers were unnerved by mediation and lacked 
specific training around appropriate conduct for mediation in personal injury litigation.196 
 
In a US study, researchers evaluated the suitability of mediation for medical malpractice 
lawsuits involving private hospitals in New York City. Participants in 57 lawsuits were 
contacted after referral to the study, and interviews were subsequently held with participants 
and mediators in 31 mediations.197 The study found that plaintiff lawyers were more willing 
to mediate than defendant lawyers, with plaintiff lawyers agreeing to mediate in 49 cases out 
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of 57 cases, compared with defendant lawyers who agreed to mediate in 31 cases out of 57 
cases.198 The investigators noted this was a surprising finding, attributing the refusal to 
mediate by some lawyers to a range of factors including: the unsuitability of the case for 
mediation, the threat of legal exposure, differing attitudes towards losing a case, existing 
settlement negotiations, and the preference of certain mediators or lawyers to increase 
billable hours.199  
 
The existing literature on the role of lawyers has demonstrated that lawyers’ attitudes and 
practices can significantly influence the nature of the dispute resolution process, as well as 
participants’ direct participation. Lawyers generally appear more comfortable with an 
adversarial style of dispute resolution and have a tendency to use that in mediation. Lawyers 
also exert a high level of control of the process, tending to act as spokesperson on behalf of 
their client. Preventing parties from participating in mediation can substantially affect their 
experience of the process and acceptance of the outcome, resulting in disempowerment and 
lack of self-determination.  
 
Medical negligence can give rise to emotionally charged disputes, where there is a strong 
need for parties to express their emotions, seek an explanation for the medical error , or 
pursue an apology from their medical practitioner. The literature on the role of lawyers has 
therefore informed the questions in this research, so that participants were expressly asked to 
reflect on the role of lawyers in the mediation of medical negligence disputes. This was a 
significant aspect of the research to explore how lawyers saw their role in the resolution of 
these disputes, the extent of direct participant involvement and the nature of court-connected 
mediation in practice. Given the literature suggests that lawyers dominate the mediation 
process, it was important to explore whether they are aware of this tendency and further  
whether they acknowledge the role of emotion in the resolution of disputes or whether such 
acknowledgment was sidelined in favour of more legalistic or financial objectives. 
Accordingly, the next section discusses the literature on emotion in mediation to demonstrate 
the important role that emotion plays in dispute resolution.  
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3.7 EMOTION IN MEDIATION 
The exploration of emotion in the mediation process is identified in the literature as the 
opportunity for parties to reveal underlying interests and concerns of parties through a 
discourse that allows for emotional expression. Emotion is a key component of conflict, with 
the emotional experiences of parties typically defining and driving conflict.200 In 
negotiations, emotion can drive party decision-making.201 Emotion has been described as 
consisting of three components, the physiological experience, a cognitive process and a 
communicative process, with all three components highly relevant in conflict.202 There is 
increasing recognition in literature that attention to emotion is significant in negotiation and 
in mediation practice.203 A US study of eighteen mediation simulations and sixteen 
negotiation simulations conducted using undergraduate students as participants and 
professional or volunteer mediators found that attention to emotion in conflict management 
can lead to a transformation of the dispute, including improved communication and greater 
understanding.204  
 
Medical negligence is an area where expression of emotion may be especially valuable to 
disputants. Mediation of medical negligence disputes often occurs in a court-connected 
environment, when parties have already commenced court proceedings. The legal actors 
involved, consisting of the plaintiff and defendant lawyers and the insurance representative, 
are ‘repeat players’ who might consider the nature of the dispute as ‘ordinary’.205 ‘Repeat 
players’ refers to parties who are repeat users of the court system, and who have low stakes in 
any one case, can maximise long-term gain by resisting settlements, and can also develop 
long-term relationships with court personnel.206 Lawyers who represent such parties can also 
be ‘repeat players’ gaining an advantage by developing expertise in particular legal fields and 
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institutional processes, as well as reputations that allow them to act as ‘gatekeepers’.207 In 
contrast, plaintiffs tend to be ‘one-shot players’ who often have minimal experience with the 
legal system.208 In circumstances where there is a breach of trust between a doctor and 
patient, plaintiffs will often have non-legal objectives including seeking an explanation of the 
medical error or an apology from the practitioner.  
 
Repeat players are said to dominate court-oriented mediations,209 and in doing so they 
sideline emotion and narrowly confine the issues in dispute around the likely outcome if the 
matter was litigated and a quantitative assessment about how much a defendant is willing to 
pay.210 Ryan contends lawyers distrust emotion and are quick to shut down channels of 
communication even in circumstances where they might assist their clients.211 Thus the one-
shot players frequently miss out on opportunities for dialogue and addressing non-legal 
needs. In a Canadian study of personal injury lawyers, Relis found that lawyers prioritised 
these interests over their clients’ interests, causing a missed opportunity at mediation for 
client communication and psychological healing.212 Active participation of parties gives 
effect to the traditional values of mediation such as self-determination, empowerment and 
control which in turn improves participants’ perceptions of procedural justice.213 This has led 
commentators to advocate for increased recognition by lawyers of client’s emotional and 
non-legal needs.214  
 
In the past decade, researchers have paid closer attention to the role that mediators’ 
understanding of emotion plays in mediation. Picard and Stiltaten explored how mediation 
practitioners experience learning in mediation and found that emotion was a central feature of 
the learning process.215 A separate study found a positive correlation between a negotiator’s 
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emotional intelligence and the opposing party’s trust and desire to work together again.216 
Douglas and Coburn explored mediators’ attitudes and strategies for addressing emotional 
expression through interviews with VCAT mediators.217 All participants in this study thought 
that emotion was a significant aspect of the mediation process,218 with eleven out of sixteen 
participants willing to encourage or allow the expression of emotion.219 Six of the participants 
discussed specific techniques to encourage emotional expression in mediation, including 
reflection of emotional content, paraphrasing and questioning.220 The authors argue this 
evidences a shift in practice towards a higher awareness of the emotional dimensions of 
conflict.221  
 
Lawyers may find it difficult to prioritise emotions in negotiation due to a legal culture that 
sees emotion as an impediment to rational decision-making.222 This hostility towards emotion 
is arguably deeply ingrained in historic notions of justice affiliated with calm, rational 
decision-making, making emotion incompatible with reason.223 Such inherent hostility 
towards emotion can cause lawyers to rationalise decision-making and prioritise financial 
objectives in mediation, while sidelining their clients’ emotional needs. Kimberlee Kovach 
has highlighted the need for lawyers to adopt an ‘ethic of care’, so as to focus not only on 
rights and duties in dispute resolution, but also on connections between individuals.224 This 
requires lawyers to use skills such as empathy and listening.225 A focus on legal rights and 
duties can result in an evaluative or settlement style of mediation which can compromise self-
determination by diminishing the role of the parties in dispute resolution.226 Evaluative 
dispute resolution models are frequently used in court-connected contexts and can also 
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jeopardise participants’ perceptions of procedural justice.227 Bogdanoski advocates for 
increased use of facilitative mediation and principled negotiation as preferred dispute 
resolution avenues in medical negligence disputes because these approaches may better meet 
the non-financial needs of parties.228  
 
Despite the ability of mediation settings to offer participants an opportunity to address 
emotional issues and non-financial objectives, in practice medical practitioners rarely attend 
mediation which can diminish the opportunity for plaintiffs to meet these emotional needs. 
For example, in a US study of mediation of law suits brought against New York hospitals 25 
out of 31 plaintiffs attended the mediation but not one medical practitioner attended.229 
Liebman argues that the non-participation of doctors at the mediation of medical negligence 
disputes constitutes a lost opportunity for: reconciliation between doctor and patient; 
forgiveness; information giving and gathering; as well as for institutional policy changes to 
alter practices that have led to the error.230 Lack of attendance can be detrimental to the 
doctors themselves as they are deprived of procedural justice through their lack of voice, 
representation and participation in the dispute resolution process.231 
 
Liebman explains that lawyers discourage medical practitioners from participating for a 
number of reasons, varying from a need to emotionally protect their clients, to overfamiliarity 
with the evaluative approach to mediation or a lack of awareness of the full benefits of 
mediation.232 Yet the presence and active participation of medical practitioners is crucial if 
the parties are to engage meaningfully in the process. There are many non-adversarial 
approaches that recognise the significance of emotion in dispute resolution, including 
therapeutic jurisprudence, restorative justice and procedural justice. These concepts are 
introduced and discussed in the following section, with particular attention to their 
significance in mediation of medical negligence disputes.  
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3.7.1 THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE  
The therapeutic jurisprudence movement values the expression of emotion for court users. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is a philosophy that considers how the law affects the emotional 
well-being of court users.233 In other words, it examines the actions of legal actors to consider 
the impact of their decisions on the emotional life and psychological wellbeing of those 
affected by our justice system. Therapeutic jurisprudence asserts that emotional issues are an 
integral aspect of the dispute resolution process.234 Therapeutic jurisprudence has been 
applied to a variety of legal fields, including in worker’s compensation.235 As injured people 
can be particularly vulnerable, telling their story and receiving validation can alleviate stress. 
Accordingly, commentators contend that compensation systems should have sufficient 
flexibility to facilitate an appropriate mechanism for injured people to present their story.236  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence promotes creative problem-solving by lawyers to meet the unique 
needs of clients.237 In the context of legal problem-solving, therapeutic jurisprudence 
suggests that the law should consider emotional factors in legal processes. Therefore, when 
professionals such as lawyers and mediators, are exercising legal skills, it is important to 
consider their own and their clients’ emotions in promoting a problem’s comprehensive 
resolution.238  
 
3.7.2 RESTORATIVE JUSTICE  
Similar to the therapeutic jurisprudence movement that values the role of emotion in the legal 
framework, Restorative Justice (‘RJ’) is another non-adversarial practice that acknowledges 
the role of emotion in dispute resolution. RJ encompasses a set of principles and practices 
concerned with repairing harm caused by crime by bringing together the victim and 
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offender.239 One mechanism through which this can be achieved is through RJ conferencing, 
which involves the offender, victim, and family and friends meeting to discuss the harm 
sustained and possible reparation. Family group conferencing in youth offences was 
introduced legislatively in the late 1980s in New Zealand.240 In Australia, RJ practices 
commenced in Wagga Wagga in 1991 for juvenile offenders and have since been used in 
Victoria for youth justice and neighbourhood justice.241 Conferencing is the most commonly 
used type of restorative justice process in Victoria, and Australia-wide, though victim-
offender mediation with a professional facilitator may also be used.242 
 
RJ practices are not limited to the criminal context, and are used more broadly in a range of 
civil matters, including family, child protection, and workplace contexts.243 ADR and RJ are 
said to share common origins and principles, particularly the need for participation by all 
stakeholders in a dispute in order to successfully address conflict.244 Boulle and Field 
acknowledge RJ’s close relationship with facilitative dispute resolution processes in the civil 
context and contend it also has a role to play in shaping lawyers’ professional identity in 
dispute resolution practice.245 In the US, Jonathan Todres argues that restorative justice 
principles can play a crucial role in medical malpractice suits by promoting a healing-centred 
approach for the aggrieved parties.246 
 
The role of emotions in justice processes, together with the value in using restorative justice 
conferencing has been recognised to address the emotional aspects of crime commission.247 
Commentators have recognised that justice processes tend to focus on the needs of offenders, 
yet increasing attention is being paid to procedures to allow victims to have their voice heard 
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in justice proceedings.248 While processes such as mediation can facilitate the expression of 
emotion by aggrieved parties, the rise of evaluative models and lawyers’ adversarial 
approaches can hinder the ability of parties to use such forums to meet non-legal needs. 
Therefore parallel processes that attempt to address the emotional aspects of conflict, such as 
RJ conferencing, may be influential in the resolution of medical negligence disputes.  
 
For instance, the use of an apology to repair the harm has the potential to meet the non-legal 
needs of disputants and may influence their overall satisfaction with the outcome. A UK 
study undertaking content analysis of 57 victim-offender mediations found that in all of the 
cases where an apology was accepted, the victim was satisfied with the mediation 
outcome.249 Georgina Richardson and Grant Gillett highlight the necessity for a justice 
system to meet a variety of disputant needs following medical error apart from financial 
compensation.250 They contend that a scheme based on RJ would have the capacity to address 
patients’ need to be heard, to allow for communication between the parties and also to obtain 
remedies such as an apology or a change in healthcare practices.251 
 
3.7.3 PROCEDURAL JUSTICE  
Procedural justice (‘PJ’) refers to the parties’ perceptions of the fairness of a process by 
which a decision is reached.252 If disputants perceive dispute resolution processes to be fair, 
they are more likely to accept the outcomes as fair and this in turn legitimises decision-
making institutions.253 Disputants’ views on fairness are affected by a variety of factors such 
as voice, process control, participation, trustworthiness, interpersonal respect and 
neutrality.254 Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler identified four key criteria that influence parties’ 
perceptions of fairness: opportunity for disputants to share their stories; neutrality; trust; and 
courtesy and respect.255 In a qualitative study assessing interviews with Victorian mediators, 
Douglas and Hurley found that PJ can occur in mediation but that mediators have not yet 
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realised the potential for mediation to offer this kind of experience for parties.256 Providing 
disputants with an opportunity to have their voice heard during the mediation process is a key 
aspect of PJ in mediation. A key finding emerging from Douglas and Hurley’s research was 
that the majority of mediators in the study held the view that parties needed to have their 
voice heard, In the research many mediators commented on the parties’ desire to share their 
side of the story.257   
 
In the medical negligence context, it may be particularly important for victims of medical 
error to be heard by the doctor and to tell their side of the story due to the impact of the 
negligence on their lives. Yet, when doctors are absent from mediations, plaintiffs are 
unlikely to feel their voice has been heard and thus parties’ perceptions of procedural fairness 
is likely to be adversely affected.258 In Relis’ study of Canadian legal actors and disputants 
experiences with medical malpractice mediations, 93% of plaintiffs and 89% of doctors 
discussed the importance to them of ‘being heard’ in mediation.259 Meeting these needs was 
practically difficult given the majority of lawyers in that study expressed they had limited, if 
any, experience with doctors attending mediation.260 In spite of these challenges regarding the 
culture and practice of law in medical negligence, emotion should be considered a key feature 
of these disputes and addressing emotional needs of parties may be crucial in allowing parties 
to experience procedural justice and feel satisfied with the outcome.  
 
Medical negligence disputes can often be emotionally charged and mediation can be an 
appropriate forum for parties to resolve differences and address the emotional consequences 
of a medical error. Yet, as the literature has demonstrated, mediation may not be used to its 
fullest advantage by lawyers who tend to dominate the process. By adopting an evaluative 
mediation style, attention is diverted to settlement-bargaining and thus no opportunity is 
afforded for the non-legal needs of the parties to be met at mediation. Consequently, this can 
result in the parties experiencing a lack of procedural justice in the dispute resolution process.  
 
One aim of this study was to explore to what extent parties in medical disputes engage in 
mediation and whether emotional issues are a relevant factor for those participating in 
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mediation. Further, it was important to explore whether the mediation process assists 
participants to express the emotions associated with a medical negligence dispute. In view of 
these international studies that indicate that lawyers prioritise legal and financial objectives 
over parties’ emotional needs, it was appropriate to explore whether the same practice occurs 
in the Victorian medical negligence jurisdiction.  
3.8 THE ROLE OF MEDIATION IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND MENTAL 
HARM DISPUTES  
The traditional response to healthcare disputes has been to ignore them, manage them 
informally, deal with them through ethics committees or have the cases litigated in the 
courts.261 These methods of dispute management have been criticised as ‘costly, time-
consuming, complex, stressful, lacking in equal participation, biased and controlling’.262 In 
response, mediation and other forms of ADR are increasingly being used in healthcare 
disputes in Australia.263 Of medical malpractice law suits, Szmania, Johnson and Mulligan 
have observed that: 
[e]ven the best-trained physicians can commit errors that result in continuing medical 
disabilities or even death. The conflicts that result from these errors are often fueled by 
emotion, and the complexity of modern medical care and can lead to expensive litigation.’264  
 
Eric Galton, a leading US mediator, has noted that, ‘[t]rial is like surgery without 
anesthesia’.265 Galton contends that when one considers the needs of the parties in medical 
negligence disputes (such as the expression of regret, sympathy or an explanation as to the 
reasons for a bad outcome), one will appreciate that mediation is an appropriate and 
therapeutic resolution mechanism.266 In this regard, mediation offers an opportunity for an 
explanation, the potential for an expression of an apology or sympathy and the ability to gain 
closure or convey forgiveness.267  
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Sheila Johnson is critical of the use of litigation as a means to resolve medical negligence 
disputes, contending that litigation neither serves to compensate the injured person nor to 
decrease negligence.268 Johnson uses a battle analogy to illustrate her contention: 
 
Litigation is based upon a war model. The parties muster an army (the firm), appoint a 
general (the lead trial lawyer), choose a battleground (the court with jurisdiction), stockpile 
the ammunition (discovery), engage in battles (the motion practice), participate in a required 
peace effort (pre-trial settlement conference), blow each other to bits (trial) and declare a 
victor (the verdict).
269
 
 
In contrast, mediation does not result in a winner but empowers the parties to reach 
agreement.270 Further benefits include that mediation can assist with the maintenance of a 
professional relationship and assist the parties to express their emotions.271 
 
Mediation of personal injury disputes continues to be prominent despite having features 
which may suggest the unsuitability of such cases for mediation.272 Reasons for potential 
unsuitability include the inequality of bargaining power between plaintiffs and insurer 
defendants, a limited issue in dispute (damages) and the lack of an ongoing relationship 
between the parties.273 Another complicating factor is the typical absence of the negligent 
party (the doctor) in mediation, with that role being represented by the insurer.274 Some 
plaintiffs may also prefer to have their matter heard in court.275  
 
Despite these factors, mediation is supported for a number of reasons. One reason is the fear 
that a trial may negatively exacerbate the plaintiff’s emotions, and another is the risk of 
public disgrace of the defendant’s professional reputation.276 A further reason is the cost of 
medical negligence litigation which is often complex and lengthy.277 Finally, litigation can 
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raise complex legal issues.278 This is what makes the benefits of mediation so well suited to 
medical negligence: it is a confidential process, it is quicker and more cost efficient, the 
process grants parties more control and is generally less acrimonious than litigation.279 
 
The use of mediation to settle personal injury insurance disputes may also have financial 
advantages for the insurer.280 An integrative negotiation approach where both parties can 
achieve their goals may deliver a more satisfactory outcome, one that meets the needs of the 
claimant whilst reducing the payout figure for the insurer.281 Mediation allows for positive 
communication and the exchange of information.282 The use of a mediator can also prevent 
hostility spiralling out of control, given the claimant in insurance disputes will frequently 
experience strong emotions.283 Further, a mediator can assist to maintain the claimant’s 
expectations and realistic notions of fairness.284  
 
The driving forces for plaintiffs in medical negligence claims often involves more than 
simply financial objectives.285 For victims of medical negligence, there is an emotional 
driving force in instigating a claim, such as the need to have their story heard or the desire to 
receive an apology from the medical practitioner responsible. Medical negligence disputes 
are a source of great emotional conflict because plaintiffs have often sustained catastrophic 
personal injuries or are claiming as a carer for a disabled child or relative. The medical error 
might even have resulted in the death of a loved one. Consequently, the stories of personal 
injury conform to the genre of tragedy.286 Yet litigating in court can turn the narrative into a 
melodrama. As Hardy puts it:  
 
The plaintiff, ideally characterised as inherently good, suffers from an injury due to the acts or 
omissions of the defendant, who is characterised as inherently bad. The injury results in the 
plaintiff’s previously good life completely transforming into a life typified by pain and 
suffering. The plaintiff consequently feels dissatisfaction with life but resignation to their fate. 
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The plaintiff and defendant are linked in a relationship of complementarity in that the 
defendant is portrayed as highly blameworthy and the plaintiff as not at all blameworthy. The 
plaintiff makes a public demonstration of virtue and the defendant is publicly judged. The 
plaintiff is then rewarded to the defendant’s detriment and justice is served.287 
 
To avoid this descent into melodrama, mediation can be the preferred method of resolving 
disputes, allowing the expression of emotion in a venue far more suitable than a courtroom. 
In the context of mental harm proceedings, plaintiffs with a psychological condition pursuing 
a mental harm action may particularly benefit from mediation.288 This is because the process 
is informal and thus less lengthy and stressful in nature.289 Plaintiffs are also provided with 
timely breaks if the process of negotiating about anxiety-inducing events, such as the cause of 
the injury or the pain of living with an injury, become too overwhelming for them.290 The 
process is also confidential which avoids any shame or guilt the plaintiff might feel from 
being exposed to public scrutiny.291  
 
Some academics recommend that a facilitative mediation style should be adopted in medical 
negligence disputes because it addresses the plaintiffs’ emotional needs and interests.292 The 
facilitative mediation style can be contrasted with using evaluative approaches common in 
court-connected mediation which involve harsher negotiation practices.293 Evaluative 
mediation involves the evaluation by a mediator of the legal or other merits of the dispute, in 
order to reach settlement according to the norms and principles of the relevant field of law.294 
Evaluative mediation does not take into account the parties’ subjective needs, interests and 
priorities.295 In contrast, in the facilitative mediation model the focus is on problem-solving, 
taking into account the parties’ personal and commercial interests and priorities.296 If 
facilitative mediation is viewed as having an important role to play in the resolution of 
medical negligence disputes, it is necessary to explore whether this model is practiced in 
mediation of Victorian medical negligence disputes. 
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3.9 PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON MEDIATION IN MEDICAL 
NEGLIGENCE  
This chapter has demonstrated that the use of mediation in medical negligence disputes is 
widely supported by academics and members of the legal profession. However, no systematic 
empirical study on the use of mediation in medical negligence and mental harm disputes has 
yet been undertaken in Australia. Empirical research on this issue has been undertaken in 
international jurisdictions and this section outlines the results of several studies relevant to 
this research.  
 
3.9.1 NORTH CAROLINA MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM  
In the 1990s North Carolina became one of the first states in the US to adopt a court-ordered 
mediation program.297 An empirical study was conducted involving analysis of court data 
records of malpractice cases ordered to mediation, observations of 42 mediations, review of 
47 closed insurance files, and a survey of 45 plaintiff lawyers, 72 defence lawyers and 32 
mediators.298  
 
In relation to the timing of the mediation, the study found that in 30.5% of cases, mediation 
was attempted nine months to one year of the filing date299 and approximately five months 
after mediation was ordered by the court.300 Using a number of variables the researchers also 
analysed the success of malpractice mediation and concluded that 44% of the mediations 
were successfully settled either at mediation or through a mediation related settlement.301 
Further, out of the 117 lawyers who were surveyed, approximately 75% supported the 
referral of disputes to mediation.302 Many of the participants believed that mediation offered 
‘meaningful potential for a “better resolution” of the case’.303  
 
As a case management tool, the study showed the mediation process was an effective way to 
handle those malpractice cases in which both parties have a genuine desire to settle. Many 
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cases were resolved directly as a result of the mediation. On the other hand, for those cases in 
which the parties were not inclined to settle, there was little evidence that the mediation 
program was able to transform the dispute or significantly alter the parties’ understanding or 
approach to the case.304 Despite the study having been conducted in a different jurisdiction, it 
serves to demonstrate the importance of mediation in the settlement of medical negligence 
cases and that its use is supported by the legal profession.  
 
3.9.2. NHS MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE PILOT SCHEME  
 
In response to increasing inaccessibility, costs, delays and unsatisfactory outcomes in medical 
negligence litigation, the British National Health service funded a pilot scheme in 1995 
involving referral of medical negligence disputes to two external mediation agencies.305 
Evaluations of twelve mediations between 1995 and 1998 were conducted, including 60 
interviews with parties involved in the mediations and three observations. Settlement was 
reached in eleven cases, with some of the cases having non-monetary settlements such as an 
explanation of the clinical errors, public apologies or improvements to hospitals as a result of 
the claim being made.306 However, lawyers who were interviewed indicated they were 
uncomfortable with lack of control in the mediation process and addressing non-financial 
matters in the process.307  
 
Doctors were present in six out of ten mediations involving practitioner negligence. Despite 
lack of unanimous support for their attendance in all situations, some parties were able to 
make substantial progress in mediation due to the fact that the doctor was present.308 The 
doctors expressed some dissatisfaction in participating, finding the mediation confrontational,  
distracting and time-consuming.309 Yet, their participation was considered valuable in 
circumstances where it allowed negotiations to progress, or to permit an explanation, apology 
or acknowledgment of responsibility.310  
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In summary, mediation was generally considered satisfying in the pilot scheme because of the 
opportunity to address the needs and interests of the parties rather than simply achieve a 
settlement.311 Although a pilot study, this research is significant as it demonstrates the 
importance of the doctor’s presence at mediation of medical negligence claims in allowing 
parties’ non-legal needs to be met.  
 
3.9.3 NEW YORK CITY’S PROJECT FOR MEDIATING MALPRACTICE CASES 
 
In a US pilot study, the New York City Project for Mediating Malpractice Cases, nineteen 
cases of medical malpractice mediations in 2004 were studied to measure participants’ 
satisfaction with the mediation processes, regardless of whether settlement was reached.312 
Participants included the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s support person, the plaintiff’s attorney, a 
representative from the Health and Hospital Corporation and the comptroller’s office , and the 
defendant’s attorney.313 Thirteen of the nineteen cases settled, and in eleven cases an apology 
of sympathy or responsibility was offered, with ten of those apology cases settling.314 Only 
three of the eight cases where an apology was not offered settled.315  
 
The researchers concluded that facilitation of apology was an advantage of mediation, with 
settlement occurring 2.42 times more frequently when an apology was offered.316 Despite a 
strong association between apology and settlement needs, the authors could not confidently 
assert that an apology always led to settlement,317 and acknowledged this correlation required 
further study.318 Further, the results of the study found that the parties and their lawyers 
viewed mediation as fair, satisfying and responsive to their interests.319 Overall, this study is 
significant because it highlights the important role of apologies in dispute resolution 
following medical error.  
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3.9.4 MEDIATING SUITS AGAINST HOSPITALS 
 
The ‘Mediating Suits Against Hospitals’ study is built on the ‘New York City Project for 
Mediating Malpractice Cases’ research project and was conducted by the same research team. 
The aim of the ‘Mediating Suits Against Hospitals’ study was to assess the suitability of 
mediation of medical malpractice lawsuits involving private hospitals in New York City.320 
Sixty-seven lawsuits were referred to the study, but data was only gathered from 57 cases as 
10 cases were withdrawn.321 31 out of 57 cases proceeded to mediation.322 As indicated 
earlier in this chapter, the researchers found that plaintiff lawyers were more willing to 
mediate than defendant lawyers, with plaintiff lawyers agreeing to mediate in 49 out of 57 
cases, compared with defendant lawyers who agreed to mediate in 31 out of 57 cases.323  
 
Out of the 31 cases, sixteen cases settled at mediation and five settled following the 
mediation.324 Plaintiffs and lawyers for both sides indicated a clear satisfaction with 
mediation, as did hospital representatives and insurers.325 Plaintiffs participated in 25 
mediations, with the study investigators noting plaintiff lawyers were concerned about loss of 
control over their client, or about what their client might hear in the mediation.326 No treating 
medical practitioners in the study participated in the mediations, with defence lawyers citing 
work schedules and the need to protect their client as reasons for non-attendance.327 The 
investigators noted that lawyers, hospital representatives and insurers did not fully understand 
the benefits of mediation, so without medical practitioners’ attendance the focus of the 
mediation was predominantly on the settlement sum.328 The mediation style used was 
facilitative and interest-based (rather than evaluative which focuses more strictly on legal and 
financial issues) and plaintiff and defence lawyers in the study reported they were satisfied 
with this approach.329  
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Apologies from defence lawyers or hospital representatives were given in nine mediations, 
with eight of those involving an expression of empathy but no admission of fault.330 The 
study also examined changes in practice or policy by hospitals, and found that only in four 
cases did the defendants listen to and identify a need to improve procedure to avoid or reduce 
medical error in the future.331 The researchers concluded the lack of attendance by doctors 
reduced parties’ ability to experience the full benefits of mediation, such as the opportunity 
for plaintiffs to understand or forgive the medical error.332 It also deprived doctors of the 
opportunity to identify and learn from errors in order to improve future healthcare services.333 
This study is significant insofar as it demonstrates the benefits of interest-based mediation for 
resolution of medical disputes, and further, highlights the importance of the attendance and 
participation by medical practitioners at mediation in order to make the process meaningful.  
 
3.9.5 PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS AND PARTIES IN LITIGATION AND 
MEDIATION OF PERSONAL INJURY DISPUTES  
 
Another study relevant to this research is Relis’ empirical study, which gathered the 
experiences of legal and lay participants, in the mediation of medical injury disputes in 
Canada.334 The data was gathered from 131 semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and 
observations of the lawyers, parties and mediators in 64 mediations.335 In relation to 
plaintiffs’ litigation aims, Relis concluded that lawyers’ perceptions are that plaintiffs sue 
predominantly for monetary reasons and consequently lawyers exclude other plaintiff 
objectives such as an admission of fault or apology for which mediation may be better 
suited.336 The study found strong support from lawyers in participating in voluntary 
mediation and a lack of opposition to mandatory mediation.337 Relis addresses the issue of 
power in mediation, noting that despite a plaintiff’s desire to have the defendant present at 
mediation, many defendant lawyers advised their clients not to attend the mediation.338 Many 
lawyers viewed doctors’ attendance at mediation as ‘risky’ because it might increase 
plaintiffs’ emotional reactions or attendance was considered ‘unnecessary’ because the 
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insurer indemnified the doctor and thus the doctor was not personally responsible for 
compensating the plaintiff.339 Because the doctor is not present at the mediation there is an 
inability to address emotional objectives and consequently mediations are transformed into 
venues for ‘bargaining over money’.340  
 
An analysis of the participants’ mediation objectives also highlighted the divergence between 
the plaintiffs’ extra-legal objectives and the lawyers’ tactical agendas.341 The experiences 
during the mediation also highlighted this divide: the plaintiffs used the mediation process to 
express their emotions and needs whereas the lawyers considered the information obtained 
during the mediation process as strategically important for future litigation.342 This 
divergence was also evident with respect to mediator perceptions; the plaintiffs focused on 
the mediators’ human attributes, whilst the lawyers preferred an evaluative mediation style 
and focused on the tactical assistance the mediator could offer.343 Overall, the study is useful 
to this research as it compares the varying perceptions of legal and lay participants involved 
in medical injury disputes. It is highlights the extent to which plaintiffs are keen to participate 
in mediation and the push by lawyers to avoid the presence of doctors at mediation. The 
study also highlights the relevance of emotion and power as themes prevalent in mediation, 
which are discussed in more detail in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
3.10 LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE ADVERSARIAL CULTURE OF LAWYERS 
The training and education of lawyers, combined with the personality types of individuals 
attracted to law, would suggest that a majority of lawyers tend to adopt an adversarial 
approach to lawyering.344 While this approach is helpful in a courtroom, it can be extremely 
detrimental in mediation if lawyers dominate the process, control their clients and steer the 
negotiations towards rights-based or financial objectives. In disputes where emotion is a 
factor, adversarialism can hinder the ability of participants to express feelings, seek an 
explanation or apology from the opposing party, or receive emotional closure. To address the 
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critical lack of emotional understanding and intelligence in lawyers, commentators argue that 
curricular reform in law schools and continuing legal education is needed.345  
 
Macfarlane contends that lawyers construct a professional identity based on their beliefs 
about their role in the legal profession, and identifies that the dominant values in legal culture 
are closely affiliated with the adversarial stereotype.346 These include aggressive argument, 
positional bargaining, formalistic rituals and procedures, and a strategy to win.347 Despite 
these stereotypes, an increase in ADR has led to a cultural change in the professional identity 
of lawyers, with lawyers amenable to alternative forms of dispute resolution.348 Macfarlane 
explains this is ‘the evolution of a new form of lawyering, which is more effective and more 
realistic within a changed disputing landscape in which trials are a rarity’.349 She suggests 
there are three core dimensions that distinguish the new lawyer from the old lawyer: first, an 
increase in negotiation skills; second, an increase in communication as vehicle for resolution 
of conflict; third, a change in the relationship between a lawyer and client where the lawyer 
considers the client as a partner in problem-solving thus encouraging active client 
participation.350  
 
Lawyers’ professional identity is influenced from a number of sources, including legal 
education, communities of practice, personal experiences, mentorship, and professional codes 
of conduct.351 To Macfarlane, legal education is a site ripe for change in the promotion and 
evolution of new professional identities for lawyers.352 In Australia, ADR education can be 
provided in law school, in pre-admission training in practical training programs or through 
continuing professional development of lawyers.353 
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Corbin, Baron and Gutman advocate for reform in legal education, combined with more 
directive professional rules, to shift the lawyering culture.354 In relation to professional 
conduct rules, the scholars contend that these rules have traditionally prioritised the lawyer’s 
duty to the client over interests such as a duty to other parties or to society.355 They 
acknowledge that a welcome addition is a more directive rule obliging lawyers to inform 
clients of all dispute resolution avenues.356 The authors further emphasise the importance of 
legal education in fostering a change in culture and assert this can be helped by two factors: 
firstly, the inclusion of Threshold Learning Outcomes in the standards imposed on law 
schools to emphasise the importance of ADR and secondly, the inclusion of ADR as a core 
subject in law schools.357 The Threshold Learning Outcomes were developed in 2010 and 
represent a set of six knowledge and skills outcomes expected of Australian law graduates.358  
 
Academics have highlighted how teaching ADR in law schools can assist to shape positive 
professional identities in lawyers and equip them with the knowledge, skills and attitudes for 
practice.359 Field and Duffy also support the inclusion of ADR as a mandatory subject for law 
students. They contend that if the significance of ADR in legal practice is accepted, then law 
schools are failing future legal practitioners because of the lack of ADR content.360 The 
Australian Government’s Access to Justice Report recommended that lawyers admitted to 
practice should be equipped with skills to guide a client through a dispute resolution process, 
and understand the major ADR processes.361 In a subsequent report, NADRAC agreed with 
this recommendation, and contended that the teaching of ADR in law schools should be 
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compulsory.362 Field and Roy support the introduction of ADR as a compulsory subject in 
law curricula, advocating for ADR to be made a capstone subject.363 
 
While many commentators have called for the inclusion of ADR as a mandatory course in 
legal education, some have highlighted the need to examine how and when it is incorporated 
into a law degree, in order to maximise benefits.364 In a study conducted by Douglas 
consisting of interviews with 24 Victorian and Queensland teachers who taught ADR, all 
participants endorsed the value of ADR in a law course as well as the need for law students to 
understand and choose from a range of dispute resolution alternatives.365 The participants in 
this study were also asked about the placement of ADR within the law course they were 
teaching. Three universities offered ADR as a stand-alone compulsory course, another three 
combined ADR and Civil Procedure as a compulsory course, a further three offered ADR as 
an elective subject integrated with an earlier compulsory substantive law course, and finally 
another three universities offered ADR as an elective.366 The positioning of ADR in the law 
program varied, with some universities offering it as a first-year subject while others offered 
it in later years of study.367 Ultimately the participants in the study endorsed the inclusion of 
ADR theory and practice as a valuable source of teaching future lawyers negotiation and 
mediation skills, and supported the inclusion of ADR as a first year subject. The participants 
were not unanimous in their responses as to whether ADR ought to be taught as a stand-alone 
module or combined with another area of study.368 
 
Greater focus on ADR in legal education is also valuable for educating future lawyers about 
the importance of addressing emotion in conflict and dispute resolution. Traditionally, legal 
education has focused on teaching legal principles, fact-finding skills and application of law 
to facts, yet non-adversarial forms of justice such as therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative 
justice suggest that emotional intelligence and interpersonal skills are of equal importance.369 
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These skills include the ability to understand clients’ psychological and emotional needs, and 
garnering techniques of understanding and empathy.370  
 
Douglas and Batagol have explored how ADR and non-adversarial justice are being used as 
sites to teach law students about emotion in dispute resolution through interviews and surveys 
of Australian law teachers.371 When asked about the importance of emotion in ADR, the 
general consensus of participants was that emotion was an integral part of conflict.372 
However emotion was considered less important by teachers of civil procedure courses which 
would suggest that combining ADR with more adversarial approaches reduces emphasis on 
factors such as emotion.373 When asked about incorporating teaching about emotion into 
ADR courses, participants offered a number of strategies including drawing on literature, 
class discussion, teaching communication skills, and debriefing role plays.374 Douglas and 
Batagol concluded that while ADR is an optimal subject for teaching emotion, not all law 
schools have fully engaged with this opportunity.375 
 
In December 2016, the Law Admissions Consultative Committee revised the Model 
Admission Rules for legal practice, altering Civil Dispute Resolution (formerly Civil 
Procedure) to include teaching of ADR.376 Given that Civil Dispute Resolution is part of the 
‘Priestley 11’ core units which law students must complete to gain admission to practice,377 
this recent revision represents a significant shift in the acceptance of ADR in the training and 
education of lawyers. While this change is relatively recent, it will be an important site for 
future research to explore its effect on the teaching of ADR in law schools and its subsequent 
impact on legal practice.  
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3.11 CONCLUSION  
The literature in this chapter has demonstrated that mediation has a vital role to play in the 
resolution of medical negligence and mental harm disputes. The particular characteristics of 
medical negligence disputes, such as complexity of medical subject matter and heightened 
emotions, lend themselves to resolution by alternative means of dispute resolution. Mediation 
offers an environment capable of catering to the non-legal needs of the parties and also 
provides a quicker, cheaper and less formal alternative. With the increase of court-connected 
mediation in the resolution of medical negligence disputes, it is important to explore how 
mediation is practiced in this niche jurisdiction. This includes exploration of the role of 
lawyers in mediation, addressing parties’ emotion as an influential factor, and the practical 
challenges faced by lawyers and parties throughout the process.  
 
Empirical studies in the medical negligence context discussed in this chapter indicate that 
generally lawyers are more comfortable taking an adversarial stance in mediation, because 
they are more familiar with this approach. Consequently, lawyers tend to sideline client’s 
emotional needs in favour of legal and financial objectives. Previous studies also show the 
necessity for both parties attending and meaningfully participating in mediation to allow for 
the non-legal needs of the parties, such as the expression of regret, sympathy, an explanation 
or an apology, to be met. This is consistent with the literature on non-adversarial justice 
approaches, including TJ, RJ and PJ, which highlight the role of emotion in conflict and the 
importance of addressing non-legal needs of parties.  
 
Despite the benefits facilitative or interest-based mediation can offer in medical negligence, 
results of previous studies would indicate that lawyers have a tendency to favour an 
evaluative or rights-based style of mediation that does not necessarily cater to the needs of 
the participants. These findings suggest lawyers foster an adversarial culture which is 
reflected in mediation practice, and in order to shift this culture, more emphasis needs to be 
placed on legal education and the teaching of ADR in law schools to facilitate this change. In 
summary, this literature review chapter informs the mediation part of this qualitative research 
that seeks to explore how mediation of Victorian medical negligence disputes occurs in 
practice.  
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CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY  
 
4.1         INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Two of this thesis explored the background to major tort reforms in 2002-2003 
affecting medical negligence and mental harm proceedings, including challenges presented 
by injury thresholds, caps on damages and the statutory causation test. The literature 
described criticism from prominent academics and legal professionals regarding the 2002-
2003 reforms to the Wrongs Act, centred on the lack of an empirical basis underpinning the 
need for the reforms and the rushed nature of implementing the resulting amendments. 
 
Chapter Three of this thesis explored how the shadow of the law can impact upon mediation 
practice in the medical negligence context, including how lawyers can influence the 
resolution process and the role that emotion can play in resolving such disputes. The 
background literature also highlighted the lack of a systematic empirical study into medical 
negligence litigation and mediation practice in Victoria. In order to address this gap, the 
empirical component of this research explores whether the Ipp Reforms have had any effect 
on the litigation and mediation of meritorious medical negligence and mental harm claims in 
Victoria, from the perspective of lawyers and judges with medical negligence experience. It 
also explores the potential impact of the 2015 remedial amendments to the Wrongs Act on 
medical negligence and mental harm claims.  
 
This chapter outlines the scope and aims of this doctoral study. It includes the 
epistemological and methodological choices for this research and reasons for using a 
grounded theory approach. The methods used in the study including ethics approval, data 
collection, sampling, recruitment method and interviewing approach, and data analysis are 
then addressed. Finally, the limitations of the study are outlined.  
4.2 AIMS AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this study is to explore whether the 2002-2003 amendments to the Wrongs Act 
have presented challenges to the successful recovery of compensation in meritorious medical 
negligence and mental harm claims. This research may be beneficial in exploring the 
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challenges faced by medical negligence parties in the litigation of such claims. Another aim 
of this study was to explore and to understand how the current state of the law has affected 
court-connected mediation practice in medical negligence disputes. Accordingly, this 
doctoral research project was confined to exploring mediation of medical negligence disputes 
in a court-connected environment and issues such as mediation in the hospital and healthcare 
contexts were not explored in this research. Finally, the research may assist policy-makers in 
developing possible improvements to the current regulatory framework for the mediation and 
litigation of medical negligence disputes.  
 
The primary research questions are: 
1. Have the 2002-2003 amendments to the Wrongs Act resulting from the Ipp Reforms 
had any effect on the litigation and mediation of meritorious medical negligence 
claims?  
2. What impact are the 2015 amendments to the Wrongs Act likely to have on the 
litigation and mediation of medical negligence disputes?  
A number of subsidiary research questions also explore the challenges faced by lawyers in 
medical negligence practice. The subsidiary questions are divided into litigation and 
mediation categories.  
 
Litigation Questions:  
 Following the Ipp Reforms, what are the challenges experienced by lawyers in 
medical negligence litigation? Do these challenges apply to mental harm claims as 
well?  
 Does the element of causation present as a hurdle to plaintiffs succeeding in a 
negligence case?  
 Based on your experience, what are your perceptions about the changes (if any) 
experienced in the number of litigants commencing medical negligence disputes 
following the Ipp Reforms?  
 Based on your experience, what are your perceptions about the changes (if any) 
experienced in the compensation payments received by plaintiffs in medical 
negligence proceedings, following the Ipp Reforms? Do these changes apply to 
mental harm claims as well?  
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 What impact do you see the recent 2015 amendments to the Wrongs Act having on the 
ability of plaintiffs to recover compensation?  
 
Mediation Questions:  
 To what degree do parties engage in mediation for medical negligence disputes? If 
they do, are emotional issues a relevant factor in participating in mediation?  
 Does the mediation process assist participants to express their emotions associated 
with the medical negligence dispute?  
 What is the role of lawyers in the mediation of medical negligence disputes?  
 Following the Ipp Reforms, what are the challenges (if any) experienced by lawyers 
in mediation of medical negligence disputes?   
 Is mediation a more suitable dispute resolution avenue than litigation for medical 
negligence claims?  
 What benefits or disadvantages does mediation (as opposed to litigation) have on 
medical negligence clients (either plaintiff or defendant)?    
 Are there any aspects of the medical negligence dispute litigation or mediation 
process in need of further reform?  
 
4.3 ETHICS  
Ethics refers to the moral principles governing conduct.1 It is important for a researcher to 
adhere to the highest ethical principles possible because failure to do so can have adverse 
consequences for the research participants and organisations involved. In order to explore the 
research questions, a qualitative research method using semi-structured interviews was 
adopted.  
 
Ethics approval for this research (project no. 19618) shows that it was deemed low risk by the 
RMIT University Business CHEAN Committee and approval was granted on 15 October 
2015. A copy of the approval letter is contained in Appendix 1. On 24 December 2015, an 
ethics amendment approval was granted extending the research sample to Victorian County 
Court judges with medical negligence experience. The recruitment method was also 
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expanded to include the snowball sampling technique. A copy of this approval letter dated 24 
December 2015 is contained in Appendix 2. On 31 March 2016, a further ethics amendment 
approval was granted allowing Victorian Supreme Court Justices with medical negligence 
experience to be interviewed for the research. A copy of this approval letter is contained in 
Appendix 3.  
 
The research participants in this study are Victorian lawyers and judges with medical 
negligence experience. The participants fall into a low risk category in this study. However, it 
was important to recognise that participants could face some risk in agreeing to participate in 
the interview. For instance, the participants may open themselves up to criticism from their 
employer if they were perceived to be critical of any aspect of their employment. In addition, 
the lawyers could be criticised by their clients for failing to adopt a certain stance. For 
instance, a medical negligence defence practitioner whose client is an insurance firm may be 
criticised for sympathising with plaintiffs. The participants could also be censured by other 
members of the legal profession which could adversely impact their reputation.  
 
To overcome these ethical concerns, the candidate provided the participants with a consent 
form prior to commencing interviews. The researcher also ensured anonymity of the research 
participants by de-identifying participant information. Each participant was categorised as 
‘Lawyer Plaintiff’, ‘Lawyer Defendant’ or ‘Lawyer Court’ and assigned a number. 
Participants were also assured that only the researcher and the researcher’s supervisors would 
have access to the identifying data.  
4.4 EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY  
A research paradigm is the framework that guides the conduct of the research.2 It is the 
philosophical framework that ensures appropriate methodological choices to serve the 
purpose and aims of the research. The two main paradigms are positivism and 
interpretivism.3 The positivist position supports the view that there is only one objective 
reality in existence.4 An alternative paradigm is interpretivism, which holds that social reality 
is a subjective construction based on interpretation and interaction.5 It is grounded in the 
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assumption that research on humans and human institutions differs from research into the 
natural and physical sciences.6 It is best suited to research exploring participants’ thoughts, 
feelings and beliefs about a phenomenon.7 
 
The research paradigm contains a number of philosophical assumptions. The ontological 
assumption is concerned with the nature of reality.8 Positivism supports the view that social 
reality is objective and external to the researcher whereas interpretivism posits that social 
reality is subjective and socially constructed.9 The epistemological assumption is concerned 
with the processes through which knowledge is created.10 Under the positivist view the 
researcher seeks to be objective and distant from the data whereas interpretivism holds that 
the researcher’s knowledge is obtained through engagement with subjective evidence 
provided by participants.11  
 
Epistemological positions are associated with certain methodologies. Adherence to a 
positivist paradigm leads to quantitative research aiming to measure and test a hypothesis, 
commonly implemented through surveys and questionnaires.12 The interpretive approach is 
associated with collecting qualitative data. Collecting qualitative data involves the researcher 
gathering the feelings, thoughts and ideas of the participants. Qualitative research strategies 
are inductive because they involve the creation of a theory following data collection, rather 
than the testing of an existing theory.13  
 
The most appropriate paradigm for this research is interpretivism. This is because the purpose 
of the research was to gain an understanding of the impact the Ipp Reforms and the 2015 
reforms have had on the litigation and mediation of medical negligence disputes through the 
views of lawyers representing plaintiffs and defendants. Interpretivism adopts the view that 
reality is situational and personal, and will vary between individuals.14 This underpinning is 
well suited to conducting qualitative research because judges and lawyers are a rich source of 
information who are well positioned to comment on any challenges experienced by their 
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clients in medical negligence litigation and mediation disputes. They are able to comment on 
the legal issues that affect the opportunity to be compensated in medical negligence cases 
after the Ipp Reforms and can also articulate possible further legislative change.  
4.5 GROUNDED THEORY 
The philosophical framework and methodology selected as the most suitable to the aims of 
this research is grounded theory. Grounded theory was selected as the research methodology 
to undertake the analysis of the data. This can be contrasted with corrective justice theory 
which was selected as the conceptual framework through which analysis of the data occurred.  
While methods such as thematic content analysis or phenomenography can also be used in 
qualitative research designs,15 grounded theory was selected as it seeks to include a variety of 
data sources that might contribute to theory development. In this research, past literature and 
doctrinal analysis of case law and legislation was highly relevant to the development of the 
emerging theory.  
 
Grounded theory was first developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in response to a 
need to generate new theory from data, as opposed to testing existing theories.16 Glaser’s 
background was in positivist methodology whereas Strauss was a field researcher who 
studied symbolic interactionism (a theory that explains social reality through the manner in 
which individuals interact with one another).17 Their combined experience enabled them to 
bring a ‘pragmatist philosophical study of process, action, and meaning into empirical inquiry 
through grounded theory’.18 Glaser and Strauss’ perspectives on grounded theory 
subsequently diverged,19 Glaser’s writings moved towards the theoretical while Strauss’ 
focus was practical. Strauss later collaborated with Corbin to produce texts which outlined a 
structured approach to grounded theory including clear analytical steps.20 As a consequence 
of this divergence, grounded theory can be viewed in two different modes: the classic 
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(‘Glaserian’) mode originally developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967 and the latter 
‘Straussian’ mode developed by Strauss and Corbin. Given that the Glaserian mode is rooted 
in the positivist paradigm, the Straussian mode is better suited to the research in this study 
because of its origins in pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. Further, methodological 
gaps in the early texts on grounded theory do not assist in the planning and execution of a 
rigorous study, while the practical rigour of the Straussian mode is more suitable for a 
doctoral study.21 
 
Grounded theory is inductive, and it is used when the researcher seeks to create a theory from 
data or when researching a matter about which little is known.22 It is most often used in 
research with qualitative data sources.23 In contrast with a deductive method, it is not used to 
test an existing theory, that is, the researcher ‘does not begin with a theory, then prove it. 
Rather, the researcher begins with an area of study and concepts relevant to the phenomenon 
are allowed to emerge’.24 Grounded theory is most useful in explaining the phenomenon 
being studied.25 The way that data is collected in grounded theory studies can take many 
forms however interviews are the most common method.26   
 
A unique tool utilised by grounded theory is theoretical sampling, defined by Glaser and 
Strauss as ‘the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly 
collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find 
them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges’.27 In this study after initial data collection 
from lawyers, the researcher decided to extend data collection to Victorian judges and 
justices to garner a different perspective from them. Members of the judiciary are not only 
highly experienced lawyers but have the unique advantage of adjudicating medical 
negligence disputes so it was beneficial to the study to gather reflections from these 
participants. Theoretical sampling involves accessing an initial source of data, then 
interpreting the meaning of the data and relating it back to the evolving theory.28  
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Grounded theory outlines methods of data analysis which are executed through coding and 
categorisation.29 It is accepted there are many variations of the method of data analysis.30 The 
approach in this study is generally consistent with a small ‘g’ grounded theory approach, 
involving a thematic analysis directed by grounded theory. This approach involved using 
thematic directions that enabled analysis of data and exploration of themes without 
necessarily constructing a metatheory from the data.  
 
Coding is the process of analysing the data and identifying the different concepts emerging 
from it. It occurs by acknowledging that participants’ words represent a broader concept.31  
The next stage in grounded theory analysis is theorising, which involves the researcher 
identifying the information gained in the data, identifying any missing information and 
testing a preliminary hypothesis with existing or new data.32 This means that the entire 
process of gathering data does not occur at the commencement of the study, but rather 
continues until the researcher has reached theoretical saturation. Theoretical saturation is a 
point where no new themes in the data emerge and the data collected does not add to the 
knowledge already gained.33 
4.6 DATA COLLECTION 
Consistent with the research paradigm and methodology, interviews were the most suitable 
data collection method for this study. Interviews are used when the researcher is capable of 
identifying the key respondents integral to the research and engaging them in an interview 
process.34 In order to collect the data, the researcher identified a sample of Victorian lawyers 
and judges with medical negligence experience and interviewed them. The lawyers represent 
a sample from those instigating and defending negligence claims. The lawyers were 
identified as the experts in their field best placed to provide reflections on the challenges of 
practicing in this area since the 2003 and 2015 reforms to the Wrongs Act. Plaintiff lawyers 
formulate the claims on behalf of their clients and play a significant role in the gaining of 
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compensation for them. The role of defendant lawyers is to formulate defenses to claims on 
behalf of insurers and ensure compensation paid is not disproportional. These lawyers attend 
mediation with their clients and advise them of the desirability of accepting offers of 
settlement. As repeat players in mediation, they are able to offer insights about their own 
experiences and the experiences of their clients with this ADR option.  
4.7 SAMPLING  
In a qualitative study, the ‘richness’ of data is crucial to the study which may be obtained 
from a smaller number of participants. For researchers gathering quantitative data, a large 
number of participants is needed in order to ensure that the participants are representative of 
the population so that the findings have general application. The researcher did not determine 
the exact number of participants at the beginning of the research process. Rather, the 
researcher continued interviewing participants until saturation was achieved. In grounded 
theory, it is important to select participants based on their ability to provide information 
relevant to the study. In this study, it was envisaged that the researcher would interview 
between 20 and 40 participants, depending on when saturation was reached.35 
 
Participants were selected using purposive sampling,36 meaning they were selected based on 
certain characteristics, such as their level of experience in medical negligence. Purposive 
sampling allowed the researcher to select participants who had information and experience 
which was relevant to the research questions. Purposive sampling is consistent with the use of 
grounded theory because it allowed the researcher to select the participants who were able to 
provide the richest insight into the study phenomenon, based on their experience. An internet 
search was conducted initially to locate the participants and to determine the extent of their 
experience in medical negligence. Subsequently, the snowball sampling method was used to 
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allow participants who had already been interviewed to recommend further participants with 
relevant experience for the study.37  
 
In order to gain a representative sample, the interviews were conducted with medical 
negligence lawyers representing plaintiff and defendants, as well as with barristers who 
usually had experience representing both parties. The use of Victorian participants was based 
on considerations of budget and accessibility of participants. In December 2015, the 
researcher decided to expand the range of participants to include Victorian judges and 
justices with medical negligence experience.  
4.8 RECRUITMENT 
The participants were identified through a website search of Victorian medical negligence 
law firms and barrister clerk lists. The participants were contacted by email and invited to 
participate in the research. The email contained a plain language letter and consent form. A 
copy of the invitation letter and consent form is contained in Appendix 4. If no response were 
received, a follow up email was sent. If a positive response were received, a date and time for 
the interview was scheduled. On 22 December 2015 approval was granted by the RMIT 
University Ethics Committee to expand the recruitment method to include further participants 
obtained by snowball sampling. This technique continued until the researcher reached 
saturation point where no new concepts, themes or ideas that would contribute to the research 
findings emerged.38  
 
During recruitment, the researcher needed to overcome a number of challenges. Firstly, the 
research questions focused on experiences prior to and following the Ipp Reforms which 
limited the pool of participants to senior legal practitioners. The researcher needed to locate 
participants that held the relevant length of experience in medical negligence. This process 
became easier with the use of ‘snowball sampling’ as participants could recommend fellow 
medical negligence lawyers who were sufficiently experienced. Secondly, the research relied 
heavily on participants volunteering to be interviewed while balancing demands of busy work 
schedules. The work constraints resulted in several participants rescheduling interviews or 
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advising the researcher they no longer wished to participate. Finally, during initial 
communications some participants expressed concern about their perceived need to be 
familiar with the precise nature of the Ipp Reforms. Once the participants were reassured the 
researcher sought their perceptions and experiences in medical negligence, rather than 
doctrinal knowledge, they indicated they were comfortable participating in the research 
project.  
4.9 INTERVIEWING 
The researcher adopted a reflexive approach while conducting the interviews. Reflexivity in 
research is ‘grounded in the in-depth, experiential, and interpersonal nature of qualitative 
inquiry’.39 It emphasises the importance of ‘deep introspection, political consciousness, 
cultural awareness, and ownership of one’s perspective’.40 Reflexivity involves a researcher’s 
self-questioning and self-understanding.41 Reflexivity can involve personal reflections on the 
researcher’s values, epistemological reflections on how the world is known, or ethical 
reflections regarding the research being undertaken.42 It is important for the researcher to be 
aware of the effect of their involvement in the research and any impact this may have on the 
research. For instance, there is a risk that a researcher’s critique of the data can reflect badly 
on medical negligence practice and expose the participants to criticism from their employer 
or the legal profession. Therefore it is important for a researcher to be consciously aware of 
how they can influence the study. In addition, adopting a reflexive approach may assist in 
avoiding bias on the part of the interviewer by encouraging the researcher to evaluate 
research processes. A reflexive approach can also help the researcher to adopt a ‘curious’ and 
‘open’ stance to the issues under investigation.  
 
When conducting interviews, the researcher used an interview schedule to guide the 
conversation with participants. A complete list of the questions in the interview schedule is 
contained in Appendix 5. The researcher asked open-ended questions to allow the 
participants to provide answers based on their knowledge and experience. Following 
introductions, the researcher provided an overview of the research to the participant, 
explained the consent form, and obtained consent for audio recording of the interview. The 
                                                 
39
 Michael Q Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods  (SAGE Publications, 4
th
 ed, 2015) 70.  
40
 Ibid.  
41
 Ibid.  
42
 Marilyn Lichtman, Qualitative Research for the Social Sciences  (SAGE Publications, 2014) 32-33.  
132 
 
researcher then obtained information from the participant on the nature and duration of their 
work experience in medical negligence. This preliminary information was followed by a 
conversation based on the prompt questions contained in Appendix 5.  
 
To trial the interview schedule, the researcher conducted a pilot interview with a participant. 
The trial resulted in the inclusion of a specific question with respect to causation to directly 
ask participants whether they thought it presented as a hurdle in meritorious medical 
negligence claims. Otherwise all interview questions remained the same as those reflected in 
the interview schedule. The interview data obtained in the pilot interview was relevant to the 
research questions and was therefore included in the overall study. Once the remedial 
amendments to the Wrongs Act had taken effect in late November 2015, a specific question 
about the anticipated effect of the VCEC reforms was included. 
 
The interviews with research participants lasted between thirty and sixty minutes and were 
conducted face-to-face. The interviews were held between November 2015 and June 2016. 
All interviews were audio recorded. One third of the interviews were transcribed by the 
researcher and the remaining interviews were transcribed through a transcription service, 
OutScribe. The identity of the participants was separated from the data by adopting a 
numbered coding system. Each participant was categorised as ‘Lawyer Plaintiff’, ‘Lawyer 
Defendant’ or ‘Lawyer Court’ and assigned a number. The electronic identifying data was 
kept on secure password-protected RMIT University servers and the printed consent forms 
and interview notes in locked cabinets on site at RMIT University. The identifying data was 
only available to the researcher and the researcher’s supervisors.  
 
The semi-structured interviews and open-ended questions allowed the participants to discuss 
the subject matter openly and to offer their experience and opinions on the topics presented to 
them. The participants were able to comment on the legal issues that affect the ability of 
plaintiffs to be compensated in medical negligence and mental harm claims, and could assist 
with the articulation of possible further legislative change. Further, the participants could 
offer reflections on how they perceived their role in the mediation of medical negligence 
disputes, how the shadow of the law impacts upon mediation practice and whether the 
mediation process allowed for the expression of emotion by the parties. 
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4.10 DATA ANALYSIS 
Consistent with the interpretivist paradigm, analysis of the data was undertaken through 
emergent themes. In some sections of this thesis a basic numerical analysis is also used to 
clearly illustrate participants’ responses. This approach is consistent with scholars’ views that 
a numerical summary can play an important role in qualitative research by offering clarity in 
the representation of the findings.43 The process of data analysis is outlined in comprehensive 
detail below.   
 
4.10.1 OPEN CODING 
After the data was transcribed, the researcher analysed the transcripts using open coding to 
identify relevant themes and concepts.44 In grounded theory, open coding is the first step in 
research and involves identifying and labeling important terms in the interview transcripts.45 
Open coding was undertaken manually by the researcher, by analysing the interview 
transcripts line-by-line to identify key words, sentences or phrases with respect to legal 
challenges in medical negligence and mental harm claims. This allowed the researcher to 
remain open to the data and to understand the meaning behind the participants’ words.  
 
The open codes were developed through reading the transcript of the interviews to obtain the 
emerging concepts. The concepts were then checked or adapted through a second reading of 
the data. Throughout this process, the researcher created memos to identify the concepts and 
support them with participants’ quotes. For instance, the researcher specifically questioned 
the participants about emotion as a factor in medical negligence proceedings and this is 
recorded as a category. In other instances, themes repeatedly emerged from participants’ 
responses such as the category of ‘access to justice’. Table 1 contains an outline of the initial 
codes identified by the researcher:  
  
                                                 
43
 Joseph A. Maxwell, ‘Using Numbers in Qualitative Research’ (2010) 16(6) Qualitative Inquiry 475, 480; 
Karen Messing et al, ‘Qualitative Research Using Numbers: An Approach Developed in France and Used to 
Transform Work in North America’ (2005) 15(3) New Solutions 245. 
44
 Corbin and Strauss, above n 20.  
45
 Birks and Mills, above n 21, 10.  
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 Table 1: Examples of Open Codes  
Access to justice Medical negligence cases 
are different to TAC and 
Workcover cases 
Loss of chance cases 
 
Access to damages Role of the Civil Procedure 
Act 2010 (Vic) 
Role of peer professional 
opinion defence  
Cost of litigation Emotion as a factor Restriction of small claims 
Litigation is an unpleasant 
process 
Importance of an apology Novel claims to recover 
compensation 
Unfairness and inequality 
of reforms and restrictions 
Impairment level as a 
restriction 
Role of lawyer in mediation 
Unfairness in mental harm 
claims 
Mediation as a farce Role of mediator in 
mediation 
Legal challenges in medical 
negligence and mental harm 
claims  
Role of plaintiff in 
mediation is limited 
Importance of privacy in 
mediation 
Causation as hurdle Mediation vs Litigation  Need for uniformity and 
legislative consistency 
throughout Australia  
 
Impact of 2015 reforms Role of jury in medical 
negligence cases 
Discrimination in physical 
and psychological injuries 
 
Whenever a significant concept became apparent from reading the interview transcripts, a 
code was assigned. The data was rich with concepts and sometimes a single paragraph could 
elicit multiple codes, derived both explicitly from the words of the participants or from what 
their words implied. For example, the following quote reveals the relevant codes highlighted 
in bold:   
 
I’ve always really felt I don’t understand why we have an 11 per cent impairment for mental 
harm claims and six per cent (Impairment Thresholds) – I think why should a person with 
… psychological injury be treated any different to (Discrimination between Physical and 
Psychological Injuries) – differently to a person with a physical injury (Unfairness) 
(Plaintiff Lawyer 1).  
 
This quote elicited several codes which referred to the impairment thresholds in medical 
negligence, the discrimination between physical and psychological injuries under the Wrongs 
Act, and to an overarching theme of unfairness.  
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4.10.2 AXIAL CODING 
As the concepts from the data were coded, they were grouped together with codes which 
were similar in nature. This second step in coding is known as axial coding. Strauss and 
Corbin define axial coding as  
a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by 
making connections between categories. This is done by utilising a coding paradigm 
involving conditions, action / interactional strategies and consequences.46 
For instance, the codes about ‘restriction of small claims’, ‘impairment level as a restriction’ 
and ‘restrictions in access to damages’ could all be grouped in a category of ‘Restricting 
Access to Justice’. The purpose of this grouping was to reassemble the codes into categories 
so that the researcher could identify overarching themes.  
 
4.10.3 SELECTIVE CODING 
The advanced stage of coding in grounded theory is known as selective coding.47 Strauss and 
Corbin define selective coding as ‘the process of selecting the core category, systematically 
relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need 
further refinement and development’.48 This lies at the heart of theoretical integration, which 
involves gathering all of the theoretical concepts into a final grounded theory.49 Birks and 
Mills contend that theoretical integration commences when the first piece of data is gathered, 
and develops further as relationships between concepts emerge, until the researcher can pull 
together a theoretical scheme to create the final grounded theory.50  
 
The core theme that emerged in this study focused on ‘legal challenges in medical negligence 
and mental harm’. This is used as an umbrella term to describe various aspects of challenges 
faced by lawyers in medical negligence disputes, including thresholds, caps on damages and 
causation as restrictions in litigation, and the lack of opportunity to express emotion in 
mediation. The participants acknowledged both the legal right to take action in medical 
negligence and mental harm claims and the role of legal avenues such as mediation and 
litigation to assist with dispute resolution. However, many participants identified challenges 
with accessing justice in this field. For instance, the participants referred to impairment 
                                                 
46
 Strauss and Corbin, above n 20, 96.  
47
 Birks and Mills, above n 21, 91.  
48
 Strauss and Corbin, above n 20, 116.  
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 Birks and Mills, above n 21, 108.  
50
 Ibid 109-110.  
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thresholds and the caps on damages and causation as hurdles preventing plaintiffs from 
recovering damages.  
 
In relation to mediation, almost all of the participants endorsed the classical attributes of 
mediation (less adversarial, faster and cheaper) and yet challenges were frequently mentioned 
about the inability to use mediation to its full effect in medical negligence claims. For 
instance, plaintiffs play a limited role in mediations and are denied the ability to express 
emotion, despite medical negligence and mental harm claims often arising in emotional 
circumstances. This core theme assisted the researcher to answer the central research 
questions, namely that the Ipp Reforms have resulted in legal challenges for both plaintiff and 
defendant lawyers, and that these challenges have not been removed by the 2015 reforms. 
Further, the shadow of the law has a significant impact upon mediation practice, influencing 
how lawyers conduct settlements of medical negligence disputes in this arena.  
 
4.10.4 DATA VALIDATION 
The validation of the data was undertaken by consulting with research supervisors, ensuring 
the transparency of the research process and seeking disconfirming data. Validity is not 
considered relevant in qualitative studies insofar as ‘measuring’ validity is concerned.51 For 
the purpose of the research it was important to gather a broad range of unique responses, 
hence the need for objective validity was significantly reduced. However, one form of 
validation is respondent validation, where the researcher provides each participant with an 
account of the information provided by them in the interview to verify its accuracy.52 The 
researcher took the opportunity to clarify or confirm answers wherever it was necessary to do 
so. Further, the researcher offered to send a copy of the transcribed interview transcript to 
each participant for verification purposes but no formal requests were made by the 
participants.  
 4.11 DESCRIPTION OF PARTICIPANTS  
There were 24 participants in this study. The participants comprised of three judges and 21 
lawyers (including barristers) with medical negligence experience. All participants were 
employed in Victoria. Eleven participants identified as predominantly representing plaintiffs 
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 Bryman, above n 6, 389.  
52
 Ibid 391.  
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whilst eight identified as predominantly representing defendants. Five participants (including 
the judges) were categorised as court lawyers. The participants in the sample were highly 
experienced in their profession with their average medical negligence experience being 21 
years. An outline of the participants’ level of experience is outlined below in table 2:  
 
Table 2: Participants’ Level of Experience  
 
Interviewee  Details Years of Medical 
Negligence 
Experience  
P1 Lawyer Plaintiff  15 
P2 Lawyer Plaintiff  10 
P3 Lawyer Plaintiff  25 
P4 Lawyer Plaintiff  19 
P5 Lawyer Plaintiff  20 
P6 Lawyer Plaintiff  10 
P7 Lawyer Plaintiff  20 
P8 Lawyer Plaintiff  16 
P9 Lawyer Plaintiff  40 
P10 Lawyer Plaintiff  16 
P11 Lawyer Plaintiff  28 
 
D1 Lawyer Defendant  30 
D2 Lawyer Defendant  10 
D3 Lawyer Defendant  18 
D4 Lawyer Defendant  10 
D5 Lawyer Defendant  30 
D6 Lawyer Defendant  18 
D7 Lawyer Defendant  35 
D8 Lawyer Defendant 40 
 
C1 Lawyer Court  14 
C2 Lawyer Court  30 
C3 Lawyer Court  14 
C4 Lawyer Court 5 
C5 Lawyer Court 29 
 
4.12 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
One limitation of the study is that the data collection was restricted to participants from 
Victoria and did not include other Australian states. This decision reflected accessibility, 
budget constraints and time restrictions of this research. Given the Ipp Reforms affected other 
Australian states, there is scope for further research in this field in other Australian 
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jurisdictions. Participants were also limited to medical negligence lawyers and judges. There 
is scope to conduct further research using medical negligence parties (such as plaintiffs or 
doctors). This was outside the research aims of this doctoral study. As previously stated, 
lawyers are best placed to comment on the legal challenges faced in medical negligence 
disputes and were thus selected for this research.  
 
Although the sample size may seem relatively small, the participants were selected from a 
pool of highly experienced Victorian tort lawyers and judges, and the focus of this qualitative 
study is on the depth of experience and relevance of response. Medical negligence is a highly 
specialised field of negligence, and given the average level of experience of the participants 
was 21 years, the views gathered represent attitudes of senior members of the profession.  
 
The relatively recent nature of the 2015 remedial reforms also made it difficult for the 
participants to comment with certainty on the impact of the 2015 reforms on conducting 
medical negligence claims. Despite this limitation, the participants’ initial reactions are 
valuable in determining whether the legislature has struck the right balance or whether further 
reform is needed and further research would be helpful to elicit impact at a time more distant 
from the initiation of the reforms.  
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CHAPTER 5 – FINDINGS PART 1: LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MEDICAL 
NEGLIGENCE AND MENTAL HARM CLAIMS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
More than fifteen years since their implementation, the effects of the Ipp Reforms continue to 
be experienced by victims of medical negligence and mental harm when seeking 
compensation for their injuries. The literature review in Chapter Two of this thesis outlined 
some of the continuing challenges that plaintiffs face in the litigation of medical negligence 
and mental harm claims, including establishing the element of causation, satisfying 
permanent impairment thresholds and limits on compensation imposed through caps for non-
economic loss damages. The focus of this study is to ascertain whether these challenges were 
experienced by lawyers in practice. The data was coded and analysed pursuant to the 
grounded theory methodology outlined in Chapter Four of this thesis. Emergent themes 
relating to legal challenges in medical negligence and mental harm are discussed in this 
chapter.  
 
Firstly, this chapter presents findings on the legal challenges in litigation articulated by the 
participants in this study, including whether the element of causation presents as a hurdle to 
recovery of compensation meritorious claims. Secondly, findings on the changes in the 
number of litigants and amount of compensation payments before and after the Ipp Reforms 
are presented and discussed. Thirdly, the chapter describes the participants’ preliminary 
views on the likely impact of the 2015 amendments to the Wrongs Act on the ability of 
plaintiffs to recover compensation. Finally, opportunities for law reform arising out of the 
analysis of the data are explored, including the introduction of a narrative test currently used 
in Victorian statutory schemes, as well as the possibility of using a no-fault statutory scheme 
similar to those which currently operate in other jurisdictions.  
5.2 CHALLENGES IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND MENTAL HARM 
Tort reforms in 2002 and 2003 impacted medical negligence and mental harm claims through 
the introduction of significant injury thresholds, caps on damages and a statutory test of 
causation. Many commentators have questioned whether these restrictions affect the rights of 
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plaintiffs in meritorious claims.1 The participants in this study were asked to reflect on the 
challenges experienced in medical negligence and could list more than one challenge. The 
participants were further asked whether these challenges applied in mental harm claims and if 
their response was in the affirmative, they were invited to elaborate on the challenges. The 
majority of participants interviewed, 15 lawyers, reported that the significant injury 
impairment thresholds were the predominant challenge in medical negligence claims. In 
relation to mental harm, nine participants thought the thresholds were the principal challenge.  
 
The primary challenge raised by the participants was the requirement for plaintiffs to satisfy 
significant injury thresholds. The underlying theme in the responses was unfairness in 
situations where plaintiffs had sustained a devastating injury but were unable to satisfy the 
minimum threshold to qualify for compensation. According to the majority of participants 
this concern was not addressed by the 2015 changes to impairment levels. For instance, one 
participant recalled a situation where a plaintiff’s cardiac valve replacement would not have 
satisfied the threshold without additional scarring:   
 
[T]he important reform was the level of impairment. That can have some really unfair 
consequences. You can have people with significant issues that don’t satisfy either the 6 per 
cent, well, now 5 per cent, or the 11 per cent impairment. I had a client that had a cardiac 
valve replacement and on the basis of the cardiac valve replacement he was only 5 per cent 
impaired, and then the scarring added to his impairment, but it could have meant that he was 
locked out. So there are a number of different injuries that just don’t fit into those criteria very 
well and you get that unfair result. (Plaintiff Lawyer 1) 
 
The unfairness of the thresholds and its adverse effects on people who are not employed, such 
as non-working mothers, children and the elderly, was expressed by another participant. 
Where plaintiffs fall into these three categories, their income is likely to be on the lower end 
of the spectrum, which means their compensation will be low. In order to receive significant 
compensation, these plaintiffs must rely on non-economic loss compensation. One defendant 
lawyer stated that it was frustrating that this kind of plaintiff has restricted access to 
compensation: 
 
                                                 
1
 John Chu, ‘Analysis and Evaluation of Victorian Reform in General Damages for Personal  Injury under the 
Tort of Negligence’ (2007) 10(2) Deakin Law Review 12; Andrew Field, ‘“There Must Be a Better Way”: 
Personal Injuries Compensation since the “Crisis in Insurance”’ (2008) 13(1) Deakin Law Review 67; 
Jeremy King, ‘When Justice is Significantly Injured’ (2012) 86(3) Law Institute Journal 26.  
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[F]rom my point of view as a plaintiff lawyer, it was very upsetting to realise that a terrible 
injury to say an elderly person, a child or a non-working outside the home woman. [I]f they - 
healed at under six – 5 or under – they wouldn’t have access to general damages…  [I]t’s 
particularly ironic in the medical field because…the bulk of people involved in the medical 
system are women, children and the elderly. (Defendant Lawyer 2)  
 
Another participant stressed that because of the manner in which the injuries are assessed 
under the AMA Guides, certain injuries, such as scarring, do not attract sufficient 
compensation:  
 
There’s many instances such as scarring cases that don’t feature very highly on the AMA 5 th 
edition guides, and so people with meritorious claims aren’t necessarily able to pursue a case 
where they don’t meet the greater than 5 per cent permanent impairment for physical injuries. 
(Plaintiff Lawyer 3) 
 
Another participant highlighted problems with the need to satisfy permanent impairment 
requirements, attributing the cause of such challenges to the Ipp Reforms:  
 
The challenge is for people who have significant injuries but don’t turn out to be permanent, 
or significant injuries that turn out at 4 per cent, [injuries such as] extensive scarring. So these 
people are equally traumatised as anyone else but they’re cut out... I know one of my 
colleagues had a matter where his economic loss was cut out by the upper threshold – the 
three times average weekly earnings thresholds – you see far less of that. It’s more frustrated 
clients who know they’ve been wronged by a doctor, chiro[practor], physio[therapist] … who 
are cut out because…of the baseline thresholds. That’s the consequence from the Ipp 
Reforms. (Plaintiff Lawyer 4) 
 
A plaintiff lawyer identified the challenge of establishing significant injury thresholds and 
caps on damages after the Ipp Reforms. Notably this participant also identified the difficulty 
for lawyers of explaining compensation caps to a plaintiff due to the complexity of the 
legislation:  
 
[T]here are a number of challenges that are faced as a result of the Ipp Reforms. The first of 
them is, I suppose, in relation to thresholds. So we have the added difficulty of establishing 
that someone’s got a significant injury or able to bring a claim for pain and suffering 
damages. It’s an extra hurdle for the plaintiff to jump through. We also have the difficulty 
of…explaining to our clients why it is that their claim for pain and suffering might be capped 
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and that can be very difficult in…for people who are catastrophically injured. (Plaintiff 
Lawyer 2) 
 
The above quotes suggest that thresholds and caps on damages are two continuing challenges 
under the Wrongs Act which can lead to unfair consequences in medical negligence litigation. 
Reflecting on these two challenges, one participant thought the legislative restrictions 
amounted to indirect discrimination:  
 
I think one of my objections always has been that the operation of the legislation is, in fact, 
indirect discrimination. Because it discriminates against children, it discriminates against 
people who are elderly or who don’t work because, you know, the right to recover for your 
economic losses is unchanged, but your pain and suffering damages [is altered]. So those 
people, I feel, are disenfranchised by the legislation. (Plaintiff Lawyer 8) 
 
 
5.2.1 CAUSATION AS A CHALLENGE  
Six participants thought the causation principle presented an unfair challenge to plaintiffs in 
medical negligence. The Ipp Reforms prompted the introduction of a two-part statutory test 
of causation, requiring the plaintiff to satisfy two limbs: factual causation and scope of 
liability.2 The first test requires the plaintiff to show their harm was factually caused by the 
defendant’s negligence. In order to satisfy the second test, the court must be satisfied that it is 
appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the harm. One 
participant reflected on the problems with the ‘but for’ test, replicated in the factual causation 
limb of the legislative provisions:  
 
I think there are two things that stick in my mind as examples. [O]ne of them is the return 
from the March v Stramare test of causation to a ‘but for’ test. I mean the High Court, for 
those of us who can understand anything the High Court says when it comes to common law, 
said the ‘but for’ test has got hairs on it. It doesn’t work for reasons which are now well 
understood and the test of causation is a common-sense test… [W]hy would you have a 
reform of ‘but for’ when the High Court, the highest court in the land, said, ‘Well we’ve 
                                                 
2
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 51(1). For a discussion on causation see Mirko Bagaric and Sharon Erbacher, 
‘Causation in Negligence: From Anti-Jurisprudence to Principle – Individual Responsibility as the 
Cornerstone for the Attribution of Liability’ (2011) 18(4) Journal of Law and Medicine 759 and Susan 
Bartie, ‘Ambition Versus Judicial Reality: Causation and Remoteness Under Civil Liability Legislation’ 
(2007) 33(2) University of Western Australia Law Review 415.  
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abandoned that.’ Historically we’ve abandoned it, it doesn’t work, it [has] got its own 
problems. (Court Lawyer 2) 
 
Here the participant is questioning why the legislature elected to return to the ‘but for’ test by 
introducing the factual causation limb in circumstances where the High Court of Australia 
has said the test is problematic. In relation to the second limb of the test, scope of liability, 
another participant discussed the challenges around the uncertainty presented by this limb:  
 
The main issue that seemed to come up in [medical negligence] was causation… lawyers, I 
think, suddenly sort of became conscious of scope of liability and that’s the limb of causation 
that this, the Ipp Reforms, really highlight and which [is a] real grey area I think. (Court 
Lawyer 5) 
 
The vagueness surrounding the scope of liability has attracted criticism from these 
commentators for its lack of precision and clarity,3 which has potential to impact upon the 
ability of plaintiffs to satisfy this limb of the test.  
 
5.2.2 THRESHOLDS IN MENTAL HARM  
When asked about the challenges in litigating mental harm claims, nine participants stated 
they thought satisfying the significant injury thresholds was the primary challenge. One 
participant highlighted a problem with the imposition of minimum thresholds in 
circumstances where plaintiffs have lost a loved one, particularly in relation to the 
discrepancies that arise because of statutory exemptions.4 For instance, loss of a foetus 
automatically satisfies the injury thresholds whereas the loss of an adult child does not: 
 
[T]his is the other weird thing about the law. The loss of a baby or a foetus is an exception so 
you don’t have to get your certificate to get your significant injury. But the loss of a child or 
an adult son isn’t. You still have to get your 10 per cent certificate, and we had cases where 
two parents, equally distressed, because [of] the mother’s innate fortitude or the make-up of 
her brain, she wouldn’t get her certificate and the father would, or vice versa. Well I mean the 
weird thing is…some people grieve and it’s psychological, it doesn’t become psychiatric… 
[T]he reason for that is that we're talking about nervous shock not grief which is all clearly a 
load of rubbish… [I]t’s really interesting that some people won't get over their 10 per cent 
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 Bagaric and Erbacher, above n 2, 765. 
4
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28LF(1).  
144 
 
threshold and other people will, and for some reason [those who won’t get over are] not 
entitled to damages. It’s terrible. (Defendant Lawyer 2)   
 
In the above quote, the participant has also highlighted the discrepancies that arise when two 
plaintiffs might be compensated differently for loss arising from the same tragic event. For 
instance, in Sorbello v South Western Sydney Local Health Network; Sultan v South Western 
Sydney Local Health Network5 the mother received 15 per cent more compensation than the 
father because she satisfied a higher impairment threshold. Ultimately, both parents face the 
lifelong consequences of their baby’s intellectual injuries caused by oxygen deprivation a t 
birth.  
 
Even where plaintiffs are able to satisfy significant injury thresholds in mental harm claims, 
their entitlement to compensation is limited by caps on non-economic loss damages. This 
ultimately affects the quantum of damages in such claims, as noted by a participant:  
 
[Mental harm claims] seem to be treated very conservatively in Victoria in terms of the 
quantum of the claims. That’s probably the biggest challenge I have in psychiatric claims 
and…explaining to them that, even if it’s a case where they might have lost a baby for 
example, that the courts, in my opinion, are quite mean in general damages in those cases. So 
I think that’s one of the biggest challenges in those cases. (Plaintiff Lawyer 10) 
 
Plaintiffs with pre-existing mental illness can also be unfairly prejudiced by the legislative 
framework, because the plaintiff cannot rely on pre-existing mental illness to assist them to 
satisfy the threshold. One participant commented on this issue: 
 
The group of people who miss out are those who already have a mental illness because that’s 
a person who’s less able to cope with new trauma or new shock or new depression and that 
person’s overall impairment score, you know, might be significantly above the 10 per cent 
threshold, but then when you try and untangle it all and they say the person has got more pre-
existing than post 2003 injury related impairment, they miss out unfairly. And they’re the 
ones who are probably often most affected because their overall level of injury is far worse 
than someone else and they can cope [with it] far less. They’re unfairly prejudiced by the 
reform, I think. (Plaintiff Lawyer 4) 
 
                                                 
5
 [2016] NSWSC 863 (24 June 2016).  
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Explaining the legal requirement of significant injury thresholds in mental harm claims to a 
client can also be a challenge. One participant stressed that explaining legal requirements is 
especially difficult in circumstances where the plaintiff has lost a loved one, but asserted this 
was not due to the Ipp Reforms:  
 
The challenge for a legal practitioner is to, I think, convince or explain to the lay client that 
you don’t get compensation for the loss of a loved one. You’ve got to have an injury. And a 
lot of members of the community don’t understand that and find that very, very difficult to 
take in and understand. But that’s really got nothing to do with the Ipp Reforms. (Defendant 
Lawyer 8).  
 
The significant injury thresholds are likely to continue to present a challenge in mental harm 
claims, despite the lowering of the requirement from ‘more than 10 per cent’ to ‘10 per cent 
or more’. As one participant put it:  
 
I think, [it’s] going to be a little bit better now that the new reforms have come in recently, so 
the 10 per cent, as opposed to greater than 10 per cent, is actually a significant difference 
because the way the impairment guides work, there’s a whole raft of diagnoses or psychiatric 
conditions that will land on 10 per cent, which is why in the first place it was couched as 
greater than 10 per cent. But it's still not going to be a complete solution. (Plaintiff Lawyer 6) 
 
5.2.3 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN PHYSICAL INJURY AND MENTAL HARM  
In Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey6 Justice Windeyer highlighted the slow advances of law in 
keeping up with medical science when he described law as ‘marching with medicine but in 
the rear and limping a little’.7 The comment was made in a case where the plaintiffs sought 
damages for pure mental harm without any physical injury. The comment continues to be 
relevant in relation to modern legal principles governing mental harm which have not kept 
pace with medical developments in psychiatry. The law continues to impose more stringent 
requirements for psychiatric injuries than for physical injuries, thus magnifying the historic 
distinction between mental and physical injury.8 Two participants reflected on the unfair 
consequences that can arise because of such a distinction:   
 
                                                 
6
 (1970) 125 CLR 383. 
7
 Ibid 395 (Windeyer J).  
8
 Christine Forster and Jeni Engel, ‘Reinforcing Historic Distinctions Between Mental and Physical Injury: 
The Impact of the Civil Liability Reforms’ (2012) 19(3) Journal of Law and Medicine 593.  
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I’ve always really felt I don’t understand why we have an 11 per cent impairment for mental 
harm claims and six per cent [for physical injury]… I think, why should a person with 
psychological injury be treated any differently to a person with a physical injury? [Y]ou do 
get a situation where someone’s had a pretty devastating event happen, a family member die. 
They’ve had really significant issues but they’ve managed to recover to a point where a 
psychiatrist doesn’t believe they have that level of impairment and if there’s no financial 
dependency claim, there’s no claim for that person…I think [there] can be very unfair sort of 
consequences there. (Plaintiff Lawyer 1) 
 
Obviously when someone dies that is a pretty horrific outcome for medical treatment… But 
these people are forced into the same sort of process as someone who has a mental injury or 
suffers mental harm as a result of their physical injuries. [T]hat's just unfair, I think, because 
why are we making people who have lost a son or a husband or a wife prove that they’re over 
10 per cent whole person impairment from psychiatric – you know, the shock harm. And it’s 
got to be more than the normal or expected grief reaction, whatever the hell that is supposed 
to mean. I think that’s a particularly unfair effect of those changes. (Plaintiff Lawyer 6) 
 
The reflections from participants highlight the challenges faced by plaintiffs who have lost a 
relative but need to satisfy stringent legal requirements using the same process as a person 
who has suffered a physical injury.  
 
5.2.4 SCEPTICISM OF MENTAL INJURY  
As outlined in the literature review in Chapter Two, courts have historically treated mental 
injuries with scepticism.9 The Ipp Report acknowledged that one of the reasons for the 
scepticism is that psychiatric injuries are difficult to diagnose and quantify objectively.10 Four 
participants stated that this scepticism towards mental injuries is still an ongoing issue, with 
one participant stating the difficulty that an objective measure presents as a hurdle in mental 
harm claims:   
 
[T]here’s been a groundswell of work against people who’ve got a mental injury. We, I think 
cynically, work on the basis [of] ‘if it’s in your head it’s hard to measure therefore we’re 
going to make it much harder for you to succeed’. You’ve got to be almost the sort of mental 
                                                 
9
 Bernadette Richards and Melissa De Zwart, Tort Law Principles (Lawbook Co, 2
nd
 ed, 2017) 239; 
Margaret Fordham, ‘Psychiatric Injury, Secondary Victims and the “Sudden Shock” Requirement’ (2014) 
(Jul) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 41.  
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 Panel of Eminent Persons to Review the Law of Negligence, Review of the Law of Negligence Report, 
Second Report, Canberra, October 2002 (‘Ipp Report’) 135. 
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smoking wreck otherwise you don’t get up. But I think [the reforms] have made mental injury 
claims much harder. (Court Lawyer 2) 
 
One participant asserted that this scepticism is reflected in the need for the plaintiff to satisfy 
a higher threshold for psychological injuries over physical injuries: 
 
[T]he requirement for significant injury at 11 per cent, now 10 per cent psychiatric injury, is a 
real shame because it seems to suggest to the plaintiff this element of disbelief in the extent of 
their injury or the validity of their claim. That seems to be a really unfortunate reflection of 
the way that general society perceives or views mental harm and the permanency of those 
injuries. (Plaintiff Lawyer 2) 
 
The court’s scepticism regarding psychiatric injury is also evident in jury trials, with two 
participants asserting that it impacts on the trial outcome:  
 
I think in fact it’s where [the Ipp Reforms have] had the hardest impact, because being able to 
demonstrate that you have psychological or psychiatric injury as a result of medical 
negligence is much more difficult now than it previously was. It’s certainly eliminated those 
pure mental harm [cases]; there were many more prior to the reforms. And interestingly, as a 
judge, they’re perhaps not just medical negligence claims, but they are the more difficult ones 
for plaintiffs to succeed in. Juries have got a real view about psychiatric injury. (Court 
Lawyer 3) 
 
 [T]he main problem with mental harm claims is not the qualification, I think it’s quite easy to 
get significant injury because so many psychiatrists are very quick to say, ‘It’s a 10 per cent 
disability’, and it’s a lot harder in organic medicine to say that, but psychiatry being a fuzzier 
science, the plaintiffs have no trouble in getting psychiatrists to say that they qualify. The 
main problem with the mental harm cases is juries are cynical, so unless you’ve got a decent 
organic injury as an adjunct to the psychiatric injury so that the psychiatric injury may have 
been caused or inflamed by the physical injury… If it’s pure psychiatry alone such as in 
nervous shock, or a reaction to being bullied for example is another good example, then juries 
are very cynical. (Defendant Lawyer 7) 
 
The two quotes above highlight that plaintiffs face unique challenges in pure mental harm 
claims, where unlike physical injury, the level of injury is not as easily assessed. 
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5.2.5 DISCUSSION  
The practitioner perspectives gathered for this research are especially valuable because the 
participants are highly experienced repeat players in handling medical negligence and mental 
harm claims, and thus were able to reflect on the continuing shortcomings of the legislation. 
These responses indicate that significant injury thresholds represent the predominant 
challenge in both medical negligence and mental harm claims. In addition, some of the 
lawyers interviewed articulated themes of discrimination and unfairness relating to mental 
harm claims, where the emotional impact on plaintiffs can be greater than that suffered in 
physical injuries. For instance, in claims for pure mental harm the plaintiff can be gravely 
affected due to situations like the loss of a family member, without sustaining any physical 
harm.  
 
The data gathered in this study indicates that many participants regarded the restrictions 
imposed by the Ipp Reforms as unfair. Firstly, plaintiffs with psychiatric injuries are put 
through the same claim process as plaintiffs with physical injuries. Secondly, the significant 
injury thresholds for psychiatric injuries are set at twice the impairment level for physical 
injuries. Thirdly, even if plaintiffs satisfy the prescribed thresholds, caps on damages for non-
economic loss limit their entitlement to compensation. The result is a discriminatory 
legislative framework that adversely impacts vulnerable members of society seeking 
compensation.  
5.3 CAUSATION IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND MENTAL HARM  
Following medical negligence, plaintiffs can be left with devastating permanent injuries that 
warrant compensation. These plaintiffs might satisfy a breach of duty of care yet the statutory 
test of causation presents a hurdle to successful recovery in meritorious negligence claims. In 
2015 reforms, the Victorian government reduced injury thresholds and increased 
compensation caps but did not address the contentious issue of causation. Causation remains 
a contentious legal principle following the introduction of a two-part statutory test in 2003 as 
the two-part test results in many litigants being unable to access compensation. Therefore, 
one of the key concerns of this doctoral study was whether the principle of causation presents 
a hurdle to successful recovery of compensation in practice. The qualitative responses of the 
participants were analysed to extract a positive or negative response. The quantitative 
analysis is outlined in table 3.  
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Table 3: Participants’ responses to the question ‘Does the element of causation 
present as a hurdle to plaintiffs succeeding in a negligence case?’ 
 
Response Number of lawyers 
supporting response 
Yes, causation does present as a 
hurdle to successful recovery  
18 
No, causation is not a hurdle   5 
No response specifically to 
the issue of causation 
1 
 
5.3.1 THE CAUSAL HURDLE 
In response to direct questioning about whether causation presents as a hurdle to successful 
recovery, eighteen participants, a significant majority, stated that it is a hurdle. Many of the 
participants said that causation is the ‘largest hurdle’, a ‘massive hurdle’ or the ‘biggest issue’ 
in negligence proceedings. For instance, one participant was of the opinion that causation is 
an even bigger hurdle than the significant injury thresholds 
 
[Causation] is the biggest hurdle. The Ipp Reforms added in the significant injury – 
permanent significant injury threshold in Victoria, but the biggest hurdle in medical law 
claims is causation on the balance of probabilities. (Plaintiff Lawyer 4) 
 
VCEC’s report highlighted that the permanent impairment significant injury thresholds were 
a problem prohibiting successful recovery in certain meritorious claims.11 This resulted in a 
reduction of the thresholds for spinal and psychiatric injuries.12 The quote above supports the 
assertion that causation is also a problem and yet VCEC did not consider this issue.   
 
Establishing causation can be more difficult in medical negligence cases, where there is a 
need for the plaintiff to establish a worse outcome because of negligent treatment. As one 
participant put it,  
…[causation] is the biggest issue that applies across the board. In all of the years I practiced 
in medical negligence, I’ve had three cases where liability has been accepted and even in 
                                                 
11
 Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, Adjusting the Balance: Inquiry into Aspects of the 
Wrongs Act 1958, Final Report, Melbourne, 26 February 2014 (‘VCEC Report’) vii - viii.  
12
 The Wrongs Amendment Act 2015 (Vic) came into operation on 19 November 2015. This amending act 
altered to s 28LB of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) decreasing the impairment threshold level in spinal cases 
from more than 5 per cent to 5 per cent or more and in psychiatric cases from more than 10 per cent to 10 
per cent or more. The amending act also altered the maximum cap on damages for non-economic loss in s 
28G of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) to $577,050.  
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those cases causation remains an issue because often a person has gone in for an operation, 
has had an adverse outcome and it’s a matter of teasing out what part of that adverse outcome 
is due to the negligent act as opposed to something that may have happened in any event 
despite the best of care. (Plaintiff Lawyer 3) 
 
One participant thought causation can be a central obstacle to the plaintiff’s case:    
 
I think, generally, medical negligence cases are difficult from a causation point of view. So 
that’s one of the biggest day to day aspects of cases that I’m in, in terms of day to day running 
of my files. We’ll often have a case where there’s negligence or we think, if I’m for the 
plaintiff, there’s a pretty good chance of establishing negligence. But causation can be 
complex and difficult to prove and…whereas in some jurisdictions, that’s not such an issue 
and people are a bit more casual about causation and more confident they’ll succeed. I think 
in medical malpractice, if there’s a strong causation argument, you genuinely stand to lose 
and you just struggle to proceed with the case. (Plaintiff Lawyer 10) 
This response highlights that causation in medical negligence litigation is inherently complex 
and can genuinely prevent a plaintiff succeeding where they are faced with a solid causation 
argument from the defendant.  
Two of the participants expressed the view that causation is a complex concept to 
communicate to a client. One participant acknowledged this difficulty in circumstances where 
a breach of duty of care has been established but the causal link remains difficult to prove:   
 
People find it very hard to understand as well, you know, you’re saying to them, ‘I’ve got a 
doctor saying there’s negligence but I can’t establish that it’s had a worse outcome for you.’ 
People say, ‘But you told me this doctor was negligent, I have a damages claim.’ Well not 
unless the negligence has caused an injury and we can’t establish…so a lot of people who 
have reports to say there was negligence but can’t proceed with the claim because we can’t 
[say] that it’s actually caused a worse outcome for them. (Plaintiff Lawyer 1) 
 
The above quote suggests the claimant might be expecting corrective justice, because a 
medical practitioner is found to have breached their duty of care, yet the claimant’s case fails 
on the legal test of causation. Another participant acknowledged this difficulty:   
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You already had something going on with you. You went to the doctor’s. On the balance of 
probabilities, it’s got to be significantly worse for you to get across the threshold. Having 
proven negligence, having proven significant injury, it’s the hardest bit. (Plaintiff Lawyer 4) 
 
These responses support the academic discussion that causation is a complex principle, both 
in theory and in practice.13  
 
5.3.2 DIFFICULTIES WITH THE STATUTORY TEST  
The introduction of a statutory test has arguably made it more difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy 
causation when compared with the previous common law test. One participant addressed this 
issue:  
[I]f you look at March v Stramare and the cases that followed it and the enshrining of a 
different test and the abandonment of ‘but for’ you can see where ‘but for’ I think may well in 
worthy cases exclude those cases and prevent them from succeeding. Whereas if the ordinary 
test of causation of common law was applied I wouldn’t say they’d succeed but they’d have a 
better chance. So maybe the purpose of these reforms, and this is what I think is the 
undercurrent of these reforms, and the undercurrent is just to make claims harder because 
there needs to be some sort of economic and social containment… Social and economic 
containment by making claims harder… [T]hat’s what I think Ipp set out to achieve and that’s 
what he’s achieved with these reforms. (Court Lawyer 2) 
 
This participant proposes an economic efficiency theory as the driver of the Ipp Reforms, 
namely the imposition of restrictions to limit successful recovery of compensation. In a 
negligence context, economists are concerned with the imposition of liability rules that 
promote and encourage economic efficiency.14 In other words, the role of tort law is simply 
costs allocation and the aim of tort law should be minimising the cost of accidents and 
reducing the cost of avoiding them.15  
 
Another participant focused on the factual causation element and stated the statutory reforms 
have not had a significant impact on causation:  
                                                 
13
 Bagaric and Erbacher, above n 2, 759; Bartie, above n 2, 415; Danuta Mendelson, ‘Australian Tort Law 
Reform: Statutory Principles of Causation and the Common Law’ (2004) 11(4) Journal of Law and 
Medicine 492.  
14
 See for instance Richard Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law (Little, Brown, 2
nd
 ed, 1977); Guido 
Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (Yale University Press, 1970); David Partlett, ‘Economic Analysis and 
Some Problems in the Law of Torts’ (1982) 13(3) Melbourne University Law Review 398. 
15
 Calabresi, above n 14.  
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[T]he test at common law and the test under the Wrongs Act – it’s almost splitting hairs quite 
frankly, in true application. I mean, you know the March v Stramare common sense test as 
opposed to the factual causation two limb test… I can’t see the outcome being all that 
different at the end of the day. (Court Lawyer 3) 
 
The participant’s views are premised on the similarity between the common law ‘but for’ test 
and statutory ‘factual causation’ test, which both require that the harm be caused by a breach 
of duty of care. While the first limb of causation may be quite clear, the second limb appears 
to be more problematic. One participant focused on the problems with the statutory ‘scope of 
liability’ test and relied on case examples in New South Wales16 to illustrate the difficulties:  
 
On causation, obviously, the second limb of the test that it was codified was new, I suppose, 
this idea of normative causation, or the policy question some people call it. I have to be 
honest, it's not really had an effect on claims until recently, and even then, the effect is 
limited. There’s not been a case in Victoria on it. However, our very litigious friends in New 
South Wales have run a number of cases on that, well, where that issue's been considered, 
starting in 2013-ish, and it's clear that it is an issue and has effected causation. (Plaintiff 
Lawyer 6) 
 
Another participant identified challenges with the ‘scope of liability’ test:  
 
[A] lot of lawyers I think suddenly sort of became conscious of scope of liability and that’s 
the limb of causation that this, the Ipp Reforms really highlight and which, I think, is probably 
caused, that’s the real grey area I think, so the challenge is around that. (Court Lawyer 5) 
 
The same participant elaborated on the statutory test, highlighting that one effect of the Ipp 
Reforms is the need for judges to articulate their reasoning with respect to causation around 
two clear elements:  
 
[O]nce upon a time, maybe courts might have tended to gloss over causation a bit more and 
with Ipp Reforms sort of spelling out, this is what causation is all about and it’s got two 
elements and you must satisfy each, and really focusing as, it took a while, but really those 
appellate courts are saying, ‘Look, judges really need to address both elements here.’ [F]or 
starters making courts focus and be a bit more sort of analytical in looking at things and, 
‘Have we satisfied this test?’ I think [for] most of the … cases, the ‘but for’ is relatively easy 
                                                 
16
 The participant referred to Paul v Cooke [2013] NSWCA 311 (19 September 2013) and Wallace v Kam 
(2013) 297 ALR 383, both of which originated in New South Wales.  
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to satisfy. But then you’ve got those sort of more nebulous ones, where scope of liability 
comes in and pulls the wool out from under a plaintiff, and trying to understand what comes 
within that scope of scope. (Court Lawyer 5) 
 
As noted, this theme was raised by Bartie who contends that the legislative amendments 
sought to reform the courts’ approach with respect to the principle of causation and the way 
that judges were conducting their analysis.17 Bartie describes the ambition behind the Ipp 
Reforms to causation as two-fold: the first is the desire for courts to depart from the ‘common 
sense’ and ‘remoteness’ approaches to causation, and the second is prompting the courts to 
undertake an in-depth analysis of the considerations relating to causal issues.18 In relation to 
the ‘scope of liability’ element, Bartie acknowledges the breadth of the provision and 
highlights the potential risk that this element may render the other elements superfluous.19 
Bartie concludes that it may be preferable that judges be left to develop the area of law 
relating to causation without interference from the legislature.20 
 
Adding to the criticism of the statutory reforms to causation, one participant asserted that the 
previous ‘common sense’ test under the common law functioned appropriately and the two-
part test is ‘formulaic’: 
 
I think the causation provisions are nonsensical and they try to make something formulaic 
where it worked quite well as pure common law with the High Court saying well, ‘causation 
is a matter of common sense,’ and I think juries regard it as common sense too. But it 
complicates the charge to the jury going through various statutory layers to demonstrate 
causation. So again, viewed academically you would think that it would be all too hard, but in 
the context of jury litigation, if a jury think that as a matter of common sense, a given injury is 
connected to the surgical misadventure, as an example, they’ll take the step without worrying 
about the various steps that the statute sets out. (Defendant Lawyer 7) 
 
Another participant focused on the ‘evidentiary gap’ provisions in s 51(2) of the Wrongs Act 
and accepted that even science sometimes cannot satisfactorily answer causal questions:  
 
                                                 
17
 Bartie, above n 2, 415. 
18
 Ibid 416.  
19
 Ibid 436. 
20
 Ibid.  
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…that’s a real challenge and there is a provision in the Wrongs Act – the evidentiary gap 
provision. People try to use that provision which…my understanding of it is, basically, a court 
being willing to get a plaintiff home on causation, where the negligence is sufficiently strong 
and where science is unable to bridge that gap… [T]hat’s an issue, I think, is that, in a lot of 
the cases, the science isn’t strong enough to categorically say one way or the other. (Plaintiff 
Lawyer 10)   
 
5.3.3 PROBLEMS WITH CAUSATION DO NOT STEM FROM IPP  
Six participants asserted that problems with the causation principle may not necessarily be as 
a result of the law reforms stemming from the Ipp Report. For instance, one participant 
highlighted that causation in medical negligence is manifestly complex:  
 
So in asbestos litigation, for example, causation is very difficult from a scientific point of 
view, but every asbestos case pretty much wins because there’s just an understanding, really, 
that people aren’t going to take the point. It’s very rare that cases run. There’s the odd one 
that runs. But medical malpractice is a different world to that. So that’s the day to day thing. 
I’m not sure if that arises out of the reforms so much, as opposed to just being a general 
malpractice issue. (Plaintiff Lawyer 10) 
 
The above quote shows that causation is particularly difficult in medical negligence cases. 
This assertion is supported by another participant, who stresses that causation is potentially 
more problematic in ‘failure to warn’ medical cases:  
 
So in the medical cases, causes are not obvious and more importantly, in the medical cases 
which involve not inappropriate treatment but a failure to give advice, well the cause is 
critical because you have to show that had you been given the right advice that would have 
changed the outcome. And really that means you would have had a different method of 
management. So that issue really never arises in, you know in general common law cases. 
There are very few common law cases that involve advice cases other than professional 
advice. And in terms of injury there are very few that involve, advice cases that involve 
anything other than medical cases. So you’ve got that, you’ve seen the cases that people will 
be saying for example ‘If I’d been told this I wouldn’t have had the surgery,’ and the Court’s 
found that there was a failure to tell but it didn’t make any difference because the person was 
presenting with such a condition that it probably wouldn’t have made any difference. So that 
issue of causation is a big issue in all medical cases. More so in advice cases but I don’t know 
that the amendments to the Wrongs Act have made many changes to that. (Court Lawyer 1) 
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This quote highlights that medical negligence cases involving a practitioner’s failure to warn 
can have their own peculiar problems, which are not experienced in traditional common law 
claims or even professional negligence claims. Addison acknowledged these difficulties were 
faced in failure to warn cases between 1992 and 2002 decided pursuant to common law 
principles, noting that patients were less likely to succeed in an action alleging a negligent 
failure to inform than in the previous decade.21 Following the insertion of a two-part statutory 
test of causation, these problems continue to arise in ‘failure to warn’ cases such as Wallace 
and Odisho. The decision in Wallace has been described by Faunce as part of a judicial trend 
to ‘go cool’ on patients’ rights, in medical negligence cases involving failure to disclose a 
material risk.22 
 
5.3.4 COMPARING MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE WITH TRANSPORT ACCIDENT AND 
WORKCOVER CASES  
This difficulty of establishing causation in medical negligence cases is even more prominent 
when compared with transport or workplace accidents, as acknowledged by one participant:  
 
[I]t's a different situation than say, you know, a transport accident case. You’re driving a car, 
someone smashes into you, you then have your broken neck. There’s a very clear causative 
link. With medical negligence cases, by definition there is an illness or an injury or a 
syndrome or a pathology before the interaction with the doctor or hospital. So the question of 
whether this injury, illness, syndrome was worsened because of the lack or the wrong 
treatment is fundamentally a very different question and a classic example is a failure to 
diagnose cancer. (Defendant Lawyer 2)  
 
Another participant affirms this assertion, and highlights that causation in medical negligence 
cases takes up a large portion of litigation:  
 
[P]ractically in the common law, medical malpractice is the place where causation gets the 
most airtime. In the context of industrial accident, occupier’s liability, general injuries it 
rarely gets much airplay but in med mal it really does. (Defendant Lawyer 4) 
 
                                                 
21
 Thomas Addison, ‘Negligent Failure to Inform: Developments in the Law Since Rogers v Whitaker’ 
(2003) 11(1) Torts Law Journal 1. 
22
 Thomas Faunce, ‘Disclosure of Material Risk as a Systems-Error Tragedy: Wallace v Kam (2013) 87 
ALJR 648; [2013] HCA 19’ (2013) 21(1) Journal of Law and Medicine 53.  
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These two quotes demonstrate that medical negligence is different to transport accident and 
workers’ compensations claims, where recovering compensation is a simpler process. 
VCEC’s inquiry acknowledged the inequities arising out of the inconsistency in the 
provisions, highlighting that recovery under the transport accident and workplace legislation 
is under a no-fault statutory scheme.23 Whilst some of the inequities were responded to (such 
as the injury thresholds for spinal injuries and psychological injuries and the caps on non-
economic loss), others like the causation principle were barely acknowledged by VCEC.24 
This represents a lost opportunity to seek submissions on this principle from the legal 
community.  
 
5.3.5 OPTIONS FOR REFORM  
None of the participants offered a definitive solution to the problems posed by causation 
principles however one participant called for uniformity across the states:  
 
It would be nice if all of the states in Australia had similar provisions. I think it’s really hard, 
particularly for insurer clients, to get their head around the various provisions that differ from 
state to state and I wonder why it needs to be like that. That would be an ideal; to have more 
similar if not identical provisions. It won’t happen but nevertheless if I had my wish list… 
(Defendant Lawyer 3) 
Another participant thought that the recent law reforms were welcome but that governments 
should regularly review the law. The participant also highlighted that the courts have been 
adapting to the new laws and engaging in their own reform:  
 
[W]e’ve been engaged in two years of reform here in the court in personal injury cases. The 
legislative reforms I think are all appropriate, the ones that have been passed of recent times, 
there’s nothing in those that’s controversial or I think is going to be better or much worse. It’s 
good that governments go back and review and think about these things, so I see that as a 
positive. Within the court system, as I said, we have done a lot of work in terms of the way 
we manage cases for a number of reasons. (Court Lawyer 3) 
                                                 
23
 VCEC Report, above n 11, 20-23.  
24
 The VCEC Report only mentions ‘causation’ ten times throughout the entire report and this is mainly in 
the context of the Medical Panel being unable to determine causation issues.    
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5.3.6 DISCUSSION  
The views of the majority of participants interviewed show that causation is a difficult hurdle 
in medical negligence litigation. Arguably, the issue is with the vagueness of the ‘scope of 
liability’ element and this is supported by academic literature as well as the data. The case 
law, mainly in NSW, shows that causation is the final hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome. Six 
participants did not think that the problems with causation stemmed from Ipp, but rather, they 
are of the view that causation is an inherently complex principle. Barbara McDonald supports 
this, stating ‘causation is a notoriously difficult question for lawyers, philosophers and 
scientists alike.’25 She further elaborates: ‘In law, academic and judicial views go around and 
around with no-one ever entirely satisfied that he or she has got it exactly right or has solved 
all issues of logic, legality and morality’.26 The senior tort lawyers were quick to criticise 
causation yet none of them was able to offer a definitive solution. This suggests that there 
may be no simple solution. In Chapter Seven of this thesis, the author considers three 
possible solutions: (1) the codification of the causation principle; (2) amendment of existing 
statutory provisions to offer more clarity; or (3) the implementation of a reversal of the onus 
of proof for causation. Causation is consistent with the corrective justice theoretical 
framework because it determines the causal link and liability between the wrongdoer and the 
sufferer.27 Yet many participants in this study viewed it as an excessively high threshold to 
overcome. In such circumstances, the introduction of a no-fault scheme embodying 
distributive justice may have fairer outcomes for the community. These reforms are 
considered in Chapter Seven of this thesis.  
5.4 PRACTITIONERS’ PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE CHANGES IN LITIGATION 
TRENDS AND COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE IPP 
REFORMS  
One of the key research questions for this thesis was to explore whether the 2003 
amendments to the Wrongs Act resulting from the Ipp Reforms had any effect on the 
litigation and mediation of meritorious medical negligence claims. Participants were asked to 
offer their perceptions regarding the number of litigants commencing medical negligence 
disputes post the Ipp Reforms and whether the participants had observed an increase or 
                                                 
25
 Barbara McDonald, ‘Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The Common Law, Statutory 
Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia’ (2005) 27(3) Sydney Law Review 443, 472.  
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Ernest J Weinrib, ‘Causation and Wrongdoing’ (1987) 63(3) Chicago-Kent Law Review 407, 412. 
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decrease based on their experience. Litigation trends are an important aspect of this research 
because the perceived increase in personal injury claims was one of the drivers of the Ipp 
Reforms. Many academics have been quick to counter these claims. For example, Chu 
highlights that in 2001 civil litigation rates had been falling 4% a year in the preceding four  
years.28 Further, Professor Wright’s research showed that litigation rates were not increasing 
prior to the commission of the Ipp Report.29 There have been no contemporary quantitative 
studies commissioned to assess whether the Ipp Reforms and the 2015 reforms have had any 
effect on the litigation rates in medical negligence and mental harm claims.  
 
The research questions do not purport to gather objective empirical data. Rather, the 
participants were asked to offer their perceptions on the numbers of litigants commencing 
medical negligence post-Ipp, based on their experience.  The obvious limitation of gathering 
subjective responses is that they are based on participants’ observations and experience, 
rather than any objectively substantiated numbers. The participants’ responses are set out in 
Table 4 below:  
 
Table 4: Participants’ responses to the question ‘Based on your experience, what are 
your perceptions about the number of litigants commencing medical negligence 
disputes following the Ipp Reforms?’ 
 
Response Number of participants 
Participant perceived a decrease in the 
number of litigants following the Ipp 
Reforms   
13 participants 
Participant perceived an increase in 
the number of litigants following the 
Ipp Reforms   
2 participants  
Participant did not perceive a change 
in numbers 
4 participants 
Participant could not comment   5 participants 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Chu, above n 1, 142.  
29
 Edmund Wright, ‘National Trends in Personal Injury Litigation: Before and After ‘Ipp’’ (2006) 14(3) 
Torts Law Journal 233.  
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The majority of participants expressed the view that they perceive the number of litigants to 
be lower following the reforms, although they stressed that the decline was not as drastic as 
some commentators foreshadowed at the time of the Ipp Reforms. A defendant lawyer 
explained the phenomenon experienced with a new wave of reforms, explaining a surge in 
litigation followed the enactment of the reforms in 2003, followed by a slight decline and 
then consistent numbers:  
 
I know when the reforms were first introduced but not yet enacted, there was a huge spike in 
activity in order to get people in before the reforms became active. Since then I think there was a 
slight decline from usual baseline data in terms of the number of claims that were brought, but 
then I think it stayed pretty consistently around that level. You might say litigation decreased 
slightly but my own personal opinion is it hasn’t decreased to the extent that people were 
foreshadowing at the time the reforms were first raised and then enacted. (Defendant Lawyer 3) 
 
Many participants explained that their perception of a decline in litigation rates is due to the 
inability of injured persons who fail to satisfy the thresholds to pursue their claim:  
 
It’s certainly fallen. We’ve got a presentation that one of the insurers did about things falling that 
I can probably dig out. There's no question that it’s fallen. But that’s the thresholds. The 
thresholds knocked out claims. (Plaintiff Lawyer 6) 
 
A fellow plaintiff lawyer did not perceive much of a change in the number of litigants. The 
participant agreed that certain claims were ‘knocked out’ because they could not satisfy the 
thresholds, but explained that these lower quantum cases may not have been viable in any 
case:   
 
I think medical negligence cases are complex and it’s expensive litigation. And it’s rare that 
there’s an open and shut case in medical negligence and so those lower end claims that are wiped 
out by people not reaching the physical and mental threshold for impairment means that the lower 
quantum cases are just knocked out. They’re not viable but may not have been viable in any 
event. And I say that because their legal costs would exceed any payment that they would receive. 
So whilst I think there are definitely some cases that are not able to be pursued because of the 
2003 Wrongs Act reforms, I think generally the lower end claims were never viable given the 
difficulty of this litigation and the cost that would follow. (Plaintiff Lawyer 3) 
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Participants were also asked about their perceptions of any changes in the compensation 
received by plaintiffs in medical negligence and mental harm claims. Ten participants did not 
perceive any significant change, save for an increase due to indexation. The findings are 
presented in table 5 below.  
 
Table 5: Participants’ responses to the question ‘Based on your experience, what are your 
perceptions about the changes (if any) experienced in the compensation payments 
received by plaintiffs in medical negligence proceedings, following the Ipp Reforms?’ 
 
Response Number of participants 
Participant did not perceive a 
change in quantum of damages 
10 participants 
Participant perceived quantum 
of damages as higher following 
the Ipp Reforms  
6 participants 
Participant perceived quantum 
of damages as higher following 
the Ipp Reforms 
4 participants 
Participant could not comment 4 participants 
 
 
A defendant lawyer explained they perceived claimants were now receiving higher levels of 
compensation, but that was because lower quantum claims were not pursued. This means that 
a claimant who may have received a small sum of compensation prior to the Ipp Reforms 
would not receive zero, but that the value of the claim for those who do satisfy the thresholds 
has increased:  
 
I think they’re getting more, but that’s because that the value of the claim is more if you get over 
the threshold. The minor claims are now effectively eliminated. But that’s because of the 
thresholds. So the person who goes to the doctor and the doctor does something wrong, and the 
claimant then suffers some temporary exacerbation of a relatively minor condition, they might 
have issued and got $5,000 before the thresholds, but now they don’t issue. But of course, as a 
direct result of the thresholds it’s only the more serious or the significant injuries I suppose,  that 
get through the gateway. So they’re naturally going to be worth more, in terms of non-economic 
loss damages anyway. (Defendant Lawyer 8)  
 
When discussing whether the restrictions have affected sums of compensation, twelve 
participants explained that they perceived the thresholds and caps have adversely affected 
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mental harm claims in particular. A plaintiff lawyer described damages awards in mental 
harm claims as ‘mean’ and insinuated that it’s partly due to the sceptical perception of 
psychiatric claims:  
 
I think [damages are] too conservative, they’re too mean. There was a case called Karamesinis a 
couple of years ago where a guy was killed and his parents were awarded $175,000 for 
psychiatric injury each and that was said to be at the higher end, given what they’d been through. 
They’d previously lost another child. Now, I think that’s pretty mean and I think there’s just a 
general perception about mental health claims that means people pay less. (Plaintiff Lawyer 10) 
 
The sentiments of distrust and scepticism were echoed by a defendant lawyer who explained 
there is a ‘lurking distrust’ of psychiatric claims that has a direct correlation to the 
compensation awarded for mental harm claims when compared to physical injury.  
 
Even the genuine [mental harm claims] never ever get what they’re worth, there’s always a 
lurking distrust, or that they’re going to get better when the case is over. A person with 
irreversible brain damage is not going to get better, but a person with a psychological problem – 
so thinks the jury, and I think [so] too – has a prospect of getting better. But there are some very 
genuine mental harm cases, there’s some appalling cases of nervous shock. I’ve got one where a 
young man couldn’t find his brother and so went looking for him, and he found his brother had 
[committed suicide] by hanging from a tree, and the body had been hanging there for about a 
week, it had been fly-blown, and this kid just freaked out, and entirely reasonably. He might as 
well have brain damage but he has not; if he did have brain damage he’d be worth – for the same 
symptoms – he’d be worth $3.5 million. His case was settled for $350,000. (Defendant Lawyer 7)  
 
The example of mental harm compared with organic brain damage given in the quote above 
illustrates the discrimination between physical and psychiatric injuries in the legal 
framework.30  
 
In summary, while the data gathered from the participants was subjective and reflected 
participants’ perceptions of changes in the number of litigants and quantum of damages (as 
opposed to objective empirical data), it was nevertheless beneficial in providing insight into 
perceived trends before and after the Ipp Reforms. As indicated earlier, the Ipp Reforms were 
                                                 
30
 Forster and Engel, above n 8, 593.  
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perceived by many as being ‘reactive’ to an ‘alleged’ or perceive insurance crisis, therefore it 
was helpful to gather reflections from medical negligence practitioners on this matter.   
 
5.5 IMPACT OF THE 2015 REFORMS ON PLAINTIFFS IN MEDICAL 
NEGLIGENCE AND MENTAL HARM    
As outlined in Chapter Two of this thesis, in 2015 the Victorian government enacted 
amendments to the Wrongs Act attempting to strike a balance between affordable insurance 
premiums and the need to compensate the meritorious claims of individuals who have 
suffered loss. Despite only a recent implementation of the legislative changes at the time the 
interviews were conducted, it was nevertheless beneficial to obtain the views of senior tort 
lawyers about the likely impact of the 2015 reforms.  
 
Chapter Four of thesis explains that the participants in this study have capacity to provide 
important insights into the challenges faced by plaintiffs pursuing medical negligence and 
mental harm claims in Victoria and whether the 2015 amendments prompted by the VCEC 
Report are sufficient to address these challenges. The majority of the interviewees saw the 
reforms as a positive step forward for claimants but suggested that the changes could have 
gone further in terms of the thresholds and the need for a test that took account of the 
personal circumstances of a claimant. Table 6 summarises the responses of the lawyers to a 
specific question about whether the 2015 amendments will have an impact on plaintiffs’ 
ability to recover compensation.  
 
Table 6: Participants’ responses to the question ‘What impact do you see the 2015 
reforms having on the ability of plaintiffs to recover compensation?’  
 
Response Number of lawyers 
supporting response 
The 2015 reforms will not 
have a significant impact  
7 
The 2015 reforms will have 
some impact 
11 
I do not know / I am unsure 2 
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5.5.1 NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT  
Seven participants expressed the view that the changes would not have any significant 
impact. In other words, these participants believed the 2015 amendments will not necessarily 
make it easier for plaintiffs to recover compensation. In the view of the participants, this was 
principally because the maximum amount of damages for non-economic loss is awarded in 
the most severe cases.31 For instance, one participant explained that the maximum non-
economic loss damages were awarded in ‘high quantum’ cases with injuries such as cerebral 
palsy or quadriplegia, but claimants with such extensive injuries could also recover under 
separate heads of damages:  
 
I don’t think the increase in the cap is significant. In cases that are going to get a maximum 
for general damages, high quantum cases, generally often have a lot of quantum related to 
care components, whether it be a cerebral palsy case or a quadriplegic case and, in fact, the 
generals end up being often a minority section of the damages. It might be a couple of million 
for the other components. So another 50 grand [$50,000] I don’t think makes much 
difference. (Plaintiff Lawyer 10) 
 
Another participant noted the increase to the damages cap will likely make only a modest 
difference:  
 
[H]aving gone up to $577,000 there is a higher level, but I think that makes a modest 
difference because if it’s a claim that’s worth somebody getting the cap for general damages 
then it’s obviously a very significant claim and an extra $50,000-$70,000 is neither here nor 
there in the outcome… So I don’t see that change having any significant impact. (Defendant 
Lawyer 3) 
 
In other words, this participant suggests the amendment will only affect high-end claims. 
That is, even if a plaintiff is entitled to the maximum cap for non-economic loss the minor 
increase in compensation is unlikely to have a substantial practical impact.  
 
                                                 
31
 See for instance a recent decision of Sorbello v South Western Sydney Local Health Network; Sultan v 
South Western Sydney Local Health Network  [2016] NSWSC 863 (24 June 2016) where the parents of a 
child who sustained severe brain injury due to oxygen deprivation at birth sued for mental harm. Non-
economic loss for the mother was assessed at 35 per cent and for the father 20 per cent.  
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The participants’ views that the amendments are unlikely to have a significant impact on 
plaintiffs is consistent with the stated aim of the VCEC inquiry not to undermine the intent of 
the 2002-2003 tort law changes or adversely impact the price and availability of indemnity 
insurance.32 One of the participants expressly acknowledged that VCEC did not wish to ‘open 
the floodgates’ to unmeritorious claims:   
 
I don’t really think that it’s going to have an enormous effect on claims… VCEC were pretty 
clear in saying that they don’t want to open the floodgates. (Plaintiff Lawyer 6) 
 
VCEC anticipated that two effects of the reduction of impairment threshold levels would be 
an increase in insurance claims costs by $0.6 to $4 million per year and an increase in 
insurance premiums by 0.1 to 1 per cent.33 However, given the recent nature of the reforms, it 
was unsurprising that one participant stated they have not seen any significant impact since 
the introduction of the 2015 reforms:  
 
I haven’t observed any great impact. The only thing is that it does, it softens the harshness of 
the previous reforms. [I]t permitted some plaintiffs who previously wouldn’t have qualified to 
commence proceedings, it permitted them to do so… [C]ertainly I’ve not experienced there’s 
been an avalanche of cases, unmeritorious or otherwise, that have flown as a result of those 
reforms. (Defendant Lawyer 4) 
 
The participant appears to suggest that as the 2015 reforms will only have an impact on 
borderline claims, the reforms are unlikely to unleash an avalanche of unmeritorious 
negligence claims. Another participant stated that the reduction in thresholds may make a 
small difference by allowing borderline claims through, however that change is unlikely to be 
significant:  
 
[It] probably broadens the field a little bit, but not much. I mean, you just broaden the class a 
bit in terms of people that can recover, so if you have a back injury and the panel said 5 per 
cent, you wouldn’t get up, but now you would…but I don't know that it makes a big 
difference in terms of the numbers, it might increase the numbers a bit, but I wouldn’t think 
it’d be a huge amount. (Defendant Lawyer 5) 
 
Similarly, another lawyer was of the view the 2015 reforms would not have a great impact:  
  
                                                 
32
 VCEC Report, above n 11, 14. 
33
 Ibid 93.   
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Will it make a significant difference? I don’t know. I doubt it, is my gut feeling. (Court 
Lawyer 3) 
 
Two participants, while acknowledging the beneficial nature of the reforms for claimants, 
expressed a need for further reform:   
 
I think they’re a good start. That’s the first and foremost point. They’re a good start. They 
should go further. (Plaintiff Lawyer 4) 
 
 I think they’re welcome, and I think they are two [thresholds and caps] of the really serious 
bits that did result in a lot of injustice. I certainly would have liked to see them go a bit 
further. (Plaintiff Lawyer 8) 
 
5.5.2 THE REFORMS WILL HAVE SOME IMPACT  
The majority of participants, 11 out of the 20, thought that the 2015 amendments would have 
some impact on the ability of plaintiffs to recover compensation. They endorsed the changes 
to the thresholds as providing claimants with a more balanced access to compensation 
through the changed thresholds. A number of the participants differentiated between physical 
and psychological injuries. For instance, a participant noted that the amendments have 
potential to have a significant impact in claims for compensation for physical injuries:  
 
[T]hey’re going to have a significant impact with respect to physical injury because the 
change in the threshold to 5 per cent, rather than above 5 per cent, captures quite a significant 
group of people… But part of the discussion as to whether the changes should be introduced 
was just how many cases was the change from more than 5 per cent to 5 per cent going to 
capture, and it does capture quite a large cohort of changes. (Court Lawyer 1) 
 
This quote suggests the reforms have the potential to affect a large number of participants 
despite a small increase to the threshold. Another participant thought the reforms would have 
a positive impact on access to justice by increasing the number of plaintiffs who qualify for 
compensation, without adversely impacting upon insurance costs:  
 
I think they were necessary amendments; they won’t influence the cost substantially, there’ll 
be a small increase in the volume and a small increase in the quantity of damages. But I don’t 
think it’s going to be a costly amendment, but it’s going to get rid of some injustice in a few 
cases. (Plaintiff Lawyer 9) 
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This seems to suggest the 2015 reforms have struck a fair balance, insofar as they will not 
open the litigation floodgates but will eliminate some of the injustice caused by the Ipp 
Reforms. Similarly, another participant described the 2015 amendments as ‘pretty fair’  and 
pondered whether it will make it slightly easier for plaintiffs to bring a claim:  
 
I think it’s probably…a pretty fair amendment. Will it necessarily open up the door and make 
it easier for plaintiffs? Perhaps it will, but in my experience the matters that I was involved in 
generally, the plaintiffs, it was very clear cut whether they were over the 5 per cent or 10 per 
cent threshold anyway. Perhaps it will affect the ability of claimants who are bringing psych 
claims which, I think, is harder to establish. It may make it a little bit easier for them, but I 
mean at the end of the day I don’t think that the impact, well in my view, will be too great. 
(Court Lawyer 4) 
 
These perspectives suggest the effects of the 2015 reforms are remedial in nature without 
undermining the entire purpose of the Ipp Reforms, which is ultimately consistent with 
VCEC’s objective.  
 
5.5.3 SPINAL CASES  
Six participants indicated that amendments will have particular impact in spinal cases, as was 
intended by VCEC’s recommendations. Participants highlighted the injustice caused by 
threshold levels requiring more than 5 per cent impairment, in circumstances where an 
injured person may be assessed at 5 per cent. As discussed in Part III of this paper, the 
application of the AMA Guides can lead to unjust results for plaintiffs because of the manner 
in which injury thresholds are categorised. One participant referred to the unjust application 
of the AMA Guides and thought the amendments would have a positive impact on the ability 
to recover compensation for spinal injuries, noting:  
 
We didn’t talk about the 5 [per cent], but it’s only back cases as you know, and that was much 
more unjust because it seems all right at five but it meant more than 5, and the next notch is 
10, so [that] meant you’ve got to get 10 per cent, and under the guidelines you’ve got to be 
nearly dead to get 10 per cent for an organic injury. So therefore whilst it’s only restricted to 
back, I think it will increase the number of cases by a third. (Defendant Lawyer 7) 
 
The above quote suggests the minor difference between a ‘5 per cent’ and ‘more than 5 per 
cent’ threshold can have significant practical consequences. A similar view was shared by a 
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different participant, acknowledging that plaintiffs with spinal injuries faced a significant 
threshold hurdle in applying for compensation:  
 
I think the biggest thing is that the people with back injuries in the industrial context will have 
a greater chance of getting up because it was terrible before because there were plenty of 
people at 5 [per cent], because of the way the tables worked, so I think that will be helpful… 
[T]he spinal assessment will make a significant difference in the number of claims that get 
over the threshold. (Plaintiff Lawyer 11) 
 
Whilst the amendment to the threshold in relation to spinal injuries appears to be minor, these 
participants suggest that it may have a significant effect in practice.  
 
5.5.4 PSYCHIATRIC INJURIES   
The legal position relating to mental harm has been criticised for discriminating between 
physical and psychiatric injury. Forster and Engel contend that statutory reforms to mental 
harm have reinforced and magnified the historic distinction between the two.34 This 
distinction was reflected in the Wrongs Act provisions which required a more than 5 per cent 
whole person impairment for physical injury and more than 10 per cent for psychiatric injury. 
One participant acknowledged the difficulty in satisfying the previous thresholds and 
considered the reduction of the threshold to equal to 10 per cent may allow more plaintiffs to 
initiate claims:  
 
[T]he mental claims I think you had to have more than 10 per cent to be able to bring a claim 
for a mental injury. That was almost impossible because what you need to prove for 10 per 
cent you needed to be a smoking wreck. You needed to be more than a smoking wreck in 
order to get up. So I think that’s probably let more people in. (Court Lawyer 2) 
 
VCEC acknowledged the difficulty of plaintiffs satisfying the more than 10 per cent 
threshold, mainly due to an anomaly in the application of the tool used to assess the 
impairment.35 Psychiatric injuries are assessed pursuant to the Guide to the Evaluation of 
Psychiatric Impairment for Clinicians (GEPIC).36 The anomaly arises because the Wrongs 
Act threshold and the GEPIC categories do not align, enabling a person with 11 per cent 
                                                 
34
 Forster and Engel, above n 8, 608.  
35
 VCEC Report, above n 11, xxvi.  
36
 Michael WN Epstein, George Mendelson and Nigel HM Strauss, The Guide to the Evaluation of 
Psychiatric Impairment for Clinicians (2005). 
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impairment to recover compensation while a person with a 10 per cent threshold would be 
ineligible.37 The unfairness arises because a person may have a valid diagnosed psychiatric 
injury, but if they do not satisfy the quantitative assessments, they are prevented from 
recovering any compensation. One participant reflected on the frequent inability of 
participants with psychiatric injuries to satisfy the more than 10 per cent threshold:  
 
[W]ith the psych injuries, a lot of people have got 10 and no more, and so that will have an 
impact for those particular cases. (Lawyer Plaintiff 8) 
 
Participants’ comments in this regard suggest the threshold for psychiatric injury is quite 
high, meaning that only plaintiffs with the most severe psychological injuries will satisfy the 
thresholds, further reinforcing the historical distinction between physical and psychological 
injuries.  
 
5.5.6 NARRATIVE TEST  
VCEC considered the introduction of a ‘narrative test’ in assessing threshold requirements. 
The use of a subjective test would address the rigidity of the thresholds under the AMA 
Guides. At present, assessment of whether a person meets the significant injury threshold 
under the Wrongs Act is predominantly quantitative because of the requirement that the 
injured person must have the prescribed whole person permanent impairment. However, 
consideration of some qualitative factors are taken into account in the assessment of injury 
under the AMA Guides, such as when assessing scarring or the impact of pain from an 
injury.38 Impairment thresholds are arbitrary and do not distinguish between the loss of a 
finger to a bank representative who could continue in their occupation, as opposed to a pianist 
whose career would be destroyed.39  
 
Whilst the participants in this study did not expressly articulate the need for a narrative test, 
many comments alluded to the need to take into account individual circumstances, such as 
plaintiffs’ pain and suffering, which may not necessarily be considered in the application of 
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 VCEC Report, above n 11, xxvi. 
38
 Chapter 15 in the AMA Guides which deals with chronic pain is excluded from providing guidance for 
injury assessment under the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28LB. However, each individual chapter dealing with 
various parts of the body includes a component for pain.  
39
 Martha McCluskey, ‘Rhetoric of Risk and the Redistribution of Social Insurance’ in Tom Baker and 
Jonathan Simon (eds), Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility  (University 
of Chicago Press, 2002) 150.  
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the current assessment. One participant articulated this issue in the context of medical 
negligence:   
 
[One consequence of the reforms is that it] adds a level of complexity in terms of the 
impairment requirements. It affects medical negligence cases particularly where there has 
been the usual example of scissors being left in post-surgery, where there’s obvious 
negligence. But once the scissors are removed and although the patient has had a traumatic 
time, there’s no permanent impairment, and therefore they wouldn’t have a cause of action 
even though they could quite easily prove liability and causation. (Plaintiff Lawyer 3) 
 
Undeniably, there is a tension between the need to compensate victims of medical negligence 
and a need to maintain affordability of insurance premiums. There is also merit in a system 
that is predictable in that the scheme can be applied uniformly to claimants. However, it is 
important that the law take into consideration individual circumstances affecting people’s 
lives. The introduction of a narrative test into the Wrongs Act would ensure plaintiffs who are 
currently prevented from accessing compensation have the opportunity to do so.  
 
As outlined above, VCEC considered the introduction of a narrative test following 
recommendations based on the experience of lawyers from the Australian Lawyers Alliance, 
the Law Institute of Victoria and the Monash Law Students Society Just Leadership Program. 
The Law Institute of Victoria provided an example of pain and suffering experienced by a 
woman suffering sciatic nerve pain. Under the previous ‘more than 5 per cent’ threshold, the 
woman in the example would not have been able to recover compensation despite her quality 
of life drastically deteriorating. In their submission, the Law Institute of Victoria outlined the 
qualitative factors that are not captured by the quantitative assessment under the AMA 
Guides.40 For example, following the injury the woman’s daily capacities and independence 
are curtailed, her sitting and standing ability is restricted to 40 minutes, she can walk only 
short distances and is no longer able to attend to most ordinary domestic tasks.41 
 
Opponents argued against the narrative test because of the risk it would lead to increased 
costs.42 Other risks of adopting a narrative test include definition and interpretation risks, as 
                                                 
40
 Law Institute of Victoria, Submission No 13 to Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, 
Inquiry into Aspects of the Wrongs Act 1958 , Submission 12 September 2013, 6-7. 
41
 Ibid.  
42
 The Municipal Association of Victoria was one such opponent: VCEC Report, above n 11, 42. 
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well as the risk that poor claim management by insurers in the injury claims process could set 
a precedent of accepting unmeritorious claims.43 An alternative to the narrative test available 
to VCEC was to recommend use of chapter 15 of the AMA Guides which deals with 
evaluation of pain in significant injury assessments.44 VCEC rejected the introduction of a 
narrative test because of the risk it would increase the number of claims (including for 
claimants who were already within the threshold percentage but were seeking to increase 
their impairment percentage), causing an increase to court and administrative costs and 
ultimately leading to increased medical indemnity insurance premiums.45  
 
The VCEC Report alluded to the unfairness caused by the permanent impairment thresholds 
and caps on damages, with this unfairness also reflected in the Second Reading Speech of the 
Wrongs Amendment Bill 2015 (Vic).46 The unfairness of the regulatory framework was also 
echoed by the participants in this study: 
 
I think there are quite a number of people now with genuine negligence claims and I’ve had to 
say to people, ‘I can’t proceed because we can’t establish the level of impairment.’ So 
recently I had a client who had a hip replacement, had Moore’s arthroplasty, got an infection, 
had to have that removed, another hip replacement put in and she didn’t get through the Panel 
to establish a 6 per cent impairment or more which I thought was terribly unfair but very 
difficult to appeal the Medical Panel’s decision. So therefore we were kind of just locked out. 
(Plaintiff Lawyer 1) 
 
The challenge is for people who have significant injuries but don’t turn out to be permanent 
or significant injuries that turn out at 4 per cent [such as] extensive scarring. So these people 
are equally traumatised as anyone else but they’re cut out by the thresholds… I mean, 
compared to doing the TAC work that I used to do, the medical law claims seem to be far less 
generously compensated than [TAC]–unfairly. (Plaintiff Lawyer 4) 
 
                                                 
43
 Australasian Disability and Injury Insurance Services Group, Supplementary Advice Regarding Narrative 
Test for Access to Benefits, 18 August 2016 <http://greenslipreforms.nsw.gov.au/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/ADIIS-Group-advice-18-August-2016.pdf>. 
44
 VCEC Report, above n 11, 41 - 42.  
45
 Ibid xxvii.  
46
 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 September 2015, 3281 (Martin Pakula). The 
Hon Mr Pakula noted, ‘While there is evidence to suggest that the tort law reform project was successful in 
reducing insurance premiums, there are concerns that the reforms have disproportionately affected the rights 
of claimants to access damages, and some deserving claimants have been denied compensation.’ 
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The participants’ quotes reflect the unfairness that can result from the current legislative 
regime, in circumstances where plaintiffs with substantial and painful injuries cannot satisfy 
the threshold requirements.  
 
Concepts of certainty and predictability relate back to the rule of law, which outlines basic 
requirements of a legal system, such as equality and legal certainty.47 In the context of tort 
law, Witting has contended that the development of policy should be made with regard to 
values of certainty, consistency and predictability.48 Pursuant to this view, a regulatory 
approach assessing and compensating injury should render consistent and predictable 
compensatory payouts. As an example, the New Zealand compensation scheme is the 
ultimate model of regulatory consistency, providing predictable compensation for all injured 
people.49 In Australia, the imposition of thresholds and caps on damages presents some level 
of consistency in the types of cases that warrant compensation and the level of damages 
awarded. However, the drawback of such stringent regulatory equality and predictability is 
the failure to provide for individual circumstances.  
 
A possible solution is the introduction of a provision, similar to the economic loss section 
relating to motor vehicle injuries in section 56A(3) of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), 
which provides: 
a court may award damages in a case that would otherwise be excluded if satisfied –   
(a) that the consequences of the personal injury with respect to loss or impairment of future 
earning capacity are exceptional; and  
(b) that the application of the threshold set by that subsection would, in the circumstances of 
the particular case, be harsh and unjust.50  
 
The introduction of a narrative test would achieve regulatory consistency with transport 
accident and workplace legislation.51 Ten participants in this study compared negligence 
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 Stephanie JA ter Borg and Suzan Stoter, ‘Is Goal-Based Regulation Consistent with the Rule of Law?’ in 
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 Christian Witting, ‘Tort Law, Policy and the High Court’ (2007) 31(2) Melbourne University Law Review 
569, 574. 
49
 The no-fault scheme used in New Zealand arises pursuant to the Accident Compensation Act 2001 (NZ). 
For a discussion on the New Zealand scheme see Stephen Todd, ‘Treatment Injury in New Zealand’ (2011) 
86(3) Chicago-Kent Law Review 1169. 
50
 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 56A(3). See also Australasian Disability and Injury Insurance Services 
Group, Supplementary Advice Regarding Narrative Test for Access to Benefits , 18 August 2016 < 
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under the Wrongs Act with transport accident and workplace injuries. All were of the view 
that recovering compensation under these statutory schemes was easier than the Wrongs Act. 
One participant explained:  
 
With transport accidents and WorkCover, it’s much more straightforward. I was in an 
accident, I’ve got an injury. I was lifting something at work, I’ve got a back injury… I don’t 
see why in medical negligence claims people should be treated any differently to transport 
accident victims, or public liability also has a three year time limit, but why people should be 
treated any differently to those that have been involved in car accidents or WorkCover 
incidents? (Plaintiff Lawyer 1) 
 
Hurdles faced by plaintiffs under the Wrongs Act are much more stringent than under other 
personal injury schemes, leading to the assertion that the Victorian Government has been too 
tentative in their recent reforms. The Victorian Government should have considered the 
introduction of a narrative test or similar initiative to deal with injuries that do not meet the 
objective whole person permanent impairment thresholds.  
 
At this stage it is difficult to make a final assessment regarding the effectiveness of the 
changes that were implemented. It is important to allow a period of time to elapse to allow for 
the implementation of the amendments. It would then be advisable to conduct research that 
captures the experiences of plaintiffs and insurance companies to ascertain the effectiveness 
of the 2015 amendments. Empirical research that provides details regarding the amounts of 
compensation provided to plaintiffs is recommended. In addition, case studies on the effect of 
compensation levels on recipients will be useful to evaluate how the compensation has 
affected their experience of managing their impairment. 
5.6 TIME FOR A NO-FAULT APPROACH?  
Despite not expressly advocating the adoption of the New Zealand scheme in Australia, the 
participants in this study endorsed the benefits of no-fault schemes, such as those used under 
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 Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) s 93 and Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) s 134AB. See also 
Jason Taliadoros, ‘A Way Through the Dark and Thorny Thickets? The Adjudication of “Serious Injury” 
under the Narrative Tests in the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) and the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Act 2013 (Vic)’ (2015) 23(1) Journal of Law and Medicine 243.  
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the Victorian transport and workplace accident legislation.52 The participants highlighted a 
range of benefits including the simplicity of the claims process:  
 
It’s definitely a simpler process. I mean, the TAC have a protocol for dealing with matters 
before they’re issued. That’s probably because liability and causation aren’t so difficult in 
majority of TAC claims. I think that the conference process is much less formal. It allows for 
a resolution. (Plaintiff Lawyer 2)  
 
Medical law is crying out for a similar process to the TAC process, I think. (Plaintiff Lawyer 
4) 
 
Without being prompted by the interviewer, ten participants compared the claims process in 
medical negligence and mental harm claims to the process in transport and workplace 
accidents. All of these participants were of the view that the claims process and statutory 
requirements under the schemes were far more straightforward, producing fairer results.  
 
The problems raised by the participants in this study suggest that the current negligence 
legislative framework requires reform. There are two options that should be considered: 
reducing the significant injury thresholds, or adopting a statutory scheme similar to that 
operating in NZ. The recent reduction of the thresholds by the Victorian parliament was 
conservative, reducing the thresholds by one per cent in spinal and psychiatric injuries.53 The 
threshold for physical injuries remains unaltered at ‘more than 5 per cent’ while the threshold 
for psychiatric injuries is still double that of physical injury. A reduction in the thresholds 
may not alleviate the discriminatory features of the legislation, because the imposition of 
thresholds itself acts as a hurdle to plaintiffs recovering compensation in legitimate claims. 
 
An argument for imposing thresholds was to reduce the number and cost of smaller (‘trivial’) 
claims54 yet it would appear, according to many lawyers in this study, the smaller scale 
injuries are not trivial. Damages for non-economic loss are essentially compensation for ‘pain 
and suffering’ corresponding with a subjective response to physical and emotional trauma,55 
yet the Victorian legislation focuses on objective assessments of an injury. Therefore 
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reducing injury thresholds would allow more claims, however it would not eliminate the 
problems intrinsic to thresholds. 
 
A solution that would alleviate the problems with the current framework is the adoption of a 
statutory scheme to replace the common law fault-based system. Various legal commentators 
support the introduction of a no-fault scheme in Australia, particularly in relation to medical 
liability, because a no-fault scheme offers predictable care and support, consistent coverage 
of injured people and a more efficient system.56 One concern with use of a statutory scheme 
is the ‘one-size-fits-all’ compensation payouts that may not be sufficiently generous to 
compensate catastrophic injuries. Stephen Todd evaluated whether the NZ scheme operates 
adequately to compensate in medical injury cases, and concluded that the compensation is 
reasonably generous and available with minimum formality.57 Insofar as compensation for 
medical injury is concerned, the NZ scheme excludes ordinary consequences of treatment and 
the injured person’s pre-existing health condition. It also excluded compensation for pure 
mental harm.  
 
One recommendation the Australian legislature might consider is the introduction of a similar 
statutory scheme for treatment injury, with a broadened scope to include actions for pure 
mental harm. This solution merits detailed consideration by the legislature, such as a detailed 
enquiry by the Productivity Commission, a suggestion offered by Weisbrot and Breen.58 The 
implementation of such a scheme would be a step in the right direction towards achieving 
justice for victims of medical negligence and mental harm.59  
5.7 CONCLUSION  
In summary, the findings of the research described in this chapter demonstrate that significant 
injury impairment thresholds were considered the predominant challenge amongst the various 
challenges such as caps on damages and causation, in medical negligence and mental harm 
claims. The reflections of senior tort practitioners show that the current regulatory framework 
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is perceived as overly restrictive and adversely impacting injured plaintiffs, resulting in 
unfairness and discrimination. According to participants, the 2015 amendments to the 
Wrongs Act were a step in the right direction towards improving access to justice by lowering 
thresholds, however these amendments are arguably insufficient to ease the restrictions 
imposed by the Ipp Reforms. The solution may be the introduction of a no-fault statutory 
scheme similar to the scheme currently operating in NZ, with the aim of producing a cost-
effective scheme to compensate victims of medical negligence and mental harm claims. 
 
When questioned about causation, a substantial majority of participants were of the view that 
causation is a hurdle in medical negligence litigation. The views on the reasons vary, with 
some asserting that the statutory test is the cause of the problems whilst others were of the 
view that causation in medical negligence is inherently complex and that the problems with 
causation do not stem from the Ipp Reforms. The participants in this study did not expressly 
articulate a solution to the difficulties presented by the causation element, suggesting that 
there may not be a simple or obvious solution and more investigation may be required.  
 
The challenge to meritorious claims represented by the hurdle of causation, acknowledged by 
most of the participants suggests that the VCEC Report and subsequent law reform in 2015 
presented a lost opportunity for the Victorian government to revisit the operation of the 
causation principle in practice. As one participant noted, the law is changing. VCEC was 
evidence of the need for continuing revision and identified that the next law reform 
opportunity should include causation. In the light of corrective justice theory and the need to 
compensate those who have been injured in medical negligence, this situation warrants 
further consideration.  
 
When questioned about the likely impact of the 2015 reforms on medical negligence and 
mental harm claims, the majority of participants were of the view that the 2015 reforms will 
have some impact on the ability of plaintiffs to recover compensation in meritorious medical 
negligence and mental harm claims. The views regarding the impact vary, with some 
practitioners believing that greater impact will be on physical injuries (including spinal 
injuries) while others believe it will impact psychiatric injuries more. Although the majority 
of the participants saw the amendments to the thresholds as a positive change for claimants 
some regarded them as too modest. Many of the participants expressed doubts about the 
effectiveness of the amendments in alleviating the harshness of the Ipp Reforms. Although 
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the participants did not specifically articulate the need for a narrative test as outlined in the 
VCEC Report, they did mention the importance of individualising damages where there may 
be circumstances that result in claimants being unable to satisfy the impairment thresholds. 
Analysis of the data in this study indicates the 2015 reforms have not yet achieved the 
balance between the need to compensate claimants and the cost concerns regarding insurance 
premiums.  
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CHAPTER 6 – FINDINGS PART 2: MEDIATION OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 
AND MENTAL HARM CLAIMS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
As discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, legislative endorsement of mandatory dispute 
resolution processes has entrenched ADR processes including mediation into the Australian 
civil justice system. In the medical negligence context, a matter is unlikely to be litigated at 
trial unless the parties first attempt mediation.1 The use of mediation in medical negligence 
disputes offers not only opportunities for swift resolution of such disputes but also has the 
potential to allow claimants to experience a process that addresses both legal and non-legal 
needs. The role of the lawyer in medical negligence mediation can vary across a spectrum 
ranging from adopting a collaborative problem-solving approach, to transferring 
adversarialism from the courtroom into mediation. The widespread use of mediation in 
medical negligence warrants exploration of how this form of dispute resolution is used in 
practice, the extent of engagement with the process by legal and non-legal actors and the 
challenges experienced in attempting to reach settlement.  
 
This chapter presents the second part of the findings of this thesis. Consistent with the 
research methodology in Chapter Four of this thesis, grounded theory was used to code and 
analyse the data to extract emergent themes. The chapter presents a discussion of the themes 
relating to mediation practice in medical negligence disputes. Firstly, the extent of 
engagement with the mediation process is discussed. Secondly, the chapter contains findings 
with respect to emotion, and whether the mediation process allows for the expression of 
emotion. Thirdly, the role and influence of lawyers on the mediation process is then explored. 
Finally, opportunities for reform are explored. Expanding legal education is suggested as a 
catalyst for shifting the culture of the legal profession to capitalise on the opportunity offered 
by mediation as a process offering emotional closure for the parties. 
 
                                                 
1
 This is because of a combined effect of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 7 and court practice 
directions. See County Court of Victoria, Practice Note: Common Law Division – Medical List No 1 of 
2015, 24 July 2015, [66]. 
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6.2 ENGAGEMENT WITH MEDIATION 
The privileging of ADR as a valuable and inherent component of a dispute resolution process 
is evident in state and federal legislation,2 with further endorsement in recent law reform 
commission reports.3 In medical negligence disputes, the County Court practice directions 
also stipulate that all proceedings in the Medical List must be subject to mediation.4 This 
legislative endorsement of ADR and particularly mediation as part of case management is 
echoed in the reflections of the participants.  
 
All of the lawyers interviewed expressed support for mediation in medical negligence claims 
processes, although they proffered a variety of reasons for this support. Participants were 
asked whether they thought mediation was a more suitable dispute resolution avenue for 
medical negligence claims, compared to litigating at trial based on their experience. All 24 
participants endorsed the benefits of mediation and responded in a manner that either 
expressly stated it was a more suitable dispute resolution avenue, or implied through their 
response that it was. Participants offered the following descriptions:    
 
  [M]ediation is an intrinsic and very desirable aspect to litigation… (Defendant Lawyer 1) 
 
Mediation [is] a really important step in the process and there’s a lot of advantage for both 
sides if a matter can be resolved at mediation rather than proceeding to trial. (Plaintiff Lawyer 
2) 
 
  I can’t speak highly enough of mediations… (Defendant Lawyer 3) 
 
  I think it’s a very important method. I think it has proved successful. (Plaintiff Lawyer 8) 
  
As much as it’s against every barrister’s commercial interest to promote mediation, it’s the 
best for the protagonists involved. (Defendant Lawyer 4)  
 
The overwhelming majority endorsed the benefits of mediation as reflected in the quotes 
outlined above.  
                                                 
2
 Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) s 6; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 7. 
3
 Productivity Commission, Access to Justice Arrangements, Report No 72 (2014) 
<https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/access-justice/report>; Victorian Government Department of 
Justice and Regulation, Access to Justice Review (2016) <http://www.vic.gov.au/news/access-to-justice-
review.html>. 
4
 County Court of Victoria, Practice Note: Common Law Division – Medical List No 1 of 2015, 24 July 
2015, [66]. 
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When asked to what level they engaged in mediation in medical negligence disputes, 16 
participants stated they engaged because the process was court-ordered and thus mandatory: 
 
[T]hey’re court ordered – there’s always a mediation prior to trial. (Plaintiff Lawyer 5) 
 
[T]hey’ve got no choice. They’re always court ordered. But you do see ones that aren’t court 
ordered where people, for example early on, want to meet and discuss. I would be very 
surprised if anyone said it wasn’t successful. It has been successful in a number of cases. It’s 
got, in the medical negligence field, it’s got advantages for both plaintiffs and defendants. 
(Plaintiff Lawyer 7) 
 
Every order in any litigation in the common law division will include a mandatory 
requirement for mediation so it’s absolutely imperative. (Court Lawyer 2)  
 
One participant stressed that mediation is part of the litigation process, rather than a complete 
alternative to it, and indicated judges were actively promoting mediation:  
 
Mediation is a part of litigation. No case is listed for trial until it’s been mediated at least once 
and judges are now more actively suggesting mediation, even during the running of a trial. So 
all parties engage in mediation for medical negligence disputes and have for many years. 
(Defendant Lawyer 1) 
 
Eight of the 16 participants did not expressly use the words ‘court-ordered’ but used language 
which indicated that participating in mediation was a compulsory part of the dispute 
resolution process. In other words, it was simply something the participants saw as 
obligatory:  
 
 Mediation is almost universal in medical negligence claims. (Plaintiff Lawyer 4) 
 
All of the litigated claims that I’m in, we absolutely always go to mediation. I can’t think of 
one where we haven’t unless it’s clear cut negligence and there’s a very reasonable quantum 
claim being made that you don’t want to incur the costs of mediation. But for all of the others 
we always go to mediation. (Defendant Lawyer 3) 
 
[P]arties are told there’s going to be a mediation, there always is and they’re told that 
mediations have reasonable prospects of success and that there are good reasons for 
participating in a mediation. So I don’t think they’re given much choice about it, they’re not 
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asked – I’ve never asked a plaintiff do you – or a defendant – do you want to go to a 
mediation? They’re ordered, so it’s more we’re going have to do a mediation so here’s the 
story about mediation. (Plaintiff Lawyer 11) 
 
The quotes above reflect the current use of mandatory mediation in the Victorian medical 
negligence context. As indicated in Chapter Three of this thesis, imposition of mandatory 
mediation in the court system attracts various concerns. With the widespread use of 
mediation due to support from policy-makers and the judiciary, there are those who assert 
that imposition of mandatory mediation can threaten the rule of law and result in the erosion 
of common law rights.5 For example, Genn argues that mediation can be beneficial where the 
process is voluntary, but sees the civil justice system as a necessary backdrop against which 
mediation can operate.6 Genn emphasises the value of public adjudication and common law 
precedent, and cautions about unknown consequences of unregulated processes in private 
disputes resolution.7 However, in this thesis participants readily accepted the imposition of 
mandatory mediation. None of the participants discussed a lack of opportunity to litigate in 
court, nor did they critique the mandatory nature of mediation in the manner of Genn and 
other writers. 
 
In contrast to the participants who stressed that their participation in mediation was 
mandated, other participants did not frame their engagement with mediation as part of the 
institutional compulsion of case management. Rather, these participants expressed insights 
regarding the positive benefits of mediation. Eight participants thought Victorian legal and 
non-legal actors engage willingly, using terms such as a ‘fruitful tool’ to describe mediation:  
 
I think that mediation remains a really fruitful tool for resolving complaints. Parties generally 
approach it with good intentions and they engage constructively in the main… The parties 
                                                 
5
 Hazel Genn, ‘What is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice’ (2012) 24 Yale Journal of 
Law and the Humanities 397; Hazel Genn, ‘Why the Privatisation of Civil Justice is a Rule of Law Issue’ 
(36th F A Mann Lecture, Lincoln’s Inn, 19 November 2012) 19; Hazel Genn, Shiva Riahi and Katherine 
Pleming, ‘Regulation of Dispute Resolution in England and Wales: A Sceptical  Analysis of Government and 
Judicial Promotion of Private Mediation’ in Felix Steffek and Hannes Unberath (eds), Regulating Dispute 
Resolution: ADR and Access to Justice at the  Crossroads (Hart Publishing, 2013) 137; Richard Abel, ‘The 
Contradictions of Informal Justice’ in Richard Abel (ed), The Politics of Informal Justice, Volume 1: The 
American Experience (Academic Press, 1982); Owen Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93(6) Yale Law 
Journal 1073. 
6
 Hazel Genn, Judging Civil Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 79 - 80.  
7
 Hazel Genn, ‘Why the Privatisation of Civil Justice is a Rule of Law Issue’ (36th F A Mann Lecture, 
Lincoln’s Inn, 19 November 2012) 15.  
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always engage in mediation in medical negligence disputes. To the extent that they engage I 
think it is pretty constructive. (Plaintiff Lawyer 2) 
 
Participants also indicated there was ‘genuine goodwill’ about participating in mediation 
(Plaintiff Lawyer 8) and that the ‘main players are pretty keen’ to mediate (Defendant 
Lawyer 5). One participant stressed that ‘the desire to mediate is enormous’, particularly for 
defendant doctors who have a professional reputation to preserve: 
 
The insurer and the insured, in particular [the] insured doctor, has got a great desire to 
mediate. Doctors in particular when matters go to trial, whether they reach verdict or not, run 
the risk of real damage to professional reputation… So the desire to engage in mediation is 
enormous for all the obvious reasons, costs, compromise, risk, all of that, but there’s that real 
personal element in [medical negligence] for the defendant as well as the plaintiff, obviously. 
That means that there is a real willingness and preparedness to mediate. (Court Lawyer 3) 
 
The participants’ language demonstrated they had a compelling desire to engage in 
mediation, indicating a strong community of practice amongst medical negligence lawyers. 
Participants’ attitudes towards mediation were indicative of wholehearted endorsement, not 
simply as a response to mandatory imposition of mediation, but rather indicating a change of 
culture. Macfarlane has recognised that in the past 30 years a significant change in the dispute 
resolution culture has occurred and that lawyers have needed to be responsive to this change.8 
In many cases lawyers are now playing a different role, their focus shifting from advocacy to 
problem-solving and resolution of disputes.9 Similarly, the majority of the participants in this 
study showed a strong commitment to mediation, with many of them finding the dispute 
resolution process valuable. Macfarlane suggests that lawyers’ attitudes towards mediation 
become more positive over time following repeated experiences of mediation.10 While 
lawyers may initially be unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the process, they experience a shift 
in practice the more they engage with the process.11  
 
When asked about the advantages of mediation, the participants endorsed many of the 
classical attributes of mediation including: mediation is cheaper and less stressful than trial, i t 
                                                 
8
 Julie Macfarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transforming the Practice of Law (University of 
British Columbia Press, 2008) 2-3.  
9
 Ibid 9.  
10
 Ibid 11.  
11
 Ibid.  
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does not involve giving evidence in court which itself is stressful for claimants, it does not 
waste court resources, it avoids the risk and uncertainty of a trial verdict, it saves time, afford 
privacy and assists with a speedier resolution. In this study, 23 participants stressed that cost 
was a major benefit. Some participants simply listed it as a benefit while others expanded on 
their response by explaining the enormous expense of litigating a medical negligence case at 
trial, so that the more modest cost of mediation offered a cost-saving opportunity. Cost is 
often the driving factor of choosing ADR over litigation, because the perceived cost of 
litigation encourages parties to attempt settlement.12 For example, one participant stated:  
 
I think the lawyers embrace it well, and they look forward to it. Because litigation’s amazingly 
expensive, and … the courts order that there be a compulsory mediation before the trial, usually 
three or four months or maybe even longer, but I often get a call before those orders are made 
for the parties to engage in a mediation. And even sometimes, without there being proceedings 
issued. So I think the lawyers like it because it reduces costs, if they can resolve it. (Defendant 
Lawyer 8) 
 
The use of legislation is a way to change the culture of lawyers and their approach to 
mediation. The introduction of the ‘overarching obligations’ provisions through the 
introduction of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), requiring the facilitation of ‘just, 
efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute’ has assisted with 
the increase in alternative means of dispute resolution annexed to the court process.13 Three 
participants recognised the role legislation has played in encouraging acceptance of 
mediation in civil disputes. For example, one defendant lawyer recognised the importance of 
legislation in tempering the litigious culture and highlighted that the legislative provisions 
have assisted parties to engage with ADR:   
 
I think the Civil Procedure Act has been an excellent introduction. I think that is having quite 
an impact on cases in this jurisdiction and I am heavily in favour of that Act and the need to 
have a proper basis for everything that you allege. And I think it has gone further to 
encouraging parties to try and resolve matters earlier and to cooperate with one another. 
(Defendant Lawyer 3) 
 
                                                 
12
 Michael King et al, Non-Adversarial Justice (Federation Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2014) 98.  
13
 Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 7.  
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This quote demonstrates the successful use of public policy legislation in Victoria as a tool to 
shift the culture of lawyers from adversarialism and litigation to a more collaborative 
problem-solving focus. Macfarlane highlights that policy makers in North America have 
prioritised cost-savings and efficiency in the court systems by encouraging earlier and more 
informal resolution of disputes.14 She contends that the increasing use of ADR has led to a 
cultural change in the professional identity of lawyers, with lawyers responsive to alternative 
forms of dispute resolution.15  
 
Menkel-Meadow also posits that cultural change amongst the legal profession is required but 
questions whether the introduction of legislative rules or procedure is solely capable of 
reforming the adversarial system.16 Menkel-Meadow suggests that a variety of dispute 
resolution methods will facilitate choice for parties and allow lawyers to have greater 
flexibility in the dispute resolution models they choose to adopt.17 However, Genn remains 
sceptical about the use of public policy legislation to impose mandatory mediation, and 
argues that public adjudication and access to justice through the courts continues to have a 
fundamental purpose in dispute resolution.18  
 
One participant in this study explained that judges are using the legislative provisions to 
ensure court resources are used wisely, so that parties genuinely attempt mediation, and if 
their attempt is unsuccessful, then the parties are prepared for trial:  
 
I think the judges are getting very critical under the Civil Procedure Act if they feel that a 
proper attempt at mediation hasn’t occurred or that medical reports are starting to be 
exchanged after the medication process because then, of course, you have a trial looming and 
you’ve got the possibility that the trial may be adjourned if there’s further…investigations 
after the mediation. (Plaintiff Lawyer 1) 
 
Despite the many advantages of the Civil Procedure legislation, one participant posited that 
the opportunity for parties to attempt mediation in medical negligence cases occurs far too 
                                                 
14
 Macfarlane, above n 8, 2. 
15
 Ibid 2-3.  
16
 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World’ 
(1996) 38(1) William & Mary Law Review 5, 42.  
17
 Ibid 43-44.  
18
 Hazel Genn, ‘What is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice’ (2012) 24(1) Yale Journal 
of Law and the Humanities 397, 415-417.  
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late in the dispute resolution process, and that processes used to resolve TAC and WorkCover 
disputes are preferable because they take place much earlier:  
 
The Civil Procedure Act talks about there being pre-trial resolution opportunities. It doesn’t 
happen in medical law and it should. It’s only got a three year time limit and such a short time 
limit on discoverability compared to TAC and WorkCover. You’ve got a mandatory pre-issue 
process in WorkCover, an opt-in protocol process in TAC which works very very effectively 
to get through at least half the claims before a case has even started or a dollar spent on a writ. 
Medical law is crying out for a similar process to the TAC process, I think. Pre-issue 
mediation, pre-issue judicial conferencing [or] pre-issue informal conferencing between the 
parties would get rid of a lot of these disputes, I reckon. (Plaintiff Lawyer 4) 
 
Transport and workplace accident claim systems have successfully implemented pre-action 
protocols which assist with the early resolution of disputes.19 Such early resolution of 
disputes can have a positive effect on claimants, with one study having found that the time 
taken to resolve a dispute may have a direct correlation to a claimant’s perception of justice. 
Genevieve Grant’s research explored the claims-processing experiences of 332 participants 
who had pursued a workplace or transport accident claim.20 Grant found that there is value in 
acknowledging the role played by the claims process experienced by injured claimants as a 
primary facilitator of access to justice.21 That can include factors such as the length of a 
claim, whether claimants are informed about entitlements and ensuring claimants do not 
receive information that is overly complex and confusing.22  
 
Consistent with the findings in Chapter Five of this thesis where participants highlighted the 
benefits of statutory schemes, the participant’s quote presented above indicates such schemes 
also have advantages in dispute resolution processes and procedures. One clear advantage is 
that pre-action protocols encourage parties to resolve their dispute prior to instigating court 
proceedings, resulting in fiscal savings for the parties and reducing the burden on court 
resources. A study of construction lawyers’ and mediation in Scotland supports the use of 
mediation early in the dispute on the basis that it encourages resolution before parties become 
                                                 
19
 The Victorian Transport Accident Commission has implemented dispute resolution protocols that 
encourage use of ADR pre-litigation: Transport Accident Commission, No Fault Dispute Resolution 
Protocols, 1 July 2016 <https://www.tac.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/181399/No-Fault-Dispute-
Resolution-Protocols-July-2016.pdf>. 
20
 Genevieve M Grant, ‘Claiming Justice in Injury Law’ (2015) 41(3) Monash University Law Review 618. 
21
 Ibid 654.  
22
 Ibid 650.  
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too entrenched in deep-seated positions.23 However, despite key benefits of adopting pre-
action protocols in no-fault schemes, such as efficiency in dispute resolution and payment of 
compensation, pre-action protocols can have disadvantages. For instance, Legg and Boniface 
caution that mandatory pre-action protocols can result in front-loading of costs for parties and 
also risk an increase in compliance or ‘satellite’ litigation where parties contest the 
imposition of cost orders for failing to comply with the requirement for pre-action 
protocols.24 Provided relevant protections are included to allow parties to avoid pre-action 
protocols in exceptional circumstances (such as the vulnerability of a party or the need to 
pursue a test case in court), Legg and Boniface acknowledge pre-action protocols have many 
strengths.25 
 
The suggestion of participants to introduce pre-action mediation is interesting in the light of 
the former Labor state Victorian government’s attempt to introduce mandatory pre-action 
protocols in 2010, with the provisions being repealed only a year later with a change of 
government.26 Yet, pre-action mediation is being used in some Australian jurisdictions to 
resolve medical negligence claims and it is also showing promising signs of being effective 
internationally. In South Australia, the introduction of the Supreme Court Fast Track Rules 
2014 (SA) means that parties are required to satisfy a number of requirements before 
commencing court proceedings, including exchange of evidence relating to liability and 
causation.  
 
Similarly, international jurisdictions have used contractual methods of introducing 
requirements for pre-suit mediation to reduce legal costs and resolution time. The Florida 
Patient Safety and Pre-Suit Mediation Program was introduced in January 2008 and involves 
patients signing a pre-suit mediation agreement before receiving medical care, obliging them 
to mediate before commencing court proceedings.27 Evaluation of the program’s 
effectiveness from commencement in 2008 until 31 December 2015 showed a reduction of 
                                                 
23
 Andrew Agapiou and Bryan Clark, ‘Scottish Construction Lawyers and Mediation: An Investigation into 
Attitudes and Experiences’ (2011) 3(2) International Journal of Law in the Built Environment  159, 167.  
24
 Michael Legg and Dorne Boniface, ‘Pre-action Protocols in Australia’ (2010) 20(1) Journal of Judicial 
Administration 39, 55-56.  
25
 Ibid 57.  
26
 Tania Sourdin, ‘Making an Attempt to Resolve Disputes Before Using Courts: We All Have Obligations’ 
(2010) 21(4) Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 225, 226-227. 
27
 Randall C Jenkins et al, ‘Mandatory Pre-Suit Mediation for Medical Malpractice: Eight-Year Results and 
Future Innovations’ (2017) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 1, 3.  
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resolution time and an 87 % reduction in defendant legal expenses.28 These examples indicate 
a tripartite approach to dispute resolution may be beneficial in encouraging early resolution 
of medical negligence disputes: firstly, legislative endorsement of ADR through legislation 
such as the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic); secondly, court endorsement of pre-action 
mediation through court rules and practice directions; and thirdly, contractual pre-action 
mediation requirements akin to the Florida program.  
 
Analysis of the participants’ responses indicates there is a high level of engagement with 
mediation, with two thirds of the participants engaging in the process because of a legal 
requirement to attempt mediation. A further third indicated Victorian lawyers engage 
constructively because of a culture that fosters goodwill about ADR. These findings support 
the use of court-ordered or mandatory mediation in the medical negligence context, with all 
participants endorsing the benefits of mediation.  
 
Mandatory mediation can be a powerful case management tool, saving resources for parties 
and the court, and encouraging parties to use reasonable endeavours to resolve a dispute.29 
Advocates of mandatory mediation contend that mandating ADR increases court efficiency, 
saves costs, time and emotions for the parties.30 On the other hand, commentators caution that 
a cultural shift would need to occur in the legal profession if mandatory mediation were to be 
implemented.31 The findings in this study suggest lawyers practising in the Victorian medical 
negligence jurisdiction have embraced mediation wholeheartedly, demonstrating a cultural 
shift towards non-adversarial practice in this legal practice group.  
 
However, a non-adversarial culture does not appear to be thriving in all jurisdictions, with 
several participants drawing a distinction between Victorian and NSW lawyers’ attitudes 
towards mediation. For instance, one participant identified a clear distinction between 
                                                 
28
 Ibid 5.  
29
 Krista Mahoney, ‘Mandatory Mediation: A Positive Development In Most Cases’ (2014) 25(2) 
Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal  120; Melissa Hanks, ‘Perspectives on Mandatory Mediation’ 
(2012) 35(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 929; Michael Redfern, ‘Should Pre-Litigation 
Mediation be Mandated?’ (2012) 23(1) Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 6; Paul Venus, ‘Court 
Directed Compulsory Mediation – Attendance or Participation?’ (2004) 15(1) Australasian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 29; Magdalena McIntosh, ‘A Step Forward – Mandatory Mediations’ (2003) 14(4) 
Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 280. 
30
 Mahoney, above n 29, 126. 
31
 Redfern, above n 29, 11.  
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attitudes of NSW practitioners suggesting they have a tendency to treat mediation as a 
formality, compared with Victorian lawyers who engage more enthusiastically:  
 
In New South Wales the attitude was that mediation was a bit of a formality. In Victoria it’s the 
exact opposite. The reason why we have so few cases proceeding to trial is that parties meet, talk, 
discuss and settle. (Court Lawyer 1) 
 
Two participants highlighted the litigious culture of lawyers practising in NSW, explaining 
the tendency of lawyers in this jurisdiction to adopt an ‘all or nothing’ mentality and an 
aggressive adversarial approach to dispute resolution:  
  
The practical effect is that people don’t want to run trials because juries are unpredictable.  And 
maybe that’s a good thing, but you know, we’re, sort of, forcing more compromises and 
settlements before trial because they’ve run a lot of stuff in New South Wales and there’s 
obviously problems with that as well because then it becomes all or nothing. (Plaintiff Lawyer 6) 
 
But I think one of the great credits I heard from [an event] I went to, there were people from all 
over Australia representing [administrative tribunals and courts], who said “We really admire 
Melbourne because you’ve got one of the most vibrant private and institutional systems of 
mediation in Australia”. So Melbourne’s very, very mediation driven. It’s almost as if it is the 
venue … [Sydney lawyers] have a very aggressive, very aggressive attitude amongst solicitors 
and barristers on either side and they say some things, I mean I’ve been involved in some 
interstate mediation and I’m thinking gee what have…what are you saying all this for! You know 
it got really ugly around the table. But then we’d go outside and have a bit of a chat and we’re 
mates. (Court Lawyer 2) 
 
The responses of the above three participants indicate a distinction between Victorian and 
NSW lawyers’ approaches to dispute resolution, consistent with findings of a recent study 
evaluating ADR in disputes about taxation.32 In the Australian study of 118 taxation disputes, 
58.8% of Victorian disputes resolved following ADR, compared with 38.5% in NSW. 
Sourdin suggests that the discrepancy can be attributed to various factors, including a culture 
of practitioner behavior, and notes that practitioners engage with ADR to varying degrees in 
different states. The findings of Sourdin’s study would appear to support the views of several 
participants who observed a difference in approach of lawyers in the two states.  
                                                 
32
 Tania Sourdin, ‘Evaluating Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Disputes About Taxation’ (2015) 
34(1) The Arbitrator & Mediator 19. 
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Macfarlane’s comparative study of attitudes and practices of Toronto and Ottawa commercial 
litigators endorses the view that legal culture of lawyers can vary across jurisdictions 
depending on the local professional culture within each city and also exposure to mediation.33 
The study found that Ottawa practitioners have a more established culture of documentary 
disclosure and exchange than in Toronto. There was also a strong preference for evaluative 
mediation in the Toronto sample.34 In addition, the Ottawa lawyers spoke more positively 
about, and appeared more comfortable with their client’s involvement in mediation.35 
Analogous to Victorian and NSW practitioners, Ottawa lawyers exuded a more positive 
attitude toward mediation and were simultaneously critical of the adversarialism displayed by 
their lawyer counterparts in Toronto.36 Yet the introduction of mandatory mediation indicated 
a growing rise in acceptance of mediation at both sites,37 including a shift in attitudes towards 
accepting mediation in Toronto despite the resistance within this group.38  
 
Macfarlane attributes the difference in attitudes and practices between the two cities to two 
key factors. The first is local legal culture which is influenced by local leadership and 
professional relationships and seems to be stronger in smaller ci ties. The second factor is the 
extent of individuals’ experience in mediation. In Ottawa 100% of cases went to mediation 
compared to 25% in Toronto, and this familiarity with the mediation process meant Ottawa 
practitioners more easily embraced mediation.39 While the limited number of responses in 
this doctoral study comparing the Victorian and NSW jurisdictions does not conclusively 
establish the former are more willing to engage in mediation of medical negligence disputes 
than the latter, it certainly shows a greater disposition towards non-adversarial practice for 
Victorian lawyers than NSW lawyers. Macfarlane’s research endorses the conclusion that 
civil procedure rules alone are unlikely to foster a change of culture that embraces mediation.  
6.3 SUITABILITY OF MEDIATION IN THE MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CONTEXT  
As discussed in the literature in Chapter Three, certain areas of legal practice where disputes 
are relationship-focused or involve an emotional dimension may be better suited to less 
                                                 
33
 Julie Macfarlane, ‘Culture Change – A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation’ 
(2002) 2 Journal of Dispute Resolution 241, 318.  
34
 Ibid 285.  
35
 Ibid 314.  
36
 Ibid 314.  
37
 Ibid 299.  
38
 Ibid 300.  
39
 Ibid 318.  
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adversarial methods of dispute resolution. Medical negligence disputes are a highly 
specialised niche of legal practice, integrating complex principles of law and medicine and 
frequently involving a breakdown of an existing relationship between a doctor and a patient. 
Hence the resolution of such disputes occurs in an emotionally charged environment where 
the needs of the parties involve more than merely financial objectives.  
 
In addition to advantages relating to the relationship between the parties and their emotional 
needs, mediation of medical disputes can have benefits such as confidentiality and costs 
savings, as well as deepening awareness regarding medical errors and how to avoid them in 
the future. Commentators have endorsed the use of ADR processes to resolve medical 
malpractice claims because they are informal, confidential, speedy, enforceable, cost 
effective and consensual as opposed to determinative.40 Given that the mediation literature 
pertaining to medical negligence disputes suggests their suitability, it was imperative to 
ascertain whether participants in this study viewed mediation as a suitable form of dispute 
resolution of medical disputes.  
 
Arguably cost is a particularly prevalent factor in the resolution of medical negligence 
disputes, which frequently involve complex medico-legal issues that can result in lengthy and 
expensive litigation.41 When endorsing mediation as a preferable method of dispute 
resolution in medical negligence claims, many participants acknowledged that mediation is 
advantageous for both parties.  
  
My experience is mediation is an intrinsic and very desirable aspect to litigation in that it 
takes place usually when interlocutory procedures have been completed. So I think there are 
great advantages in mediation not as opposed to litigation but as a part of it, and I think that 
[it] advantage[s] both plaintiffs and defendants. (Defendant Lawyer 1) 
 
I think that mediation’s a really important step in the process and there’s a lot of advantage 
for both sides if a matter can be resolved at mediation rather than proceeding to trial. Trial’s 
costly and expensive and stressful always and those are the only certainties, for the result is 
unknown. (Plaintiff Lawyer 2)   
 
                                                 
40
 Lisa Emanuel and Michael Mills, ‘Medical Negligence, Litigation and Mediation’ (2002) 5(4) ADR 
Bulletin 1, 2. 
41
 Ibid; Paul Harpur, ‘The Financial Benefit for Insurers: Mediate in Personal Injuries Disputes’ (2004) 15(1) 
Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 70.  
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These quotes indicate that mediation can have advantages for the injured claimants, as well as 
for defendant doctors. In advocating for continued use of mediation in the resolution of 
medical disputes, all participants endorsed many of the classical attributes of mediation 
including cost, certainty, control, confidentiality and less emotional stress for the parties:  
 
I think number one, the legal costs are much less significant at mediation. And there’s a much 
less significant stress level for clients at mediation than there would be at court. (Plaintiff 
Lawyer 1) 
Speed, certainty, saving on costs, are all huge factors. The fact that [the parties] don’t have to 
generate evidence. There are some people who’ve suffered badly whose claims you just can’t 
run because they can’t generate the evidence. (Plaintiff Lawyer 11) 
 
[T]he advantages are you’ve got a certain result. I mean, if you go to court, you might win, 
you might lose, and no case is unlosable. Particularly with the added variable of the jury, 
which, you know, you just never know who’s going to be sitting in that box, and you have 
very little control over it. (Plaintiff Lawyer 8)  
 
Some participants highlighted that mediation can be particularly beneficial in reducing stress 
and managing emotions for the parties:  
 
[Mediation is preferable] in the sense that everyone gets a result. And you get the result 
without your client going through a fairly stressful situation. (Plaintiff Lawyer 5)  
 
You’re dealing with human beings, and I think the courtroom and the trial process is the worst 
possible way for the resolution of a dispute – not just because of the emotional impact on the 
individuals, but the issues are never, ever… the courtroom’s so artificial. (Court Lawyer 3)  
 
Despite so many participants citing the advantages associated with the mediation process, 
some participants qualified their responses by acknowledging that mediation operates in the 
shadow of the legal framework and advocated for the necessity of trial in the resolution of 
some matters:  
 
You can’t have mediation without having a trial system because that’s there for actually 
settling – when I say settling I mean settling by [court] order - the dispute… [M]ediation 
wouldn’t work if it didn’t have a court system in the background which is a shadow in which 
the mediation system operates because people see that if you don’t settle at a mediation it has 
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to be settled in the courtroom. And that can be unattractive for lots of people for lots of 
reasons. (Defendant Lawyer 6)  
 
In this quote, the participant is elaborating upon a rights-based negotiation approach that 
facilitates settlement of disputes in the shadow of the legal system. Macfarlane acknowledges 
that the anticipation of future litigation influences the manner in which lawyers approach 
negotiation, so their decisions regarding settlement and disclosure of information occur 
against the backdrop of a likely court outcome.42 This encompasses a rights-based position 
where lawyers prioritise the need to convince a court of the superiority of their client’s claim. 
In other words, lawyers are using the trial process and authority of judges to settle cases  by 
negotiating in the shadow of the law, but in many instances without the need for trial.43 When 
embodying a rights-based model, lawyers may become entrenched in their positions making 
it extremely difficult to resolve disputes that do not require rights-based solutions.44  
 
Macfarlane contends that a better strategy is to adopt ‘wise and transparent bargaining’ 
towards the best possible solution in the circumstances such as addressing emotional or non-
legal needs of the parties.45 Similarly, some commentators have acknowledged that 
settlement negotiations are influenced by the shadow of the law,46 while others stress that 
mediation should be seen as a dispute resolution process in its own right rather than merely a 
process of settling disputes in the shadow of expected court outcomes.47 Despite the 
acknowledgement of the necessity of trial, participants proffered colourful descriptions of the 
harrowing trial process which are set out below, indicating that trial should be reserved as a 
dispute mechanism of last resort for medical disputes.  
 
6.3.1 TRIAL IS WORSE THAN MEDIATION  
Six participants definitively asserted that the trial process is far worse than the mediation 
process in medical negligence matters. Some participants highlighted the benefits of 
mediation by contrasting it with the process of trial, describing the trial process as a 
‘traumatic’, ‘gut-wrenching’ and an ‘awful’ experience for the parties:  
                                                 
42
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[A]ny settlement of a case is a better thing to do than having the risk and trauma of running a 
trial. You know the trial’s a gut-wrenching experience for the barristers who know all about 
it, let alone for the poor parties who have to front up day after day and endure cross-
examination and watch people saying and doing things that they don’t think are right, or you 
know, it’s just terrible for them and then at the end one gets vindicated and the other doesn’t, 
so that’s horrific too. So at least with a mediation there’s the prospect of a result where 
neither one feels run into the ground. (Plaintiff Lawyer 11) 
 
Litigation is traumatic for plaintiffs as well as defendants. No one wants to be dragged 
through that. [A] lot of plaintiffs think that they would like to have their day in court but it’s 
awful. (Defendant Lawyer 2) 
 
Trials are publicised; They’re costly. They’re time consuming. I imagine they would be 
incredibly intimidating for a plaintiff and I think they all just increase the level of stress and 
anxiety of all involved. So trial really is the last option. (Defendant Lawyer 3) 
 
These quotes from participants endorse the view held by many proponents of mediation that 
litigation can be a stressful and negative experience for clients. Menkel-Meadow contends 
that the adversarial system is inadequate to meet the often complex and multi-faceted 
problems of parties in disputes.48 She is critical of the ‘limited remedial imaginations’ of 
courts and their tendency to produce binary, win-loss solutions.49 Adopting a postmodernist 
critique, Menkel-Meadow challenges the notion that there is simply one ‘truth’ or one 
accurate version of the facts. She contends that the adversarial system should be used in 
circumstances where it is most appropriate and where parties freely choose such an avenue, 
as a ‘court of last resort’.50 Further, Menkel-Meadow posits that the only way to truly reform 
the adversarial system is to ‘oppose’ it with other forms of dispute resolution processes such 
as mediation, to allow parties greater choice in how to resolve disputes.51  
 
Johnson has used a war model to illustrate the brutality of trial, asserting that parties ‘blow 
each other to bits’ and declare a victor.52 Interestingly, one participant thought that settlement 
negotiations can evoke a similar outcome where participants walk away slightly wounded. 
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Yet the participant asserted this was a positive factor because everyone involved has 
contributed to the final outcome:  
 
It’s much better to have a process in which you get together, talk about a case and make an 
agreement. And the best settlement involves everyone walking away battered, bruised and 
bloodied basically because everyone has given, everyone’s got, everyone’s compromised, but 
everyone’s agreed that they can live with the end result. (Court Lawyer 1) 
 
This participant appears focused on a battle leading to compromise, which reflects a 
preference for an evaluative style of mediation, rather than on achieving an interest-based 
negotiation that may accommodate the parties’ distinct needs. The evaluative and interest-
based styles of mediation are discussed in more detail in later sections of this chapter.  
 
6.3.2 COST IS A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE  
The primary advantage of mediation raised by the participants was cost savings. As indicated 
the majority, 23 participants, expressed the view that reducing costs was by far the biggest 
advantage in mediation because expenses affiliated with trial, such as cost of senior and 
junior counsel, medical reports and expert evidence, were reduced. Many participants 
commented on the high expense of a trial:  
 
[W]hat it does is save trial fees and they are huge really. In terms of, you know, the costs of a 
medical trial, or any trial, they’ll generally involve senior and junior counsel, they’ll involve 
at the bar table, you know, at least two solicitors assisting each party, so that’s about 
$50,000.00 a day. Costs go into hyper drive. (Court Lawyer 1) 
 
Cost. You know, the cost of the trial is outrageous. One side with a silk and junior barrister 
running in the County Court jury in the civil jurisdiction, three weeks, you’re looking at 
$200,000… You’ve got the doctors, the witnesses - once you get into the second week, your 
daily hearing fees are $1000 a day. Jury fees are the same. You know, the solicitor’s time is 
just so expensive that as many cases as you can resolve through alternate dispute resolution 
and mediation the better. (Plaintiff Lawyer 5) 
 
[Participating in mediation does] reduce the cost because sadly, you know, litigation in the 
Supreme Court probably costs a minimum of $25,000 a day and so two weeks is a quarter of a 
million dollars so there’s got to be a lot of work done by practitioners to try and save their 
clients that sort of money. (Defendant Lawyer 1) 
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I think the lawyers like [mediation] because it reduces costs, if they can resolve it… [I]t costs 
a fortune to have a trial. (Defendant Lawyer 8) 
 
If it takes more than one mediation then go for it, is my view. I mean it’s much more cost 
effective. You would never run a medical negligence matter to trial without having a QC 
involved really. That is incredibly expensive. (Defendant Lawyer 3) 
 
These findings indicate that avoiding the cost of a trial was a major incentive for practitioners 
to encourage their clients to participate in mediation. The practitioners viewed mediation as 
saving their clients enormous expenses associated with litigation. Some participants also 
acknowledged that the cost incurred in running a trial had wider repercussions for the general 
community. For instance, one participant recalled that calling a doctor to give evidence in 
court caused the cancellation of procedures on public hospital waiting lists:  
 
I had a case dealing with – a breast cancer case, a failure to diagnose, and I had - I remember 
this trial vividly – I had two experts who had to cancel two public lists each, so it’s four 
public lists [that] were cancelled for them to attend court. So the incidental cost to the 
community was enormous. The people who were waiting for surgery on public lists got it 
cancelled so these doctors could come to court. I thought there’d be outrage in the community 
if people knew of that. (Court Lawyer 3) 
 
Another participant discussed the cost to the community not only because of disruption to 
patients in the healthcare system, but also because it places a burden on court resources and 
members of the community who are called as witnesses: 
 
It’s a huge amount of time, and the cost to community is even greater, because there’s a judge 
sitting there, and there’s a jury that gets paid, but you pay transcript fees, and there’s a lot of 
dislocation. You have the doctors who are involved and the hospitals involved who have to 
have their usual routines disrupted because they’re involved in litigation, so they’ve got to go 
and sit in court, or give evidence, or whatever, so it’s a very expensive exercise, but the 
reality is, there aren’t that many of these claims that run. (Defendant Lawyer 5) 
 
6.3.3 CERTAINTY OF OUTCOME   
While cost savings were seen as the predominant advantage of participating in mediation for 
medical negligence claims, participants also stressed that certainty of outcome was achieved 
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far more easily in mediation because of the unpredictability of juries. One participant 
explained that expert evidence is highly technical and emphasised that there is no control 
over how a jury might decide facts: 
 
[T]he evidence is technical and it’s complicated, it’s heavily reliant on experts. So it’s sort of 
out of the parties’ hands in many ways as to how that expert goes and whether they’re 
believed. They may be right and the jury just decides not to accept their evidence, and there’s 
no control over that. So I think that’s another reason that mediation’s more appropriate. 
(Plaintiff Lawyer 6) 
 
Another participant agreed that juries can be unpredictable, asserting that occasionally 
members of the jury do not make decisions rationally but rather outcomes are based on how 
favourably juries perceive the parties:  
 
[Y]ou’ve got to put your trust in the judge and/or the jury; what are they thinking? Judges are 
calm I suppose and rational. Juries can sometimes, we think, and I don’t know this for a fact, 
but I can’t help feeling that sometimes it’s a bit of a popularity contest. And sometimes the 
thinking of a jury can be distant from the questions that you ask them and the facts and issues 
that you put to them… I did a case involving a young woman who I thought ‘Oh yeah she 
might succeed, she might not.’ I thought she was worth about $250,000. The jury gave her 
$1.4 million. Now why? They hated the defendant. (Court Lawyer 2)  
 
6.3.4 CONFIDENTIALITY   
Apart from costs and certainty of outcome as important advantages of mediation, 
practitioners also raised confidentiality as a significant benefit of participating in mediation, 
particularly given the reputation of doctors and hospitals is on the line. As one participant put 
it:  
I think one of the main benefits [of mediation] is [that] it provides a confidential forum for 
parties to openly ventilate the issues and try and distil some of the key parts of the dispute. I 
think particularly when you’re dealing with health professionals for example, or any sort of 
professional, you obviously need to take into account that, at the end of the day, this is their 
reputation on the line and their livelihood. I think in that respect if matters can be resolved at 
a mediation or shortly thereafter on a confidential basis, I think that’s going to probably, from 
the practitioner’s point of view as well, be a better outcome for them. (Court Lawyer 4) 
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One participant stressed that confidentiality of settlement was crucial not just for doctors, but 
also for plaintiffs who are unlikely to want private aspects of their dispute publicly aired by 
the media: 
  
[Mediation is] private and confidential so we haven’t got doctors and nurses with their faces 
in the paper or cameras chasing them down the road. The same for plaintiffs. They’re not 
exposed to the media. The whole world doesn’t know that they are suing because they say 
their child was unwanted. The media is generally always averse to hospitals’ interests but it 
likewise can be very averse to plaintiff’s interests. There is none of that. It is all confidential. 
(Defendant Lawyer 3) 
 
In total, five participants highlighted the importance of confidentiality, particularly in light of 
the role of media. In addition to protecting the privacy of the parties, one participant observed 
that keeping medical negligence out of the spotlight keeps the public’s confidence in the 
health system intact:  
 
It helps maintain public faith in the system I think as well, because the only cases that make it 
to the media are the sensational ones or the ones that grab headlines. And the ones that grab 
headlines in this context are the record verdicts, the unscrupulous behaviour of health 
institutions or health practitioners. So mediation has the benefit of keeping that out of the 
public eye, so that, because those sorts of examples really only incur the ire of the general 
public because it denudes their faith in the medical system, it denudes their faith in the legal 
system, because they think ‘My God, how can this have happened in the first place?’ or ‘How 
could that person have got so much money?’ So I think it’s good, it permits the participants to 
maintain control over their dispute, and it saves people having to air their dirty laundry. 
(Defendant Lawyer 4)  
 
The disadvantage of preserving confidentiality is the risk that medical errors will be 
concealed from the public domain. This will prevent hospitals, clinics and practitioners from 
addressing medical errors and imposing safeguards for the future. Confidential settlements 
may also prevent negligence from being uncovered by the public. Practitioners from 
Australia’s leading medical negligence law firms have recently called for a centralised 
national system to monitor healthcare complaints so that all complaints could be filtered 
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through a single system.53 They contend that while the terms of the financial settlement may 
be kept confidential, plaintiffs should not be prevented from discussing their experiences 
publicly.  
 
6.3.5 DISCUSSION 
Given the advantages of mediation have long been recognised in many legal disputes, 
combined with its frequent use in the medical negligence jurisdiction, it was unsurprising that 
the practitioners who participated in this study uniformly endorsed the use of mediation for 
medical negligence disputes. The findings indicate that the participants in this study clearly 
perceived the advantages of mediation over litigation. Insights provided by the participants 
suggest they believe medical negligence claims are conducive to resolution by mediation 
because of a saving in costs and time, and also because the approach allows party control 
over the process. Expense was a significant factor, with participants emphasising that the 
complexity of issues and length of expert evidence in medical negligence trials can lead to 
exorbitant fees.  
 
These findings are consistent with previous studies involving lawyers and mediation of 
medical negligence disputes. In a North Carolina study, 75 per cent of lawyers who were 
surveyed indicated they would support the referral of a malpractice case to mediation.54 A 
New York study using structured interviews with participants and mediators found plaintiff 
lawyers were more willing to mediate than defendant lawyers.55 In contrast, the findings of 
this research show that all 24 participants were willing to engage with the mediation process 
although this willingness may be stimulated by legislation and court practice directions.  
 
The findings of this research are similar to the findings of a Canadian empirical study of 
perceptions of legal and lay participants in personal injury disputes. In that study, Relis found 
that lawyers showed strong support for participation in voluntary mediation and, further, did 
                                                 
53
 Katherine Towers, ‘Medical negligence “shouldn’t be hidden”’, The Australian, 2 November 2015 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/health/medical-negligence-shouldnt-be-hidden/news-
story/68ed074f3bc489a3e125a15ab1799262>. 
54
 Thomas B Metzloff, Ralph A Peeples and Catherine T Harris, ‘Empirical Perspectives on Mediation and 
Malpractice’ (1997) 60(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 107, 141.  
55
 Chris Stern Hyman et al, ‘Interest-Based Mediation of Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: A Route to 
Improved Patient Safety?’ (2010) 35(5) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 797, 804-805.  
198 
 
 
not exhibit opposition to mandatory mediation.56 The participants in this doctoral research 
study also showed a similar acceptance of mediation, though they did not differentiate 
between voluntary and mandatory mediation. They highlighted the positive attributes of the 
mediation process and encouraged client participation in the process, even when mediation 
was mandated or court-connected.  
 
Previous studies and the findings of this research would indicate a growing culture of non-
adversarial legal practice and a changing legal landscape in medical negligence litigation. 
The introduction of court rules in South Australia encouraging pre-action protocols for 
resolving medical negligence claims and the use of contractual provisions in Florida to 
encourage pre-suit mediation are indicative of the necessity for such tools to encourage early 
resolution of disputes. Combined with policy shifts encouraging increased use of ADR, the 
landscape may be ripe for introduction of pre-action protocols or mandatory mediation as ‘the 
extra dose needed to cure the medical malpractice crisis’.57 
6.4 EMOTION AND MEDIATION OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE DISPUTES  
The literature review in Chapter Three of this thesis has demonstrated that emotion is a 
crucial component of dispute resolution. Parties in dispute will frequently have an emotional 
reaction to conflict, including fear and anger.58 This may be more prevalent in medical 
negligence disputes where a patient sustains harm due to their doctor’s error; the resultant 
effect is that the conflict is fueled by emotion.59 Previous studies show that addressing 
emotional needs of the parties has the ability to transform the issues in dispute.60 For 
instance, Jones suggests that emotion defines conflict, hence triggering events that cause 
conflict elicit emotion.61 Emotional intensity is linked to emotional communication, thus 
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perceptions of emotional situations may further affect conflict.62 Maise suggests that 
stimulating or tapping into emotions can assist parties to move beyond negative emotions 
such as hatred or violence.63 Therefore allowing parties to acknowledge or express emotion in 
the mediation of medical disputes may assist with conflict transformation and be a key to 
successful resolution.  
 
One of the espoused advantages of mediation in medical disputes is that the process allows an 
opportunity for the parties to obtain an explanation, to express an apology, to receive 
sympathy or to gain closure.64 However, this may not always occur in practice. In some 
instances this is because the mediation process is dominated by lawyers who sideline parties’ 
emotional needs and interests. Another issue more broadly is the development of a legal 
culture in medical negligence that does not value emotion and actively suppresses parties’ 
engagement with the mediation process.  
 
Lawyers who engage in the mediation of medical negligence disputes may sideline clients’ 
emotions to focus on financial interests, or they may simply lack the skills to engage with the 
emotional aspect of conflict. In such circumstances if lawyers dominate the mediation 
process, they may impact on a client’s ability to tell their story, express emotion or address 
non-legal issues which in turn stands as an obstacle to settlement.65 Some commentators 
contend that lawyers should encourage greater party participation in the mediation process 
and thus empower parties to gain control and self-determination in the process.66 
 
Given the increasing recognition of the role of emotion in dispute resolution, it was 
worthwhile exploring the role of emotion as a factor in medical negligence disputes and 
whether the mediation process allows for the expression of emotion. When asked ‘Are 
emotional issues a factor in mediation?’ eighteen participants indicated it was a factor, two 
did not directly answer the question, while four said the answer depended on the 
circumstances. These four practitioners elaborated that an answer depended on whether the 
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dispute was viewed from the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s perspective, the seriousness of the 
injury, and whether the dispute involved the death of a family member.  
 
6.4.1 IS EMOTION A FACTOR IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE DISPUTES? 
Eighteen participants considered that emotion was a significant aspect of medical negligence 
disputes. Consistent with the literature on the prevalence of emotion in medical negligence 
claims, one participant put the heightening of emotional issues down to a breach of trust 
between a patient and their doctor:  
 
[T]here’s no aspect of litigation in which emotional issues don’t play a big part; that’s the 
starting point, particularly if you’ve got injuries. But you can’t ignore that in medical cases 
they play an even bigger part because you start off with a relationship between a patient and a 
doctor, or a patient and an institution which is one of trust and if it’s felt that there’s a breach 
of the trust then the emotional impact of that is always very significant. So if you’re bowled 
over by someone who’s driving badly, well you’re very cross with that person but if it’s your 
best friend or someone that you trust who’s let you down completely it’s a much more 
emotional case. And in medical cases people trust their doctors, people have relationships 
with their obstetricians, people trust their hospitals and when they’re let down it plays a very 
big part in the whole process. (Court Lawyer 1)  
 
The participant distinguished between medical cases and transport cases where a plaintiff is 
injured by a negligent driver, asserting the breach of trust fuels emotion and this plays a role 
in the process of dispute resolution. One emotion that can be particularly prevalent in medical 
disputes is anger, as articulated by a participant who stated that plaintiffs are so emotionally 
invested in their claim that it seeps into their bloodstream:  
 
Is there an emotional side of it? Absolutely. And it comes in several forms. There’s just plain 
downright anger and until you can remove that from the picture you don’t get someone 
thinking rationally and they just won’t listen. Secondly people make an investment in their 
claim and it’s understandable why they’re living that claim day in [and] day out. And some 
people, unhappily, become absorbed in their litigation to such an extent that they start to 
become more disabled than they were before the claim started. In other words, it gets into 
their bloodstream. (Court Lawyer 2) 
 
Fifteen participants saw emotion as predominantly plaintiff-orientated. They thought this was 
because plaintiffs are emotionally invested in pursuing a claim, feel aggrieved that their 
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doctor has breached their trust by committing an error and must come to terms with the pain 
and suffering associated with their injury. One lawyer described emotional stressors as 
‘enormous’ for plaintiffs because of the personal significance of claims to them:  
 
In terms of the emotional stressors for mediation, it’s enormous. A plaintiff is in a position 
where they’ve never been before. They’re out of their comfort zone. They’ve got to make 
important decisions and the subject matter is very personal and critical to every aspect of their 
life and the outcome of the mediation will have a great impact on their future quality of life. 
So emotionally it’s enormous. (Plaintiff Lawyer 3) 
 
Another plaintiff lawyer explained that emotional issues are a factor for plaintiffs because 
their lives have been dramatically altered by an injury, whereas for doctors the mediation is a 
commercial operation:  
 
On the whole, emotional issues are certainly more relevant for plaintiffs than defendants. 
Defendants are always – almost always – insurance companies who are able to… you know, 
they’re experienced litigants; they’re able to bring a commercial approach to it, with some 
exceptions. And they can try to take the emotion out of it. They try and look at their bottom 
line, work out what’s going to happen in court, what’s the jury going to do,  what’s the judge 
going to do. But plaintiffs can be much harder and it can be their life; this is their one and 
only chance, their one and only case and their life can have been altered dramatically by what 
they’ve been through and it could have been extremely traumatic. They might have lost a 
loved one as part of it, it might have been the loss of a child or something like that or 
something very dramatic like that. And so those cases are difficult at mediation and emotional 
factors are harder. (Plaintiff Lawyer 10) 
 
The significance of emotion in medical negligence claims for injured plaintiffs has been 
recognised in a Canadian explorative study. In the study of 64 court-orientated medical 
malpractice mediations undertaken by Relis, plaintiffs were asked about their mediation aims. 
In their responses, all plaintiffs interviewed stated they wanted to be seen, and have their 
stories about what they had been through heard by the opposing side.67 While plaintiffs 
accepted that obtaining financial settlement was one aim, they also stressed other objectives 
such as wanting to hear the defendant’s perspective, seeking answers or explanations about 
what had occurred, or obtaining an acknowledgement of their suffering.68 Further, plaintiffs 
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were interviewed about their objectives during mediation, including needs and fears, with 
emotional factors being particularly prevalent for female disputants. Out of 11 female 
plaintiffs interviewed, 100% spoke about emotional needs in a mediation forum (versus 33% 
of 6 male plaintiffs interviewed).69 Therefore Relis’ study confirmed that emotional or 
‘human’ factors played a significant role in mediation of medical disputes.  
 
In contrast to the findings of this doctoral study where participants acknowledged the central 
role of emotion and non-legal objectives in mediation, the majority of lawyers in Relis’ study 
thought that plaintiffs sued solely or predominantly for financial reasons.70 These lawyers 
seemed to disregard many of the non-financial objectives of plaintiffs, including admission of 
fault, acknowledgment of harm, retribution for defendant conduct, prevention of 
reoccurrences, answers, and apologies.71 When asked about mediation objectives, the legal 
actors focused predominantly on monetary settlement.72 Relis concludes that resolution of 
medical malpractice disputes occurs in a parallel world, evidencing a disparity between legal 
and lay actors, with lawyers’ practices grounded in tactics and strategy while lay disputants’ 
focus is on psychological needs, feelings and emotions.73 
 
Participants in this study acknowledged that emotional issues are more significant for 
plaintiffs, because doctors rarely attend mediation. Doctors are indemnified by insurance 
companies and therefore the hospital or insurance representative participates in the 
bargaining process on doctors’ behalf:  
 
I think emotional issues are a relevant factor and [plaintiffs] find it extremely nerve-wracking. 
Doctors generally don’t. We tend to leave doctors out of it and we just have them on the 
phone if we need to. But insurers are the ones who are coming up with the money so really 
the doctor doesn’t need to participate. So doctors really don’t get any particular emotional 
connection to the mediation. (Defendant Lawyer 2)  
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Despite acknowledging significance of emotion, the lawyer’s description of the absence of 
the doctor from the mediation prevents the process achieving its fullest potential because of a 
lack of opportunity for a meaningful interaction between the parties. One participant 
identified that, in theory, both parties are present at mediation but in practice that rarely 
happens because the parties are kept in separate rooms. Therefore no opportunity materialises 
for the expression of emotion and emotional issues are not resolved:   
 
[T]hose emotional issues don’t get resolved in mediation because when you get taught about 
mediation, the plaintiff and the defendant are always in the room in that hypothetical sense. In 
the mediations in personal injury litigation that never happens, it’s always the lawyers in one 
room talking about it and then we go and talk to our client outside of it. So that tends to be the 
way. So those emotional issues don’t get addressed in the mediation room. They get 
addressed where we talk to the client and say, ‘You’ve got to look at this as a commercial 
operation.’ (Plaintiff Lawyer 5) 
 
Like defendant lawyers representing the insurer, this quote shows that even plaintiff lawyers 
view mediation as a commercial operation rather than as a forum for exploring emotional or 
psychological needs of their clients. The lack of doctors’ attendance at mediation is a 
significant obstacle preventing the exploration of non-legal or non-financial objectives. In 
Relis’ study, lawyers indicated they had little or no experience in mediation where doctors 
were present, though the few who did described the experience positively.74 The majority of 
legal participants (physician, plaintiff, hospital and mediator lawyers) offered reasons both in 
favour and against doctors’ attendance, and only a small proportion of participants were 
firmly in the ‘against’ camp.75 The reasons most frequently cited against doctors’ attendance 
were that it heightened emotions and animosity in mediation and, further that doctors do not 
instruct on the quantum of compensation so there is little practical utility in their presence.76 
Interestingly, while the lawyers in the study cited doctors’ busy work schedules as  a barrier to 
attendance, none of the lawyers interviewed by Relis raised this constraint.77  
 
When asked about reasons in favour of doctors’ attendance, the two most frequently cited 
responses of participants were that it would benefit plaintiffs (acknowledging the 
psychological and emotional aspects of the dispute) and also to encourage settlement, though 
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participants also acknowledged it could benefit doctors to learn from their error or lead to 
improvement in the quality of healthcare.78 The minority of plaintiff lawyers (25%) who were 
in the solely pro-attendance camp acknowledged that doctors’ attendance could assist with 
plaintiffs’ non-legal needs, including the benefit of an emotional confrontation or an 
explanation from the doctor.79 Relis concludes that for the lawyers mediation was a forum 
centred on strategy, negotiation, and settlement. In other words, it was a forum where ‘money 
talk’ played out, so lawyers generally perceived their clients’ attendance as either assisting or 
hindering the achievement of this settlement goal.80  
 
Participants in this doctoral study saw emotion as interfering with decision-making, with one 
plaintiff lawyer stating that occasionally mediation is halted to prevent a plaintiff making an 
emotionally-fuelled decision: 
 
Emotional issues, I could only guess from the defendants’ perspective and I wouldn’t like to, 
but from the plaintiff’s point of view sometimes, I think that the enormity of it becomes 
overwhelming and sometimes we have to cut mediation short because we’re concerned that 
there’s so much information for them to take on and the emotion of that becomes so much 
that they’re not – they may not make the right decision for their case. (Plaintiff Lawyer 2)  
 
This focus on the quantum and the customary use of shuttle mediation where parties are kept 
in separate rooms suggests that the participants are using an evaluative or settlement model of 
mediation. In an evaluative model or style of mediation, the aim is to reach a settlement that 
accords with external norms and principles,81 such as the legal principles that would dictate 
the outcome in court proceedings. In facilitative mediation the focus is on the interests of the 
parties,82 while in a settlement model the focus is on the quantum of money that forms the 
settlement.83 Parties will gradually shift from their initial positions until they either reach an 
agreement or fail to settle at all, but ultimately the goal of this model is to reach settlement.84  
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The model that the participants in this study have adopted resembles the evaluative or 
settlement model of mediation, because it precludes dialogue and negotiation about non-legal 
interests and constrains the conversation around the sum of money the insurer defendant is 
willing to pay. Using an evaluative or settlement style of mediation in medical negligence 
engenders potentially negative implications around the inability to use mediation to its fullest 
capacity, including the inability to meet the non-financial needs of the parties which can 
ultimately affect future doctor/patient relations.  
 
While the majority of participants saw emotion as a factor for plaintiffs, one practitioner who 
had previously acted for medical practitioners recalled a phone call where the emotional 
impact on the doctor was apparent:  
 
I had a doctor call once – he was a military doctor. A young cadet had just killed themselves 
and he was the last person to see them. At the end of the phone call, I just said to this 
particular doctor, ‘Do you have someone to talk to?’ and he said, ‘Oh, I'm fine.’ I said, ‘No, 
no, that wasn’t my question.’ I said, ‘Do you have someone to talk to because I suspect this is 
really stressful for you and I just want to make sure you’re okay.’ And he, sort of, went, 
‘Yeah’. He called me the next day and actually said, ‘I wanted to thank you,’ he said. ‘You 
caught me off guard asking me if I was okay, because as doctors, nobody ever asks us if 
we’re okay, we always ask if they’re okay.’ So the emotional side of it is enormous in 
medical negligence. It’s enormous. (Court Lawyer 3) 
 
This quote acknowledges the considerable emotional impact medical error can have on 
defendant doctors. In Relis’ study, physicians were asked their views on attending mediation. 
While they found the mediation of disputes stressful or upsetting, all 12 physicians were 
willing to participate in mediation, particularly as it allowed them to explain their story.85 The 
physicians viewed their presence at mediation as important in order to facilitate ‘real’ 
mediation, one with human interaction and an opportunity for parties to ‘feel better’.86 The 
doctors’ responses indicated their focus was also on addressing emotional and psychological 
needs, as well as having an opportunity to explain their perspective.87 While doctors and 
plaintiffs were on opposite sides of the dispute, their emotional needs in mediation were quite 
similar and in direct contrast to lawyers’ commercial or rights-based positions.88 
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The majority of participants in this research saw emotion as a significant factor in medical 
negligence disputes. Many thought plaintiffs were ‘heavily emotionally involved’ and the 
experience was often ‘extremely traumatic’. Breach of trust by a doctor or a hospital was seen 
as a substantial factor driving emotion. The significance of these findings is that the majority 
of practitioners acknowledged the existence of emotion in medical negligence disputes, rather 
than ignoring it. Therefore it was important to explore whether the practitioners were 
allowing or encouraging the expression of emotion in mediation, sidelining emotion or 
discouraging it altogether.  
 
6.4.2 DOES MEDIATION ALLOW FOR EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION?  
Recognising the role of emotion in mediation of medical negligence disputes and allowing 
disputants to express emotion can assist with the transformation of conflict. Expression of 
emotion can also be an effective tool in prompting the negotiation to move forward. Jones 
and Bodtker acknowledge the importance of emotion in mediation practice and contend that 
to fully understand the nature of conflict, mediators must attend to the emotional triggers of 
disputants in recognising or defining conflict.89 However, Ryan observes that lawyers have an 
inherent distrust of emotion and are quick to close channels of emotional communication, 
even in circumstances where it might genuinely assist with negotiation.90  
 
Mediation literature suggests that healthcare disputes are filled with emotion and the 
participants in this research confirmed that emotion is indeed a significant factor in such 
disputes. Mediation may be a beneficial process for allowing parties to confront one another 
and to express emotion, particularly in personal injury or family disputes. Therefore it was 
crucial to explore whether this occurs in the medical jurisdiction.  
 
When asked ‘Does mediation help with the expression of emotion?’ twenty participants said 
it does not. One participant did not directly respond to this question and two stated that it 
depended whether the dispute is viewed from the perspective of plaintiffs or defendants. Only 
one participant thought that mediation assisted parties to express their emotion, though the 
participant was a former in-house counsel so perhaps limited in the practical experience of 
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the other participants. Despite their view that mediation did not assist with the expression of 
emotion, nine participants highlighted the role of apologies in medical disputes, stating that 
an apology is of ‘great assistance and provides closure to plaintiffs’ and in past disputes ‘the 
most important [outcome] to the plaintiff was an apology from the hospital’.  
 
In answering whether the mediation process assists parties to express their emotions, an 
overwhelming majority asserted that parties do not get to express their emotions because they 
do not actively participate in the process:  
 
[It] doesn’t really happen. Usually in these cases, personal injury cases across the board, [a] 
plaintiff will attend a mediation but won’t participate in the joint session. (Defendant Lawyer 
4) 
 
No, because they don’t participate in the actual process. They participate in the sense they’re 
cooped up in a room and their barrister goes backwards and forwards, ‘So we’ve got some 
more money,’ or ‘We haven’t got enough for any more,’ as the case may be, and we’re 
talking about plaintiffs because there’s nothing very emotional from the defendant’s 
viewpoint. (Defendant Lawyer 7) 
 
Another participant contrasted mediation of medical negligence claims with mediation of 
family disputes, as well as with the process of conciliation frequently used in workplace 
accident claims, and said the process in medical negligence radically differs:  
 
It’s not a mediation like a Family Court mediation. It’s shuttle mediation. It’s not conciliation. 
It’s lawyers talking across a table and going and sitting in a room with their client so it’s not a 
particularly emotional thing. (Defendant Lawyer 2) 
 
The participant described mediation as ‘shuttle mediation’ which means parties are kept in 
separate rooms and the mediator moves between the rooms to meet the parties, therefore this 
process affords no real opportunity for the parties to meet face-to-face. There are various 
reasons to use shuttle mediation including where there is a need to protect the physical and 
emotional safety of parties, to allow expression of strong emotions by one party without the 
other party being present, or to allow private discourse with the mediator rather than the 
opposing party in order to avoid blame or other emotional reactions.91 Shuttle mediation is 
                                                 
91
 Mieke Brandon, ‘Use and Abuse of Private Session and Shuttle in Mediation and Conciliat ion’ (2005) 
8(3) ADR Bulletin 41, 44. 
208 
 
 
necessary in circumstances where the parties are physically located remotely from one 
another, or to keep parties apart for safety reasons where there is a court order or 
apprehended violence order, as well as in international mediations where there is a need to 
preserve diplomacy.92 While the shuttle mediation style can be beneficial in some specific 
circumstances, the lack of interaction between the parties more generally reduces the efficacy 
of the mediation process. The emphasis is placed on the mediator who becomes responsible 
for communication between the parties, with risks of misreporting facts or dealing with 
parties’ unresolved emotional issues.93 
 
 Boulle and Field contend that shuttle mediation is a manifestation of adversarial legal 
culture. They suggest mediators frequently resort to this style of mediation following opening 
statements and that this style is supported by lawyers who perceive that joint sessions could 
weaken their client’s case.94 This ‘fallback’ use of the shuttle mediation style cannot be 
justified in all legal settings and should arguably be reserved for circumstances where it is 
genuinely necessary to counteract distance, or preserve safety or diplomacy.95 
 
Lawyers may perceive that allowing their clients to express emotion shows weakness or risks 
revealing information that may give rise to a tactical advantage should the matter be litigated 
at trial. Many of the participants in this study who thought the mediation process does not 
allow for the expression of emotion explained the lack of opportunity was because the 
plaintiff is not physically present in the negotiation room for primarily ‘tactical’ or ‘strategic’ 
reasons:  
 
So the first thing is that in almost all the mediations I’ve been engaged with, the plaintiff 
doesn’t enter the room with the other side. They don’t get an opportunity – mostly for tactical 
reasons – to explain their version of events or to express their hurt, their dissatisfaction 
directly to the lawyers or to the insurers. So that’s the first point. Secondly, almost all these 
matters are resolved with a denial of liability and with confidentiality. So how much 
satisfaction can the person get that there’s a recognition of what’s gone wrong and why, when 
those factors are at play, and then they don’t have the opportunity to say their piece. (Plaintiff 
Lawyer 2)  
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The participant explained that plaintiffs do not get an opportunity to describe their version of 
events or express their feelings as they are prevented from speaking for tactical reasons. The 
participants’ responses indicated that this was due to an apprehension that the plaintiff may 
inadvertently disclose material harmful to their case. A practitioner stated that defendant 
lawyers do not have access to the plaintiff during the mediation because they have been 
instructed by their lawyers not to say anything, and this defendant lawyer agreed with the 
approach taken by opposing colleagues:  
 
The plaintiffs themselves don’t tend to come into the joint session and we don’t have access 
to them usually in the mediation process. We know they’re sitting in another room giving 
instructions but that’s the extent of it. Those that have sat in on a mediation don’t tend to say 
anything because they’ve quite rightly been told by their lawyers not to say anything. 
(Defendant Lawyer 3)  
 
A plaintiff lawyer described that keeping plaintiffs away from the defendant and their lawyer 
is ‘strategic’ because if the mediation is unsuccessful, the plaintiff’s lawyers want to save 
ammunition for trial: 
 
Typically, we do keep the plaintiff away from the defendants so they don’t get to go in a 
room. Typically, the doctor who’s at fault or the hospital doesn’t come to the mediation; it’s 
their insurer. Rarely do they come. Typically, the plaintiff is also kept out of the mediation 
room and doesn’t even hear the presentation and that’s for emotional reasons, often, because 
of what I’ve already just said about them being emotional. But it’s also strategic, because you 
don’t want to give the defendant any kind of forensic [advantage] – you want to maintain all 
your forensic advantage as a plaintiff and you don’t want the defendant to see the plaintiff or 
know what the plaintiff’s like until the plaintiff gets in the witness box. So I’m not sure the 
plaintiff always gets to express their emotions to the extent they might like to at mediations. 
(Plaintiff Lawyer 10) 
 
Anger is an emotion that is particularly prevalent in the context of medical negligence 
disputes, especially where plaintiffs feel aggrieved that a doctor has broken the trust in the 
doctor-patient relationship by committing an error that has led to a devastating injury. One 
participant was firm in the response that mediation offers no real opportunity for closure:  
 
Because the reasons a person may have come to see the lawyer in the first place might have 
been loss of trust in their longstanding doctor which might be a breakdown of, you know, a 
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relationship you had a for a long time or being really angry or upset by what’s happened and 
the mediation process does not address that at all … Emotional opportunities – there’s no real 
opportunity there. No one gets closure in the end. (Plaintiff Lawyer 4) 
 
Scholars have recognised that in addition to anger another emotion that can arise in conflict is 
fear.96 One participant raised the notion of fear, stating lawyers usually have to reassure 
plaintiffs they do not have to confront their doctor at mediation: 
 
In terms of confronting the doctor I normally have to reassure them that they won’t have to 
confront the doctor and that they’ll be in a breakout room on their own and the people that 
they will engage with on the day is limited. (Plaintiff Lawyer 3) 
 
This indicates that there are some benefits to keeping the parties separate at mediation, 
because it may protect a vulnerable party. In contrast, some participants indicated that they 
had experienced mediations where the parties confronted each other and were able to express 
emotion, which led to a positive result:  
 
[There were] a couple of mediations where the plaintiffs were present and they certainly had 
an opportunity and did utilise that opportunity to speak about their injuries and the matter. 
And I think that in those circumstances that was probably a positive thing for them and for the 
rest of the parties to hear as well. But for the most part generally the clients were not there. 
(Court Lawyer 4) 
 
The findings with respect to emotion mirror the findings in Relis’ study where the legal 
actors focused predominantly on using mediation as a settlement or bargaining arena, 
seemingly disregarding parties’ non-legal objectives.97 Relis contends that lawyers are rights-
orientated and their training leads them to focus on financial issues. She holds the civil justice 
system responsible for ‘conditioning’ lawyers to avoid human needs, instead focusing 
predominantly on financial aspects of disputes.98  
 
Riskin and Welsh highlight that one of the great promises of mediation is attention to the 
underlying interests of parties,99 yet this is often compromised by the mediation procedures 
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adopted by ‘repeat players’, namely lawyers, mediators and insurance representatives who 
have repeated contact with the legal system.100 Using rational or legal approaches, lawyers 
can adopt procedures in mediation that overly confine the issues in dispute so that attention to 
underlying interests such as psychological or emotional needs of the parties are excluded.101 
Therefore, the focus on litigation can result in disputants missing out on a vital opportunity to 
use a dispute resolution process that suits their needs.102 Using a case example of parents with 
a disabled child caused by negligence of a hospital, they assert that the repeat players in that 
case largely ignored psychological and relational interests (termed personal ‘core’ issues). 103 
Mediations were structured to focus on concerns of the lawyers (rules and standards), thus 
sidelining emotions and non-legal needs of the parties.104  
 
Riskin and Welsh contend that ‘problem definition’ is significant in the resolution of 
disputes, because repeat players tend to impose a narrow definition in mediation and thus 
limit the opportunity for discussion of other non-legal issues.105 To overcome this, they 
emphasise the need to make problem definition an explicit process so as to adopt an 
appropriate problem definition in dispute resolution.106 They propose adoption of court rules 
directing mediation programs specifically for lawyers and mediators with a view to mapping 
and setting questions in pre-mediation sessions to assist with problem definition.107 Further, 
they advocate for ‘customized mediation’ designed to fit the needs of the specific parties 
rather than simply use a process that focuses on standard litigation issues.108  
 
6.4.3 AN ‘ADAPTED’ MEDIATION MODEL 
The participants in this study acknowledged the significant role of emotion in medical 
negligence disputes, yet the style of mediation used by these participants precludes emotional 
expression. Participants’ responses indicated that the mediation model used in medical 
negligence disputes strays from the purely facilitative model taught in mediation training. 
Instead, the ‘adapted’ model is heavily influenced by the shadow of the law so that during 
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mediation focus is on achieving settlement according to parties’ legal entitlements. Parties are 
kept out of the mediation room hence their participation is limited. One participant 
acknowledged that mediation of personal injuries in Victoria differs to the theoretical process 
based on interest-based negotiation taught in training courses: 
 
In Melbourne or in Victoria, the personal injuries mediations don’t follow the model that the 
courses train you in. We’ve adapted our own. And that is, we very rarely would have a 
plaintiff present during the joint decision, it’s an exceptional thing. But usually the doctors 
aren’t present. If it’s a hospital involved, you’ll frequently get a representative from the 
hospital. And you’ll also have a representative of the insurer for either the doctors or the 
hospital. But the plaintiff doesn’t take any part. So they don’t get a chance to unload if they 
want to. (Plaintiff Lawyer 7) 
 
Interestingly, this participant explained that legal practitioners in the medical negligence 
jurisdiction have adapted their own model of mediation, so that plaintiffs are not present 
during settlement discussions and do not take an active role in the negotiations. Even if the 
plaintiff wanted to confront the doctor, that opportunity is limited because a hospital or 
insurance representative frequently attends on behalf of the hospital or doctor. Therefore, no 
opportunity for emotional confrontation is afforded to plaintiffs. Perhaps the unique 
characteristics of medical negligence disputes lend itself to a tailor-made mediation model.  
 
Medical negligence disputes involve a complex highly-specialised intersection of law and 
medicine, mediation of which occurs in the shadow of the law. These disputes often involve 
an inequality of power between a doctor or hospital who is well-resourced and a plaintiff who 
might have limited involvement with the legal system. Critically, medical negligence disputes 
frequently involve severe physical or psychiatric injury, permanent disability or even death so 
plaintiffs are emotionally invested in their claim. Lawyers may play a critical role in 
protecting their clients by shielding them from further emotional stress, but by restricting 
client participation in mediation the core feature of mediation, party self-determination, is 
compromised.  
 
The participants’ quote above also hints at the development of a subculture amongst 
Melbourne’s medical negligence practitioners, who have devised their own processes or ‘way 
of doing things’ which places lawyers at the forefront of disputes and sidelines direct 
participation by disputants. Macfarlane refers to the existence of a ‘local legal culture’ 
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amongst lawyers where communities of lawyers develop their own norms and values.109 Thus 
membership in a practice group, such as in the area of personal injury, directly contributes to 
lawyers’ identity and professional development,110 and can also have an impact on the level 
of cooperation, adversarialism and degrees of formality evidenced in dispute resolution.111 
Macfarlane also asserts that lawyers are influenced by their clients, so that when faced with 
constantly emotional or angry clients, lawyers might adopt community strategies to blunt that 
emotional impact.112 In the medical negligence context, where disputes are often fuelled by 
heightened emotions, it is unsurprising that lawyers within the community have adopted a 
unique practice to respond to the characteristics of their clientele. This ‘adapted’ model used 
in Victorian medical negligence disputes requires further empirical investigation, but at its 
core undeniably resembles an evaluative or settlement style of mediation.  
 
6.4.4 THE ROLE OF APOLOGY IN MEDIATION  
Apologies following medical error can have critical significance in medical negligence 
disputes, as individuals are more likely to pursue a legal cause of action against a doctor in 
circumstances where they have not received an explanation, an apology or some admission of 
wrongdoing.113 In other words, the absence of an apology can have a direct influence on 
whether plaintiffs pursue a legal cause of action, particularly where they feel aggrieved 
following medical error and an apology is not forthcoming. The participants in this study 
acknowledged that emotion was a significant factor in medical negligence disputes, and one 
key avenue of addressing parties’ emotional needs is through the use of an apology.  
 
The importance of an apology has become increasingly prevalent in negligence claims 
following the introduction of provisions into the Wrongs Act stipulating that an apology does 
not equate to an admission of liability.114 More recently, the Victorian Government’s Access 
to Justice Review report advocated for further expansion of the role of apologies as a 
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meaningful way to offer redress and reduce litigation.115 In NSW similar provisions relating 
to apologies are far more expansive given in that jurisdiction an ‘apology’ includes an 
admission of fault, rather than merely an expression of regret. Further, in NSW the apology 
cannot subsequently be admitted into legal proceedings as evidence of fault or liability.116  
 
Participants in this study were not directly asked about apologies, yet nine participants 
discussed apologies and emphasised their importance in medical negligence claims. Some 
participants indicated that an apology can prevent litigation because in many circumstances a 
plaintiff is actually seeking an explanation, apology or expression of regret rather than 
damages: 
 
We often find that people are very aggrieved by the attitude of the doctors afterwards and 
there’s a real problem, I think, with a lot of doctors with communication and not wanting to 
deal with the consequences of their mistake and being honest about that. And I can’t tell you 
how many of our clients would say, ‘If he had come and explained to me what happened and 
apologised, I wouldn’t bother with this.’ (Plaintiff Lawyer 6) 
Carroll contends that as a legal remedy, apologies can address the psychological needs of the 
parties and might redress the plaintiff’s loss better than an award of damages.117 While the 
participants thought the mediation process did not assist with the expression of emotion, 
some thought an apology was beneficial in offering emotional closure:  
 
Where I have seen the mediation process assist with the plaintiff’s emotions is when 
following the joint session, the hospital representative might say, ‘I would like to make a 
personal apology to the plaintiffs,’ and so then we’ll go and meet with them in their room and 
the hospital representative will convey an apology and I’ve seen that be of great assistance 
and provide closure to plaintiffs in some cases, but again it’s a rare occurrence. (Defendant 
Lawyer 3)  
 
Another participant’s quote elucidated the devastation that can be felt by plaintiffs who not 
only experience a breach of trust when their doctor commits a medical error, but can feel 
abandonment when they do not receive an apology for the error:  
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In terms of the apology, yes absolutely. It is enormous and right from the beginning of getting 
a call from a new client the issue is ‘This has happened to me’, a sense of outrage, and ‘I 
don’t want it to happen to anyone else’. Medical cases in particular are emotional because 
people have such a faith in their doctor that they’ll be looked after and when that doesn’t 
happen the disappointment is enormous and the issue of getting a ‘sorry’ particularly in 
circumstances where the doctor has no doubt been told not to talk to them or to make any 
admissions for fear of voiding their insurance [policy]. Plaintiffs take that as they’ve just been 
abandoned by somebody who they thought cared about them and getting an apology is an 
important healing part, you know, and quite apart from the compensation to have a ‘sorry’ 
often is a main outcome. (Plaintiff Lawyer 3) 
 
The quote also highlights the problems with the Victorian legislative provisions, where 
defendant doctors or hospitals may avoid apologising for fear of voiding their insurance 
policy. Another participant affirmed this and explained insurance companies are frequently 
reluctant to offer an apology, so plaintiffs should be encouraged to accept a financial offer of 
settlement as an admission of wrongdoing: 
 
[O]ccasionally, our clients will say, ‘As part of this I want an acknowledgement or an 
apology,’ and in even less cases they’ll actually do it. It’s pretty rare, but occasionally it’s 
happened. Settlements at mediation always come with a denial liability, and it’s rare that the 
plaintiff gets any closure in terms of getting an acknowledgement, verbally, written, otherwise 
of what’s happened to them. The insurers are very, I think, quite opposed to that; and it’s, 
yeah, it's not something that comes up. So generally it’s us saying, ‘Well, the 
acknowledgement is the fact that they’re willing to pay such a large amount of money and 
they wouldn’t be doing that unless they thought they’d done something wrong.’ (Plaintiff 
Lawyer 6) 
 
The findings of this study indicate that apologies are a crucial part of the dispute resolution 
process, with nine out of 24 participants emphasising the significance of apologies following 
medical negligence. Further, participants thought that apologies may be particularly helpful 
in allowing plaintiffs to gain closure. Researchers have conducted an Australian qualitative 
study into the role that apologies and explanations play in medical negligence. Twenty-three 
individuals who were involved in adverse healthcare events were interviewed and the 
findings showed that open disclosure, apologies and offers of tangible support to the 
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aggrieved person were crucial in attaining complainant satisfaction.118 In a US study of 
mediations of law suits brought against New York hospitals, researchers found that apologies 
were offered in 25% of the mediations studied.119 Significantly, the apologies were not 
delivered by physicians but by defendant lawyers, with the hospital representative or insurer 
echoing the apology. Direct apologies from physicians would have been difficult given that 
25 plaintiffs (out of 31 cases) attended the mediation but not a single physician attended.120 
The researchers concluded that the absence of the medical practitioners at mediation deprived 
the plaintiff of the opportunity for healing, understanding, forgiveness and repair of a broken 
relationship.121 
 
Vines contends that in order to be effective, an apology must include an acknowledgement of 
wrongfulness and responsibility, not simply acknowledgement that harm occurred.122 She 
distinguishes between a ‘full apology’ involving acknowledgement of fault, and a ‘partial 
apology’ consisting simply of an expression of regret.123 Vines contends that apologies occur 
in the context of moral communities within which civil norms exist, so that when an 
acknowledgement of fault occurs, the process validates the social norm that has been violated 
by the defendant.124 Consistent with the corrective justice approach adopted in this thesis, 
Vines contends that apologies operate within the parameters of corrective justice because 
they allow the wrongdoer to restore the equilibrium between the parties.125 Vines supports the 
approach used in NSW and contends their legislation is the most effective path to reducing 
litigation.126 Further, commentators have acknowledged that the law plays a vital role in 
encouraging dispute resolution, and that mediation is an ideal forum to facilitate authentic 
and meaningful apologies.127  
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Given the recent emphasis on apologies placed in the Victorian Access to Justice report, 
increased use of apologies in mediation of medical negligence disputes may assist to give 
greater procedural satisfaction to the parties by offering emotional closure and 
simultaneously reduce plaintiffs’ desire to pursue litigation. Nine participants in this study 
stressed the crucial role an apology can have in medical negligence disputes in allowing 
claimants’ non-legal needs to be met. Consistent with Vines’ views and recent endorsement 
of apologies in the Access to Justice report, use of a full apology with an acknowledgement 
of fault in medical negligence can assist to effect corrective justice between the parties in 
mediation, without the case having to reach trial. The participants in this study acknowledged 
that emotion is a factor in medical negligence disputes, particularly for plaintiffs, therefore 
apologies are arguably a key mechanism that should be used to assist the parties to gain 
emotional closure. Most importantly, apologies can restore the equilibrium between the 
parties and give effect to corrective justice at a much earlier stage of dispute resolution.  
6.5 THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN MEDIATION OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 
DISPUTES  
The role of lawyers in non-adversarial dispute resolution is increasingly being researched to 
ascertain lawyers’ attitudes and practices in these contexts.128 The way in which lawyers 
construct their role can influence the process and success of settlement.129 Direct participation 
in the mediation process by non-legal actors has been recognised as giving effect to intrinsic 
values of mediation such as self-determination and empowerment.130 Field describes self-
determination as ‘the key fundamental element of mediation, particularly in terms of 
validating the process as a legitimate alternative to litigation.’131 Self-determination lies at the 
core of mediation practice, and regardless of the level of involvement of the mediator, it is the 
parties who should ultimately remain responsible for consensually reaching an outcome.132 
Yet giving effect to values such as self-determination can be compromised in court-connected 
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mediation processes, which are frequently dominated by lawyers who prevent their clients 
from speaking or expressing emotion. Unlike disputes involving close relationships, such as 
family law or estate matters, direct participation by parties in mediation is not as common in 
tort and commercial disputes.133 One of the reasons that lawyers dominate the process is to 
preserve their legitimacy as translators of the legal system and to maintain control of the 
dispute resolution process.134 By empowering their clients through familiarity with the 
process, lawyers reduce the mystery of the legal system and diminish their legitimacy.135  
 
Against the backdrop of increasing use of court-connected mediation to resolve civil disputes 
and the discussion of how lawyers can best contribute to mediation in the literature, it was 
pertinent to explore how lawyers in medical negligence disputes interact with their clients. 
Participants were asked how they saw the role of lawyers in mediation of medical negligence 
disputes, including the role of solicitors, barristers and mediators. Participants’ responses 
indicated a high level of lawyer involvement and control of the mediation process. None of 
the lawyers allowed their client to have free rein during negotiations. In many responses, the 
participants described their role as ‘legal advisor’, seeing their purpose as informing their 
clients on the merits of their case. Some participants described their role as a ‘translator’ of 
the legal system advising on the realistic parameters of settlement, while others saw their role 
as ‘protector’, shielding their clients from the stressful and emotional impact of dispute 
resolution.  
 
When asked to reflect on their role in mediation, seven participants stressed that ‘proper 
preparation’ was a necessary aspect of their role, in order to make the mediation process 
meaningful and maximise the opportunity of settlement:  
 
As a lawyer, I feel like my role is really to prepare the case for the mediation as best as I can 
and give it the best opportunity to resolve. (Plaintiff Lawyer 2) 
My role is to make sure that I can attend fully prepared so that it’s not a waste of anyone’s 
time or money because they are expensive, they are time consuming and you have to 
acknowledge that there are plaintiffs who would be, you know, really building up to that 
experience… I think it’s imperative that you only agree to a mediation when you know you 
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can make it a meaningful process. I refuse to participate in a mediation I think is going to be 
futile. It’s not good for my clients, it’s not good for the plaintiffs. (Defendant Lawyer 3)  
 
One of the seven participants highlighted the importance of proper preparation in the medical 
jurisdiction which often involves technical medical terminology and complex evidence. This 
participant also explained that the art of persuasion is necessary in mediation of medical 
claims:  
 
[T]he primary role is to advance the case in a compelling and persuasive manner. I don’t just rock 
up… Some people rock up to mediations and just say, ‘We want 500 grand; what are you going to 
do about it?’ In medical malpractice, that really doesn’t wash and people expect detail and they 
like to be persuaded, and I think the mediation open session, if you can put forward a compelling 
argument and the insurer is sitting in the room on the other side of the table, that can have an 
impact. (Plaintiff Lawyer 10) 
 
Managing the client was also raised as an important aspect of a lawyer’s role, consistent with 
literature asserting that for many lawyers, management of their client’s expectations 
constitutes competent lawyering:136  
 
[O]n the day of the mediation itself, during the mediation I really see my role mostly as 
managing the client ensuring that I’m getting their instructions, that they’re feeling calm and 
in control about the process. (Plaintiff Lawyer 2) 
 
 So cases always involve parties identifying really what they need. Often they come to a 
lawyer in a medical case looking for answers because they don’t understand what happened 
and they want an explanation. They’re not interested in damages. But then what happens is 
when they start to get the explanation they get a bit angry about the fact that it’s never been 
made clear to them, and they’ve had to go through all this to find it out, and they’re told that 
compensation is not designed to punish it’s designed to restore them and that’s their right. So 
it opens their thought process to compensation and then, you know, managing that process in 
the sense of explaining to them that the compensation that you get invariably is inadequate 
because money making up for injury and pain – the two don’t work very well together. So all 
of that requires management and a lot of input. So it’s a huge process. (Court Lawyer 1) 
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When asked how they perceived their role at mediation, another participant offered the 
following response:  
 
The master of fine detail. The organiser. The eye of the storm. [Laughs]. I mean, pick a 
cliché. You’ve got teenagers in grown up barrister bodies frantically panicking about this that 
and the other and you’re the one who’s got to stay calm, keep your client in control, keep the 
family in check and keep the barrister on point. Keep the mediator on side and keep the other 
side at a distance. (Plaintiff Lawyer 4) 
 
These quotes show that the participants considered proper preparation as a key component of 
their role in mediation. However, another theme that emerged was an emphasis on ‘client 
control’, with the participants indicating that client management was a necessary task to be 
performed. The participants viewed themselves as experts in the legal field intent on 
dominating the mediation process with their legal expertise. They thought client control was 
necessary in order to restrain their client’s emotions which might be perceived to be a 
weakness if they disclosed information detrimental to the case outcome.  
 
6.5.1 SPECTRUM OF LAWYERS’ INVOLVEMENT  
In addition to proper preparation and client control, it was also necessary to explore the extent 
of lawyer involvement in the mediation process itself. When asked about the lawyer’s role in 
mediation, participants also provided responses about the extent of their involvement in 
mediation. While the participants were not expressly asked to address styles of mediation, 
their responses nevertheless gave an indication of the ‘adapted’ style of mediation that has 
developed in the Victorian medical negligence jurisdiction.  
 
Olivia Rundle has created a five-category spectrum of lawyers’ level of involvement in 
mediation.137 One end of the spectrum represents less involvement and a lawyer can be either 
an ‘absent advisor’138 who advises on substantive and procedural merits of the case but does 
not attend mediation or an ‘advisor observer’139 who attends mediation to provide support 
and advice but will not interact with the other party or the mediator. In the centre of the 
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spectrum is the ‘expert contributor’140 who participates in mediation by providing their client 
with legal advice during the mediation. The other end of the spectrum represents more 
involvement by a ‘supportive professional participant’141 who can negotiate on behalf of the 
client and reality test the workability of settlement. Finally, the ‘spokesperson’142 is a lawyer 
who speaks for their client, negotiates for their client and provides legal advice but the client 
remains silent. 
 
Echoing some of the characteristics of the expert contributor lawyer, one participant 
identified the need to construct an argument in mediation and emphasised the importance of 
persuasion:  
 
As counsel for a plaintiff, you’ve got to construct an argument. You’ve got to have them 
condensed down but constructed so that’s easily appreciated and the other side understand 
exactly how you’re putting your case. You’ve got to draw on the bits of evidence that support 
you and ignore the ones that don’t. [Y]ou’ve got to present a scenario for a defendant that 
they can see that it’s a persuasive argument that can be made to the court and a jury might go 
for it. (Plaintiff Lawyer 7)  
The participant’s response indicates the role of the lawyer is potentially far more adversarial 
than the expert contributor lawyer. Here, the participant has constructed a case that can 
persuade the opposing party’s lawyer of the likely successful outcome should the matter 
proceed to court. This approach fits with a lawyer’s role in the evaluative style of mediation 
with a focus on advocacy and persuasion. 
 
In contrast to Rundle’s assertion that the spectrum of issues is determined by the parties 
themselves,143 the participants in this study highlighted that part of the lawyer’s role is 
working out the needs and interests of their clients:  
 
Trying to work out what the client really wants and then providing the client with the advice 
that’s appropriate, and seeking to get a match between what the client really wants and what’s 
achievable. (Plaintiff Lawyer 11) 
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In the above quote, the participant explains their role of reality testing the client’s 
expectations. In contrast, a different participant spoke about the lawyer’s role in formulating 
the thinking of their client and using their expertise to reality test the settlement:   
 
So the lawyers have an incredibly important role in formulating the thinking of their client, 
getting their client to sort of look down the slot, making the client understand well look there 
are ranges and damages, that whole sort of picture which is terribly important to paint. And if 
they’ve got the confidence of the client and if they use that confidence correctly, they can say, 
‘Listen, you know, look here are your risks, you’ve now been offered half a million dollars, 
your risks are now greater because the prospect is you might get a bit more but you might get 
a bit less, you’re in that grey area, you’re now at a greater risk’. Now if you’ve got the client’s 
confidence the client can say, ‘Yeah okay, I understand what’s going on. What do you think I 
should do?’ ‘I think you should settle.’ 
 
The participant’s quote reflects a distributive type of negotiation (otherwise known as zero-
sum negotiation) rather than an interest based negotiation. In a distributive negotiation the 
parties hold opposing positions, and every gain by one party is equal to the other’s loss.144 
Distributive negotiation is diametrically opposed to integrative negotiation which emphasises 
the parties’ interests.145 In interest-based negotiations, the parties are focused on exploring 
and satisfying their interests, rather than positions.146 By outlining the ‘zone of possible 
agreement’ affiliated with distributive negotiation,147 the participant is indicating the 
parameters of settlement which shifts the focus from interests to positions.  
 
Rundle asserts that in medical negligence cases it is helpful for lawyers to adopt an expert 
contributor role, because in these cases legal analysis of liability is important, as are the non-
legal needs of clients.148 In cases where a plaintiff is seeking an apology or a change in 
hospital procedure, Rundle suggests it is more appropriate that the plaintiff conduct the 
negotiations with the doctor or the hospital representative.149 However, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter, the participants in this study strongly discouraged their clients from participating 
in mediation for tactical reasons. This practice is reflected in a quote from a barrister:  
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I tell people when I’m acting for plaintiffs that they are welcome if they wish to participate 
fully in the mediation but I would discourage that because the other side are likely to talk 
more frankly in their absence… It’s the role of the lawyers to encourage a resolution of the 
matter and to make sure the client fully understands each step of the process along the way. 
(Defendant Lawyer 1) 
Discouraging or preventing clients from speaking at mediation is reflective of the 
‘spokesperson’ lawyer who dominates the negotiation process. The client is a mere observer, 
who receives legal advice and provides instructions to the lawyer outside of the mediation 
session.150 This is consistent with the ‘shuttle-style’ approach described by the participants as 
being used in medical negligence mediations where parties are kept in separate rooms while 
the lawyers negotiate before a mediator. For instance, one participant stressed that mediation 
reflects the adversarial environment found in court where the lawyer’s role is to achieve the 
best possible financial result for their client:  
 
[E]ach [lawyer] has to represent their side and it’s still an adversarial situation where the 
plaintiff’s counsel is duty bound to get as much as he reasonably can for his client and the 
defendant’s objective is to get out for as little as he possibly can… But we don’t like emotion 
because it blurs the judgment, and I know people say it’s good to let air out of the balloon and 
all the rest of it but that’s not our job, our job is to talk money, and there’s nothing very 
emotional about that. (Defendant Lawyer 7) 
 
Here the participant explained that from his perspective, emotion can interfere with the ability 
to achieve a suitable settlement. The participants in this study frequently saw their role as 
getting the ‘right figure’ of compensation for their client or advancing their client’s case:  
 
[T]he job of the legal advisors is to put their client’s case as best as it can be put, and to 
acknowledge the difficulties, and accentuate and emphasise the strengths. (Defendant Lawyer 
6)  
 
It’s really to try and maximise the outcome for your client. We go in there, try to convince the 
defendant why they should be paying a compensation sum, and then that’s really a question of 
them trying to – if we think that’s reasonable, then trying to convince our client if they don’t 
think it’s reasonable. Or sometimes you get the scenario where the client says, ‘I just want to 
grab the money and run,’ and we have to say, ‘Look, just hold onto your horses, there’s got to 
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be some more there.’ So I suppose your role is just to try and maximise the best outcome. 
(Plaintiff Lawyer 5) 
 
When discussing their role at mediation, many participants spoke about achieving the ‘best 
outcome’ for their client in reference to fiscal objectives, reflecting that the parameters of 
negotiation occur within the shadow of the law:  
 
My duty is to do the best I can for the client. And what I say to [clients] is also, you know, 
‘What we want to do is to leave here today understanding what’s the last dollar they’re 
prepared to pay.’ You know, we don’t want to send them home without money in their 
pockets, you know. We might take their money, we might not, but what we want to do is get 
to the point where we know, ‘This is the most they’re prepared to pay.’ (Plaintiff Lawyer 8) 
The above three quotes indicate that the lawyers in this study sidelined emotion in order to 
focus on achieving the ‘right figure’ or the ‘best outcome’ for their client. This indicates that 
the shadow of the law impacts upon the focus of mediation, turning the focus into a legal 
rights-based one, rather than heeding the non-legal needs of the parties. The participants 
voiced a preference to focus on quantitative financial objectives, upholding their client’s legal 
rights and attaining a settlement that they deem to be the best financial outcome for their 
client. The participants are sidelining non-quantitative and non-legal interests such as the 
capacity for the plaintiffs to have their story heard, to receive an acknowledgement of their 
injury and suffering, or to receive an apology from the medical practitioner. For defendants, 
there is also a missed opportunity to learn about the impact of their error or to explore 
changes in medical procedure. These quotes indicate medical negligence lawyers are 
adopting an evaluative mediation style, using a shuttle procedure to conduct the mediation. 
The participants showed empathy and care for their clients, but this translated into a goal of 
achieving a desirable financial settlement on behalf of their client.  
 
When lawyers dominate the mediation process and thereby exclude direct disputant 
participation, such an approach can compromise parties’ self-determination in reaching a 
settlement. Confirming Menkel-Meadow’s concerns about lawyers colonising ADR,151 the 
findings of this study indicate that lawyers in the Victorian medical negligence practice group 
are sidelining their clients’ involvement in mediation in favour of rights-based settlement 
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goals. By transferring adversarialism into the mediation room, lawyers risk robbing their 
clients of the ability to express themselves and pursue non-legal or non-financial objectives. 
This approach is consistent with an evaluative rather than a facili tative mediation style, and 
closely mirrors the traditional adversarial role of a lawyer in litigation.152 However, it may 
also be argued that the lawyers have shaped the mediation of medical negligence disputes 
into a unique process that assists rather than hinders the parties. Rundle contends that lawyers 
have significant influence in shaping how the dispute resolution process is conducted, as well 
as influencing their clients’ needs and expectations from dispute resolution.153 Alternatively, 
rather than perceiving the Victorian medical negligence lawyers as having colonised 
mediation, their adaptation of a model that fits this niche practice area may be viewed as 
practical and effective. 
 
The participants’ responses indicated that the majority of the roles adopted by lawyers at 
mediation were that of ‘spokesperson’. The ‘spokesperson’ lawyer is highly interventionist, 
and this may be appropriate in circumstances where there is a power imbalance between the 
parties, or where direct participation may expose the more vulnerable party to 
disadvantage.154 Rundle contends that in such circumstances a highly interventionist 
approach may assist in rebalancing the parties and ensuring the mediation proceeds fairly.155 
This approach can be particularly valuable to medical negligence claimants, likely 
inexperienced one-shot players, when opposed to repeat players in the form of insurance 
representatives and their lawyers. Two participants explained that taking on the spokesperson 
role at mediation was akin to acting as protector of their clients:   
 
I suppose our role is to protect our clients. And that means a variety of things, I suppose. It 
means making sure that the settlement is a reasonable one, but it also means giving them very 
clear advice as to when the risks of proceeding and the potential outcomes outweigh the 
potential benefits. (Plaintiff Lawyer 6)  
 
[F]rom the plaintiff’s perspective, the lawyers create for the client a protection, because the 
client goes into a mediation with a barrister, with a solicitor, with a big fat file and everyone’s 
sort of well-armed, and the client feels comfortable in that environment because he or she is 
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being protected, represented, and has confidence built and if that happens, the client’s going 
to listen. (Court Lawyer 2)  
 
Lawyers acting as a ‘spokesperson’ may be beneficial in circumstances where there is a 
breakdown of an existing relationship, such as between a doctor and patient, and also where 
the client is suffering from a psychological disorder.156 Therefore in mental harm claims the 
client may benefit from having a spokesperson lawyer to shield them from emotional stress.  
However, by dominating the mediation process lawyers may deprive clients from a valuable 
opportunity to address emotional and psychological aspects of the dispute.  
 
Non-adversarial justice approaches encompass the role of emotion in legal problems and 
advocate for resolution techniques that address the psychological aspects of disputes.157 For 
instance, the therapeutic jurisprudence movement advocates for legal professionals to 
recognise and incorporate emotions in problem-solving.158 In the medical negligence context, 
emotions can frequently be fuelled by painful injuries or a breach of trust with a doctor, so 
addressing emotion can be crucial in reaching a resolution. It may also be valuable for parties 
to be able to tell their side of the dispute in mediation as it provides the experience of 
procedural justice for court users. Procedural justice theory argues that giving parties voice, 
courtesy and respect in a court process can assist with the acceptance of court outcomes.159 
This may be particularly true in medical negligence disputes as these disputes can be 
emotional due to claimants often wishing for an explanation of the negligence and potentially 
an apology.  
 
Similarly, restorative justice recognises that harmful behaviour can have a negative impact on 
psychological or emotional wellbeing, so it promotes emotional healing through dialogue 
between the offender and victim.160 While restorative justice derives from the criminal justice 
system and primarily applies in victim-offender contexts, restorative practices can also be 
used in civil disputes.161 For instance, restorative justice approaches can address the harm 
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created by medical negligence, and hold the negligent parties accountable. The findings of 
this study thus indicate that mediation is potentially not being used to its fullest extent to 
address parties’ emotional needs and suggest that practices akin to restorative justice 
conferencing may offer a more suitable process to cater to parties’ emotional and 
psychological needs. 
 
6.5.2 DISCUSSION   
Analysis of the data indicates the participants in this research tended to dominate the 
mediation process, with the parties frequently absent from negotiations. This is supported by 
empirical research which has frequently found that lawyers have a tendency to restrict cli ent 
engagement, limit discussion to legal issues and only involve clients in decision-making 
when it is absolutely necessary.162 The focus of the lawyers in this study was on achieving the 
best outcome for their client but this was constrained to quantum rather than encompassing 
what their client actually wanted. A focus on quantitative objectives meant that non-financial 
objectives were removed from the equation and non-legal objectives of the parties such as a 
desire for an explanation or an apology were sidelined.  
 
This finding is consistent with a Canadian empirical study of legal and lay actors in personal 
injury disputes, which found that parties’ objectives in mediation are on emotional, 
psychological and extra-legal needs whereas the lawyers’ focus was on strategy, tactics and 
financial objectives.163 Relis argues that the findings of her study highlight important 
contradictions in legal policy and initiatives in the resolution of civil disputes, because the 
system is not serving disputants’ needs.164  
 
The approach taken by lawyers in this study was consistent with the findings of a different 
study of mediation use in the County and Supreme Court in Victoria, which found that 
mediation was conducted in a manner preferred by lawyers, as opposed to their clients.165 
Further, the study found shuttle negotiations were most common with minimal party 
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engagement.166 These findings are consistent with the evaluative mediation style adopted by 
participants who adopted a shuttle procedural method of conducting mediation. In contrast, 
one research study involving interviews with medical negligence claimants reported that the 
degree to which clients want involvement in their claims can vary, with none of the 
participants stating they wanted more control of the claim and many who were content to 
delegate that responsibility to their lawyer.167 However, most claimants in that study did 
report they initiated legal action for non-legal outcomes, such as an explanation or an 
apology, a fact that was not fully appreciated by lawyers who focused predominantly on 
financial outcomes.168 
 
The participants in this study favoured an evaluative, rights-based style of mediation or 
settlement approach and used advocacy skills to persuade the opposing party of the likely 
success of the case should the matter proceed to trial. Despite the tendency to adopt a 
‘spokesperson’ role at mediation,169 the participants did not embody an adversarial culture. 
Rather, the participants exhibited a cooperative settlement culture in the medical negligence 
context.170  
 
The lawyers in this study were repeat players who were highly-experienced,171 had adapted 
their own mediation style to suit this niche jurisdiction and potentially their own preference to 
control negotiations in mediation. The participants had created a separate culture that was 
tailor made for the medical negligence context, with lawyers handling complex cases and 
managing clients fraught with emotion. The lawyers interviewed were highly-skilled and 
deeply concerned for their clients. They valued protecting their client from further harm, but 
that protection meant that lawyers colonised the mediation process and prevented their clients 
from expressing emotion. The mediation tended to focus on achieving the best financial 
outcome for the client, because lawyers viewed that as the primary remedy to help their 
client. Consequently they missed out on the opportunity to explore non-quantitative and non-
legal interests of the parties.  
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Analysis of the data indicates that lawyers largely colonised mediation as a vehicle for 
bargaining to achieve a desirable settlement,172 but by doing so they may have neglected 
significant benefits offered by the early promise of mediation, particularly the element of 
self-determination. Yet, it could also be said that the lawyers have arguably shaped the 
mediation process in this niche jurisdiction to a process that is best suited in the medical 
negligence context.173 Crucially, the process of court-connected mediation in medical 
negligence, doctors’ reluctance to attend mediation, and insurance representatives’ 
domination of the process to focus on financial objectives all make it difficult to alter the 
styles of mediation that have been adapted.  
 
The lawyers practising in medical negligence showed a strong ethic of care, which Relis 
acknowledges is an important aspect of legal practice.174 Kimberlee Kovach has advocated 
for a shift in lawyers’ responsibilities to incorporate an ‘ethic of care’ which focuses more on 
human needs rather than legal rights and duties.175 Kovach stresses the importance of legal 
education towards non-adversarial practice for lawyers working in mediation and contends 
that, ‘if mediation is to survive as a formidable, unique process with the characteristics 
remaining that have made it a process resulting in party satisfaction, then practices and 
procedures with regard to lawyers’ conduct in the mediation process must change, 
commencing with legal education.’176  
 
Julie Macfarlane contends that legal education is an important site for reforming lawyers’ 
professional identity, especially in assisting a cultural shift towards non-adversarial 
practice.177 While the participants’ responses did not suggest legal education as a site for 
reform, analysis of the data about lawyers’ roles in mediation highlights the  importance of 
educating lawyers about the benefits of ADR, both in law school and through continuing 
legal education. This may assist lawyers to recognise the importance of party self-
determination in mediation and facilitate expression of emotion by parties in medical 
negligence disputes.  
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 Menkel-Meadow, above n 151, 34-35. 
173
 Rundle, above n 153, 14. 
174
 Relis, above n 56, 242.  
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 See also Kimberlee K Kovach, ‘New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for 
Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation’ (2001) 28(April) 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 935, 966-967.  
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6.6 CONCLUSION   
The findings relating to mediation indicate a range of important implications for mediation 
theory and practice, including the extent of engagement with the process and the role that 
lawyers play in mediation, particularly with respect to lawyers acting as gatekeepers of their 
clients’ emotions. Participants in this study showed a high level of engagement with 
mediation for resolution of medical negligence disputes which was undoubtedly assisted by 
legislative endorsement and court practice directions. The participants endorsed the classical 
attributes of mediation, including cost savings, speed and less emotional stress for their client.  
 
Despite the majority of participants acknowledging that emotion was a significant factor for 
plaintiffs in the resolution of medical negligence disputes, parties were prevented from 
expressing emotion in the mediation process. Lawyers tended to dominate the mediation 
process and tended to transfer the adversarial culture from the court room to mediation. The 
focus tended to be on legal rights and financial objectives, with limited opportunities for 
apologies and expression of emotion. These findings relate to broader themes, including 
adversarialism and the culture of lawyers. With the advent of legislation and case 
management tools targeted at promoting greater use of ADR in dispute resolution, it may be 
timely to consider introduction of pre-action protocols in medical negligence. Further, the use 
of legal education can assist to foster a cultural shift in lawyers to the less adversarial 
spectrum. Evidently, the findings suggest there may still be a long road to travel before 
emotion will form part of the discourse of mediation in court-connected contexts.  
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the research findings and consider the two central 
research questions of this doctoral study, which concern the challenges in litigation and 
mediation of medical negligence and mental harm claims in a post-Ipp era. Following a brief 
introduction, this chapter begins by presenting an overview of findings, then summarises 
those findings from the qualitative interviews undertaken and outlines the significance and 
the contributions of this research to medical negligence practice. Next, the discussion section 
outlines the potential for policy reform, both nationally and internationally, emanating from 
the findings of this study, and advocates strategies which could be adopted to effect reform. 
This is followed by an outline of the research limitations and recommendations for future 
research.  
  
The ultimate objective of this research was to encourage policy reform to remove the barriers 
to compensation in meritorious claims, and to explore the operation of mediation in this 
practice context. Specifically, the two research questions were (1) Have the 2002-2003 
amendments to the Wrongs Act resulting from the Ipp Reforms had any effect on the 
litigation and mediation of meritorious medical negligence claims? and (2) What impact are 
the 2015 amendments to the Wrongs Act likely to have on the litigation and mediation of 
medical negligence disputes? This research has captured insights from tort practitioners to 
better understand how legal processes and dispute resolution procedures operate in Victorian 
medical negligence and mental harm claims, and to highlight the challenges and 
shortcomings of these processes.  
 
As indicated earlier in this thesis, the research approach adopted a qualitative methodology to 
gather the experiences of senior tort lawyers, barristers, and judicial officers in Victoria, 
specific to medical negligence reforms and the use of mediation in such processes. Despite 
many scholarly writings that critiqued the impact of the Ipp Reforms, this research represents 
the first study undertaking an exploration of the perceptions of legal actors in the Victorian 
medical negligence context. As the first study of its kind, this research is unique in that it 
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gathers the perceptions, and offers the perspectives of practitioners and judicial officers 
practising in the field. 
 
The literature on medical negligence and mediation practice, together with theories of 
corrective justice and economic efficiency, were used as a lens to analyse the data for this 
research. Whilst data was gathered in Victoria, the findings are valuable in informing other 
Australian jurisdictions that have adopted similar or identical statutory restrictions stemming 
from the Ipp Reforms. The findings from this research study into mediation practice of 
medical negligence have the potential to inform the reform and practice in other Australian 
states, as well as in international jurisdictions.  
 
The first part of this thesis, in Chapters Two and Five, focused on the challenges in litigating 
medical negligence claims. The most significant research finding from the study was an 
underlying theme of unfairness in the resolution of medical negligence disputes. A majority 
of participants highlighted that satisfying permanent injury thresholds for plaintiffs was the 
most significant challenge experienced by lawyers in medical negligence disputes, followed 
by restrictions imposed by caps on damages, and the restrictive test of causation. Unfairness 
was a dominant theme in the data relating to mental harm claims, as participants discussed 
their perception that the law discriminated between physical and psychiatric injuries by 
imposing higher barriers for the latter.  
 
The majority of participants stressed that satisfying the causation test presented as a hurdle to 
plaintiffs. Some practitioners qualified this commentary by explaining that the test for 
causation is inherently difficult to satisfy for any negligence claim, and this difficulty does 
not emanate solely from the Ipp Reforms. The majority of research participants expressed a 
view that the 2015 reforms are likely to have some positive impact on the ability of plaintiffs 
to recover compensation, although participants acknowledged that the full nature and extent 
of that impact is difficult to determine so soon after the reforms.  
 
When discussing their perceptions of litigation trends and compensation payments before and 
after the Ipp Reforms, most participants stated that they perceived the number of litigants was 
lower, as many claims that would have been viable prior to the introduction of injury 
thresholds were no longer sustainable. This is because plaintiffs with injuries that do not meet 
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the physical or psychiatric injury thresholds are excluded from claiming compensation for 
non-economic loss, therefore claims solely for non-economic loss that are unlikely to meet 
the threshold are simply not pursued.  
 
Participants’ responses were divided on the issue of whether, in their experience, the reforms 
have resulted in changes to the compensation payments received by plaintiffs. Participants 
were unable to comment with certainty on an increase or decrease in payments for all 
Victorian claimants without relying on empirical data, but their responses were based on their 
experiences attaining compensation on behalf of their clients. The participants perceived that 
claimants who would have previously been able to attain compensation prior to the 
introduction of the thresholds were now unable to attain any compensation. The participants 
perceived that claimants who met the thresholds were receiving higher compensation, 
particularly in light of the 2015 increase to the non-economic loss damages cap. While the 
practitioners’ responses are helpful in offering an insight into their perception of litigation 
trends, an obvious limitation of the qualitative responses is that it does not provide objective 
empirical data based in fact. 
 
Analysis of the interview data showed that the participants considered that significant injury 
thresholds, caps on non-economic loss damages and the principle of causation presented as 
unfair barriers to plaintiffs’ ability to attain compensation for meritorious claims. Research 
participants perceived the current regulatory framework as excessively restrictive, which 
adversely impacted injured plaintiffs, engendering unfairness and discrimination. This 
finding supports the need to explore alternative avenues for regulating entitlement to personal 
injury damages, including: amending significant injury thresholds; changing caps on damages 
and causation; or alternatively adopting a ‘no-fault’ compensation scheme, like those 
currently used in foreign jurisdictions, such as New Zealand.   
 
The second part of this thesis, in Chapters Three and Six, focused on mediation practice in 
medical negligence. The focus of the study was on court-connected mediation, rather than 
dispute resolution mechanisms used by hospitals following medical error. The use of court-
connected mediation to assist dispute resolution was endorsed by all research participants, 
who stated that mediation was speedier, offered confidentiality and less emotional stress, 
promised more certainty of an outcome, and was less expensive than trial. All participants 
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described their experiences of participating in mediation processes, either due to its 
compulsory, court-ordered nature, or because it was an ingrained dispute resolution process 
in their professional culture. The nature of the ‘role of the lawyer’ emerged as an important 
theme from the research, as the data indicated that practitioners in this field tend to dominate 
the mediation process on behalf of their client, often acting as an ‘advocate’ or ‘translator’. 
Participant responses indicated that lawyers tended to control the mediation process. None of 
the participant lawyers allowed their clients to have ‘free rein’ during negotiations, meaning 
they were reluctant to allow clients to have freedom of expression in mediation. Many 
participants described acting as an ‘advocate’ for their client, by presenting strong arguments 
to convince the opposing side of the merits of the plaintiff case. Some participants described 
their role as a ‘translator’ of the legal system, offering advice about realistic parameters for 
the settlement of claims.  
 
The dominance of lawyers at mediation was shown to affect the mediation style and 
procedures used. Participants recorded use of an ‘evaluative’ rights-based mediation style that 
focused on legal rights and financial objectives, without including attention to the non-legal 
and non-financial objectives of the parties. Emotion in mediation emerged as another 
important theme, with the majority stating it was a factor in the mediation of medical 
negligence disputes, yet the expression of emotion was only permitted in limited 
circumstances. Participants indicated that ‘shuttle’ mediation was the preferred procedure for 
conducting mediation, where parties were kept in separate rooms, whilst the mediator moved 
between them. This finding suggests that lawyers may not be using mediation to its fullest 
potential to allow parties to explore issues including emotional and non-legal objectives, such 
as the need for an explanation, or an expression of regret or apology for the harm caused to 
them.  
 
Further, the mediation culture of Victorian medical negligence lawyers favours an evaluative 
style which prevents the non-legal and non-financial interests of the parties being met. Whilst 
responses from medical negligence lawyers demonstrated that they value mediation, the 
findings of this study show that their actions in dominating the process meant that the ability 
of parties to fully maximise the benefits of mediation were curtailed. The potential for parties 
to tell their story of the dispute, and to be given a voice in the process was discouraged by the 
lawyers due to the fear that parties may inadvertently harm their own claim. This also meant 
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that parties were not given the opportunity within the conflict resolution process to achieve a 
level of emotional dialogue which may enhance the potential for closure. Practitioner 
participants adopted a style of mediation that favoured advocacy and persuasion. Prioritising 
the pursuit of monetary objectives diminished the opportunity for procedural justice through 
‘party-voice’ and ‘self-determination’ during mediation. This finding supports the need to 
explore whether change in legal education, where a focus on valuing the emotional and non-
legal needs of the parties during the mediation process, has the potential to shift the culture of 
lawyers and enhance their role in the mediation of medical negligence disputes. 
7.2 THRESHOLDS, CAPS AND THE TEST FOR CAUSATION ARE RESTRICTIVE 
FOR PLAINTIFFS  
The first research question explored whether amendments to the Wrongs Act, resulting from 
the Ipp Reforms, influenced the litigation and mediation of meritorious medical negligence 
claims. To address this, practitioner participants were asked about the challenges they 
experienced in managing medical negligence and mental harm claims. As discussed in 
Chapter Five of this thesis, the findings indicate that thresholds, caps on damages, and the test 
for causation presented barriers to successful recovery of compensation by injured plaintiffs. 
Participants were asked an open question regarding the challenges faced by claimants in 
medical negligence claims, followed by the same question with regard to mental harm claims. 
The participants were able to list more than one challenge faced by claimants. Fifteen lawyers 
reported that significant injury impairment thresholds were the predominant challenge in 
medical negligence claims. Nine of the participants considered that thresholds were the 
principal challenge in mental harm claims.  
 
Unfairness emerged as a recurrent theme. Many participants described harrowing 
circumstances where plaintiffs with a significant injury could not satisfy minimum permanent 
injury thresholds to qualify for compensation. When describing the thresholds, participants 
frequently used the word ‘unfair’ to describe the consequences of the current framework. 
Although some participants did not expressly use the word ‘unfair’, the theme of unfairness 
emerged. Explanations for this unfairness included discussion of the disparity between 
significant injury percentages for physical harm (more than 5 per cent) and psychological 
harm (10 per cent or more) demonstrating a divide in how the law treats different injuries in 
the legal system. Several participants believed this divergence represented discrimination by 
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the law between physical and psychological injury, which is a view echoed by leading 
academics.1 Research participants indicated that unfairness emerged in the caps on non-
economic loss damages that impact upon non-working parents, children and the elderly who 
could not claim for economic loss because they could not demonstrate ‘loss of earnings’. As a 
result, these claimants relied on damages for non-economic loss, which includes pain and 
suffering, and loss of amenity, however the monetary ceiling for this category is restrictive.  
 
When asked about continuing challenges following the Ipp Reforms, six participants 
responded that the statutory test of causation was complex and unnecessarily restrictive. 
These six participants cited numerous reasons to explain this, including the complexity of 
satisfying this element of negligence when proving negligence; combined with the lack of 
clarity in interpretation and application of the statutory test. Participants were subsequently 
asked, ‘In your view, does the element of causation present as a hurdle to plaintiffs 
succeeding in a negligence case?’ Eighteen participants expressed the view that it does, 
stating that establishment of causation was the ‘largest hurdle’, a ‘massive hurdle’ or the 
‘biggest issue’ in medical negligence proceedings. Participants elaborated that difficulties 
arose when plaintiffs needed to establish their injury was significantly worse due to a direct 
causal correlation with their doctor’s breach of duty. For example, where there is lack of 
treatment, incorrect treatment or failure to diagnose a terminal illness such as cancer, 
establishing the causal link can be difficult.  
 
Many participants compared medical negligence cases to the schemes addressing workplace 
injuries or transport accidents, and suggested that these compensation schemes offered an 
easier mechanism for claimants to recover compensation. These findings show that under the 
fault-based common law system currently operating in Victoria, hurdles such as causation 
and significant injury thresholds pose substantial barriers to a plaintiffs’ ability to recover 
compensation.  
 
Participants were also asked to reflect upon their perceptions about the changes in the number 
of litigants commencing medical negligence disputes, as well as the compensation payments 
received after the Ipp Reforms. Participants’ responses reflected their perceptions and were 
not informed by empirical data. For instance, participant commentary about the lower number 
                                                 
1
 Christine Forster and Jeni Engel, ‘Reinforcing Historic Distinctions Between Mental and Physical Injury: 
The Impact of the Civil Liability Reforms’ (2012) 19(3) Journal of Law and Medicine 593. 
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of plaintiffs commencing medical negligence claims was based on their observations of the 
number of new clients attending initial consultations with lawyers.2 Thirteen participants 
perceived the number of litigants pursuing medical negligence claims as lower, and they 
attributed this change to the imposition of the significant injury thresholds introduced in the 
wave of the Ipp Reforms. However, practitioners qualified their statements by stating that 
litigation itself is complex and expensive. Regardless of the presence of thresholds and caps 
on damages for medical negligence claims, both before and after the Ipp Reforms, the 
practitioners perceived that there would always be claims that were not worth pursuing 
because these claims were not financially viable.  
 
When asked whether they perceived compensation payments received by litigants was lower 
or higher after the Ipp Reforms, 10 participants stated that they had not observed a noticeable 
difference, despite the introduction of caps on damages. Six participants thought litigants 
were receiving higher sums of compensation because low quantum claims were no longer 
being pursued in courts. Four participants perceived that compensation payments were now 
lower. Ten participants did not observe a difference, whilst the remaining four participants 
were unable to comment without empirical data. When asked the same question about mental 
harm claims, notably 12 out of 24 participants thought that the thresholds and caps introduced 
by the Ipp Reforms had adversely affected the compensation in mental harm claims, 
attributing this to the law’s scepticism regarding psychiatric claims.  
 
In view of the 2015 amendments to the Wrongs Act, particularly the increase to the caps on 
damages, and a lowering of the psychiatric and spinal injury thresholds, participants were 
questioned about whether the subsequent reforms would affect the ability of plaintiffs to 
recover compensation. Seven participants stated that the reforms were minimal, and unlikely 
to have a substantial impact. When discussing the increase in the upper ceiling for non-
economic loss damages, participants explained that only a small proportion of the injuries 
(such as cerebral palsy or quadriplegia claims) would likely merit the maximum award. In 
their opinion, the amendment would have little practical significance to the majority of claims 
classified as within the ‘mid-range’ of the compensation spectrum. Eleven participants 
perceived that the reforms would have a substantial impact, and attributed this to the decrease 
in the thresholds. Participants explained that the decrease from ‘more than 5 per cent’ to ‘5 
                                                 
2
 Such as clients who had sustained an injury, but could not pursue a claim as they did not satisfy the 
threshold. 
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per cent or more’ for spinal injuries and ‘more than 10 per cent’ to ‘10 per cent or more’ for 
psychiatric injuries would likely permit many more claimants to qualify as eligible to recover 
compensation. The recent nature of the reforms means that their impact cannot be fully 
captured currently. It is envisaged that over time, the 2015 reforms will present a rich site for 
further empirical study.  
 
7.2.1 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS  
The findings outlined in Chapter Five of this thesis are significant, because they demonstrate 
that the effects of the restrictive Ipp Reforms continue to impact upon claimants who are 
dependent on compensation. The rigid nature of the thresholds, and their assessment per the 
AMA Guides and the GEPIC tool fail to adequately consider qualitative evidence of the 
impact of an injury on a person’s life. Victims of medical negligence who are dependent on 
non-economic loss damages are restricted in the sums of money they can receive even if they 
satisfy the thresholds.  
 
Data analysis in this thesis pertaining to thresholds, caps and the test for causation was 
conducted through the lens of corrective justice theory, which imposes an obligation on the 
wrongdoer to repair the harm caused to the victim.3 In tort law, corrective justice theory 
requires a negligent person to repair an injured person’s loss through compensation. 
Contemporary academics support the use of corrective justice theory to explicate the 
foundations of negligence law.4 In contrast, distributive justice focuses on the equal 
distribution of resources across a community so that benefits and burdens are equally 
dispersed.5 The principle of causation conforms to corrective justice theory, by providing that 
claimants are only able to recover losses from a defendant wrongdoer who is responsible for 
the loss, and who caused that loss.6 Alternatively, economic efficiency theory centres on the 
economic welfare of the community by minimising costs.7 Economic efficiency theory has 
been discussed in Chapter One of this thesis as the theoretical model underpinning the 
reasons for the Ipp Reforms.  
                                                 
3
 Jules L Coleman, The Practice of Principle (Oxford University Press, 2001) 32. 
4
 Gemma Turton, Evidential Uncertainty in Causation (Hart Publishing, 2016) 6; Sharon Erbacher, 
Negligence and Illegality (Hart Publishing, 2017).   
5
 Danuta Mendelson, The New Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2014) 313. 
6
 Alan Schwartz, ‘Causation in Private Tort Law: A Comment on Kelman’ (1987) 63 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 639, 639.  
7
 Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (Yale University Press, 1970). 
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In the context of causation, liability does not fix onto a ‘single causal attribution’, but draws 
from a plethora of social, moral, political and economic considerations.8 Danuta Mendelson 
maintains that the Australian judiciary has tended to apply principles of economic efficiency 
in case law, whereas the reforms to the Wrongs Act have been influenced by corrective justice 
theory.9 Mendelson explains economic efficiency theory as being akin to distributive justice, 
by allowing judges to impose liability on defendants even when the plaintiff cannot satisfy 
causation, as the theory considers that the wrongdoer should be held responsible.10 In 
contrast, corrective justice theory requires the court to apply legal principles pertaining to 
breach of duty and causation, requiring the court to undertake a comprehensive factual 
analysis to reach a decision.11  
 
A fault-based tort system that requires plaintiffs to satisfy the elements of negligence to 
pursue a cause of action to attain damages, is consistent with corrective justice theory.  This 
requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that a medical practitioner acted negligently, thus fault is 
attributed to justify the imposition of liability.12 The findings of this doctoral study indicate 
that the current system of tort regulation does not give effect to corrective justice principles 
between the parties, as the combined effect of the statutory principle of causation, significant 
injury thresholds, and caps on damages are too restrictive. Therefore, the law cannot 
accommodate corrective justice principles between the parties because wrongdoers are not 
required to restore the harm suffered by the victim. In many circumstances in medical 
negligence claimants are unfairly denied access to compensation, thus preventing restoration 
of the equilibrium between the parties.13  
 
The 2015 reforms were an acknowledgement by the Victorian government that the 
compensation system in Victoria was flawed as a result of the restrictions imposed through 
the Ipp Reforms. These recent reforms reflect positive action taken by the legislature to 
reduce barriers in obtaining medical negligence compensation. The responses of the 
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9
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 Georgina Richardson and Grant Gillett, ‘Justice, Restoration and Redress: Error, No-Fault and Tort-Based 
Systems’ (2016) 23 Journal of Law and Medicine 785, 786-787.  
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participants demonstrated a desire for further refinement of existing laws. When questioned 
about further reform, most participants cited the removal of impediments to a plaintiff being 
able to sue in instances of negligent treatment, particularly the removal of permanent injury 
thresholds, as needing amendment. Many participants cited problems with the statutory test 
of causation, and the caps on non-economic loss damages, as the cause for limiting access to 
damages. Multiple participants emphasised that the claims process under the statutory work 
injury and transport accident injury schemes were simpler mechanisms, enabling victims to 
attain compensation. The data shows two opportunities for future reform:  
 
(1) Amending aspects of the existing system including lowering the minimum 
significant thresholds, increasing caps on damages, amending the statutory 
causation test, and adopting the narrative test; and 
(2) Replacing the common law fault system with a no-fault system such as the 
scheme operating in New Zealand.  
 
7.2.2 REFORM 1 – AMEND THE EXISTING FAULT-BASED SYSTEM 
The simplest and most cost-effective avenue for reform would be retaining the fault-based 
tort system presently operating in Victoria, and reducing restrictions through further 
legislative amendments to the Wrongs Act. Research participants perceived that the injury 
thresholds were the primary hurdle preventing claimants from recovering compensation in 
meritorious medical negligence and mental harm claims, as thresholds were the most 
common challenge cited by the participants. To succeed, claimants must have sustained a 
degree of impairment of the whole person resulting from the injury, which needs to be 
assessed by a medical practitioner as meeting the threshold level.14 The prescribed threshold 
level under the Wrongs Act means impairment of ‘10 per cent or more’ for psychiatric injury, 
impairment of ‘5 per cent or more’ for spinal injury and impairment of ‘more than 5 per cent’ 
for all other physical injuries.15  
 
Chu characterises the imposition of significant injury thresholds as ‘unethical’ and the ‘most 
controversial’ of the legislative changes affecting personal injury damages.16 Mullany 
                                                 
14
 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28LF.  
15
 Ibid s 28LB.  
16
 John Chu, ‘Analysis and Evaluation of Victorian Reform in General Damages for Personal Injury under 
the Tort of Negligence’ (2007) 10(2) Deakin Law Review 125, 156.  
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contends that the thresholds and caps are ‘arbitrary and artificial’ and unsubstantiated by 
legal reasoning, manifesting in a mesh of principles devoid of any clarity.17 Criticisms that 
the current right to compensation is determined upon an arbitrary figure are warranted, 
because assessment of an injury under the present legislative framework is predominantly 
quantitative and does not consider the impact of an injury on a claimant’s life. Whilst each 
chapter of the AMA Guides addresses ‘pain’ as a component of injury, chapter 15 of the 
AMA Guides, which deals with ‘chronic pain’ is excluded.18 Lastly, the thresholds do not 
consider the personal circumstances of claimants, such as the extreme significance of a loss 
of a finger by a pianist,19 which would attract minimal compensation, despite having a drastic 
impact on the victim.  
 
Mullany elaborates that thresholds do not remove the cost of injury from the community, but 
shift costs to the injured person, and therefore to the community more generally.20 From an 
economic efficiency theory perspective, thresholds do not reduce the costs of accidents to 
society. Restricting the compensation paid to claimants, forces injured members of the 
community to bear the cost of the injury, or seek alternative avenues of funding to support 
themselves whilst unable to continue working, which typically mean depending on social 
welfare payments for income or relying on the public health system to fund medical 
treatment.  
 
The introduction of thresholds in 2002-2003 has been described as eroding common law 
rights, as injured claimants cannot recover compensation for non-economic loss without 
meeting minimum thresholds.21 King asserts that the thresholds breach human rights,22 
particularly the right to the protection of the law without discrimination.23 This is evident 
where individuals, who are unable to seek economic loss damages, become reliant on non-
economic loss damages (such as non-working parents, children and the elderly). The present 
system unfairly denies compensation to claimants who have legitimate injuries but cannot 
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 Nicholas J Mullany, ‘Tort Reform and the Damages Dilemma’ (2002) 25(3) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 876, 878.  
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 Martha McCluskey, ‘Rhetoric of Risk and the Redistribution of Social Insurance’ in Tom Baker and 
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 Jeremy King, ‘When Justice is Significantly Injured’ (2012) 86(3)  Law Institute Journal 26.  
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meet required thresholds. When asked about challenges in attaining compensation for 
medical negligence, 15 out of 24 participant responses indicated that significant injury 
impairment thresholds were the predominant challenge. While participants were invited to list 
multiple challenges, their responses emphasised the unfairness and injustice presented by the 
permanent injury thresholds in particular. For mental harm claims, nine participants believed 
the thresholds were the principal challenge.  
 
At the time of implementation, former Victorian Premier Steve Bracks explained that the 
thresholds would reduce damages in small claims of $50,000 or less, and thus alleviate the 
pressure on businesses and professionals concerned about facing successive minor claims.24 
Yet more than a decade later, Attorney-General Martin Pakula acknowledged that ‘the [Ipp] 
reforms have disproportionately affected the rights of claimants to access damages, and some 
deserving claimants have been denied compensation.’25 Personal injury thresholds and caps 
on damages essentially relinquish tortfeasors from their responsibility to amend their wrongs, 
contrary to principles of corrective justice. While the 2015 reforms did reduce some 
restrictions, the failure to address all the issues identified in the report has meant that many of 
the restrictions have not been eliminated. For instance, individuals will risk missing out on 
compensation due to the continued operation of injury thresholds, and differences in 
outcomes for similarly injured individuals will continue to occur across the major injury 
compensation schemes in Victoria.26 Further, assessment of injuries will continue to be 
conducted on a predominantly quantitative basis, as VCEC did not recommend the adoption 
of a narrative test. 
 
Injury thresholds also unfairly curtail the rights of claimants to recover compensation for 
psychological injuries. Not only are thresholds for psychological injuries set at double the 
percentage of impairment compared to physical injury but claimants pursuing a mental harm 
claim must also satisfy the hurdle requiring them to show ‘normal fortitude’ and a 
‘recognised psychiatric illness’.27 Peter Handford contends that the statutory ‘codification’ of 
mental harm principles has had a detrimental effect on the law in two ways. First, the lack of 
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 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 21 May 2003, 1782 (Steve Bracks, Premier).  
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 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 September 2015, 3281 (Martin Pakula, 
Attorney-General).  
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 Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, Adjusting the Balance: Inquiry into Aspects of the 
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consistency between states (as outlined in Appendix 6) could mean a plaintiff might succeed 
in one state, but not another because some states, such as Queensland and the Northern 
Territory, retain common law principles.28 Secondly, provisions exclude liability for some 
situations where the common law has recognised liability for psychiatric injury.29 Forster and 
Engel assert that the civil liability reforms have further reinforced the historic distinction 
between physical and mental harm injuries. They call for a more effective compensation 
framework which would reduce the direct and indirect costs of mental injury.30 
 
The first recommended option for reform is the removal of injury thresholds. In its place the 
Victorian Government could implement a graduated general damages system, akin to the 
legislative principles operating in Queensland and South Australia. Queensland uses a sliding 
scale between 0 and 100 to allocate a point value for injuries.31 The point value then 
determines the level of compensation payable. To illustrate, for a claimant who sustained a 
whiplash injury from a motor vehicle collision and experienced constant neck pain and 
headaches, as well as periodic pain in her mid to lower thoracic spine, the injury was deemed 
to be a 15 point value on the injury scale and the claimant received $23,700 for non-
economic loss.32 By way of comparison, if a similar injury occurred in Victoria in a transport 
accident collision the claimant would be covered by the no-fault benefits operating through 
the TAC scheme. Yet, if the claimant had sustained the same injury through medical 
negligence in Victoria, they would be unable to recover non-economic damages unless they 
satisfied an independent medical practitioner their injury was both permanent and significant.  
 
A similar system to that adopted by Queensland operates in South Australia, requiring a point 
value between 0 and 60 to be applied.33 In South Australia, claimants are required to show 
they have sustained an injury warranting non-economic loss damages (pain and suffering, 
loss of amenities of life, loss of expectation of life or disfigurement).34 The court then 
assesses severity of injury, and compensation is determined pursuant to a sliding scale. 
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Scaled measures of damages for non-economic loss are fairer than ‘significant injury 
thresholds’ because they do not automatically eliminate the awarding of damages for all 
smaller claims,35 and so they present as exemplar models that the Victorian jurisdiction could 
emulate. 
 
Alternatively, if thresholds are retained, a second option could be the insertion of a provision 
into the Wrongs Act similar to the ‘narrative tests’ used in transport accident and workplace 
injury claims,36 allowing a court to award damages in circumstances that would otherwise be 
excluded.37 This provision could be used where the consequences of an injury negatively 
impact upon a claimant’s life, and where strict application of thresholds would be harsh and 
unjust, as with the earlier cited example of a pianist losing a finger.38 During the 2013 
enquiry, VCEC received a number of submissions which criticised the thresholds, and the 
manner in which impairment was assessed using the AMA Guides.39  
 
Medical practitioners are informed by the AMA Guides which focus on objective medical 
criteria, but can fail to consider the impact of injuries on a person’s life, including their 
capacity to work and carry out the activities of everyday living.40 To remedy this flaw, three 
legal bodies made submissions to VCEC advocating for the introduction of a narrative test, 
modeled on the test used for assessing workplace or transport accident injuries.41 VCEC did 
not adopt this recommendation, likely due to risks of cost increases to the system.42 However, 
the narrative test is used under statutory schemes and allows consideration for qualitative 
factors impacting upon a claimant’s life following an injury. Although VCEC rejected the 
narrative test due to economic efficiency reasoning (related to an increase in insurance costs), 
it is imperative that economic arguments are balanced with the need to compensate injured 
members of society, giving effect to corrective justice objectives.  
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Adoption of a narrative test would benefit in two ways: firstly, by achieving regulatory 
consistency with workplace and transport accident injuries;43 and secondly, by ensuring 
claimants with substantial and painful injuries, who presently cannot satisfy the thresholds, 
have an increased possibility of recovering compensation. Whilst participants in this doctoral 
study did not expressly articulate the need for a narrative test, participants underscored the 
necessity for the legislative framework to consider individual circumstances. That said, 
narrative tests under the transport accident and workplace accident schemes are not a panacea 
for this problem. Jason Taliadoros describes these tests as creating voluminous litigation that 
burdens public resources, however he acknowledges this may emanate from legal uncertainty 
regarding the wording of legislative provisions.44  
 
The narrative tests under transport accident and workplace accident schemes incorporate a 
two-limb test: first, the injury must fall into categories prescribed by the legislation;45 and 
second, three reference points must be satisfied. These reference points are: (1) assessing the 
‘seriousness’ as judged with respect to the pain and suffering, or loss of earning capacity of a 
worker because of the injury (2) evaluating these consequences of the injury with other cases 
in a range of impairments; and (3) when judging these consequences the impairment or 
disorder ‘shall not be held to be serious’ unless the pain and suffering consequence, or the 
loss of earning capacity consequence meets a semantic threshold of seriousness.46 Thus, 
merely interpreting the narrative test is convoluted for plaintiffs and practitioners. A simpler 
solution for medical negligence claims may be inserting a provision into the Wrongs Act 
which mirrors a provision used in the South Australian (‘SA’) civil liability legislation:  
 
a court may award damages in a case that would otherwise be excluded if satisfied—  
(a) that the consequences of the personal injury with respect to loss or impairment of future 
earning capacity are exceptional; and  
                                                 
43
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(b) that the application of the threshold set by that subsection would, in the circumstances of 
the particular case, be harsh and unjust.47  
 
While this SA provision relates to economic loss in the context of motor vehicle claims, it 
can be tailored to apply in the non-economic loss context. This approach would privilege 
judicial discretion by allowing consideration of plaintiffs’ individual circumstances in 
determining an outcome, and would assist plaintiffs who would not otherwise attain 
compensation if they did not meet the prescribed threshold. Such an approach would require 
judges to apply corrective justice principles to the facts of each case, as opposed to matters of 
policy normally affiliated with economic efficiency theory. The wording of the SA provision 
is clear, compared to the convoluted narrative tests applied under Victorian schemes. 
Additionally, practice notes utilised in the Medical List in the County Court could be 
amended to provide guidance on the criteria needed to satisfy the medical negligence 
narrative test, to ensure consistency of application.  
 
Another option to consider is the overhaul of the legislative framework. In the context of 
public liability claims (which have been subjected to a similar type of restrictions as medical 
negligence), Bell-James and Barker assert that liability questions in cases involving public 
authorities should revert to the common law that provides clarity and consistency over the 
current statutory framework.48 This proposition advances the repeal of existing legislative 
provisions, with a reversion to common law principles.  
 
An alternative solution is the adoption by all Australian states of uniform legislation, akin to 
the uniform defamation statutes.49 Bell-James and Barker highlight that anomalies 
experienced in the post-Ipp era indicate that if uniform legislation is adopted, it needs careful 
consideration, clear drafting and consideration of the principles and protections which the 
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common law offers.50 One participant articulated the need for uniformity in medical 
negligence law across Australian jurisdictions, echoing academics’ criticisms about the lack 
of uniformity stemming from the Ipp Reforms.51 
 
When considering the avenues of reform listed above, the simplest and most pragmatic 
initiative would be amending existing provisions in the Wrongs Act to reduce threshold 
restrictions. This could be achieved by either lowering the thresholds or introducing the 
sliding scale system operating in Queensland and South Australia which ensures all 
meritorious claims are compensated. If caps on damages are retained, this would stifle 
excessive damages awards, alleviating fears of another insurance ‘crisis’. Also, if the 
thresholds are retained, the introduction of a legislative provision allowing for the use of a 
narrative test would restore some fairness to the present framework, by considering the 
adverse effect of injuries on claimants’ lives.  
 
Other avenues of reform include repealing Part VB and VBA of the Wrongs Act legislation 
relating to caps on damages and injury thresholds and reverting to common law principles. A 
third alternative would be adopting uniform tort legislation to achieve clarity and consistency 
in an otherwise fragmented federal framework. An objective of the Ipp Reforms was to 
implement consistency across the Australian jurisdictions, yet this aim has evidently not been 
achieved. Uniform legislation would solve this dilemma, but only if its implementation is 
underpinned by independent and thorough empirical research, rather than as a reactionary 
political response to scant evidence of an insurance ‘crisis’.52  
 
7.2.3 CAUSATION  
When asked directly about causation, 18 out of 24 participants thought the statutory test of 
causation presented as a hurdle to successful recovery. Participant responses indicate that the 
statutory provisions regarding causation are a potential site for reform.  
                                                 
50
 Bell-James and Barker, above n 48, 41.  
51
 Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, ‘High Court Negligence Cases 2000-10’ (2014) 36(4) Sydney Law 
Review 585, 590.  
52
 This is supported by Edmund Wright, ‘National Trends in Personal Injury Litigation: Before and After 
‘Ipp’’ (2006) 14(3) Torts Law Journal 233, 249. Professor Wright’s research shows a stable trajectory of 
claims with a sudden increase in claims leading to the Ipp Reforms. Following the Ipp Reforms, the rate of 
claims decreased in all Australian jurisdictions.  
248 
 
 
The first potential solution is to codify the law with respect to causation. Codification 
involves a comprehensive statement of the law in one statute.53 If negligence principles were 
to be codified, such codification would require a broad wording and would need to be subject 
to judicial interpretation because of the sheer number of factual situations that could arise.54 
Yet codification in itself does not offer a comprehensive solution. In the negligence context, 
it would require a re-statement of the common law principles, and the codified law would 
continue to require judicial interpretation. One commentator contends that the insertion of a 
two-part statutory test in 2003 was effectively a codification of the common law.55  
 
A second possible solution is to alter the statutory provisions relating to causation, 
particularly the scope of liability element. The participants in this study highlighted that 
factual causation is relatively straightforward to satisfy, however the scope of liability 
element is nebulous. If the vagueness of the scope of liability element is the root of the 
problem, then the solution should focus on inserting specific criteria which need to be 
satisfied. A solution could be achieved by inserting a list of factors that the courts must 
consider, analogous to Chief Justice Allsop’s ‘salient features’ which are considered when 
assessing novel duty of care categories.56  
 
A third avenue of law reform for consideration is the reversal of the onus of proof for 
causation in medical negligence cases. The plaintiff would be required to prove duty of care 
and breach of duty, but the onus would then shift to the defendant, if the adverse outcome 
sustained by the plaintiff is one that is a recognised risk with that medical procedure.  For 
example, if the medical practitioner does breach their duty of care then the law should 
presume (in the absence of proof to the contrary) that the cause of the negative outcome is a 
breach of duty on the part of the medical practitioner.  
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The implementation of a reversal of onus of proof would result in the creation of a hybrid 
compensation scheme, similar to New Zealand’s no-fault statutory scheme.57 Consistent with 
economic efficiency theory, the operation of a no-fault statutory scheme risks placing too 
harsh an economic burden on the legal system. However, requiring a plaintiff to satisfy duty 
of care and a breach of duty but not causation (if the outcome was one of the recognised 
adverse risks) is effectively a hybrid system of compensation. The hybrid system could 
alleviate some of the injustice faced by plaintiffs who have meritorious claims and ought to 
have received some compensation for breach of duty, but failed at the causal hurdle.  
 
7.2.4 DISCUSSION OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE THEORY 
As outlined in Chapter One of this thesis, the purpose of corrective justice is to restore the 
balance, or the equilibrium, between the victim and the tortsfeasor.58 Erbacher describes 
corrective justice as a ‘rights-based instrument’ which is ‘designed to rectify wrongs 
committed by one person against another in a relationship.’59 Pursuant to this view, disputes 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis between the parties, rather than being based on 
public policy considerations or a particular economic rationale. In a medical negligence 
context, corrective justice theory would require a negligent doctor to restore any harm they 
have caused to the patient through payment of compensation. 
 
In an analysis of the theoretical lens underpinning the negligence principles of this thesis, a 
strong case has been made through the analysis of the work of Weinrib, Schwartz, Coleman 
and Erbacher for the appropriateness of corrective justice theory. The restrictions imposed in 
the Wrongs Act through tort reforms are consistent with corrective justice principles, insofar 
as they impose clear rules for determining liability amongst individuals. Commentators have 
also argued that restorative tools of the law, such as apologies, are consistent with corrective 
justice.60 
 
Ernest Weinrib’s description of tort liability focuses on the bipolar relationship between the 
wrong-doing conduct of defendant and the harm sustained by the plaintiff. Two primary 
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aspects of corrective justice articulated by Weinrib are correlativity and personality. He 
describes correlativity as ‘the connection that exists between the parties in a regime of 
liability’, while personality encapsulates ‘what is normatively significant about the parties for 
purposes of liability’.61 Correlativity refers to the organisation of private law through bilateral 
relationships between individuals. In private law this means that ‘one person’s right is always 
a function of another person’s duty.’62 Therefore, a patient’s right to compensation for breach 
of duty while receiving medical treatment directly correlates to the doctors’ legal duty to 
adhere to the standard of care reasonably expected of medical practitioners. Correlativity in 
tort liability focuses on considerations that affect both parties. Erbacher explains that ‘it is 
inconsistent with the correlative structure of corrective justice to decide liability and 
entitlements by reference to considerations that focus solely on the conduct of one party.’63 
 
Causation is highly relevant from the perspective of corrective justice theorists because it 
‘supplies the particular feature about the defendant that singles him out from the generality of 
those available for the shifting of the plaintiff's loss.’64 Consistent with principles of 
corrective justice, claimants can only recover compensation if their injury was caused by the 
defendant’s negligent conduct.65 In contrast, distributive justice and economic theories do not 
focus on a ‘singular causal attribution’66 but rather ultimate attribution of liability is based on 
social, moral, political and economic considerations. Mendelson contends that the tort reform 
legislation has been heavily influenced by corrective justice theory by emphasising the need 
for a plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s negligence has caused the harm.67 
 
Corrective justice theory supports the legal requirement to establish a causal  link in 
negligence.68 Gemma Turton stresses that causation is a central feature of corrective justice 
and the centrality is ‘unaffected by the argument that the distributive effects of liability ought 
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to be taken into account in order to balance coherence and morality.’69 Turton relies on the 
case of Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, where a doctor failed to warn their patient of a 
small risk associated with a medical procedure. The risk materialised and the patient suffered 
an injury. Yet the patient admitted that had she been warned of the risk, she would 
nevertheless have proceeded with the procedure. While the court decided that the ‘but for’ 
test was satisfied and the defendant doctor should be held liable in the circumstances, Turton 
asserts that imposition of liability should be questioned when made without a clear causal 
link.70 In other words, the provision of information or warning of the risk would ultimately 
not have made a difference in the patient’s decision to proceed with the surgery, therefore 
imposition of liability in the circumstances was not warranted.  
 
Despite corrective justice offering the best explanation for tort liability, analysis of the data in 
this study had demonstrated that by imposing numerous means of restricting access to 
compensation (such as thresholds, caps on damages and causation), the balance between 
individuals is shifted too extensively in favour of defendants. Thus, the current legislative 
framework does not embody corrective justice between parties because in many instances the 
equilibrium is not restored between the wrong-doer and the victim. Paul de Jersey, former 
Chief Justice of Queensland, argues that restrictions arising out of the civil liability reforms 
in Queensland regarding calculation of damages: 
 
‘[create] an inflexibility which eschews much of the evaluative process previously carried out 
by judges fully informed of the relevant circumstances of the individual plaintiff before them. 
This inflexibility diminishes the scope for individual corrective justice and reduces the 
chances of restoring a plaintiff to the pre-accident position; amends are not made.’71 
 
While the framework of tort liability is embedded in corrective justice, the operation of such 
a system must be questioned where it fails to effect actual justice between the parties. For 
instance, Richardson and Gillett contend that no single form of justice can suitably account 
for medical error and that myriad justice approaches are necessary in the healthcare context.72 
Richardson and Gillett accept that pursuant to corrective justice theory, a fault-based tort 
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system involves a two-party transaction where the plaintiff must prove the doctor’s 
negligence and establish fault.73 Only once this has been established can the doctor pay 
damages to ‘put-right’ the wrong that has been caused. However, problems emerge where ‘no 
clearly negligent or faulty party’ can be identified and held responsible, resulting in an 
outcome that is ‘potentially unjust’.74 Further, even if a negligent party can be identified, the 
injury may not be of sufficient gravity to satisfy legal responsibility. In such circumstances 
‘satisfying the duty of repair under normative principles of corrective justice may be 
somewhat arbitrary’.75 Richardson and Gillet contend that:  
 
Such a state of affairs is intuitively unfair to victims who have suffered the same loss given 
that the resolution or failure to resolve is not within the patients’ control. Therefore, schemes 
that rely only on corrective justice do not provide sufficient coverage to victims and often do 
not satisfy our sense of natural justice, factors that render them, by and large, inappropriate to 
deal with medical error.  
 
In circumstances where the current fault-based system is failing to effect actual justice 
between the parties, it may be appropriate to look to no-fault schemes as an alternative 
system. A no-fault scheme transfers the burden of error collectively to a community and is a 
form of distributive justice.76 Under a no-fault scheme, recognition is given to the need for 
patients who have suffered injury due to medical error to receive financial support, regardless 
of the ability to satisfy the causal relationship between breach of duty and harm. Richardson 
and Gillett assert that an argument for a no-fault scheme is convincing, when contrasted 
against corrective justice principles which require ‘significant fictions to be maintained to 
conform to our intuitive sense of justice.’77 Various benefits and drawbacks of a no-fault 
scheme is discussed in the next section.  
 
7.2.5 REFORM 2 – NO-FAULT SYSTEM  
An alternative to amending the existing Victorian fault-based tort system would be assuming 
a form of the no-fault compensation systems that currently operates in NZ, Sweden, Finland 
and Denmark for medical negligence claims. In the NZ no-fault system, claimants are not 
required to prove fault in a civil justice court system to recover compensation. Instead, an 
                                                 
73
 Ibid 786.  
74
 Ibid 787.  
75
 Ibid.  
76
 Ibid 788.  
77
 Ibid 789.  
253 
 
 
injured person is required to complete a claim form, consult with a healthcare provider to 
verify their injury, and lodge the claim with the NZ Accident Compensation Corporation.78 
The ‘no-fault system’ has been widely accepted in Australia through its operation in transport 
accident and workplace injury compensation schemes, therefore it is not a foreign process  in 
this jurisdiction and it is timely to seriously contemplate whether it can be implemented as a 
better system to manage medical injury claims.79  
 
During the Ipp Reforms, former government minister, the Hon. Joe Hockey, intended to 
introduce a no-fault scheme similar to the New Zealand scheme, but faced vehement 
opposition due to fears of the exorbitant cost and liability such a system could attract.80 
However, Andrew Field posits that most of these arguments were untethered to any 
justification and lacked evaluation of the true cost of such a model.81 Field purports that the 
arguments countering a no-fault scheme carried significant political weight prior to the 
introduction of thresholds, and prior to the removal of common law protections. In light of 
the current restrictions, it might be worthwhile considering alternatives.82 Weisbrot and Breen 
support the introduction of a no-fault scheme, asserting the current fault-based system is 
slow, expensive, inefficient, stressful, inequitable and unpredictable in helping people injured 
through medical care.83 They concede elements of opponents’ arguments are legitimate, 
regarding the social costs of the no-fault scheme, but Weisbrot and Breen  emphasise that 
funding can be sought from the community through taxpayers funds, rather than being limited 
to compulsory medical indemnity cover.84  
 
A recent example of the adoption of a no-fault scheme in Australia is the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme (NDIS), introduced in response to a 2011 Productivity Commission 
inquiry which recommended a no-fault national scheme for ‘catastrophic’ injury (including 
medical injury).85 The NDIS is similar to New Zealand’s no-fault scheme, as it provides a 
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level of compensation to people with disabilities for support services deemed reasonable and 
necessary, but it does not compensate for lost income. Weisbrot and Breen argue that the 
2011 Productivity Commission inquiry represents a missed opportunity for introducing a no-
fault system for medical injuries, and they recommend a further inquiry into this matter.86  
 
Adopting a no-fault system of liability for medical negligence claims obviates the need for 
litigation, which eliminates the social costs and plaintiff costs of trial. It is well-known that 
litigation in court is stressful for injured people,87 and the protracted process can deleteriously 
affect both finances and mental well-being, including relationships. In New Zealand, an 
injured person is entitled to claim no-fault benefits for a ‘treatment injury’, if such injury was 
sustained during medical treatment. The injured person is not required to prove negligence 
and demonstrate in court that the medical practitioner made an error.88 In New Zealand, 
funding for the no-fault scheme is sourced from employment taxes, government revenue and 
taxes on petrol and vehicle registrations.89  
 
In Australia, the NDIS provides a useful model on which to base a potential no-fault scheme. 
The NDIS was funded through government revenue (including a diversion of all usual 
disability services funding to the NDIS) and an increase to the Medicare levy.90 The increase 
to the Medicare levy is one avenue of pooling resources to fund a no-fault scheme and the 
NDIS evidences that the Australian government is willing and able to take this course of 
action. Another example is the proposed National Injury Insurance Scheme (NIIS) for 
medical treatment injuries.  
 
In their 2011 final report regarding the disability sector, the Productivity Commission 
dedicated two chapters to creation of the NIIS and the inadequacies of the common law to 
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provide necessary support to injured individuals.91 The recommendation proposed a scheme 
that would support individuals living with catastrophic injuries due to accidents or arising out 
medical treatment. The response to this recommendation has somewhat stalled, save for the 
introduction of a limited scheme in Queensland for injuries arising out of motor vehicle 
accidents.92 In July 2015, the Commonwealth Treasury released a draft medical treatment 
injury discussion paper suggesting that establishment of the NIIS is proceeding.93 The 
Government proposed a funding model based on premiums on medical practitioners’ and 
hospitals’ medical indemnity insurance. The scheme would cover spinal cord injury, brain 
injury, multiple amputations, burns and permanent blindness, but would exclude birth 
defects, injuries caused wholly or substantially through unreasonably withholding or delaying 
of treatment and individuals injured when 65 years old or older. The NIIS would be modelled 
on New Zealand’s no-fault scheme and would cover all unintended injuries that occurred as a 
result of medical treatment.94 While progress on the introduction of the NIIS remains slow, 
the policy considerations and implementation must be subjected to proper scrutiny.95  
 
In its current form, the Wrongs Act curtails corrective justice, as the compensatory pendulum 
has swung too far in favour of insurance companies to the detriment of plaintiffs seeking 
redress for harms caused to them by others. This view is supported by the discussion of the 
participants in this study who thought that restrictions in the current framework unfairly 
curtail the right of injured individuals to attain compensation. Pursuant to corrective justice, a 
tort compensation system should be able to facilitate the wrongdoer restoring justice to an 
aggrieved individual, yet in practice, corrective justice is not effected when individuals are 
unable to access justice due to legislative restrictions. Further, the principles of corrective 
justice, in practice, have limitations. It represents the balance of what a society can pay. The 
no-fault scheme represents a form of distributive justice as it allows justice between the 
parties to be effected within a statutory framework. The no-fault system ensures that all 
individuals have equal access to a compensation system that can assist them to attain some 
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compensation for treatment or rehabilitation, weekly compensation for lost income, or lump 
sum payment for permanent disabilities, without having to prove negligence in court.  
7.3 MEDIATION FINDINGS 
The appetite for ADR mechanisms has transformed the landscape of the way general 
negligence claims are managed. ADR is now a much used case management tool in Victorian 
court proceedings. Due to the rise in court-connected mediation, it was valuable in this 
research to explore how mediation operates for medical negligence claims. A large part of 
this doctoral research has explored how mediation of medical negligence disputes operates in 
the Victorian jurisdiction. Particular focus was paid to the level of lawyers’ engagement with 
the mediation process, and to the suitability of mediation as a process for resolving medical 
negligence disputes. As indicated previously in this thesis mediation has myriad benefits 
compared with litigation, including cost savings, expediency, confidentiality, and it also 
offers unique value in practice areas where parties have extra-legal, emotional, or non-
financial needs. For victims of medical negligence, this may include the plaintiff’s desire for 
an explanation of medical error, or an expression of apology or sympathy from the defendant. 
Lawyers are a key player in the mediation of medical negligence disputes as they directly 
impact upon the conduct of mediation, and influence the outcomes secured for their clients. 
As such there was a fundamental need for this research to explore the use of mediation in 
medical negligence practice.  
 
Participants’ responses regarding engagement with the mediation showed a cultural shift 
toward embracing non-adversarial practice. When questioned whether participants engaged 
with mediation to resolve medical negligence disputes, 16 of the 24 participants stated they 
did so and described their involvement as ‘mandated’ by courts, clients, or accepted norms. 
Eight out of the 16 participants explained that their involvement was due to ‘court-ordered’ 
processes, whilst the other eight used language describing a state of compulsion or inability 
to avoid mediation because of enduring legal industry practices. Participants viewed 
mediation as a process which all litigants and lawyers must undertake, though they described 
participating in mediation as a positive necessity.  
 
In contrast, the remaining eight participants expressed insights regarding the positive benefits 
of mediation, stating that legal actors and disputants engage willingly, showing a cultural 
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shift towards non-adversarial practice.96 The language expressed by participants 
demonstrated genuine willingness to participate in mediation, demonstrating a shift in legal 
culture in this practice area, rather than mere compliance with legislative requirements. Three 
participants expressly cited the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) and the expectation of judges 
that parties and lawyers should ‘genuinely attempt’ mediation prior to trial. While some 
commentators remain cautious about public policy legislation and ADR,97 the willingness of 
all 24 participants to partake in mediation strongly indicates a cultural shift toward non-
adversarial practice; a shift that was undoubtedly spurred by legislative intervention. 
  
Participants were asked about the suitability of mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism 
for medical negligence claims. Research participants unanimously endorsed mediation as the 
preferred form of dispute resolution for medical negligence disputes, speaking favourably 
about the process. Participants endorsed the classical features of mediation, including 
expediency, cost savings, certainty, control over the process and outcome, as well as less 
emotional stress for the parties. The most common benefit cited as a result of adopting 
mediation were the saving in expenses, with all but one participant stressing that its lower 
cost was a major benefit reaped from undertaking mediation. This finding mirrors the medical 
dispute literature, which highlights that cost is a significant factor as medical negligence 
disputes involve complex medico-legal issues and expert evidence.98 Six participants 
expressed the view that the less adversarial nature of mediation meant it was a desirable 
dispute resolution process when compared to trial, which was described as a ‘gut-
wrenching’99 and ‘traumatic’100 process. These perceptions are consistent with Menkel-
Meadow’s assertion that the adversarial system is inadequate in meeting parties’ needs and it 
is imperative that parties are permitted greater choice in deciding how to resolve their 
disputes.101  
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Extant literature emphasises that emotion is a key aspect of conflict and in dispute resolution 
and that addressing the emotional needs of the parties can be critical in resolving disputes.102 
Bogdanoski contends that mediation, particularly the facilitative mediation style, can cater to 
medical negligence plaintiffs’ emotional needs and interests.103 With studies increasingly 
paying attention to the role of emotion in mediation,104 it was valuable to explore whether 
participants considered that emotion is indeed a key factor for medical negligence parties, and 
if so, whether the mediation process allows for the emotional needs of parties to be 
addressed.  
 
In this study 18 out of 24 participants thought that emotion was a critical factor in medical 
negligence disputes, due to claims in medical negligence arising out of a breach of trust 
between a medical practitioner and a patient. In medical negligence disputes, parties’ loss 
may involve physical injury, permanent disability or death of a loved one (as opposed to a 
breach of contract which tends to involve purely financial loss), heightening plaintiffs’ 
emotional investment in the claim. Therefore, it was unsurprising that 15 participants  
indicated that emotions were predominantly plaintiff-orientated, with participants indicating 
doctors were largely kept out of medical negligence mediation. In fact, the responses from the 
participants revealed that doctors rarely attend mediation in Victoria. This finding is 
consistent with Tamara Relis’ study of Canadian medical malpractice disputes where the 
majority of lawyers indicated they had little or no experience with doctors in attendance at 
mediation.105  
 
Despite acknowledging the critical role of emotion for plaintiffs, 20 participants in this study 
indicated that parties’ emotional needs are not being met during mediation. The participants 
stated that the predominant focus in mediation was on legal rights, fiscal objectives and 
achieving settlement, therefore no attention was given to disputants’ non-legal needs. In 
elucidating the process adopted by lawyers in Victorian medical negligence mediations, 
participants explained that parties rarely receive an opportunity to address emotional needs 
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because joint sessions are rarely held. Parties drew a distinction between theory and practice, 
highlighting that lawyers in mediation of medical negligence disputes largely used a ‘shuttle’ 
approach, meaning that parties and lawyers are kept in separate rooms,106 with the mediator 
moving between rooms to conduct the mediation.  
 
Participants also stressed that plaintiffs were constrained by lawyers from participating in the 
negotiation process for tactical reasons. Even if plaintiffs wished to speak, or confront the 
doctor, they could rarely do so due to the lack of attendance by doctors. Yet nine participants, 
without prompting, highlighted the effectiveness of apologies by doctors to plaintiffs in 
mediation when such apologies were able to be facilitated. This is consistent with Carroll’s 
view that apologies can be a powerful legal remedy, addressing parties’ psychological needs 
more satisfactorily than an award of damages.107 
 
A theme evident from participants’ responses about the lack of client involvement in 
mediation, and the focus on legal and financial objectives, is that lawyers have a significant 
capacity to influence the mediation process.108 Participants were asked how they saw the role 
of lawyers in mediation of medical negligence disputes, including the role of solicitors, 
barristers and mediators. Participants’ responses indicated a high level of lawyer involvement 
and control of the mediation process. None of the participants permitted their clients to have 
complete involvement in negotiations. This finding is consistent with Relis’ research which 
found that lawyers dominated the mediation process and frequently ignored their clients’ 
emotional or non-legal needs.109 While the participants in this doctoral study acknowledged 
that emotion was a factor for clients, particularly plaintiffs, this awareness did not motivate 
them to reduce their domination of the mediation process.  
 
A theme that arose out of participants’ responses related to lawyers ‘managing the client’ or 
achieving ‘client control’ during mediation, particularly for tactical reasons. The lawyers in 
this study resembled Rundle’s ‘spokesperson’ lawyer who dominates the negotiation process. 
The client remains a mere observer, who receives legal advice and provides instructions to 
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the lawyer outside of the mediation session.110 Further, emotional plaintiffs were perceived as 
a liability if they divulged information that could be used by the opposing side in subsequent 
court proceedings. Despite confidentiality of mediation, the defendant could gather insights 
into the plaintiff’s likely presentation in the witness stand and many plaintiff lawyers 
perceived that as a tactical disadvantage. Again, these findings are consistent with Relis’ 
Canadian study where lawyers had a tendency to focus on strategy, tactics and financial 
objectives in dispute resolution, as opposed to disputants whose focus was on emotional, 
psychological and extra-legal needs.111 This indicates a possible international trend, at the 
very least in common law jurisdictions, in the framing of lawyers’ role in medical negligence 
disputes.  
 
Participants’ responses indicated they used an evaluative, rights-based mediation model 
which focused heavily on legal rights rather than non-legal interests and included incremental 
bargaining. The responses reflected distributive negotiation rather than an interest based 
negotiation style.112 The focus was on achieving the ‘right figure’ or the ‘best outcome’ for 
the client at mediation, rather than on addressing any non-legal needs of clients. Seven 
participants highlighted the importance of ‘proper preparation’ for mediation of medical 
negligence disputes, because these disputes often involve technical medical terminology and 
complex expert evidence. Lawyers saw themselves as experts in the law and described their 
role as ‘legal advisor’, their purpose to inform their clients on the merits of their case. Some 
participants described their role as a ‘translator’ of the legal system, advising on the realistic 
parameters of settlement. Others perceived their role as ‘protector’, shielding their clients 
from the stressful and emotional impact of dispute resolution.  
 
The participants were aware of the shadow of the law influencing settlement negotiations, 
and used advocacy skills to persuade the opposition of the merits of their case. Despite the 
focus on legal rights and financial objectives, the participants were not excessively 
adversarial in their approach. Rather, this community of lawyers have developed a 
cooperative settlement culture and also exhibited awareness of their clients’ needs and 
showed sympathy towards their clients. The lawyers did not adopt the facilitative model of 
mediation but instead had developed a tailored and unique process to the resolution of 
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medical negligence disputes in the Victorian jurisdiction. The participants recognised their 
adapted model differed from the ‘textbook’ mediation approach and it also differed from the 
highly adversarial attitude of NSW lawyers.113 The approach of this group involved speaking 
on clients’ behalf at mediation, advising them on realistic parameters of settlement and 
shielding their clients from the emotional stress of the dispute. The lawyers in this study 
dominated the discourse of the mediation in order to bargain and achieve settlement. By 
doing so the lawyers showed an approach to practice that diminished party voice and control 
in the process that also compromised party self-determination. The lawyers’ approach means 
that parties had little opportunity to directly contribute to the mediation process, achieve 
emotional expression, or gain a sense of procedural justice.114  
 
7.3.1 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS  
The findings outlined in Chapter Six of this thesis relating to mediation of medical negligence 
disputes are important because they show insights into the dispute resolution culture of this 
legal practice group. The findings regarding suitability of mediation for medical disputes, 
engagement with the process, the role of emotion in dispute resolution and the role of lawyers 
in dispute resolution have significant impact for mediation theory and practice. Data analysis 
of participants’ discussions culminated in two overarching themes: the culture of lawyers, 
and the heritage of adversarialism. The findings showed that lawyers in this study dominated 
the mediation process, discouraging their client from speaking and largely acted as a 
spokesperson. This finding endorses Menkel-Meadow’s concerns that lawyers colonise 
mediation.115  
 
However, the participants showed signs of Macfarlane’s evolving practitioner,116 because 
they spoke positively about mediation and non-adversarial practice, and exhibited genuine 
desire to engage in the mediation process. This is consistent with the increase in the use of 
mediation through public policy legislation, which can be used as a tool to shift the culture of 
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lawyers. Combined with judicial case management and the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) 
requirements, Victorian lawyers are no longer able to litigate in court without having 
attempted some form of ADR, most likely mediation. This cultural shift was a policy 
initiative of the then Victorian parliament, with former Attorney-General Hulls describing the 
reforms as a ‘generational change in the way civil litigation will be managed’, with a key 
objective of the reforms to ‘change litigation culture itself’ by adopting a ‘less adversarial 
approach’ to dispute resolution.117 The findings of this study show that in spite of this aim, 
the culture of lawyers in this particular area of practice has failed to fully embrace a more 
non-adversarial approach.  
 
While the participants in this study were positive about mediation, their views reflected 
experiences in the adapted mediation process these Victorian lawyers have created for 
medical negligence disputes. Further investigation is needed to explore the precise 
characteristics of this model, though participants’ responses revealed that an evaluative or 
settlement model is at the centre of mediation practice in the Victorian medical negligence 
jurisdiction. This finding reflects a community of practice and shows how these lawyers have 
constructed their professional identity in medical negligence, with its unique dispute 
characteristics which differ to other practice areas. As Macfarlane’s research has 
demonstrated, a range of legal cultures can develop in mediation practice.118 While the 
participants showed an ethic of care for their clients,119 the adapted process strays from the 
purely facilitative model of mediation, as participants acknowledged it did not follow the 
model taught in mediation training. Rundle acknowledges that lawyers will ultimately shape 
dispute resolution processes, including their role and their clients’ expectations.120 However, 
the adaption risks losing many benefits of mediation, such as party self-determination, 
expression of emotion and the ability to meet parties’ non-legal needs.  
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This finding raises the issue as to whether other practice areas might also have shifted from 
the traditional litigious culture of lawyers. It seems likely that the medical negligence practice 
area is not alone in making this shift. Arguably, a cultural shift may be evident more widely 
in the various practice groups that experience mediation as part of case management, at least 
at the procedural level if not in intention or implementation. Such a shift in practitioners’ 
approaches to value the legal requirement for mediation would demonstrate that the intended 
objective of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) has been achieved. Yet the participants 
primarily valued mediation for its expediency and costs savings, demonstrating the 
participants have not yet truly shifted their culture towards non-adversarial practice. The data 
also shows that the widely accepted facilitative model of mediation that values self-
determination and meeting parties’ non-legal needs is not used by the members of this study.  
 
In the medical negligence context, lawyers are clearly less adversarial in mediation but they 
are still not open to using a process and involving parties in ways that may meet the 
emotional needs of the clients in the process. Lawyers in this study saw the significance of 
emotional concerns for their clients but they did not recognise the value of emotional 
dialogue in mediation. Lawyers tend to be rationally-minded in mediation, focusing on the 
expediency of the process, cost savings and protecting their clients from further stress 
associated with dispute resolution. Thus the emotional aspects of conflict and the potential for 
emotional closure are not being addressed, other than lawyers acting protectively to shield 
their clients from stress. This approach to mediation is evident from other studies in 
Australia, such as Sourdin’s study into practice at the Victorian Supreme and County courts. 
Relis, in her Canadian study, also found that lawyers did not allow dialogue relation to 
emotion medical negligence disputes.121  
 
The tendency to control is not limited to the personal injury context, but in other disputes 
where lawyers dominate the processes.122 The lawyers in Rundle’s study of litigation in 
Supreme Court in Tasmania also adopted a rights-based style, with a focus on settlement 
bargaining. Such an approach to mediation has resulted in reduced party participation in the 
process and a curtailment of the opportunity to address the emotional repercussions of injury.  
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Repeat players in medical negligence mediation, the lawyers and insurance representatives, 
are reducing plaintiff involvement in mediation. This fact, coupled with the trend for doctors 
not to attend mediation, means any real opportunity to engage directly is limited. Substantial 
reform to legal culture and procedure would need to occur to shift the approach of lawyers. 
This suggests that there is a need for lawyer education to understand the benefits of emotion 
as part of the discourse of mediation in the court-connected context.  
 
This doctoral research demonstrates that parties have little opportunity to contribute in 
medical negligence mediation and are limited in experiencing procedural satisfaction. PJ 
research and theory demonstrates that procedural satisfaction is associated with the ability of 
participants to be heard in the dispute resolution process, to be allowed to tell their story, and 
to be treated with respect.123 Likewise, RJ theory privileges the emotional needs of parties 
and focuses on repairing harm caused by one party to another, by bringing together the victim 
and offender in conferencing.124 The balance between the wrongdoer and the victim can be 
restored through dialogue between the parties, which may be particularly valuable in medical 
negligence mediation, allowing individuals the opportunity to speak and be heard, to be 
respected and to have their emotional needs validated. Despite originating in the criminal 
context, RJ conferencing can be influential in the medical context to assist parties to attain 
procedural satisfaction.125  
 
Mediation of medical negligence can also be analysed through the lens of corrective justice 
theory, as mediation is an earlier alternative to trial that has the potential to afford corrective 
justice. It operates in the shadow of the law and influences the substance of disputes at 
mediation. For instance, the use of apologies in mediation can assist the parties to attain 
corrective justice, as they allow the wrongdoer to correct the imbalance by addressing the 
harm they have caused. Vines asserts that apologies operate within the parameters of 
corrective justice.126 Mediation has an interpersonal aspect but the opportunity to use 
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mediation as a process to address emotional needs that may include an apology is not 
exploited by lawyers.  
7.4 MEDIATION REFORM 
7.4.1 TRIPARTITE APPROACH TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
If mediation does have the potential to allow parties to attain corrective justice, questions 
arise as to what point in time mediation is most useful? The participants in this study 
indicated that in medical negligence disputes mediation often occurs far too late in the 
dispute, when parties are deeply ingrained in their positions and when excessive financial 
resources have been expended. This led participants to advocate for mediation earlier in the 
process. In South Australia, the Supreme Court Fast Track Rules 2014 (SA) requires parties 
to satisfy a number of requirements before commencing court proceedings, including 
exchange of evidence relating to liability and causation. In Victoria, the County Court 
practice directions require all proceedings in the Medical List to be subjected to mediation,127 
although by that stage parties may already have become entrenched in their positions. In the 
US, the Florida Patient Safety and Pre-Suit Mediation Program requires patients to sign a pre-
suit mediation agreement before receiving medical care, obliging them to mediate before 
commencing court proceedings.128 
 
In Victoria, mediation could be introduced as a mandatory pre-action protocol or alternatively 
as a contractual obligation between hospitals/doctors and patients. A potential solution is the 
adoption of a tripartite approach to dispute resolution to encourage early resolution of 
medical negligence disputes. Firstly, legislation endorsing ADR, such as the Civil Procedure 
Act 2010 (Vic) which is already in effect, provides a necessary framework within which 
mediation can operate. Secondly, a desirable reform is court endorsement of pre-action 
mediation through court rules and practice directions. Several participants raised the issue of 
pre-action mediation, stressing that by the time a case reaches court-connected mediation it 
may be too late for it to be successful. Requiring parties to attempt ADR prior to filing court 
proceedings, akin to the approach in South Australia, would implement pre-action mediation. 
Thirdly, introduction of contractual pre-action mediation requirements, akin to the Florida 
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program, may be used in hospitals and clinics.129 A pre-action mediation clause could be 
introduced contractually and would operate similarly to a dispute resolution clause in 
commercial contracts.130  
 
7.4.2 LEGAL EDUCATION 
Education can be a catalyst for shifting the culture of the legal profession.131 The findings of 
this study give rise to important questions about whether reform to legal education is required 
to educate lawyers about non-adversarial practice. Corbin, Baron and Gutman propound that 
reform to legal education and directive professional rules are key tools in shifting lawyering 
culture.132 They propose that Threshold Learning Outcomes in law school standards should 
prioritise ADR,133 and they also advocate for the inclusion of ADR as a core subject in law 
schools.134 This suggestion is supported by several academics,135 and endorsed by NADRAC 
who contend that ADR should be a compulsory subject in legal education.136 In December 
2016, the Law Admissions Consultative Committee revised the Model Admission Rules for 
legal practice, altering Civil Dispute Resolution (formerly Civil Procedure) to include 
teaching of ADR.137 Civil Dispute Resolution is part of the ‘Priestley 11’ core units law 
students must complete to gain admission to practice, hence this reform represents a 
significant shift in the acceptance of ADR in the training and education of lawyers.  
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While the participants in this study did not discuss legal education as a site for reform, the 
academic literature on legal education and adversarialism, coupled with the findings of this 
study suggest the need for ongoing legal education on the benefits of ADR and non-
adversarial practice. The findings of this study support the assertion that ADR education 
throughout law school is by itself insufficient to ensure lawyers continue adopting non-
adversarial approaches in dispute resolution. Rather, ongoing training about the benefits of 
ADR is needed through continuing professional development of lawyers,138 combined with 
the need to educate lawyers to fully take advantage of the opportunity of mediation as a 
process where the emotional and non-legal needs of parties can be addressed.139 Ongoing 
professional development of lawyers and education about the role of emotion in dispute 
resolution will ensure that lawyers are empowered with problem-solving skills and are better 
equipped to respond to emotional conflict.  
 
7.4.3 MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE RESTORATIVE CONFERENCE AND MANDATORY 
ATTENDANCE BY DOCTORS 
The findings of this study show that there is a lack of opportunity for plaintiffs to meet non-
legal objectives in mediation (such as apologies or an explanation for the medical error), as 
medical practitioners rarely attend mediation. This finding is consistent with research in the 
US and Canada which also found that doctors are neither attending nor participating in 
medical negligence mediations.140 The findings in this study are consistent with international 
research, which found that lawyers tend to dominate the mediation process and fear the risk 
of allowing their client to fully participate in the mediation process, so no real opportunity 
arises for plaintiffs to experience emotional closure.  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence, procedural justice and restorative justice theories acknowledge the 
role of emotion in conflict and the importance of addressing the non-legal needs of parties in 
dispute resolution. Therapeutic jurisprudence encourages lawyers not only to recognise but to 
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incorporate emotions in problem-solving.141 Procedural justice provides that parties are more 
likely to accept the outcome of a decision, whether in court or ADR, if they are to perceive 
the dispute resolution process as procedurally fair.142 It would seem particularly necessary in 
medical negligence disputes for parties to have their voice heard about their experience of 
negligence. This opportunity for expression is thwarted by lawyers and thus parties are 
unlikely to experience procedural fairness. Restorative justice practices also value the role of 
emotions in disputes, and encourage emotional healing through dialogue between the parties 
and provide a template for the potential benefits of such a focus.143  
 
The findings of this study support the recommendation that emotional dialogue between the 
parties, including the opportunity for an apology, explanation or statement of impact of an 
injury on an individual’s life, should be facilitated. To allow this to occur, doctors must be 
required to attend mediation. Carol Liebman asserts that doctors’ lack of participation has 
resulted in lost opportunities to learn from error and a missed opportunity to experience 
procedural justice for doctors.144 Liebman argues that doctors should attend mediation of 
medical negligence disputes to allow both parties to meaningfully participate in the 
process.145  
 
The findings of this study also support the recommendation that doctors should be 
encouraged to attend mediation, and one manner in which this may be achieved is through the 
introduction of new practice directions in the Medical List of the County Court of Victoria.146 
At present these practice notes only require proceedings to be subject to mediation, but do not 
mandate doctors’ attendance. A new practice direction mandating the presence of parties 
themselves would ensure doctors attend. A process similar in nature to restorative justice 
conferencing used in criminal matters, could allow the aggrieved party (the plaintiff) to invite 
the opposing party (the defendant doctor) to a ‘medical negligence restorative conference’ 
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where the parties are given an opportunity to seek an explanation, make a statement 
expressing regret or offer an apology.147  
7.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
While this study has made a meaningful contribution to policy and practice, the research 
inevitably has several limitations. The research objectives limit the scope of the study 
specifically to medical negligence practice in the Victorian jurisdiction. Given that all 
Australian states implemented reforms stemming from the Ipp Report, it would be valuable to 
explore insights from practitioners in other Australian states to ascertain whether similar or 
different challenges impact upon plaintiffs’ ability to attain compensation in meritorious 
medical negligence claims. This research used an interpretive methodology to gather rich 
insights and understandings of the impact of the Ipp Reforms from the perspective of 
Victorian legal practitioners. Unlike quantitative research, the study is not easily 
generalisable to all Australian states. A comprehensive empirical study of the litigation trends 
before and after the Ipp Reforms in all Australian jurisdictions, particularly on the number of 
litigants commencing medical negligence actions and the quantum of damages paid in 
successful claims, is desirable.148 
 
Further, this study gathered insights from lawyers about challenges faced by claimants in 
attaining compensation, as they were best positioned to comment on the legal aspects of such 
challenges. There is scope to conduct further research interviewing plaintiffs and doctors, to 
gather perspectives from the parties about their aims and objectives in pursuing medical 
negligence action, as well as the role of parties in partaking in mediation of such disputes. If 
pursued, this research would resemble Tamara Relis’ Canadian study of legal and lay actors’ 
perceptions in litigation and mediation of medical malpractice suits.149  
 
Based on views of participants in this study espousing the benefits of no-fault schemes, 
combined with views of esteemed scholars, a recommendation was made to adopt a no-fault 
compensation akin to that used in New Zealand. However, further research is needed to 
explore the benefits of such a scheme in medical negligence cases. A comparative study 
between Australia’s fault-based compensation system and New Zealand’s no-fault 
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compensation system is warranted, with a qualitative component gathering insights from 
lawyers practicing in both jurisdictions.  
 
In relation to mediation, this doctoral research project focused on court-connected mediation 
rather than dispute resolution mechanisms at hospital, following medical error. A site for 
future research could explore dispute resolution in the healthcare context through a two-part 
process. The first would focus on the site of the medical error, namely hospitals, and the 
mechanisms employed by healthcare providers to communicate with patients following error. 
The second site is the court-connected environment when disputes proceed past the initial 
hospital stage and into the legal sphere.  
 
Finally, a theme that arose from this study was the role of lawyers in mediation of medical 
negligence giving rise to unique practice groups. The findings indicated that lawyers 
practicing in medical negligence in the Victorian jurisdiction have accepted mediation as a 
legal requirement but are not yet fully embracing non-adversarial practice.150 Studies have 
shown that practice groups can exhibit unique characteristics and varying degrees of 
adversarialism across different cities.151 Therefore, it would be beneficial to undertake a 
comparative study of the role of lawyers in medical negligence dispute resolution in Victoria 
and NSW to explore levels of adversarialism within these legal cultures. Further, the 
participants indicated they were using an adapted model of mediation in medical negligence. 
Therefore, it would be beneficial to undertake further empirical research to explore the 
precise characteristics and use of this adapted model.  
7.6 CONCLUSION  
When individuals are injured as a result of medical negligence, they turn to the legal system 
to attain compensation that can provide critical financial support for the rest of their lives. 
The aim of this study was to explore whether the Ipp Reforms and subsequent 2015 reforms 
continue to present legal challenges to the attainment of compensation in medical negligence 
claims. The findings of this study demonstrate that the Victorian legal system continues to 
deprive injured individuals of compensation where they are unable to satisfy arbitrary 
threshold criteria. The results of this study show that participants considered injury 
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thresholds, caps on non-economic loss damages and causation as barriers faced by claimants 
in attaining compensation, particularly for the non-working, elderly or children. For these 
injured individuals, this is a major barrier preventing access to justice; hence reform of the 
current fault-based system is needed to provide clarity and consistency in compensation. 
Alternatively, the adoption of a no-fault system akin to that operating in New Zealand should 
be evaluated and implemented in Australia. A no-fault system provides greater fairness and 
speed than a fault-based system in delivering compensation to those who need it most.  
 
If the current fault-based system is retained, all claimants pursuing a medical negligence will 
have their case subjected to mediation prior to trial. This study shows that mediation is an 
effective addition to the litigation of disputes in the medical negligence context. Bolstered by 
legislation and a shift in the traditional adversarial culture, mediation was valued by the 
lawyers in this study. However, this shift in culture does not yet extend to allowing the full 
engagement of clients in the mediation process. For many individuals, a medical negligence 
claim is highly emotional and they seek non-legal remedies such as an explanation or 
apology. Thus the opportunity to use mediation to meet non-legal needs is a critical 
component of dispute resolution and one that must be recognised by lawyers to allow parties 
to experience a sense of procedural satisfaction.  
 
The findings of this thesis showed that participants recognised that medical negligence 
proceedings were emotional for plaintiffs, yet the participants did not facilitate expression of 
emotion in mediation. They used an adapted form of mediation that resembled an evaluative 
or settlement model, allowing lawyers to default to a model they were comfortable with 
rather than a model that would meet the needs of the clients they represented. Indeed, without 
the presence of doctors at mediation the discussion centred on compensation. The findings 
highlight that reform is needed to assist lawyers to understand the potential of mediation for 
the canvassing of non-legal elements of a dispute in medical negligence. This thesis has 
recommended a tripartite approach to dispute resolution, combined with ongoing legal 
education about ADR, to embed and prioritise the true benefits of mediation for medical 
negligence.  
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Appendix 2 - Ethics Approval Letter from RMIT University dated 24 December 2015 
 
 
  
Deputy Pro Vice-Chancellor 
(Research & Innovation) 
College of Business 
 
GPO Box 2476 
Melbourne VIC 3001 
Australia 
 
Tel: +61 3 9925 5432   
Fax: +61 3 9925 5624   
 
 
 
 
Notice of Project Amendment Approval 
 
Date:     24 December  2015  
 
Project Number:    19618 
 
Project Title:   Causation in Medical Negligence: Challenges in Litigation and Mediation 
 
Risk Classification:  Low Risk 
 
Principal Investigator: Dr Kathy Douglas 
Student Investigator: Miss Martina Popa 
Other Investigator: Dr Andrew Vaitiekunas 
 
Project Approved: From:  6 October 2015 To:  2 March 2019 
 
Project Amendment Approved:  From:  22 December  2015 
 
Amendment Details:  
 
1. Include judges with medical negligence experience as interview participants (in addition to lawyers).  This 
amendment is approved with the condition that only County Court judges are interviewed until the ethics 
process for interviewing Supreme Court judges is known. 
 
2. Expand recruitment method to include a snowball sampling technique for all participants. 
 
Terms of approval: 
1. Responsibilities of the principal investigator 
It is the responsibility of the principal investigator to ensure that all other investigators and staff on a project are 
aware of the terms of approval and to ensure that the project is conducted as approved by BCHEAN. Approval 
is only valid while the investigator holds a position at RMIT University. 
2. Amendments 
Approval must be sought from BCHEAN to amend any aspect of a project including approved documents. To 
apply for an amendment submit a request for amendment form to the BCHEAN secretary.  This form is 
available on the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) website. Amendments must not be implemented 
without first gaining approval from BCHEAN. 
3. Adverse events 
You should notify BCHEAN immediately of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or 
unforeseen events affecting the ethical acceptability of the project. 
4. Participant Information and Consent Form (PICF) 
The PICF must be distributed to all research participants, where relevant, and the consent form is to be retained 
and stored by the investigator. The PICF must contain the RMIT University logo and a complaints clause 
including the above project number. 
5. Annual reports 
Continued approval of this project is dependent on the submission of an annual report. 
6. Final report  
A final report must be provided at the conclusion of the project. BCHEAN must be notified if the project is 
discontinued before the expected date of completion.  
7. Monitoring 
Projects may be subject to an audit or any other form of monitoring by BCHEAN at any time. 
8. Retention and storage of data 
The investigator is responsible for the storage and retention of original data pertaining to a project for a 
minimum period of five years. 
  
Regards, 
 
A/Prof Penelope Weller 
Chairperson 
RMIT BCHEAN 
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Appendix 3 – Ethics Approval Letter from RMIT University dated 31 March 2016  
 
 
 
Deputy Pro Vice-Chancellor 
(Research & Innovation) 
College of Business 
 
GPO Box 2476 
Melbourne VIC 3001 
Australia 
 
Tel: +61 3 9925 5432   
Fax: +61 3 9925 5624   
 
 
 
 
Notice of Project Amendment Approval 
 
Date:     31 March 2016  
 
Project Number:    19618 
 
Project Title:   Causation in Medical Negligence: Challenges in Litigation and Mediation 
 
Risk Classification:  Low Risk 
 
Principal Investigator: Dr Kathy Douglas 
Student Investigator:  Miss Martina Popa 
Other Investigator:  Dr Andrew Vaitiekunas 
 
Project Approved: From:  6 October 2015 To:  2 March 2019 
 
Project Amendment Approved:  From:  31 March 2016 
 
Amendment Details:  
 
Expand research to include Supreme Court of Victoria Justices with medical negligence experience as interview 
participants. 
 
Terms of approval: 
1. Responsibilities of the principal investigator 
It is the responsibility of the principal investigator to ensure that all other investigators and staff on a project are 
aware of the terms of approval and to ensure that the project is conducted as approved by BCHEAN. Approval 
is only valid while the investigator holds a position at RMIT University. 
2. Amendments 
Approval must be sought from BCHEAN to amend any aspect of a project including approved documents. To 
apply for an amendment submit a request for amendment form to the BCHEAN secretary.  This form is 
available on the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) website. Amendments must not be implemented 
without first gaining approval from BCHEAN. 
3. Adverse events 
You should notify BCHEAN immediately of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or 
unforeseen events affecting the ethical acceptability of the project. 
4. Participant Information and Consent Form (PICF) 
The PICF must be distributed to all research participants, where relevant, and the consent form is to be retained 
and stored by the investigator. The PICF must contain the RMIT University logo and a complaints clause 
including the above project number. 
5. Annual reports 
Continued approval of this project is dependent on the submission of an annual report. 
6. Final report  
A final report must be provided at the conclusion of the project. BCHEAN must be notified if the project is 
discontinued before the expected date of completion.  
7. Monitoring 
Projects may be subject to an audit or any other form of monitoring by BCHEAN at any time. 
8. Retention and storage of data 
The investigator is responsible for the storage and retention of original data pertaining to a project for a 
minimum period of five years. 
  
Regards, 
 
A/Prof Penelope Weller 
Chairperson 
RMIT BCHEAN 
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Appendix 4 – Invitation Letter and Consent Form  
 
 
 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION  
Project Title: Causation in Medical Negligence: Challenges in Litigation and Mediation  
Investigators:  
 Martina Popa  
 Dr Kathy Douglas  
 Dr Andrew Vaitiekunas 
 
Dear ____________________ 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. 
Please read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before 
deciding whether to participate. If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of 
the investigators.  
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted?  
 This project is being conducted by Martina Popa, a PhD candidate of RMIT 
University as part of research into the challenges experienced in litigation and 
mediation of medical negligence proceedings.  
 The project has been approved by the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee.  
Why have you been approached?  
You have been invited to participate in the research as a lawyer practising in medical 
negligence in Victoria.  
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed?  
 The aim of this research is to critically evaluate whether the 2003 amendments to the 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), specifically to the principles of causation in medical 
negligence disputes, have presented challenges to successful recovery of 
compensation in negligence proceedings. The research objectives are to establish 
what effects (if any) the 2003 law reforms have had on the litigation and mediation of 
meritorious medical negligence claims from the perspective of lawyers practising in 
the field.  
 It is expected that approximately 36 people will be interviewed as part of this project. 
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If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do?  
You will be required to participate in an interview of approximately 45 minutes in duration 
with the researcher.  The interview can be undertaken at your place of work or a nearby 
location.  The interview will consist of questions similar to the following: 
 ‘What are the challenges (if any) experienced by medical negligence lawyers in 
litigation post the Ipp reforms?’  
 ‘Based on your experience, what are your perceptions about the changes (if any) 
experienced in the compensation payments received by victims of medical 
negligence?’ 
 
The interview will be audio recorded, however, you may request at any time for audio 
recording to cease.  If this occurs, the interviewer will make written notes of the interview 
content. 
What are the possible risks or disadvantages?  
There are no perceived risks or disadvantages of participating in the study. However, if you 
are unduly concerned about your responses to any of the interview questions or if you find 
participation in the project distressing, you should contact Dr Kathy Douglas as soon as 
convenient. Kathy will discuss your concerns with you confidentially and suggest appropriate 
follow-up, if necessary. 
 
What are the benefits associated with participation?  
There is no direct benefit to the participant from participating in this study.  Participation in 
this project is not required as part of your employment, and you will not be advantaged or 
disadvantaged in your employment if you agree or decline to participate. 
What will happen to the information I provide?  
 Your identity will be removed from records of the interview, and will not be revealed 
in publication of the results of the project.   
 All research data (audio recordings and notes) created by the interview will be 
securely held by the researcher for a period of 5 years after publication before being 
destroyed.  
 Any information that you provide can be disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or 
others from harm, (2) if specifically required or allowed by law, or (3) you provide 
the researchers with written permission. 
 The results of this project may be used in papers for publication, conferences, books 
and as an Appropriate Durable Record (ADR) in the RMIT Online Repository, which 
is a publically accessible online library of research papers.  
What are my rights as a participant?  
 The right to withdraw from participation at any time  
 The right to request that any recording cease  
 The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be 
reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the 
participant.  
 The right to have any questions answered at any time.  
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Whom should I contact if I have any questions?  
 Martina Popa  
 Dr Kathy Douglas  
 Dr Andrew Vaitiekunas  
Yours sincerely                                                         
Dr Kathy Douglas Dr Andrew Vaitiekunas  
   
Martina Popa  
  
If you have any concerns about your participation in this project, which you do not wish to 
discuss with the researchers, then you can contact the Ethics Officer, Research Integrity, 
Governance and Systems, RMIT University, 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT 
1. I have had the project explained to me, and I have read the information sheet  
 
2. I agree to participate in the research project as described 
 
3. I agree: 
 to be interviewed  
 that my voice will be audio recorded 
 
4. I acknowledge that: 
 
(a) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
from the project at any time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously 
supplied (unless follow-up is needed for safety). 
(b) The project is for the purpose of research. It may not be of direct benefit to me. 
(c) The privacy of the personal information I provide will be safeguarded and only 
disclosed where I have consented to the disclosure or as required by law.  
(d) The security of the research data will be protected during and after completion 
of the study.  The data collected during the study may be published, and a report 
of the project outcomes will be provided to participants upon request. Any 
information that will identify me will not be used. 
 
Participant’s Consent 
 
Participant:  Date:  
(Signature) 
 
  
310 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 – Interview Schedule   
 
Questions  
 
Participant Characteristics  
 
a) How long have you practised in medical negligence litigation?  
b) Do you mainly represent plaintiffs or defendants in medical negligence litigation?  
 
Prompt Questions  
 
Litigation 
1. (a) Are you familiar with the 2003 Ipp Reforms?  
(b) Are you familiar with the legal community’s response to the reforms?  
2. Following the Ipp Reforms, what are the challenges experienced by lawyers in 
medical negligence litigation? Do these challenges apply to mental harm claims as 
well?  
3. In your view, does the element of causation present as a hurdle to plaintiffs 
succeeding in a negligence case?  
4. Based on your experience, what are your perceptions about the changes (if any) 
experienced in the number of litigants commencing medical negligence disputes after 
the Ipp Reforms?  
5. Based on your experience, what are your perceptions about the changes (if any) 
experienced in the compensation payments received by plaintiffs in medical 
negligence proceedings, following the Ipp Reforms? Do these changes apply to 
mental harm claims as well?  
6. In your view, what impact do you see the recent 2015 amendments to the Wrongs Act 
having on the ability of plaintiffs to recover compensation?  
 
Mediation 
7. In your experience, to what degree do parties engage in mediation for medical 
negligence disputes? If they do, are emotional issues a relevant factor in participating 
in mediation?  
8. Do you think the mediation process assists participants to express their emotions 
associated with the medical negligence dispute?  
9. What do you see as the role of the lawyers in the mediation of medical negligence 
disputes?  
10. Following the Ipp Reforms, what are the challenges (if any) experienced by lawyers 
in mediation of medical negligence disputes?   
11. In your experience is mediation a more suitable dispute resolution avenue than 
litigation for medical negligence claims?  
12. Based on your experience, what benefits or disadvantages does mediation (as opposed 
to litigation) have on medical negligence clients (either plaintiff or defendant)?    
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13. In your opinion, are there any aspects of the medical negligence dispute litigation or 
mediation process in need of further reform? 
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Appendix 6: Negligence Comparison Table– Causation, Thresholds, Caps and Mental Harm   
 Victoria New South 
Wales 
Queensland South Australia Northern 
Territory 
ACT WA TAS 
Legislation Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic) 
Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW) 
Civil Liability Act 
2003 (Qld) 
Civil Liability Act 
1936 (SA) 
Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and 
Damages) Act 
2003 (NT) 
Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 
2002 (ACT) 
Civil Liability Act 
2002 (WA) 
Civil Liability Act 
2002 (Tas) 
Causation s 51(1) 
Factual causation 
and scope of 
liability.  
s 5D(1) 
Factual causation 
and scope of 
liability. 
s 11(1) 
Factual causation 
and scope of 
liability. 
s 34(1) 
Factual causation 
and scope of 
liability. 
No statutory 
provision on 
causation.  
s 45(1) 
Factual causation 
and scope of 
liability. 
s 5C(1) 
Factual causation 
and scope of 
liability. 
s 13(1) 
Factual causation 
and scope of 
liability. 
Thresholds 
for non-
economic loss 
s 28LE 
Requires a 
‘significant 
injury’. 
 
s 28LB 
Threshold level 
means: 
Physical injury: 
more than 5 per 
cent; 
psychological 
injury: 10 per 
cent or more; 
Spinal injury: 5 
per cent or more 
s 16(1) 
No damages may 
be awarded for 
non-economic 
loss unless the 
severity of the 
non-economic 
loss is at least 
15% of a most 
extreme case. 
s 61 
Court must assess 
injury scale 
between 0 and 
100 (sliding 
scale) 
s 52(1) 
The injured 
person must 
experience at 
least 7 days 
impairment or 
incur the 
prescribed 
minimum in 
medical 
expenses.  
s 27(2) 
A court must not 
award damages 
for non-pecuniary 
loss if the court 
determines the 
degree of 
permanent 
impairment to be 
less than 5% of 
the whole person 
No threshold. ss 9-10 
Western 
Australia uses 
‘deductible 
thresholds’ where 
a deductible 
amount is set 
($12,000 indexed 
annually). If the 
damages are less 
than this amount, 
no compensation 
is paid. If the loss 
is between 
$12,000 and 
$36,500, a 
percentage is paid 
per prescribed 
formula. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s 27 
Tasmania uses 
‘deductible 
thresholds’ where 
a deductible 
amount is set 
($4,000 indexed 
annually) and the 
payment is 
calculated 
pursuant to the 
prescribed 
formula.  
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 Victoria New South 
Wales 
Queensland South Australia Northern 
Territory 
ACT WA TAS 
Caps on 
damages 
ss 28G – 28H ss 16 -17 s 62 s 52(2) ss 27-28 No cap on 
general damages. 
No cap on 
general damages. 
No cap on 
general damages. 
Maximum 
amount for 
non-economic 
loss 
$577 050 
(indexed).  
 
$350,000 
(indexed).   
 
$551,500 now, 
percentage of 
‘most extreme 
case’) 
Damages may not 
be awarded for 
non-economic 
loss unless the 
severity of the 
non-economic 
loss is at least 
15% of a most 
extreme case. 
 
Must refer to  
Queensland Civil 
Liability 
Regulations 2003 
(Qld) awards 
general damages 
(damages for 
non-economic 
loss) based on an 
injury scale to a 
maximum of 
$337 300 
(r 6A(5)) 
The court 
assesses the level 
of severity of the 
injury. The court 
then compares 
the severity of the 
injury with ‘the 
most serious and 
least serious non-
economic loss a 
person could 
suffer, a scale of 
0 to 60.  
Maximum is 
$274,200.  
$350,000 
indexed. 
 
If the degree of 
impairment is 
more than 85% of 
the whole person, 
the maximum is 
awarded.  
 
If the degree of 
impairment is 
between 15% and 
84% then that 
percentage of the 
maximum is 
awarded.  
 
If the degree of 
impairment is 
less than 15% 
regard must be 
held to a table in 
s 27(3).Max is 
$571,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A court may refer 
to previous 
decisions to 
assess payment: s 
99 
Uses deductible 
thresholds. 
Uses deductible 
thresholds.  
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 Victoria New South 
Wales 
Queensland South Australia Northern 
Territory 
ACT WA TAS 
Legislation Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic) 
Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW) 
Civil Liability Act 
2003 (Qld) 
Civil Liability Act 
1936 (SA) 
Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and 
Damages) Act 
2003 (NT) 
Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 
2002 (ACT) 
Civil Liability Act 
2002 (WA) 
Civil Liability Act 
2002 (Tas) 
Mental Harm ss 72-75 
 
s 72(1) – Duty of 
care, normal 
fortitude 
requirement and 
recognised 
psychiatric illness 
requirement  
 
s 72(2) – 
Circumstances of 
the case 
 
s 73 – 
Limitations on 
recovery of 
damages for pure 
mental harm 
 
s 74 – 
Limitations on 
recovery of 
damages for 
consequential 
mental harm 
ss 27-33  
 
s 30 - Limitation 
on recovery for 
pure mental harm 
arising from 
shock 
 
s 32(1)  – Duty of 
care, normal 
fortitude 
requirement and 
recognised 
psychiatric illness 
requirement 
 
s 32(2) – 
Circumstances of 
the case 
There is no 
analogous law in 
Queensland 
restricting a 
person from 
claiming 
damages for pure 
mental harm. 
Accordingly, the 
courts in 
Queensland 
remain bound by 
the common law 
as described in 
the High Court 
decision 
of Jaensch v 
Coffey (1984) 
CLR 549. 
 
 
ss 33, 53 
 
s 33(1) – Duty of 
care, normal 
fortitude 
requirement and 
psychiatric illness 
requirement 
 
s 33(2) – 
Circumstances of 
the case 
 
s 53 – Damages 
for mental harm, 
including the 
recognised 
psychiatric illness 
requirement 
 
 
 
Common law 
applies.  
ss 33-35  
 
s 34(1) – Duty of 
care, normal 
fortitude 
requirement and 
recognised 
psychiatric illness 
requirement  
 
s 34(1) – 
Circumstances of 
the case 
 
s 35(1) – 
Damages for 
mental harm, 
including the 
recognised 
psychiatric illness 
requirement 
ss 5S, 5T 
 
s 5S(1) – Duty of 
care, normal 
fortitude 
requirement and 
recognised 
psychiatric illness 
requirement 
 
s 5S(2) – 
Circumstances of 
the case 
 
s 5T – Damages 
for pecuniary loss 
for consequential 
mental harm, 
including the 
recognised 
psychiatric illness 
requirement 
 
ss 31- 34  
 
s 33 – No liability 
to pay damages 
for pure mental 
harm unless 
recognised 
psychiatric illness 
 
s 34(1) – Duty of 
care, normal 
fortitude 
requirement and 
recognised 
psychiatric illness 
requirement 
 
s 34(2) & (3) – 
Circumstances of 
the case 
 
 
 
